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Jurisdictional Statement
This is an appeal from an order dismissing derivative claims brought by
Plaintiffs on behalf of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II
("HOA") against its directors —Keith Emmer, Tom Williams, Anthony Sarra,
Arlene Johnson and Carol Dean ("Directors"). This court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code sections 78A-3-102(3) and 16-6a-612(4)(g), which permits an appeal of
right from orders dismissing derivative claims under Utah Code section 16-6a612(4)(a). Because only the derivative claims are at issue in this appeal, the
appellant is the HOA and the appellees are the Directors.
Statement of the Issues
Under Utah law, members of a nonprofit corporation may bring derivative
claims in the name of the corporation against its directors when those directors
harm the corporation or otherwise do not act in its best interest. Utah Code §166a-612. Utah law also provides a mechanism to dismiss derivative claims, not on
their merits, but on the ground that their maintenance is not in the corporation's
best interest. To ensure dismissal is in the corporation's best interest—rather
than a self-serving decision of its directors —the best-interest determination must
be made by a person or group capable of exercising independent business
judgment: (i) a quorum of independent directors; (ii) a person or group
appointed by the court acting in place of the directors; or (iii) an independent
special litigation committee consisting of members appointed by independent
directors and acting in place of the directors. Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(b), (4)(f).
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Here, the Directors did not ask the court to appoint anyone to evaluate the
derivative claims. And because there was not a quorum of independent
Directors, the Directors created a special litigation committee. Under section 166a-612(4)(a), a special litigation committee must be independent and conduct a
reasonable inquiry to determine whether maintenance of the derivative claims is
in the best interest of the corporation. And under section 16-6a-612(e)(l), if a
majority of Directors are not independent, then the directors have the burden of
proving the special litigation committee complied with subsection (4)(a).
In this case, the Directors who committed and profited from the alleged
wrongdoing appointed a special litigation committee populated by other
defendants who committed and profited from the alleged wrongdoing. The
committee made observations and recommendations, but did not consider
whether maintenance of the derivative claims was in the best interest of the HOA
and did not recommend dismissal of the claims. Instead, the Directors
themselves voted to direct counsel to move to dismiss the derivative claims.
Issue 1: Whether directors have the burden to prove compliance with
Utah Code section 16~6a-612(4)'s standards that govern the appointment and
conduct of special litigation committees where (i) the plaintiff presents evidence
in a verified complaint that a majority of the directors were not independent
because they engaged in and profited from the alleged wrongdoing and
(ii) section 16-6a-612(4)(e) places the burden of proof on the directors where a
majority of directors are not independent.
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Standard of Review: Because the district court refused to rule on this
issue, this court interprets the statute in the first instance. (R.1562-63,1761-64.)
Issue 2: Whether a special litigation committee is independent under
section 16-6a-612(4)(b) where its members engaged in and profited from the
alleged wrongdoing and were appointed by directors who engaged in and
profited from the alleged wrongdoing.
Issue 3: Whether a special litigation committee conducts a reasonable
inquiry under section 16-6a-612(4)(a), where the committee provides only a legal
analysis of the derivative claims but does not make the ultimate decision
concerning whether dismissal of the derivative claims would be in the best
interest of the corporation.
Standard of Review: The standard of review constitutes a separate issue
in this appeal, but is an issue on which both parties and the district court agree.
This court has not articulated a standard of review for orders dismissing
derivative claims under section 16-6a-612(4), but courts in other jurisdictions
review such orders under the summary judgment standard that requires viewing
the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to appellants.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981); Tanssen v. Best &
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876,889 (Minn. 2003); Finley v. Superior Court 80 Cal.
App. 4th 1152,1160-61 (2000). This court should apply the same standard,
especially since the Directors urged the district court to apply—and the court did
a p p l y - R u l e 56 standards in adjudicating the motion. (R. 1382,1388,1405.)
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Preservation: All three issues were preserved in the memoranda in
opposition to the motions to dismiss, (R.1547,1556,1561-66), and again at oral
argument on the motion to dismiss. (R.1892:21-22,33,46.)
Determinative Provisions
The following provisions are set forth at Addendum B:
Utah Code §16-6a-612
Utah Code §16-6a-822
Utah Code §16-10a- 740
Model Business Corporations Act §§1.43, 7.44
Model Nonprofit Corporations Act §§1.40,13.03,13.05
Principles of Corporate Governance §§1.23, 7.09
The following cases are at Addendum C:
Einhornv.Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78 (Wis. 2000)
Tanssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003)
London v. Tyrrell, Civ. No. 3321-CC, 2010 WL 877528 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11,2010)
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981)
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Statement of the Case
I.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings
On November 25,2009, Plaintiffs filed a verified complaint against the Hi-

Country Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II ("HOA"), and the five
members of its board of directors: Keith Emmer, Tom Williams, Anthony Sarra,
Arlene Johnson, and Carol Dean ("Directors"). (R.l-16.) Those claims remain
pending in the district court and are not at issue in this appeal. Plaintiffs also
filed a derivative claim on behalf of the HOA against the Directors for breach of
fiduciary duty. (Id.) Only the derivative claim is at issue in this appeal.
Instead of addressing the merits of the derivative claims, the Directors
appointed a special litigation committee to evaluate the claims and then moved
to dismiss under Utah Code section 16-6a-612.1 (R.316A-316C.) Once the
Directors filed that motion, the court stayed the merits to allow the parties to
conduct discovery on whether the special litigation committee was independent,
conducted a reasonable inquiry, and acted in good faith. (R.1039-40.) After
limited discovery, the Directors renewed their motion to dismiss. (R.1381-83.)
1

"A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the
corporation if a person or group specified in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f)
determines in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which the
person's or group's conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative
proceeding is not in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation.
[T]he determination in Subsection (4)(a) shall be made by . . . a majority vote of a
committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by a
majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of
directors . . . . " Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(a)-(b).
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On February 23, 2012, the court granted the motion, ruling that the
Directors had demonstrated that there was no genuine issue of material fact
concerning the special litigation committee's independence, its good faith, the
reasonableness of its inquiry, or whether it had determined that maintenance of
the derivative claims is not in the best interest of the HOA. (R.1761-64;Add. A.)
The HOA appealed under section 16-6a-612(4)(g), which provides an
appeal of right from orders dismissing derivative claims under section 16-6a-612.
II.

Statement of Facts
A.

Hi-Country Estates Phase II, HOA, & Board

The Hi-Country Estates Phase II ("HCEII") development has been located
in the southwest corner of Salt Lake County near Herriman since the mid-1970s.
(R.3,482.) The HOA has a five-person board of directors. (R.1519-20.) The
Directors also hold management positions, including President, Vice President,
Director of Legal, Director of the Architectural Control Committee, Director of
Roads, Director of Water, and Director of Community Affairs. (R.440,442,455.)
The HOA board has three main functions: road maintenance, maintain the
common area, and administer the water system. (R.464-65.) Those functions are
funded from annual assessments and income from its water system. (R.464.)
Because the water system pays for itself and the common area is a bus shelter
and mailbox structure, the annual assessments are primarily for road
maintenance — e.g., more than 97% of the proposed non-water-system
maintenance budget in 2009-2010 was devoted to roads. (R.464;1493.)
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Although HOA has a Director of Roads, every member of the board
participates in road maintenance. (R.344.) Board members annually "drive the
HOA area and identify deteriorated areas on roads that lead to residences" and
"respond to complaints regarding the condition of roads." (Id.)
B.

The Derivative Claims Are Based Upon Discriminatory Board
Decisions Over the Past Twenty Years

Plaintiffs are lot owners in "Area D" of HCEII and members of the HOA.
(R.1051-52.) For twenty years, Plaintiffs, as well as other lot owners in Area D,
have been unable to develop their lots —which are many acres in size — due to the
Directors' discriminatory allocation of road maintenance resources that has
resulted in Area D roads that are accessible only by foot, horseback, or ATV.
(R.49-51,1056-57,1444,441 (one Plaintiff hampered by road issues since 1992);
R.410 (Area D lot owners threatened suit in 1993 based upon neglect of roads).)
Due to the discriminatory allocation of road maintenance resources, on
June 12,2009, Plaintiffs sent a notice of claim and written demand to the
Directors under Utah Code section 16-6a-612(3)(a). (R.53-57.) On September 10,
2009, the Directors elected a special litigation committee to investigate the claims.
(R.59-60.) After expiration of the 90-day waiting period set forth in Utah Code
section 16~6a-612(3)(a), Plaintiffs filed their claims on November 25,2009. (R.14.)
C

All Directors Participated in and Profited from the Alleged
Wrongful Conduct

At the time the special litigation committee was selected, there were five
members on the HOA board: Keith Emmer, Arlene Johnson, Tom Williams,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Anthony Sarra, and Carol Dean. (R.1520.) Over the past twenty years, each
Director played a significant role in the discrimination against lot owners in Area
D. (R.1519-20.) A review of the committee report reveals that issues concerning
the poor condition of the Area D roads arose at least yearly, and sometimes
monthly, during the time Mr. Emmer, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Williams, Mr. Sarra, and
Ms. Dean served in their decision-making roles. (R.348,350-51.)
A brief summary of each Director's involvement in road decisions is
relevant to the independence of (i) Directors who appointed the members of the
special litigation committee, (ii) members of the committee, and (iii) the Directors
who decided that dismissal was in the best interest of the HOA. (R.1477.)
Keith Emmer. Mr. Emmer is a Director who appointed the members of the
special litigation committee and is a defendant to the derivative claim who
engaged in " self-dealing and favoring services to and improvements benefitting"
his own property. (R.1561.)
Mr. Emmer has served on the board of directors for more than 15 years.
(R.1519-20.) He has held a number of important board positions, ranging from
Director of the Architectural Control Committee to President of the Board.
(R.435,440,442,444,445,455,459,461,500.) As a result, he has been an integral
player in the lengthy dispute with the Plaintiffs over road maintenance. (R.42025 (correspondence between Emmer and the HOA's attorney in 1995 regarding
roads in Area D); R.569-70 (email from Emmer justifying the neglect of Area D
roads); R.579 (email from Emmer analyzing claims).)
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As President, Mr. Emmer often took a lead role in investigating and
addressing disputes regarding the condition of roads. (R.450 (presented on road
damage at 2007 annual meeting); R.456 (discussed committee to create long-term
road plan at the 2008 annual meeting).) Emmer had frequent contact with
Howard Lundgren, the HOA's attorney, on matters relevant to the derivative
claims. (R.633-37 (letter from Lundgren to Emmer regarding claims); R.677-79
(email between Emmer and Lundgren regarding same).) Despite Mr. Emmer's
involvement in the alleged wrongful conduct, it was Mr. Emmer who first
contacted Kim Wilson (discussed below) about serving as the chairperson of the
special litigation committee. (R.1482.)
Arlene Tohnson. Ms. Johnson is a Director, member of the special litigation
committee, and a defendant who engaged in "self-dealing and favoring services
to and improvements benefitting" her own property. (R.1561.)
Ms. Johnson made road maintenance decisions for the HOA for more than
a decade. (R.1496.) Ms. Johnson served on the board from 1991 to 1995 and since
2001. (R.1519-20.) Notably, Ms. Johnson served as Director of Roads during a
substantial period of her time on the board. (R.435,440-48,455,459,461,500.)
As Director of Roads, she presented on the status of roads and prioritized
road improvements. (R.438 (presented "wish list for improvements" and fouryear plan for road paving at 2005 annual meeting); R.446 (reported on road
issues at September 2006 monthly meeting); R.451 (same at 2007 annual meeting);
R.455 (explained road proposals at 2008 annual meeting); R.461 (arranged for
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road improvements at October 2008 monthly meeting); R.501 (tasked with road
improvements at November 2008 monthly meeting).)
Anthony Sarra. Mr. Sarra is a Director and member of the special litigation
committee, as well as a defendant who engaged in "self-dealing and favoring
services to and improvements benefitting" his own property. (R.1561.)
Mr. Sarra has served on the board since 2002. (R.435~36,1520.) He served
as Vice President and Director of Legal. (R.435,440-45,455,459,461,500.) As
Director of Legal, Mr. Sarra investigated and opined on legal issues related to
roads at nearly every meeting and interacted with the HOA's counsel—
Mr. Lundgren—to obtain guidance. (R.437 (presented plan based upon
Lundgren recommendation to "avoid future problems" at 2005 annual meeting);
R.446 (provided update on legal issues at September 2006 monthfy meeting);
R.451 (update on legal issues concerning roads at 2007 annual meeting).)
Mr. Sarra worked closely with Ms. Johnson and Mr. Williams in assessing
the condition of the roads, presumably to assess any legal issues related to roads.
(R.446 (at September 2006 monthly meeting, Sarra, Johnson, and Williams jointly
assessed the status of one of the road projects in HCEII).)
Tom Williams. Mr. Williams is a Director who appointed members of the
special litigation committee and a defendant who engaged in "self-dealing and
favoring services to and improvements benefitting" his own property. (R.1561.)
Mr. Williams has served on the board of directors since 2003. (R.1520.)
Although he was not directly in charge of roads, Mr. Williams was active in road
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improvement issues. (R.446 (moving to consider road improvements and use of
Sunrise Engineering, Inc. at September 2006 meeting).)
Carol Dean. Ms. Dean was a Director at the time the Notice of Claim was
served on the board, having served as a Director from 2007 to 2009. (R.1520.)
She served as the Director of Community Affairs. (R.455,459,461,500.) Although
Ms. Dean's title appears unrelated to road maintenance, Mr. Emmer stated that
all of the Directors were responsible for monitoring the roads within HCEII,
responding to road complaints, and identifying deteriorated areas. (R.344.)
Ms. Johnson testified that road maintenance decisions were made by consensus
after the Directors drove the roads. (R.1491,1496.) Thus, each Director had
substantial participation in the wrongful conduct alleged in the derivative claim.
In total, the Directors had collectively served over forty years on the board,
and, with the possible exception of one year, at least one of the five served on the
board since road disputes began in 1992. (R.1519-20; R.441 (Plaintiff hampered
by road issues since 1992); R.410 (Area D lot owners threaten suit in 1993); R.438
(complaints about Area D roads at June 11,2005 annual meeting); R.441 (impact
of poor roads in Area D, including inability to get building permits, discussed at
January 2006 monthly meeting); R.449 (Area D roads discussed at 2007 annual
meeting); R.460 (discussing document request related to road issues at
September 2008 monthly meeting); R.463 (February 27, 2009 letter alerting board
of its discrimination and fiduciary duties); R.501 (poor conditions of Area D
roads discussed at November 2008 monthly meeting).)
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D.

The Members of the Special Litigation Committee

All Directors elected two Directors —Arlene Johnson and Anthony Sarra —
and one past Director to serve on the special litigation committee and perform
the inquiry into the derivative claims. (R.59.) Ms. Johnson and Mr. Sarra's heavy
involvement with the HCEII road decisions has been set forth above.
The third member of the special litigation committee was Kim Wilson.
(R.59.) Although Mr. Wilson was the only committee member not serving on the
board during the years leading up to the filing of the derivative claims, he was
similarly tainted by his service on the board from 1994 to 1999 and his business
relationship with the HOA. (R.446,1519-20,1579-80.) Between 1994 and 1999, the
HOA faced the same legal issues concerning road maintenance. (R.441,410.)
Mr. Wilson owns property within HCEII accessed by Shaggy Mountain
Road, one of the roads the derivative claim alleges received preferential
maintenance. (R.374.) And Mr. Wilson worked for Sunrise Engineering, Inc., a
company the Directors hired to work on HCEII's roads, (R.1579-80), and from
which the Directors sought bids for road maintenance projects. (R.446.)
E-

The Special Litigation Committee's Investigation

The committee's investigation was based in substantial part on documents
from and interviews with the Directors. For example, Mr. Emmer, one of the
Directors who selected the committee, was (i) interviewed extensively, (R.2;
R.725-38), (ii) asked to present "statements] of facts/' (R.502-03), and (iii) asked
to print out his emails, many of which are relied upon in the committee report.
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(R.339-40 nn.30-39,529-667 (section entitled "Keith Emmer's Emails").) Given the
Directors' close collaboration on the road issues, it was no surprise that other
Directors—including Ms. Johnson, Mr. Sarra, Mr. Williams, and Ms. Dean—were
frequently the drafters or recipients of those emails, many of which discuss the
derivative claims. (R.530 (Emmer to Johnson, Sarra, Dean); R.544 (Sarra to
Emmer); R.547 (Emmer to Sarra, Johnson, Dean); R.548 (Emmer to Sarra,
Johnson, Dean, Williams); R.563-64, 568-70 (Sarra, Emmer, Williams, Johnson,
and Dean); R.628-37 (Emmer, Sarra, Williams, Johnson, Dean, and Lundgren
[HOA's attorney]); R.640-43 (Emmer, Johnson, Sarra, Williams, and Dean).)
Tom Williams, another Director who selected members of the special
litigation committee, responded to written questions regarding the derivative
claim, and those responses were used to assess the merits of the claims.
(R.336,362n.224.) Parts of the committee report were based upon a review of
"correspondence by Arlene Johnson/' who both elected herself to serve on the
committee and drafted the committee report. (R.340n.40,1507-08.)
The committee conducted a number of interviews with Directors, other
HOA members, and the Plaintiffs. (R.1392.) The committee did not interview
Ms. Johnson or Mr. Sarra —who served on the committee —even though they
were Director of Roads and Director of Legal. (R. 1393,1486.)
Tellingly, during the interviews, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Sarra, and Mr. Wilson,
(likely due to their active participation in the events in question), often testified
as to their version of the events, led the witnesses based on their recollection, and
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debated with witnesses about the merits of the derivative claims. (R.757
(Hoffman interview in which Wilson testified as to why a road was closed by the
County); R.759-63 (Hoffman interview in which both Wilson and Johnson
interject facts they learned as Directors and Johnson directs questions to the
"combined memory of all [of] us"); R.769-72 (Midlestadt interview in which
Johnson testifies about rules applicable to unincorporated areas); R.780
(Messemer interview in which Johnson explains the HOA's handling of a
nuisance near the interviewee's property); R.792-93 (Plaintiffs interview in
which Johnson and Wilson argue with Plaintiff about the board's cost estimates
for improving roads); R.797-98 (Plaintiffs interview in which Wilson testifies
about road conditions near his lot); R.799 (Plaintiffs interview in which Johnson
testifies how road issues related to certain lots were funded in the 1990s); R.801
(Plaintiffs interview in which Wilson interprets HOA policies in light of events
in the 1990s); R.806-08 (Plaintiffs interview in which Wilson and Johnson testify
about their experience with County zoning regulations).)
F.

The Special Litigation Committee Report

The special litigation committee issued its report on May 29,2010. (R.33373.) While the report was principally authored by Ms. Johnson, its contents were
a result of collaboration among (i) the committee members, (ii) Mr. Lundgren,
the HOA's attorney, and (iii) Mr. Emmer, President of the board. (R.1507-08.)
Importantly, the report contains no conclusion as to whether it was in the
HOA's best interest to maintain the derivative proceeding. (R.1584.) Instead, the
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report made fourteen "observations" and three "recommendations," nearly all of
which concern the merits of the claims instead of what is in the best interest of
the HOA. (R.333-66.) For example, the report "recommended" that the Directors
cooperate with one of the Plaintiffs and share financial records to "clear up any
communication problems" and seek legal counsel concerning the fact that some
of its records contain confidential personal information. (R.339,358.) And
Observation #1 states "The Plaintiffs did not show that there is or has been a de
facto residency requirement to be on the board;" Observation #6 states "The
Board's legal counsel's opinion differs from [appellants' counsel's] opinion.
Where an issue results in a conflicting interpretation of the law between
Attorneys, the Board's most responsible option is to act according to the opinion
of their legal counsel." (R.340,349.)
Mr. Emmer, after reviewing the report, recommended that the Directors
instruct the HOA's attorneys to move to dismiss the derivative claims under
Utah Code section 16-6a-612(4)(a). (R.813.) In his email recommendation,
Mr. Emmer listed the Directors by name, indicated that Mr. Sarra and
Ms. Johnson would abstain from voting, stated that he would be voting to accept
the committee report, and then filled in votes of acceptance for Mr. Williams and
Mr. Brown.2 (Id)

2

The HOA has been unable to locate any emails from Mr. Williams and
Mr. Brown indicating their vote.
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Summary of the Argument
The district court erred in dismissing the derivative claims under Utah
Code section 16-6a-612(4)(a). Section 16-6a-612(4) provides the directors of a
corporation a mechanism to dismiss derivative claims, not on their merits, but on
the ground that maintenance of the claims is not in the best interest of the
corporation. The mechanism has roots in the business judgment rule, under
which courts defer to the business judgment of directors with regard to litigation
in the corporation's name. For obvious reasons, courts do not defer to the
judgment of directors when the derivative lawsuit alleges that those directors
engaged in self-dealing or otherwise harmed the corporation. To do so would
allow wrongdoers to control the lawsuit designed to expose their wrongdoing.
Where directors are tainted by their involvement in the wrongdoing,
section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) permits the appointment of a special litigation
committee to exercise independent business judgment in determining whether
maintenance of the lawsuit is in the best interest of the corporation. Specifically,
section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) allows the independent directors of a corporation to
appoint a special litigation committee that can recommend dismissal after
conducting a good faith inquiry into whether maintenance of the derivative
claims is in the best interest of the corporation. To warrant deference under the
business judgment rule, however, the members of the special litigation
committee must be "independent/ 7 not unlike arbitrators.
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In this case, the derivative claims allege that the Directors of the HOA
engaged in self-dealing by maintaining roads (the primary function of the HOA)
adjacent to their own properties and neglecting roads adjacent to the Plaintiffs'
properties to the point that they became impassable by cars. That neglect has
negatively affected Plaintiffs' ability to obtain building permits and the value of
their properties. Each Director participated in road-maintenance decisions and
benefitted from the discriminatory practices. Yet those same Directors appointed
the members of the special litigation committee and two of those Directors
served on the committee. In addition, as the third committee member admitted
in his deposition, the committee did not consider whether maintenance of the
claims is in the best interest of the corporation. And ultimately the Directors, not
the committee, made the decision to move to dismiss the derivative claims.
A motion to dismiss under section 16-6a-612 is governed by summary
judgment standards, so dismissal was appropriate only if there was no genuine
issue of material fact concerning the committee's independence and its inquiry
and recommendations. Under that standard, the appointment and constitution
of the committee violated the independence requirement in section 16-6a612(4) (b)(ii) and its inquiry and recommendations violated the good faith inquiry
requirement in section 16-6a-612(4)(a).
First, section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) allows only "independent" directors to
appoint members of a special litigation committee. Here, all Directors, including
those who committed the wrongdoing, appointed members of the committee.
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Second, members of the committee must be independent. Here, two
members were Directors who committed the wrongdoing and the third member
was a past Director who had previously engaged in similar wrongdoing.
Third, the committee's inquiry must be reasonable. Here, the committee
allowed the Directors to control important aspects of its inquiry and relied upon
the very corporate counsel who had approved the discriminatory practices
described in the derivative claims in the first place.
Fourth, the committee must exercise business judgment and make the
decision of whether to move to dismiss the derivative claims. Here, one member
of the committee testified that the committee did not consider the best interest of
the HOA and, as the committee report confirms, the committee did not employ
business judgment to recommend dismissal. That decision was left to the
Directors whose lack of independence required the appointment of a special
litigation committee in the first place.
For all of those reasons, there are at least genuine issues of fact concerning
whether the Directors satisfied section 16-6a-612(4) in their motion to dismiss the
derivative claims. This court should vacate the order dismissing the derivative
claims to allow those claims to be evaluated on their merits.
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Argument
The district court dismissed the derivative claims after ruling that there is
no genuine issue of fact concerning whether the Directors and members of the
special litigation committee were independent. The court based its ruling on its
view that (i) the relationships between the Directors and members of the
committee were "casual social relationship [s]" and (ii) being named as
defendants in the derivative action does not negate independence. (R.176164,1893:1-5.) The court also ruled that the committee had concluded, and had a
reasonable basis for concluding, that "the derivative proceeding is not in the best
interest of HCEII." (R.1763.)
As demonstrated below, the district court erred in dismissing the
derivative claims under section 16-6a-612(4) because the special litigation
committee was not independent, as required by section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii), and its
inquiry into whether maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best interest
of the HOA was inadequate under section 16-6a-612(4)(a).
Because the mechanism for dismissing derivative claims in section 16-6a612(4) is unusual, this brief proceeds as follows. First, it discusses the standard
of review because this court has not interpreted the dismissal mechanism in
section 16-6a-612. Second, it sets forth the relevant statutory language. Third,
because many operative terms in section 16-6a-612 are not defined and have their
origin in case law—especially Delaware case law—the brief summarizes the
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history of the dismissal mechanism that became section 16-6a-612.3 Fourth, the
brief addresses the three issues presented by interpreting the statute in light of
that history as well as (i) commentary to the Model Nonprofit Corporation Act
("MNCA") on which section 16-6a~612 is based and (ii) case law in jurisdictions
with similar statutes.
The issues addressed are (i) which party had the burden of proving that
the special litigation committee satisfied the requirements in section 16-6a612(4) (a), something the district court never decided; (ii) whether the special
litigation committee was independent under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii); and, if so,
(iii) whether the committee conducted a reasonable inquiry and concluded that
maintenance of the derivative claims was not in the best interest of the HOA.
I.

The Summary Judgment Standard Applies to Motions to Dismiss Filed
Under Utah Code Section 16-6a-612(4) (a)
Courts routinely apply the summary judgment standard in adjudicating

motions to dismiss derivative claims under dismissal mechanisms like the one in
section 16-6a-612(4). This court should adopt the same standard, especially since
the Directors applied the summary judgment standard in the district court.
As the Delaware Supreme Court 4 has noted, because the type of motion at
issue here involves control of the corporation, it is a "hybrid [motion] derived by
analogy to a motion to dismiss a derivative suit based upon a voluntary

3

For reasons explained below, the issues presented here also implicate derivative
claims filed on behalf of for-profit corporations under section 16-10a-740.
4
The Directors relied on Delaware law in the district court. (R.1405,1660.)
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settlement reached between the parties and to a motion brought pursuant to Rule
41(a)(2) whereby a plaintiff unilaterally seeks a voluntary dismissal of the
complaint subsequent to the filing of an answer by the defendant/7 Kaplan v.
Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 506-07 (Del. Ch. 1984). But despite its unique nature,
Delaware applies "the normal burden under Rule 56 that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to [judgment]
as a matter of law." Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
Other states have followed Delaware in applying the summary judgment
standard. Finley v. Superior Court 80 Cal. App. 4th 1152,1160-61 (2000) (citing
numerous cases for the proposition that "courts which have considered the issue
have concluded that judicial review of the independence, good faith, and
investigative techniques of a special litigation committee is governed by
traditional summary judgment standards"); Boland v. Boland, 31 A.3d 529,56163 (Md. 2011) (applying summary judgment standard); Janssen v. Best &
Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 889 (Minn. 2003) ("Generally, when the committee
authorized with making a business decision for the corporation is found to lack
the independence needed to grant summary judgment, or where the
independence is uncertain, the derivative suit proceeds on its merits.").
This court should apply the summary judgment standard not only because
it is applied in a majority of jurisdictions, but also because the Directors invited
the district court to apply that standard, stating that "if there are no genuine
issues of material fact regarding the committee's independence, good faith and
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investigative techniques, the derivative suit must be dismissed/' (R. 1405; see
also R.1382 ("undisputed material facts show that the board members acted in
good faith, with the care of ordinarily prudent persons, and in a manner
reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the nonprofit corporation").)
The Directors should not be able to argue for a different standard for the
first time in this court. Will v. Engebretson & Co., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1033,1043
(1989) (having chosen to frame its special litigation committee dismissal papers
as governed by the summary judgment standard, the party was "bound to follow
it in all its particulars"). Perhaps more important, the district court accepted the
Directors' invitation and applied the summary judgment standard. (R.1763 ("no
genuine issues of material fact").) This court should do the same.
If there exists a genuine issue of material fact, this court should reverse the
order dismissing the derivative claims.
II.

Under Section 16-6a-612, the District Court Erred in Dismissing the
Derivative Claims Because There Were Genuine Issues of Material Fact
Concerning Independence and the Reasonableness of the Inquiry
Utah Code section 16-6a-612 governs both how plaintiffs file derivative

claims on behalf of nonprofit corporations and how their directors may seek
dismissal of derivative claims without adjudicating the merits. While the statute
sets forth the general mechanism for dismissing derivative claims, its language is
ambiguous with regard to a number of key components. For that reason, after
setting forth the procedure and standards in section 16-6a-612, this brief
discusses both the origin of the dismissal process codified in section 16-6a-612,
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the commentary to the model acts on which section 16-6a-612 is based, and case
law interpreting similar statutes.
A.

The Procedures and Standards in Utah Code Section 16-6a-612

Derivative claims are an exception to the presumption that boards of
directors exercise sound business judgment in governing corporations. That
presumption is embodied in the so-called "business judgment rule," a
"presumption protecting conduct by directors that can be attributed to any
rational business purpose." Dennis J. Block, et al., The Business Judgment Rule:
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors 18 (5th ed. 1998). Under the business
judgment rule, "as long as the disinterested director(s) made an informed
business decision, in good faith, without an abuse of discretion, he or she will not
be liable for corporate losses resulting from his or her decision." Id. at 39. Utah
recognizes a version of the business judgment rule: Utah Code §16-6a-822.
1.

Written Demand

Derivative claims allow members and shareholders to bring claims on
behalf of the corporation against those (including its directors) who have
harmed, or otherwise not acted in the best interest of, the corporation. The right
to bring derivative claims is tempered to ensure that corporations are not forced
to pursue claims when their merit is outweighed by the time and resources
necessary to prevail. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994,1000-01 (N.Y. 1979).
Thus, before a plaintiff can commence a derivative lawsuit, "a written demand
[must be] made upon the nonprofit corporation to take suitable action." Utah
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Code §16-6a-612(3)(a)(i); see also Utah Code §16-10a-740(3)(a) (same requirement
with for-profit corporations).
2.

Verified Complaint

In Utah, once the demand is made a complaint may be filed (i) after the
expiration of 90 days; (ii) if the directors reject the demand; or (iii) if irreparable
injury would result from waiting. IcL §16-6a-612(3)(a). The complaint must be
verified and allege with particularity the demand made upon the directors. IcL
§16-6a-612(3)(b). And if the complaint is filed after the directors reject the
demand, the complaint also must allege with particularity that (i) a majority of
the board of directors were not independent or (ii) why the rejection of the
demand was legally inadequate. Id. §16-6a-612(4)(d).
3,

Dismissal Mechanism

The district court may stay the lawsuit to allow the directors to conduct an
inquiry. Id. §16-6a-612(3)(d). The stay provides an independent person or group
time to determine "in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon
which the person's or group's conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the
derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation/7 Id.
§16-6a-612(4)(a) (emphasis added).
There are three types of persons or groups who can make the subsection
(4)(a) determination and recommend dismissal: (i) a majority of "independent
directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, if the independent
directors constitute a quorum;" (ii) a special litigation committee "consisting of
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two or more independent directors appointed by a majority vote of independent
directors/7 or (iii) a court appointed "panel of one or more independent
persons."* Id §16-6a-612(4)(b), (4)(f).
If dismissal is recommended, then the plaintiff may conduct discovery
akin to Rule 56(f) that is "limited to facts relating to whether the person or group
conducting the inquiry is independent and disinterested; the good faith of the
inquiry; and the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the person or
group conducting the inquiry." Id §16-6a-612(3)(e) (emphasis added).
Discovery does not extend to the merits of the derivative claims. Id
4.

Burden of Proof

The burden of proving compliance with subsection (4) (a) is governed by
sections 16-6a-612(4)(e), (4)(f). If a court-appointed person or group makes the
subsection (4)(a) determination, then "the plaintiff has the burden of proving that
the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are not met." Id §16-6a-612(f)(ii).
Otherwise, the burden is determined by whether "a majority of the board of
directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made
to reject a demand by a complainant." Id §§16-6a-612(4)(e). If a majority is
independent, the plaintiff has the burden; if a majority is not independent, then
the directors must prove compliance with subsection (4)(a). Id

5

The HOA requested a court appointed person, but the Directors refused.
(R.235,1892:22.) Had the district court appointed someone under section 16-6a612(f) (i), the issue here regarding independence likely would never have arisen.
Brewster v. Brewster, 2010 UT App 260, f 17 n.8, 241 P.3d 357.
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5.

Unanswered Questions

The language of section 16-6a-612 leaves a number of questions
unanswered. First, it does not define "independent" or indicate whether the
scope of the limited discovery under section 16-6a-612(3)(e) — whether the person
or group was " independent and disinterested" — reveals that the
"independence]" required of a director in subsections (4)(a) and (4)(e) also
requires the director to be disinterested. If the requirement does not include
disinterestedness, then it is unclear why the plaintiff can conduct limited
discovery on that issue.
Second, the language does not indicate whether the independence
required to determine who has the burden of proving compliance with
subsection (4) (a) is the same independence required of the person or group
conducting the inquiry under subsection (4)(a). If it is the same independence,
then the burden of proof determination appears to overlap with the issue on
which a party has the burden, namely director independence.
Finally, the language does not indicate what constitutes a good faith and
reasonable inquiry into whether the derivative claims are in the best interest of
the corporation. For example, the statute does not specify what role the nonindependent directors may play in the work of a special litigation committee.
Fortunately, the history of the dismissal mechanism that became section
16-6a~612 provides clear answers to those questions.
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B.

The Origin of Derivative Claims and Special Litigation
Committees

The right to prosecute derivative claims on behalf of a corporation dates
back to 1856. Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856). Directors of a
corporation could defend against derivative claims under the business judgment
rule. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64
(1917). As long as the directors' decision not to pursue or maintain the claim
reflected a business judgment, the derivative claim was dismissed. Thus, for
example, where shareholders filed an antitrust claim on behalf of the corporation
against a competitor, dismissal in light of the business judgment of the directors
was fairly straightforward. But where the derivative claim alleged self-dealing
by a director, deferring to director business judgment was more complicated.
By 1934, the Securities and Exchange Commission began playing a
significant role in regulating corporations. In the 1970s, the SEC enforcement
division began requiring corporations to appoint independent directors to
conduct internal investigations with the assistance of outside counsel. Kenneth
B. Davis, Jr., The Forgotten Derivative Suit 61 Vand. L. Rev. 387,393-95 (2008)
("Forgotten Derivative Suit"). In some instances, the SEC required corporations
to create special litigation committees to "review pending and future claims and
questions of conflict of interest involving the company's officers, directors,
controlling persons, and employees/' Id at 394-95.
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C.

Case Law Developing the Use of Special Litigation Committees

In 1976, a federal judge was presented with a detailed report of a special
litigation committee that, with the assistance of outside counsel, concluded that
maintenance of a derivative lawsuit was not in the best interest of the
corporation. Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The
court ruled that the decision of the special litigation committee fell within the
business judgment rule because its members had acted in good faith and were
independent of the tainted board of directors in the sense that they had not acted
in an advisory capacity. Id. at 514-19. The court denied the motion, but only to
permit the plaintiffs "to test the bona fides and independence of the Special
Committee through discovery and, if necessary, at a plenary hearing." IdL at 520.
The procedure approved in Gall has been adopted by nearly every
jurisdiction. Forgotten Derivative Suit at 390. Most famously, the Delaware
Supreme Court adopted the dismissal procedure in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado,
430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).6 Zapata recognized the value of special litigation
committees in allowing corporations to maintain the business judgment rule
defense where their boards are "tainted by the self-interest of a majority of its
members/ 7 Id. at 786. The court noted that "[i]t thus appears desirable to us to
find a balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring corporate

6

In Delaware, and in some other states, the doctrine has been governed by case
law interpreting the business judgment rule and the general authority of
directors to form committees, but has never been codified. IdL at 782; Finley, 80
Cal.App. 4th at 1158-60.
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causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by the board of directors, but the
corporation can rid itself of detrimental litigation/ , IdL at 787.
An independent special litigation committee was the answer as long as the
committee—not the directors — (i) considered relevant "factors ethical,
commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as
legal," (ii) produced a "thorough written record of the investigation and its
findings and recommendations/ 7 and (iii) "cause[d] its corporation to file a
pretrial motion to dismiss/ 7 IcL at 788. Even with those protections, courts
recognized that the use of special litigation committees is "[t]he only instance in
American Jurisprudence where a defendant can free itself from a suit by merely
appointing a committee to review the allegations of the complaint/' Lewis v.
Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985). Indeed, the procedure is "designed to
provide a means, if warranted, to throw a derivative plaintiff out of Court before
he has an opportunity to engage in any discovery whatever in support of the
merits of his cause of action/' Kaplan, 484 A.2d at 509.
The "fox guarding the henhouse" nature of the process —sometimes
described as "structural bias" — requires courts "to be mindful of the need to
scrutinize carefully the mechanism by which directors delegate to a minority
committee the business judgment authority to terminate derivative litigation,
particularly when the lawsuit is directed against some or a majority of the
directors." Will, 213 Cal. App. 3d at 1043 (1989). Much like the inquiry to ensure
arbitrator independence, the inquiry into the independence of special litigation
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committees is important "to retain its integrity, a quality that is, in turn, essential
to the utility of that process/7 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917,
940 (Del. Ch. 2003).7 The type of independence required is "like Caesar's wife—
above reproach/7 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v.
Stewart 845 A.2d 1040,1055 (Del. 2004) (quoting Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967).
Because of the importance of independence, the burden to demonstrate
independence shifts from the plaintiff to the directors when the claims move
from a pre-suit demand to a post-suit motion to dismiss. Independence
determinations at the post-suit motion to dismiss stage involve "diametricallyopposed burdens" from those in the pre-suit demand context. Beam, 845 A.2d at
1055. In the pre-suit demand context, the plaintiff must rebut the presumption in
favor of the board's independence by establishing in a verified complaint "a
reasonable doubt that a majority of the board could have acted independently."
Id. at 1048-49. In the post-suit context involving a special litigation committee,
the directors carry "the burden of proving independence, good faith and a
reasonable investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith and
reasonableness." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788.

7 See also London v. Tyrrell, Civ. No. 3321-CC, 2010 WL 877528, at *16 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 11, 2010) ("members should be selected with the utmost care to ensure that
they can, in both fact and appearance, carry out the extraordinary responsibility
placed on them"); Principles of Corporate Governance §7.10 cmt. d ("[Gjiven the
possible perception that board members may be consciously or unconsciously
partial to the interests of their colleagues who are defendants, some judicial
oversight of this process is important in order to maintain public and investor
confidence in the integrity of corporate governance.").
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In a second holding that was not universally followed, Zapata held that,
even if the directors establish good faith and independence as a matter of law,
the court must"determine, applying its own independent business judgment,
whether the motion should be granted/' IcL at 789. The New York Court of
Appeals had rejected that view and held that courts should not review the
business judgment of the committee as long as its independence is beyond
question. Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979). All courts agree,
however, on the importance of independence and that the directors had the
burden of demonstrating independence and good faith in the post-suit context.
Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (outlining the
difference between the Auerbach approach and the Zapata approach).
What emerges from the early case law is the following. A plaintiff must
make a pre-suit demand. If the demand is rejected, the plaintiff must establish in
a verified complaint that a majority of the board of directors who rejected the
demand was not independent or that the rejection was wrongful. The directors
then can delegate to an independent special litigation committee the authority to
evaluate whether maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best interest of
the corporation. If the committee recommends dismissal, the directors must
show that there is no disputed issue of fact concerning whether the committee
(i) was independent, meaning "like Caesar's wife—above reproach;7'
(ii) conducted a reasonable inquiry; and (iii) acted in good faith. The directors
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also must show that the committee had fully delegated (not advisory) authority
to conduct its inquiry and make its dismissal recommendation.
D.

The MBCA, the MNCA, and Case Law Interpreting Their
Provisions Reveal That the District Court Misinterpreted Utah
Code Section 16-6a-612

Beginning in 1992, the Model Business Corporations Act ("MBCA")
codified the special litigation committee procedures and standards. The Model
Nonprofit Corporations Act ("MNCA") followed suit in 2000. A copy of the
various versions of the MBCA and MNCA are at Addendum B. The comments
to both the MBCA and MNCA—which are virtually identical —shed more light
on (i) the burden of proof in section 16-6a-612(4)(e), (ii) what constitutes
independence for a special litigation committee under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii),
and (iii) what is a good faith, reasonable inquiry under section 16-6a-612(4)(a).
1.

The Verified Complaint's Allegations That a Majority of
Directors Were Not Independent Shifted the Burden of
Proof to the Directors

Like the Delaware procedure, section 16-6a-612 contemplates that a
plaintiff will make a demand on the board of directors before filing a derivative
lawsuit. If the demand is rejected, then the verified complaint must establish
that either a majority of the board of directors lacked independence or their
rejection did not comply with subsection (4)(a). Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(d). If
the complaint establishes that a majority of directors lacked independence, then
"the corporation has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection
(4)(a) are met." Id §16~6a-612(4)(e)(i).
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The commentary to the MNCA confirms that the verified complaint is
where a lack of independence is established for determining the burden of proof.
That commentary explains that the burden shifting provisions in the MNCA
were designed in "response to concerns of structural bias" in the dismissal
mechanism. MNCA 13-17 (2008). As courts have noted, "[i]t is not cynical to
expect that [special litigation] committees will tend to view derivative actions
against the other directors with skepticism." Toy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d
Cir. 1982). To solve that problem, the directors bear the burden "where a
majority of directors is not independent, and the determination is made by [a
special litigation committee] specified in subsection [(4)](b)(ii)." MNCA 13-17.
The commentary notes that the burden shifting procedures are not
identical to those in Delaware law because, unlike Delaware law, under the
MNCA there are no "demand-excused situation[s]" that allow plaintiffs to
bypass the demand procedure by preemptively pleading "particularized facts
that create a reasonable doubt that a majority of directors at the time [a] demand
would be made are independent or disinterested." MNCA 13-14. In Delaware,
when a plaintiff establishes a lack of independence in the verified complaint—
whether to excuse the demand or in response to its rejection—the directors may
reassert the right to control the litigation by forming a special litigation
committee. But the directors then "bear the burden of proving the independence
of the committee, the reasonableness of its investigation, and the reasonableness
of the bases of its decision reflected in the motion." MNCA 13-14 to 13-15.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Under the MNCA, the plaintiff must always make a demand. MNCA
§13.03 & 13-16. Despite that difference, the MNCA retained the distinction under
Delaware law by assigning to "the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts
establishing that a majority of the board is not independent." MNCA 13-16.
Thus, it is in the verified complaint that a plaintiff establishes a lack of
independence of the majority of the board, which operates to determine which
party has the burden of proving the independence of the special litigation
committee and "the propriety of [its] inquiry and determination." MNCA 13-16.
Here, the operative verified complaint alleges that each Director was
engaged in self-dealing and personally benefitted from the decisions concerning
which roads to build and maintain within the HOA. (R.1056 ("the roads located
near the homes owned by the Board's members are maintained and improved
with monies paid by all members of the Association, while other roads are left to
deteriorate and have been rendered impassable due to intentional neglect");
R.1562-63 (Directors have burden of proving compliance with subsection (4)(a).)
Therefore, the Directors bore the burden of proving compliance with
subsection (4)(a), something the district court refused to acknowledge. (R.176164.) Ultimately, however, the burden of proof has little significance given the
motion papers filed in this case because the HOA had to demonstrate only a
disputed issue of material fact concerning compliance with subsection (4)(a).
Thus, regardless of which party has the burden in this case, disputed issues of
fact precluded the dismissal of the derivative claims.
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2.

A Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists With Regard to
Whether the Special Litigation Committee Was Independent
Under Section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii)

Section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii) governs special litigation committees. That
section requires "a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more
independent directors appointed by a majority vote of independent directors
present at a meeting of the board of directors." Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii)
(emphasis added). Thus, the members of a special litigation committee can be
appointed only by independent directors and the committee itself must consist of
at least two independent directors. If there are not two independent directors,
then only a court-appointed group can determine whether maintenance of the
derivative claims is in the best interest of the corporation. Id. §16-6a~612 (4)(f).
While section 16-6a-612 does not define " independent/7 it does specify
what does not, by itself, negate independence:
None of the following by itself causes a director to be
considered not independent for purposes of this section:
(i) the nomination or election of the director by
persons
(A) who are defendants in the derivative
proceeding; or
(B) against whom action is demanded;
(ii) the naming of the director as
(A) a defendant in the derivative proceeding; or
(B) a person against whom action is demanded; or
(iii) the approval by the director of the act being
challenged in the derivative proceeding or
demand if the act resulted in no personal benefit
to the director.
Utah Code §16-6a-612(4)(c) (emphasis added). The key language is "by itself."
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The commentary to the MNCA explains that the section was designed to
reject "the concept that the mere appointment of new directors [to the board, not
the special litigation committee] by the non-independent directors makes the
new directors not independent in making the necessary determination because of
an inherent structural bias." MNCA 13-12. The commentary also explains that
"the mere fact that a director has been named as a defendant or approved the
action being challenged does not cause the director to be considered not
independent." IcL The commentary thus makes clear that courts should assess
"actual bias" instead of applying a per se rule that a director is not independent
if the director (i) is appointed by a non-independent director, (ii) is a defendant,
or (iii) approved the challenged action (without personal gain). Id.
That interpretation has been adopted in other jurisdictions. For example,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that, even though those three factors
that are not, by themselves, enough to negate independence, courts should "give
weight to these factors; [as] the statute simply states that the presence of one or
more of these factors is not solely determinative of the issue of whether a director
is independent." Einhorn v. Culea, 612 N.W.2d 78, 86 (Wis. 2000).
Thus, in this case the district court erred in refusing to consider the fact
that both the Directors who appointed members of the special litigation
committee and members of the special litigation committee were defendants to
the derivative claims and approved the acts at issue —i.e., the discriminatory
funding of roads to favor the Directors' properties. (R.1561,1893:3-4.) The
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district court instead should have determined whether that evidence, coupled
with additional evidence of actual bias described below, created a disputed issue
of fact concerning independence.
a.

The Current Versions of the MBCA and the MNCA
Specify What Constitutes Independence for a Special
Litigation Committee

Despite the fact that most cases involving special litigation committees
focus on independence, early versions of the MNCA did not define the term
"independent/' MNCA §§1.40,13.05. The Utah Code also uses the phrase
"independent director" and similarly does not define "independent." 2006 Utah
Laws Ch. 228, §2 (West) (S.B. 84) (amending section 16-6a-612 to introduce the
term "independent director[]"); 2000 Utah Laws Ch. 130, §1 (West) (H.B. 86)
(amending section 16-10a-740 to introduce the term "independent director[]").8
In 2005, the MBCA, but not the MNCA, began using the phrase "qualified
director" instead of "independent director" and defined the term "qualified."
MBCA §7.44. A "qualified director," under the revised MBCA, is a director who
"does not have (i) a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a
material relationship with a person who has such an interest." MBCA §1.43(a)(l)
(2011). A "material interest" is "an actual or potential benefit or detriment (other
than one which would devolve on the corporation or the shareholders generally)
8

The dismissal procedure in Utah Code section 16-10a-740 (Utah Revised
Business Corporation Act) came from the MBCA in 2000, and the dismissal
procedure in section 16-6a-612 (Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act) came
from section 16-10-a-740, as the MNCA did not contain the dismissal mechanism
until 2008. MNCA §13.05.
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that would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director's
judgment when participating in the action to be taken." Id. §1.43(b)(2). And a
"material relationship" is "a familial, financial, professional, employment or
other relationship that would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of
the director's judgment when participating in the action to be taken." Id.
§1.43(b)(l).
Use of the phrase "qualified director" was intended to distinguish the
more common definition of "independent director" as a director who is not also
an officer or employee of the corporation. MBCA §1.43 cmt. 2; see also Oracle,
824 A.2d at 941 n.62 (quoting NASD Rules 4200 & 4350). Like the MBCA, the
MNCA makes clear that "independent" does not have that more common
meaning: "The concept of an independent director is not intended to be limited
to nonofficer or 'outside' directors but may in appropriate circumstances include
directors who are also officers." MNCA §13.05 cmt. I. 9
9

There is some irony, then, in the fact that the only Utah legislative history
concerning the meaning of the phrase "independent director" came in the 2000
floor debate on section 16-10a-740, when Senator Valentine explained that
"independent director" carries the same meaning as the more common
definition. He explained that the bill had
a mechanism where a majority of board of directors who are
independent members of the board of directors may make an
action and then stop the derivative action. They may make the
action that the people who were the shareholders wanted. Now
what are independent board members and what are nonindependent board members. An independent board member
is one that is outside of the organization. He or she is not an
officer, is not an employee, doesn't receive any compensation
from the corporation with the exception of the compensation
for serving as a director of the corporation. . . . In those kinds of
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The comments to the MBCA explained the change in terminology as
clarifying, not substantive:
Although the term " qualified director" embraces the
concept of independence, it does so only in relation to
the director's interest or involvement in the specific
situations to which the definition applies. Thus, the
term " qualified director" is distinct from the generic
term "independent director" used in section 8.01(c) of
the Act to describe a director's general status. As a
result, an "independent director" may in some
circumstances not be a "qualified director," and vice
versa.
MBCA §1.43 cmt.2.
Unlike the MBCA, the MNCA does not employ the phrase "qualified
director." MNCA §13.05. But it now defines "independent director" as the
MBCA defines "qualified director." Id. The MNCA definition is as follows:
A person is independent for purposes of this section if
the person does not have (1) a material interest in the
outcome of the proceeding, or (2) a material relationship
with a person who has such an interest.

cases, you can look to that independent board to determine
whether the action proposed by the shareholder is proper or not
proper and that is what [the bill] does; it allows us a way to
alleviate the litigation in a derivative action context by the
independent board's action.
Senate Floor Debate, H.B. 86,53rd Utah Leg., 2000 Gen. Sess. (Feb. 28, 2000)
(statement of Sen. John L. Valentine). Senator Valentine's definition finds
support in some case law holding that "independent" means outside directors,
i.e., "directors who were not also officers or employees of [the corporation]." In
re Abbott Labs. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795,801 (7th Cir. 2003). If
that definition applies here, then none of the Directors were independent, as they
were all officers of the HO A.
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MNCA §13.05(f).1o In fact, the definition section of the MNCA expressly
indicates that its definitions of "material interest'7 and "material relationship77 are
"[patterned after Model Business Corporation Act.77 MNCA §1.40(34), (35)
(citing MBCA §1.43(b)(l), (b)(2)).
The clarifications in the MBCA and MNCA should apply to the
interpretation of Utah Code sections 16-6a-612 and 16-10a-740. Both sections of
the Utah Code allow limited discovery on whether the person or group
conducting the subsection (4)(a) determination is "independent and
disinterested.77 Utah Code §§16~6a-612(3)(e)(i)(A), 16-10a-740(3)(e)(i)(A). And
the comments to the most recent version of the MNCA make clear that the new
definition clarifies that being disinterested was part of being independent:
The decisions that have examined the qualifications of
directors making the determination have required that
the directors be both "disinterested77 in the sense of not
having a personal interest in the transaction being
challenged (as opposed to a benefit which devolves
upon the corporation or all shareholders generally) and
"independent77 in the sense of not being influenced in
favor of the defendants by reason of personal or other
relationships. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 743 A.2d 805,
812-16 (Del. 1984). Only the word 'independent7 has
been used in Section 13.05(b) because it is believed that
a person who has an interest in the transaction would
not be independent
MNCA §13.05 cmt. 1.

10

The comments to uniform acts are "the only thing that could be described as
legislative history77 of the Utah provisions adopting a uniform act. Schurtz v.
BMW of N.Am., Inc., 814 P.2d 1108,1113 (Utah 1991); McLaughlin v. Schenck,
2009 UT 64, f 35,220 R3d 146,160.
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The American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance is
consistent with the definitions in the MBCA and MNCA.11 It defines
"interested" to apply to directors who (i) are a party to the transaction of
conduct, (ii) have a business7 financial or familial relationship with a party to the
transaction or conduct, (iii) have a material pecuniary interest in the transaction
or conduct, or (iv) are subject to a controlling influence by a party to the
transaction or conduct or a person who has a material pecuniary interest in the
transaction or conduct. Principles of Corporate Governance §§1.23, 7.09 (2012).12
A copy of the full definition is at Addendum B.
This court should accept the clarifying definition in the MNCA and hold
that directors are independent if they are disinterested in the litigation in the
sense that they have no material interest in its outcome or material relationship
with a person with such an interest. Under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii), the
11

This court may rely upon such treatises when interpreting corporate law. R&
R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 2008 UT 80, ^[28,199
P.3d 917 ("Where legislative history is absent or unclear, model codes can be a
useful resource in determining the intent of the legislature and underlying policy
issues/7); see also McLaughlin, 2009 UT 64, Tf35 (using the comments to the
MBCA to interpret the term "transaction"); Aurora Credit Servs., Inc. v. Liberty
West Dev., Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,1280 (Utah 1998) (relying on the Principles of
Corporate Governance).
12

The ALI's definition of "interested" is narrower, as it disqualifies a director (or
an associate of the director) who is a named party, but otherwise is similar to the
definitions for "qualified" in the MBCA and "independent" in the MNCA.
Compare Principles of Corporate Governance §1.23 ("reasonably . . . expected to
[adversely] affect the director's . . . judgment") with MBCA 81.43(b) ("reasonably
. . . expected to impair the objectivity of the director's judgment") and MNCA
§1.40(34), (35) ("reasonably . . . expected to impair the objectivity of [the
director's] judgment").
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directors who appoint members of the special litigation committee13 and the
directors who serve on the committee must be independent. As demonstrated
next, the case law interpreting "independence" in similar statutes is in accord.
b.

Case Law Confirms What Constitutes Independence
for a Special Litigation Committee

A number of courts have articulated factors to consider in determining
whether members of a special litigation committee are independent. For
example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considers factors consistent with the
current definition in the MNCA, but expressly sets forth as a factor whether
corporate counsel or independent counsel assisted the special litigation
committee. Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90;14 Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d
853,857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to defer to committee's recommendation in
part because its counsel was chosen by corporate counsel); In re Par Pharm., Inc.
Derivative Litig., 750 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to defer to
committee recommendation in part because it failed to retain outside counsel);
13

To illustrate the importance of independent directors appointing members of
the special litigation committee, in Iowa, if a majority of the board is not
independent, only the court can appoint the independent committee. Miller v.
Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983).
14

The factors are: (1) "status as a defendant and potential liability;" (2)
"participation in or approval of the alleged wrongdoing or financial benefits
from the challenged transaction;" (3) "past or present business or economic
dealings with an individual defendant;" (4) "past or present personal, family, or
social relations with individual defendants;" (5) "past or present business or
economic relations with the corporation;" (6) "[t]he number of members on [the]
special litigation committee;" and (7) "[t]he roles of corporate counsel and
independent counsel." Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90.
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Principles of Corporate Governance §7.09 cmt. d (although at times "the
committee may retain the counsel who earlier served the board to advise it
further/7 it may not do so "if the earlier inquiry and evaluation were conducted
or guided by interested directors").
In Tennessee, the list of factors is similar, but includes whether the special
litigation committee itself was independent of the directors in the sense that the
committee—not the directors—made the final determination concerning whether
to move to dismiss the derivative claims. Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215,224
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992);15 see also Tanssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884 ("The key element is
that the board delegates to a committee of disinterested persons the board's
power to control the litigation. A mere advisory role of the special litigation
committee fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant deference to the
committee's decision by the court."); Par Pharm., Inc. Derivative Litig., 750
F. Supp. at 647-48 (no deference to business judgment of special litigation
committee if it makes only a recommendation to the board); Greenfield v.
Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664, 668 (Colo. App. 1988) ("to be entitled to
judicial deference, the committee must be given the ultimate power of decision
or, at the least, any recommendation made by the committee must be finally
passed upon only by other disinterested members of the board of directors"); cf.
15

The factors are: "(1) the size of the committee, (2) the committee members'
relationship with the corporation's officers and directors, (3) the committee
members7 qualifications and experience,... (4) the scope of the committee's
authority, and (5) the committee's autonomy from the directors, officers, and
corporate counsel." Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224.
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Swensonv.Thibaut, 250 S.E.2d 279,298 (N.C. Ct App. 1978) (involvement of
interested directors in the decision to dismiss negated good faith under business
judgment rule).16
The Minnesota Supreme Court has attempted to compile all of the factors
considered by various courts: "(1) whether the members are defendants in the
litigation; (2) whether the members are exposed to direct and substantial liability;
(3) whether the 'members are outside, non-management directors'; (4) whether
the members were on the board when the alleged wrongdoing occurred; (5)
whether the 'members participated in the alleged wrongdoing'; (6) whether the
members approved conduct involving the alleged wrongdoing; (7) whether the
members or their affiliated firms 'had business dealings with the corporation
other than as directors'; (8) whether the members 'had business or social
relationships with one or more of the defendants'; (9) whether the members
received advice from independent counsel or other independent advisors;
(10) the severity of the alleged wrongdoing; and (11) the size of the committee."
In re UnitedHealth Grp. Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 754 N.W.2d 544, 560 n.ll

16

The ALI's official commentary states that although "§ 7.09 does not preclude a
committee from reporting back to the board with its determinations for approval
by the board as a whole," there are two important requirements for corporations
that do. Principles of Corporate Governance §7.09 cmt. d. First, the vote on the
report must take place "minus any members whose status as defendants in the
action would impair their objectivity." Id. (emphasis added). Second, "during
the period that any committee is conducting its evaluation, care should be taken
to minimize the contacts between the committee and the remainder of the board
with respect to the committee's deliberations." Id. (emphasis added).
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(Minn. 2008).17 Under any of those tests, the special litigation committee in this
case lacked independence.
c.

The Special Litigation Committee Was Not
Independent Under Section 16-6a~612(4)(b)(ii)

Under the general definition of "independent" in the MNCA and the more
detailed list of factors relevant to determining independence in the case law—as
well as under the more strict definition of independence under Delaware law,
"like Caesar's wife, be above reproach", Lewis, 502 A.2d at 967-the special
litigation committee here was not independent. At the very least, a genuine issue
of fact exists concerning its independence.
(i)

The Special Litigation Committee Was Not
Independent Under the MNCA

Under the MNCA, a person is independent "if the person does not have
(1) a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or (2) a material
relationship with a person who has such an interest." MNCA §13.05(f). Under
that definition, neither the directors who appointed the members of the special
litigation committee nor the members of the committee were independent.

17

Courts routinely find that special litigation committees lack independence
based upon such factors. Where two members of a special litigation committee
had to serve on the board of directors with the defendant to the derivative
claims, the committee lacked independence even though it had hired outside
counsel. McDonough v. Americom Int'l Corp., 905 F. Supp. 1016,1021 (M.D. Fla.
1995). Where the members of a committee were not only defendants but also
could realistically face liability, they were not independent. Kloha v. Duda, 226
F. Supp. 2d 1342,1344 (M.D. Fla. 2002). In some cases, a "prior affiliation with
the corporation" is enough to negate independence. Hasan v. Clevetrust Realty
Investors, 729 F.2d 372,379 (6th Cir. 1984).
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Each Director owns a lot within the HO A, and each Director benefitted
from and participated in the decisions concerning which roads to build and
maintain. (R.374,1056-57,1446,1448-49,1561.) Each Director engaged in "selfdealing and favoring services to and improvements benefitting" his own
property. (R.1561.) And all Directors participated in the election of members of
the special litigation committee at one of the board's regular meetings. (R.1428.)
The members of the special litigation committee also lacked independence
because each of them—Ms. Johnson, Mr. Sarra, and Mr. Wilson—owns a lot
within HCEII that has benefitted from preferential treatment. (R.374,1561,1564.)
Each member of the special litigation committee has a material interest in the
past discriminatory allocation of road maintenance resources and whether those
resources continue to be used in the same discriminatory manner. Under the
MNCA definition, then, no Director—those who appointed members to the
special litigation committee or those on the committee—was independent. That
alone was sufficient to defeat the motion to dismiss in this case.
The language in section 16-6a-612(4)(c) confirms this result. That section
states that a director's approval "of the act being challenged in the derivative
proceeding" does not "by itself" result in the director's lacking independence "if
the act resulted in no personal benefit to the director." Utah Code §16-6a612(4)(c)(iii). The clear implication of that language is that where, as here, the act
did result in a personal benefit to the director, that fact "by itself" is sufficient to
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indicate a lack of independence. Because all Directors lacked independence, the
district court erred in dismissing the derivative claims.
(ii)

The Special Litigation Committee Was Not
Independent Under Multi-Factor Tests
Articulated in the Case Law

The result is no different under the various lists of factors concerning
independence in the case law. In fact, every factor listed in those cases indicates
a lack of independence here. Consider each set of factors in turn.
The first set of independence factors includes those that section 16-6a-612
and the MNCA consider insufficient, by themselves, to negate independence —
whether the Directors are defendants and whether the directors approved the
acts being challenged in the derivative claims. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754
N.W.2d at 560 n i l ; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89. Again, while those factors, by
themselves, do not indicate a lack of independence, they are relevant to the
independence determination. Here, all Directors are defendants and all
Directors participated in the acts, i.e., the decisions concerning which roads to
build and maintain. (R.1556,1561,1564.) And two members of the special
litigation committee were Director of Roads (Ms. Johnson) and Director of Legal
(Mr. Sarra), during which time they were intimately involved in such decisions.
(R.437,445-46,451,1519-20.) The third member of the special litigation committee,
Mr. Wilson, was a director during the 1990s when the HOA faced the same legal
issues concerning Area D roads. (R.410,441,1519.)
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A second independence factor is whether the directors were outside, nonmanagement directors. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n.ll. Here, all
of the Directors, including the two who served on the special litigation
committee, were inside, management directors. All Directors own property
within the HOA. (R.374,1056,1561.) Ms. Johnson was Director of Roads. (R.435.)
Mr. Sarra was Director of Legal. (Id.) Mr. Emmer was Director of the
Architectural Control Committee and President of the HOA. (R.435,440,44445,455,459,461,500.) Ms. Dean was Director of Community Affairs.
(R.455,459,461,500.)
A third set of independence factors includes (i) whether the directors were
on the board when the wrongdoing occurred, (ii) whether the directors
participated in the alleged wrongdoing, and (iii) whether the directors approved
of the conduct involved in the wrongdoing. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d
at 560 n.ll; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89. Here, all Directors were on the board
when it made the discriminatory decisions concerning road maintenance,
participated in those decisions, and approved the conduct that constituted the
wrongdoing. (R.1556,1561,1564.) And the third member of the special litigation
committee was a past director who participated in and approved of the same
types of decisions. (R.410,441,1519.)
A fourth independence consideration is whether the directors had business
dealings with the corporation. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n.ll;
Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89. Here, all Directors own lots in the HCEII and served
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in management capacities within the HO A. (R.374,435,455,1056.) In addition,
Mr. Wilson was employed by Sunrise Engineering, Inc., a company the Directors
hired in the past to work on HCEII's roads and that continues to deal with road
maintenance projects. (R.446,1579-80.)
A fifth factor is whether a director has a social relationship with the tainted
directors. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n.ll; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d
at 89. Here, the district court acknowledged the social relationship Mr. Wilson
had to the tainted Directors, but found it insignificant. (R.1734.)
A sixth factor is whether the special litigation committee hired
independent counsel or used the very corporate counsel who approved of the
wrongful conduct in the first place. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560
n i l ; Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90. Here, the report of the special litigation
committee was the result of a collaboration among the committee members, the
HOA's attorney (Mr. Lundgren), and the most tainted Director (Mr. Emmer).
(R.333-67,1508.) During its inquiry, the special litigation committee not only
used the corporate counsel who approved of the discriminatory practices,
(R.1448 ("Howard Lundgren's verbal advice to the Board was that the Board was
within its rights to manage the road maintenance projects according to a
consistent business plan,,))/ but expressly relied upon the legal opinions of that
counsel during its inquiry without doing any independent investigation.
(R.1447.) For example, the report repeatedly states that "[w]here an issue results
in a conflicting interpretation of the law between Attorneys, the Board's most
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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responsible option is to act according to the option of their legal counsel/ 7
(R.1447,1451,1455,1461.)
A seventh factor is whether the wrongdoing is severe. UnitedHealth Grp.
Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n . l l . Here, while the wrongdoing may not be severe in
the abstract, because the vast majority of the HOA budget is allocated to road
maintenance, the wrongful discrimination in road maintenance is severe in
practice. Most of the assessments paid by residents and lot owners of HCEII are
used for road maintenance, i.e., the 2009-10 proposed budget shows that over
97% of the HOA's non-water system maintenance budget was devoted to road
maintenance. (R.387,464,1493.) And the roads leading to Plaintiffs7 lots are not
just unmaintained, but at this point are impassible except on foot, on horseback,
or via ATV. (R.49-51,441,1056-57,1444.)
An eighth factor is the size of the special litigation committee.
UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., 754 N.W.2d at 560 n . l l ; Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224;
Einhorn, 612 N.W.2d at 89-90. Here, the committee had three members, two
current Directors and one former director. If the committee had five members
and only one tainted member, then the size may mitigate the problem. But the
size of the committee cannot mitigate the problem here.
A ninth factor is whether the special litigation committee operates
independently from the tainted directors, i.e., the board delegates full authority
to conduct the inquiry and determine whether to move to dismiss the derivative
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claims.** Tanssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884; Boyd, 838 S.W.2d at 224. Here, there was
no such delegation, and the committee did not recommend dismissal. (R.143164.) Instead, the very Directors (including Mr. Emmer) who determined that a
special litigation committee was needed made the final determination concerning
whether to instruct counsel to move to dismiss the derivative claims.19 (R.813.)
All of the factors courts use to assess independence indicate that the
special litigation committee here was not independent under section 16-6a612(4) (b)(ii). At the very least, genuine issues of fact exist concerning
independence, which is enough to defeat the motion to dismiss. As one court
put it, courts must "be mindful of the need to scrutinize carefully the mechanism
by which directors delegate to a minority committee the business judgment
authority to terminate derivative litigation, particularly when the lawsuit is
directed against some or a majority of the directors/' Will, 213 Cal.App.3d at
1043-44. The district court here failed to do that. This court should reverse so the
derivative claims can be adjudicated on their merits.
18

"The key element is that the board delegates to a committee of disinterested
persons the board's power to control the litigation. A mere advisory role of the
special litigation committee fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant
deference to the committee's decision by the court/' Tanssen v. Best & Flanagan,
662 N.W.2d 876, 884 (Minn. 2003).
19

The procedure followed by Mr. Emmer is exactly backwards. Special litigation
committees are appointed to prevent interested members of a board from taking
a decision making role in recommending dismissal of a claim. Oracle, 824 A.2d
at 940 (the special litigation committee process "presents an opportunity for a
board that cannot act impartially as a whole to vest control of derivative
litigation in a trustworthy committee of the board—Le^ one that is not
compromised in its ability to act impartially.").
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III.

The Committee Did Not Conduct a Reasonable Inquiry Because It Failed
To Consider What Was In the Best Interest of the HOA and Did Not
Recommend Dismissal as Required Under Section 16-6a-612(4)(a)
The district court also erred in dismissing the derivative claims because

genuine issues of material fact exist concerning whether the special litigation
committee satisfied the requirements in section 16-6a-612(4)(a). Those
requirements include that the committee (i) act in good faith in conducting a
reasonable inquiry and (ii) determine in its business judgment whether
maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best interest of the HOA. Utah
Code §16-6a-612(4)(a). The special litigation committee here failed in both tasks.
A.

The Special Litigation Committee Inquiry Was Not Reasonable

The special litigation committee's inquiry was not reasonable. In
determining whether the inquiry was reasonable, courts examine "(1) the length
and scope of the investigation, (2) the committee's use of independent counsel or
experts, (3) the corporation's or the defendants' involvement, if any, in the
investigation, and (4) the adequacy and reliability of the information supplied to
the committee." Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999);
see also Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224 (Term. Ct. App. 1992) (same).
Here, as stated above, the committee did not use independent counsel and
allowed the tainted Directors to participate and guide their investigation. Supra
Facts II; infra Arg. III.B. In addition, the interviews conducted by the special
litigation committee undermined the reliability of the information gathered by
the committee. In the interviews, committee members often testified as to their
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version of the events, led the witnesses based on their recollection of the events,
or debated with witnesses as to the merits of the derivative claims. (R.757
(Wilson stated why a road was closed by the County); R. 759-63 (Wilson and
Johnson interject facts learned during their involvement with the HOA and
Johnson directs questions to the "combined memory of all [of] us"); R.764,766
(Johnson testifies about the interviewee's landscaping); R.769-72 (Johnson
testifies about various rules for unincorporated areas); R.780 (Johnson explains
the HOA's handling of a nuisance near the interviewee's property); R.792-93
(Johnson and Wilson argue with a Plaintiff about cost estimates for improving
roads); R. 797-98 (Wilson testifies about road conditions near his lot); R.799
(Johnson testifies as to how roads were funded in the 1990s); R.801 (Wilson offers
his interpretation of HOA policies in light of events in the 1990s); R.802 (Wilson
testifies as to why a hydrant and water line were put on one Plaintiffs property);
R.806-08 (Wilson and Johnson testify as to their experience with the County's
zoning regulations).
The inquiry was not conducted in a manner to ensure an independent
determination of whether maintenance of the derivative claims is in the best
interest of the HOA.
B.

The Special Litigation Committee Did Not Use Business Judgment
to Conclude That Maintenance of the Derivative Claims Is Not In
the Best Interest of the HOA

The special litigation committee also failed to perform the very task it is
given under section 16-6a-612(4)(a) - using business judgment to determine
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whether dismissal of the derivative claims is in the best interest of the
corporation. As Zapata explained, the special litigation committee should
(i) consider relevant "factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations,
employee relations, fiscal as well as legal," (ii) produce a "thorough written
record of the investigation and its findings and recommendations/7 and
(iii) "cause its corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss." Zapata, 430 A.2d
at 788. The special litigation committee failed in all three ways.
First, as outlined above the committee failed to make any recommendation
concerning dismissal, let alone "cause" the filing of the motion to dismiss, as
required under the case law.20 (R.1431-64.) Instead, the Directors (including Mr.
Emmer) made that final determination. (R.813.)
Second, the special litigation committee made no best interest
determination in its report. (R.1431-64.) Instead, the report makes fourteen
"observations" and three "recommendations," none of which concern the best
interest of the HO A. (Id.) In fact, Mr. Wilson—chair of the committee — admitted
at his deposition that he never evaluated whether "it would be in the best
interest of the [HOA] to pursue a claim against the Board for failing to maintain
all of [HCEII's] roads[.]" (R.1584.) That is confirmed by the fact that the
committee's report- attached at Addendum D — reveals no consideration of
"factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee relations,
fiscal as well as legal." Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788.
20

Zapata, 430 A.2d at 788; Tanssen, 662 N.W.2d at 884.
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Third, the special litigation committee did not use business judgment in its
inquiry, but instead performed a legal analysis of the derivative claims based
upon the advice of the very corporate counsel who approved the wrongful
conduct in the first place. (R.1447.) When a special litigation committee provides
only legal opinions, its recommendations do not deserve deference under the
business judgment rule. Tanssen, 662 N. W.2d at 888-89 (special litigation
committee provided a legal, not business, opinion concerning the likelihood of
success of the derivative claims). Here, the report states that its purpose is "to
determine if [the claims] have merit." (R.1433.) And the recommendations in the
report merely provide legal analysis. (R.1437,1447,1450,1456.) The report, and
therefore the work of the committee, was inadequate under subsection (4)(a).
For all of those reasons, there is at least a genuine issue of fact concerning
the adequacy of the special litigation committee's inquiry and whether it
performed its task under section 16-6a-612(4)(a). This court should reverse.
Conclusion
The Directors who appointed members of the special litigation committee
were not independent, as required under section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii). The
committee members themselves also were not independent as required under
section 16-6a-612(4)(b)(ii). In addition, the committee's inquiry was tainted, as it
never exercised business judgment to determine whether maintenance of the
derivative claims is in the best interest of the HO A, as required under section 166a-612(4)(a).
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For all of those reasons, this court should reverse the order dismissing the
derivative claims and mandate that they be adjudicated on their merits. Tanssen,
662 N. W.2d at 890 (no second bite on remand when an order granting a motion
to dismiss is reversed).
DATED this 21st day of August 2012.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC

Troy L. Booher
Clemensf A. Landau
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Glenn C. Hanni (No. A1327)
Stuart H. Schultz (No. 2886)
Andrew D. Wright (No. 8857)
STRONG & HANNI
3 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
Facsimile: (801) 596-1508
Attorneysfor Defendants

m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
HI-COUNTRY PROPERTY RIGHTS
GROUP, LINDSAY ATWOOD, JERRY
GILMORE, and BRANDON FRANK,
individually and for and on behalf of HICOUNTRY ESTATES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, PHASE II, a Utah Non-profit
corporation,

ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF
ACTION, DERIVATIVE CLAIM FOR
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
AGAINST DEFENDANTS EMMER,
WDLLIAMS, SARRA, JOHNSON AND
DEAN

Plaintiffs,
v.
KEITH EMMER, TOM WILLIAMS,
ANTHONY SARRA, ARLENE JOHNSON,
CAROL DEAN, HI-COUNTRY ESTATES
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, PHASE II,
a Utah non-profit corporation; and DOES 1 100
i \j\jy

Civil No. 090920250
i

Judge Tyrone E. Medley
Defendants,
Defendants Renewed Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
as to Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty was heard on January 18,

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"" o

r

2012, before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley, District Judge. Wade R. Budge and Michael J.
Thomas of the Law Firm Snell & Wilmer appeared on behalf of plaintiJBFs. Stuart H. Schultz of
the Law Finn Strong & Haoni and A. Howard Lundgren of the Law Firm Durham, Jones &
Pinegar appeared on behalf of defendants.

The Court, having reviewed the motions, the

memoranda and papers filed in support of, and in opposition to, the motions, having heard oral
argument from the parties, having taken the matter under advisement, and having rendered the
Court's ruling during a telephone conference with counsel on January 30, 2012, and good cause
appearing, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action

for Derivative Relief and Breach of Fiduciary Duties is granted for the reasons set forth more
fully below, and, as a consequence of the Court granting the Renewed Motion to Dismiss,
Defendants' Alternative Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Second Cause of Action
for Breach of Fiduciary Duties, is rendered moot;
2.

Defendants' Renewed Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action

for Derivative Relief and for Breach of Fiduciary Duties against Defendants Emmer, Williams,
Sarra, Johnson and Dean as members of the Board of Directors of Hi-Country Estates
Homeowners Association, Phase II (hereinafter "HCEII") is granted and the Second Cause of
Action against said defendants is dismissed, with prejudice, and on the merits, for the following
reasons:

2
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(a)

All the necessary elements for dismissal of a derivative proceeding under

Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-612(4)(a) are met, including that a special litigation committee ("SLC")
appointed by the Board of Directors of HCEII determined in good faith, after conducting a
reasonable inquiry upon which the SLC's conclusions were based, that the maintenance of the
derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the non-profit corporation, HCEII;
(b)

There are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to the independence

of the members of the SLC, that the SLC made a determination in good faith, conducted a
reasonably inquiry upon which its decision was based, and that there is a reasonable basis for the
SLC's conclusion that the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of HCEII;
(c)

Specifically with respect to the question of the independence of the members

of the SLC, the Court finds first, based on the Kaplan v. White and London v. Tvrell cases that
the alleged casual social relationship between Kim Wilson and the alleged business relationship
between Sunrise Engineering and board members were limited in nature and did not create a
genuine issue of material fact as to the independence of Mr. Wilson; second, that board
membership alone is not a basis to find a lack of independence on the part of a member of the
SLC; and third, that Utah Code Ann. § 16-6a-612(4)(c) states that being named as a director
defendant does not create a lack of independence as a member of the SLC. Further, the Court
concludes that the Beam case cited by plaintiffs supports granting the Motion to Dismiss, and
that the Oracle case cited by Plaintiffs is inapposite because the facts are so extraordinarily
different than the facts in the instant matter.

3
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Based on the foregoing, and good cause appearing, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Judgment of
Dismissal is hereby entered with respect to Plaintiffs* Second Cause of Action—Derivative
Claim for Breach of Fiduciary Duties against Williams, Emmer, Sana, Johnson and Dean and
said Second Cause of Action and all claims alleged therein is hereby dismissed, with prejudice,
on the merits, no cause of action,
DATED this ^"clay of February, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

i

TyrondE. Medley
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to Form:
SWELLS WiytfgR

w l | K Budge

^%~

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

of February, 2012, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Order of Dismissal of Plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, Derivative Claim
for Breach of Fiduciary Duties against Defendants Emmer, Williams, Sarra, Johnson and
Dean was served by the method indicated below to the following:
Wade R. Budge
Michael J. Thomas
SNELL&WILMER

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
A. Howard Lundgren
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR

111 E. Broadway,#900
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

{^f
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile

{jf
( )
( )
( )

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
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001287.00384
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§ 16-6a-612. Derivative suits, UT S T § 16-6a-612

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 16. Corporations
Chapter 6A. Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 6. Members
U.CJL 1953 § i6-6a-6i2
§ i6-6a-6i2. Derivative suits
Currentness
(1) Without affecting the right of a member or director to bring a proceeding against a nonprofit corporation or its directors or
officers, a proceeding may be brought in the right of a nonprofit corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by a complainant
who is:
(a) a voting member; or
(b) a director in a nonprofit corporation that does not have voting members.
(2) A complainant may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the complainant:
(a) is a voting member, or a director in a nonprofit corporation that does not have voting members, at the time the proceeding
is brought; and
(b) fairly and adequately represents the nonprofit corporation's interests in enforcing the nonprofit corporation's right.
(3)(a) A complainant may not commence a derivative proceeding until:
(i) a written demand is made upon the nonprofit corporation to take suitable action; and
(ii) 90 days have expired from the date the demand described in Subsection (3)(a)(i) is made, unless:
(A) the complainant is notified before the 90-day period expires that the demand is rejected by the nonprofit corporation;
or
(B) irreparable injury to the nonprofit corporation would result by waiting for the 90-day period's expiration.
(b) A complaint in a derivative proceeding shall be:
(i) verified; and
(ii) allege with particularity the demand made to obtain action by the board of directors.
(c) A derivative proceeding shall comply with the procedures of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.1.
(d) The court shall stay any derivative proceeding until the inquiry is completed and for an additional period as the court
considers appropriate if:
(i) the nonprofit corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or complaint; and
(ii) a person or group described in Subsection (4) is conducting an active review of the allegations in good faith.
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§ 16-6a-612. Derivative suits, UT ST § 16-6a-612

(e) If a nonprofit corporation proposes to dismiss a derivative proceeding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), discovery by a
complainant in the derivative proceeding:
(i) is limited to facts relating to:
(A) whether the person or group conducting the inquiry is independent and disinterested;
(B) the good faith of the inquiry; and
(C) the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the person or group conducting the inquiry; and
(ii) may not extend to any facts or substantive issues with respect to the act, omission, or other matter that is the subject
matter of the derivative proceeding.
(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if a person or group specified in
Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which the person's or group's
conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interest of the nonprofit corporation.
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to Subsection (4)(f), the determination in Subsection (4)(a) shall be made by:
(i) a majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, if the independent directors
constitute a quorum; or
(ii) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by a majority vote of
independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not the independent directors appointing
the committee constituted a quorum.
(c) None of the following by itself causes a director to be considered not independent for purposes of this section:
(i) the nomination or election of the director by persons:
(A) who are defendants in the derivative proceeding; or
(B) against whom action is demanded;
(ii) the naming of the director as:
(A) a defendant in the derivative proceeding; or
(B) a person against whom action is demanded; or
(iii) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in
no personal benefit to the director.
(d) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination is made rejecting a demand by a complainant, the complaint
shall allege with particularity facts establishing either:
(i) that a majority of the board of directors did not consist of independent directors at the time the determination was
made; or
(ii) that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are not met.
(e)(i) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of independent directors at the time the determination is made to
reject a demand by a shareholder, the corporation has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are met.
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(ii) If a majority of the board of directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made to reject
a demand by a complainant, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) are not met.
(f)(i) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent persons upon motion by the corporation to make a
determination whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interest of the corporation.
(ii) If the court appoints a panel under Subsection (4)(f)(i), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements
of Subsection (4)(a) are not met.
(g) A person may appeal an interlocutory order of a court that grants or denies a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to
Subsection (4)(a).
(5) On termination of a derivative proceeding the court may order:
(a) the nonprofit corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in the proceeding,
if it finds that the proceeding results in a substantial benefit to the nonprofit corporation;
(b) the plaintiff to pay a defendant's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred in defending the proceeding, if
it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained:
(i) without reasonable cause; or
(ii) for an improper purpose; or
(c) a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading,
motion, or other paper, if the court finds that the pleading, motion, or other paper was:
(i)(A) not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry; or
(B) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
and
(ii) interposed for an improper purpose, such as to:
(A) harass;
(B) cause unnecessary delay; or
(C) cause needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Credits
Laws 2000, c. 300, § 56, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2006, c. 228, § 2, eff. May 1, 2006.
Notes of Decisions (4)
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-6a-612,UTST§ 16-6a-612
Current through 2012 General Session
End of Document
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§ 16-6a-822. General standards of conduct for directors and officers, U i ST § 16-6a-822

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 16. Corporations
Chapter 6A. Utah Revised Nonprofit Corporation Act (Refs & Annos)
Part 8. Directors and Officers
U.GA. 1953 § i6-6a-822
§ i6-6a-822. General standards of conduct for directors and officers
Currentness
(l)(a) A director shall discharge the director's duties as a director, including the director's duties as a member of a committee
of the board, in accordance with Subsection (2).
(b) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge the officer's duties under that authority in accordance with
Subsection (2).
(2) A director or an officer described in Subsection (1) shall discharge the director or officer's duties:
(a) in good faith;
(b) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and
(c) in a manner the director or officer reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the nonprofit corporation.
(3) In discharging duties, a director or officer is entitled to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements, including
financial statements and other financial data, if prepared or presented by:
(a) one or more officers or employees of the nonprofit corporation whom the director or officer reasonably believes to be
reliable and competent in the matters presented;
(b) legal counsel, a public accountant, or another person as to matters the director or officer reasonably believes are within
the person's professional or expert competence;
(c) religious authorities or ministers, priests, rabbis, or other persons:
(i) whose position or duties in the nonprofit corporation, or in a religious organization with which the nonprofit corporation
is affiliated, the director or officer believes justify reliance and confidence; and
(ii) who the director or officer believes to be reliable and competent in the matters presented; or
(d) in the case of a director, a committee of the board of directors of which the director is not a member if the director
reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(4) A director or officer is not acting in good faith if the director or officer has knowledge concerning the matter in question
that makes reliance otherwise permitted by Subsection (3) unwarranted.
(5) A director, regardless of title, may not be considered to be a trustee with respect to any property held or administered by the
nonprofit corporation including property that may be subject to restrictions imposed by the donor or transferor of the property.
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(6) A director or officer is not liable to the nonprofit corporation, its members, or any conservator or receiver, or any assignee
or successor-in-interest of the nonprofit corporation or member, for any action taken, or any failure to take any action, as an
officer or director, as the case may be, unless:
(a) the director or officer has breached or failed to perform the duties of the office as set forth in this section; and
(b) the breach or failure to perform constitutes:
(i) willful misconduct; or
(ii) intentional infliction of harm on:
(A) the nonprofit corporation; or
(B) the members of the nonprofit corporation; or
(iii) gross negligence.
Credits
Laws 2000, c. 300, § 97, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2006, c. 228, § 6, eff. May 1, 2006; Laws 2007, c. 306, § 12, eff. April
30, 2007.
Notes of Decisions (2)
U.C.A. 1953 § 16-6a-822, UT ST § 16-6a-822
Current through 2012 Fourth Special Session.
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§ 16-10a-740. Procedure in derivative proceedings, UT ST § 16-10a-740

West's Utah Code Annotated
Title 16. Corporations
Chapter 10A. Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
Part 7. Shareholders
U.C A. 1953 § i6-ioa-740
§ i6-loa-74<x Procedure in derivative proceedings
Currentness
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "derivative proceeding" means a civil suit in the right of:
(i) a domestic corporation; or
(ii) to the extent provided in Subsection (7), a foreign corporation; and
(b) "shareholder" includes a beneficial owner whose shares are held:
(i) in a voting trust; or
(ii) by a nominee on the beneficial owner's behalf.
(2) A shareholder may not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless the shareholder:
(a)(i) was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or omission complained of; or
(ii) became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law from one who was a shareholder at the time of the act or
omission complained of; and
(b) fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in enforcing the right of the corporation.
(3)(a) A shareholder may not commence a derivative proceeding until:
(i) a written demand has been made upon the corporation to take suitable action; and
(ii) 90 days have expired from the date the demand described in Subsection (3)(a)(i) is made unless:
(A) the shareholder is notified before the 90 days have expired that the demand has been rejected by the corporation; or
(B) irreparable injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the 90-day period.
(b) A complaint in a derivative proceeding shall be:
(i) verified; and
(ii) allege with particularity the demand made to obtain action by the board of directors.
(c) A derivative proceeding shall comply with the procedures of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23 A.
(d) The court shall stay any derivative proceeding until the inquiry is completed and for such additional period as the court
considers appropriate if:
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(i) the corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations made in the demand or complaint; and
(ii) a person or group described in Subsection (4) is conducting an active review of the allegations in good faith.
(e) If a corporation proposes to dismiss a derivative proceeding pursuant to Subsection (4)(a), discoveiy by a shareholder
following the filing of the derivative proceeding in accordance with this section:
(i) shall be limited to facts relating to:
(A) whether the person or group described in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) is independent and disinterested;
(B) the good faith of the inquiry and review by the person or group described in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f); and
(C) the reasonableness of the procedures followed by the person or group described in Subsection (4)(b) or (4)(f) in
conducting its review; and
(ii) may not extend to any facts or substantive matters with respect to the act, omission, or other matter that is the subject
matter of the derivative proceeding.
(4)(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if a person or group specified in
Subsections (4)(b) or (4)(f) determines in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based
that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to Subsection (4)(f), the determination in Subsection (4)(a) shall be made by:
(i) a majority vote of independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors if the independent directors
constitute a quorum; or
(ii) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more independent directors appointed by a majority vote of
independent directors present at a meeting of the board of directors, whether or not such independent directors appointing
the committee constituted a quorum.
(c) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be considered not independent for purposes of this section:
(i) the nomination or election of the director by persons:
(A) who are defendants in the derivative proceeding; or
(B) against whom action is demanded;
(ii) the naming of the director as:
(A) a defendant in the derivative proceeding; or
(B) a person against whom action is demanded; or
(iii) the approval by the director of the act being challenged in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in
no personal benefit to the director.
(d) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a detennination has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the
complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing either:
(i) that a majority of the board of directors did not consist of independent directors at the time the determination was
made; or
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(ii) that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) have not been met.
(e)(i) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of independent directors at the time the determination is made
rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the corporation has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a)
have been met.
(ii) If a majority of the board of directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made rejecting
a demand by a shareholder, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements of Subsection (4)(a) have not
been met.
(f)(i) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent persons upon motion by the corporation to make a
determination whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation.
(ii) If the court appoints a panel under Subsection (4)(f)(i), the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the requirements
of Subsection (4)(a) have not been met.
(g) A person may appeal from an interlocutory order of a court that grants or denies a motion to dismiss brought pursuant
to Subsection (4)(a).
(5)(a) A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or settled without the court's approval.
(b) If the court determines that a proposed discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the interests of the
corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the court shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders affected.
(6) On termination of the derivative proceeding the court may order:
(a) the corporation to pay the plaintiffs reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred in the proceeding, if it finds
that the proceeding has resulted in a substantial benefit to the corporation;
(b) the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding, if
it finds that the proceeding was commenced or maintained:
(i) without reasonable cause; or
(ii) for an improper purpose; or
(c) a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including counsel fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading,
motion, or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion, or other paper was:
(i)(A) not well grounded in fact, after reasonable inquiry; or
(B) not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
and
(ii) interposed for an improper purpose, such as to:
(A) harass;
(B) cause unnecessary delay; or
(C) cause needless increase in the cost of litigation.
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(7)(a) In any derivative proceeding in the right of a foreign corporation, the matters covered by this section shall be governed by
the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation except for Subsections (3)(c), (3)(d), (5), and (6), which
are procedural and not matters relating to the internal affairs of the foreign corporation.
(b) In the case of matters relating to a foreign corporation under Subsection (3)(c):
(i) references to a person or group described in Subsection (4) are considered to refer to a person or group entitled under the
laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation to review and dispose of a derivative proceeding; and
(ii) the standard of review of a decision by the person or group to dismiss the derivative proceeding is to be governed by
the laws of the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign corporation.
Credits
Laws 1992, c. 277, § 79; Laws 2000, c. 130, § 1, eff. May 1, 2000; Laws 2012, c. 369, § 2, eff. May 8, 2012.
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SECTION 1.43

identified as owner of the shares in the corporations records, subject to certain provisos. If the corporations record of shareholders
has not been maintained in accordance with accepted practice,
a person who would have been identified in the record if it had
been so maintained is included. In addition to provisions similar to subdivisions (2), (3), and (4) of section 1.42, the Cahfornia
statute contains provisions relating to shares held subject to a voting trust or in a form used primarily to circumvent the provisions
of the statute.
The remaining jurisdictions do not have comparable provisions in their general corporation acts. The close corporation statutes of many states contain analogous numerical limitations.
SELECTED CASES
No significant reported case for this section was found.
SELECTED REFERENCES
No significant reference for this section was found.

§ 1.43. QUALIFIED DIRECTOR
(a) A "qualified director" is a director who, at the time action is
to be taken under:
(1) section 7.44, does not have (i) a material interest in the
outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a material relationship
with a person who has such an interest;
(2) section 8.53 or 8.55, (i) is not a party to the proceeding,
(ii) is not a director as to whom a transaction is a
director's conflicting interest transaction or who sought
a disclaimer of the corporations interest in a business
opportunity under section 8.70, which transaction' or
disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding, and (iii)
does not have a material relationship with a director
described in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of this
subsection (a)(2);
(3) section 8.62, is not a director (i) as to whom the transaction
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has a material relationship with another director as to
whom the transaction is a director s conflicting interest
transaction; or
(4) section 8.70, would be a quahfied director under
subsection (a)(3) if the business opportunity were a
directors conflicting interest transaction.
(b) For purposes of this section:
(1) "material relationship" means a familial, financial,
professional, employment or other relationship that
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of
the director s judgment when participating in the action
to be taken; and
(2) "material interest" means an actual or potential benefit or
detriment (other than one which would devolve.on the
corporation or the shareholders generally) that would
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the
directors judgment when participating in the action to
betaken.
(c) The presence of one or more of the following circumstances
shall not automatically prevent a director from being a
qualified director:
. (1) nomination or election of the director to the current
board by any director who is not a qualified director
with respect to the matter (or by any person that has a
material relationship with that director), acting alone or
participating with others;
(2) service as a director of another corporation of which
a director who is not a qualified director with respect
to the matter (or any individual who has a material
relationship with that director), is or was also a
director; or
(3) with respect to action to be taken under section 7.44,
status as a named defendant, as a director against whom
action is demanded, or as a director who approved the
conduct being challenged.

1-134
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CROSS-REFERENCES
Advance for expenses, see § 8 3 3 .
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:

Business opportunities, see § 8.70.
Determination and authorization for indemnification,
see § 8.55.
Directors' action in directors conflicting interest transaction,
see § 8.62.
Dismissal of derivative proceeding, see § 7.44.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
The definition of the term "qualified director" identifies those
directors: (i) who may take action on the dismissal of a derivative
proceeding (section 7.44); (ii) who are eligible to make, in the
.first instance, the authorization and determination required in
connection with the decision on a request for advance for expenses (section 8.53(c)) or for indemnification (sections.8.55(b) and
(c)); (iii) who may authorize a director s conflicting interest transaction (section 8.62); and (iv) who may disclaim the corporations
interest in a business opportunity (section 8.70(a)).
The judicial decisions that have examined the qualifications of directors for such purposes have generally required that
directors be both disinterested, in the sense of not having exposure to an actual or potential benefit or detriment arising out
of the action being taken (as. opposed to an actual or potential
benefit or detriment to the corporation or all shareholders generally), and independent, in the sense of having no personal or
other relationship with an interested director {e.g., a director
who is a party to a transaction with the corporation) that presents a reasonable likelihood that the directors objectivity will
be impaired. The 'qualified director" concept embraces both
of those requirements, and its application is situation-specific;
that is, "qualified director" determinations will depend upon the
directly relevant facts and circumstances, and the disqualification of a director to act arises from factors that would reasonably
be expected to impair the objectivity of the directors judgment.
On
thebyother
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theLawconcept
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director" has or should have special exp ertise to act on the matter in
question.
J. Disqualification Due to Conflicting Interest
The "qualified director" concept prescribes significant disqualifications, depending upon the purpose for which a director might be considered eligible to participate in the action to be
taken. In each context in which the definition applies, it excludes
directors who should not be considered disinterested:
— In the case of action on dismissal of a derivative proceeding
under section 7.44, the definition excludes directors who
have a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding,
such as where the proceeding involves a challenge to
the validity of a transaction in which the director has
a material financial interest As defined in subsection
(b)(2), a "material interest"'in the outcome of the
* proceeding involves an actual or potential benefit (other
than one that would devolve on the corporation of the
shareholders generally) that would arise from dismissal
of the proceeding and would reasonably be expected to
impair the objectivity of the directors judgment in acting
on dismissal of the proceeding.
— In the case of action to approve indemnification or
advance of funds for expenses, the definition excludes
directors who are parties to the proceeding (see section
8.50(6) for the definition of'party" and section 8.50(7) for
the definition of "proceeding"). It also excludes a director
who is not a party to the proceeding but as to whom a
transaction is a director s conflicting interest transaction
or who sought a disclaimer of the corporations interest
in a business opportunity, where that transaction or
disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding.
— In the case of action to approve a directors conflicting
interest transaction, the definition excludes any director
whose interest, knowledge or status results in the
transaction being treated as a "directors conflicting
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interest transaction." See section 8.60(1) for the definition
of "directors conflicting interest transaction."
— Finally, in the case of action under section 8.70(a) to
disclaim corporate interest in a business opportunity,
the definition excludes any director who would not be
corsidereda"qualineddjhector"ifmebusinessopportunity
wet a "directors conflicting interest transaction."
Whether a i ; hector has a material interest in the outcome of a
proceeding j a which the director does not have a conflicting per :
sonal inter).:* is heavily fact-dependent Such cases He along a
spectrum.. I: one end of the spectrum, if a claim against a director is clearly frivolous or is not supported by particularized and
well-plead ed facts, the director should not be .deemed to have a
"material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" within the
meaniDg of subsection (a)(1), even though the director is named
as a defendant At the other, end of the spectrum, a director normally should be deemed to have a "material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" within the meaning of subsection, (a)
(1) if a claim against the director is supported by particularized
and well-pleaded facts-which, if true, would be likely to give rise
to a significant adverse outcome against the director. Whether a
directc-r should be deemed to have a "material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" based on a claim that lies between these
two ends of the spectrum, will depend on the application of that
test to the claim, given all the facts and circumstances.
2. L isqualification Due to Relationships
yitk Interested Persons
In each context in which the "qualified director" definition
appl 1 es, it also excludes a director who has a "material relationship"
with another director who is not disinterested for one or more of
the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph. Any relationship
with such a director, whether the relationship is familial, financial,
profess onal, employment or otherwise, is a "material relationship," a.» that term is defined in subsection (b)(1), where it would
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the directors'
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taken on a matter referred to in subsection (a). The determination
of whether there is a "material relationship' should be based on
the practicalities of the situation rather than on formalistic considerations. For example, a director employed by a corporation
controlled by another director should be regarded as having an
employment relationship with that director. On the other hand,
a casual social acquaintance with another director should not be
regarded as a disqualifying relationship. See Beam ex ret Martha
Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050
(Del. 2004).
Although the term "qualified director" embraces the concept
of independence, it does so only in relation to the director s interest or involvement in the specific situations to which the definition apphes. Thus, the term "qualified director" is distinct from
the generic term "independent director" used in section 8.01(c)
of the Act to describe a director s general status. As a result, an
"independent director" may in some circumstances not be a
"qualified director," and vice versa. For example, in action being
taken under section 8.70 concerning a business opportunity, an
"independent" director who has a material interest in the business opportunity would not be a "qualified director" eligible to
vote on the matter. Conversely, a director who does not have
"independent" status may be a "qualified director" for purposes of voting on that action. See also the Official Comment to
section 8.01(c).
3. Elimination of Automatic Disqualification
in Certain Circumstances
— Subsection (c) of the definition of "qualii e i director"
addresses three categories of circumstances !ii it, if present
alone or together, do not automatically prev. it a director
. from being a qualified director.
— Subsection (c)(1) makes it clear that the * rticipation
of nonqualified directors (or interested sha, ** olders or
other interested persons) in the nomination J election
of a director does not automatically prevent ir i :irector
so nominated or elected from being qualified fecial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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litigation committees acting upon the dismissal of
derivative litigation often consist of directors elected
(after the alleged wrongful acts) by directors named as
defendants in the action. In other settings, directors
who are seeking indemnification, or who are interested
in a director's conflicting interest transaction, may have
participated in the nomination or election of an individual
director who is otherwise a "qualified director."
— Subsection (c)(2) provides, in a similar fashion, that the
mere fact that an individual director is or was a director
of another corporation—on the board of which a director
who is not a "qualified director" also serves or has served—
does not automatically prevent qualification to act.
— Subsection (c)(3) confirms a number of decisions,
involving dismissal of derivative proceedings, in which
the court rejected a disqualification claim predicated
on the mere fact that a director had been named as
a defendant, was an individual against whom action
has been demanded, or had approved the action being
challenged. These cases have held that, where a directors
approval of the challenged action is at issue, approval does
not automatically make the director ineligible to act. See
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Lewis v.
Graves, 701 E2d 245 (2d Cir.1983). On the other hand, for
example, director approval of a challenged transaction,
in combination with other particularized facts showing
that the director's ability to act objectively on a proposal
to dismiss a derivative proceeding is impaired by a
material conflicting personal interest in the transaction,
disqualifies a director from acting on the proposal to
dismiss the proceeding.
Where status as a qualified director is challenged in a litigation context, the court must assess the likelihood that an interest or relationship has impaired a directors objectivity, without
the need for any presumption arising from the presence of one
or more of the three specified circumstances. Thus, the effect of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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merely precludes an automatic inference of director disqualification from the circumstances specified in clauses (1), (2) and (3)
of subsection (c).

ANNOTATION
HISTORY
Model Act Derivation
1984 Act
§ 1.43 added by amendment, proposed
60 Bus. LAW 341 (2004), adopted, 60 Bus.
LAW. 943 (2005)
Historical Background .
Section 1.43 is a refined and expanded version of the term
'qualified director" as first used in section 8.62 to describe the
characteristics of directors eligible to approve a director's conflicting interest transaction. The definition continues to be applicable •
to director action approving a directors conflicting interest under
section 8.62 but now also applies to director action with respect
to derivative suits (section 7.44), indemnification (sections 8.53
and 8.55), and disavowal of the corporations interest in a business
opportunity (section 8.70). Hie term "qualified director'7 is different than the concept of "independent director'5 that is referred to
in section 8.01 and the Official Comment to section 8.25. The term
"independent director" is not defined in the Act, but is variously
defined in the listing standards for several securities market As
used in such standards, 'independent director" is largely defined
in terms of the absence of relationships (other than serving as a
director) between the corporation and the director. Accordingly
"independent director" does not relate to the directors disinterestedness with respect to a particular matter, and it is the latter
concept with which section 1.43 is concerned.
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STATUTES
Conn. Gen. Stat Ann. § 33-605 (West)
Me. Rev. Stat fit 13C, § 102 (32A)
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-1.43
Wyo. Stat § 17-16-143
STATUTORY COMPARISON
Connecticut, Maine, Mississippi, and Wyoming have adopted section 1.43, thereby applying the uniform "qualified director" definition to board action concerning dismissal of derivative
suits, permissive indemnification and advance of expenses, and
director conflicting interest transactions. For statutes applying a
similar concept in those circumstances, see the Annotations to
sections 7.44, 8.53, 8.55, and 8.62.
SELECTED CASES AND REFERENCES
See the Annotations to section 8.62; see also Annotations to sections 7.44, 8.53 and 8.55.
§1.44. HOUSEHOLDING
(a) A corporation has delivered •written notice or any other report
or statement under this Act, the articles of incorporation
or the bylaws to all shareholders who share a common
address if.
(1) The corporation delivers one copy of the notice, report or
statement to the common address;
(2) The corporation addresses the notice, report or statement
to those shareholders either as a group or to each of
those shareholders individually or to the shareholders in
a form to which each ofthose shareholders has consented;
• and
(3) Each of those shareholders consents to delivery of a
single copy of such notice, report or statement to the
shareholders' common address.
Any such consent shall be revocable by any of such
Digitized
by the Howard W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU.qf revocation
/shareholders
who
deliver
written
notice
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Model Business
Corporation Aet
Annotated
Fourth Edition
Model Business Corporation Act
with Official Comments and
Reporter's Annotations
adopted by the
Corporate Laws Committee
of the Business Law Section

Volume 2
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

SECTION 7.44

STATUTORY COMPARISON
Each of the jurisdictions listed above has adopted section 7.43
with little substantive change. Texas, however, requires the corporation to notify the court and plaintiff upon completion of review;
the initial stay of 60 days may be renewed for one or more additional 60-day periods if the corporation files a written statement
describing the status of the review and the reasons why additional
time is needed. The Texas statute also describes the effect of filing
demand on the applicable statute of limitations.
For comparison to other state statutes, see the Annotation to
section 7.40.

§7.44. DISMISSAL
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on
motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in
subsection (b) or subsection (e) has determined in good
faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its
conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative
proceeding is not in the. best interests of the corporation.
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by:
(1) a majority vote of qualified directors present at a meeting
of the board of directors if the qualified directors constitute a quorum; or
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more
qualified directors appointed by majority vote of qualified
directors present at a meeting of the board of directors,
regardless of whether such qualified directors constitute
a quorum.
(c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder, the
complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing
either (1) that a majority of the board of directors did not
consist of qualified directors at the time the determination
was made or (2) that the requirements of subsection (a) have
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(d) If a- majority of the board of directors consisted of qualified
directors at the time the determination was made, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of
subsection (a) have not been met; if not, the corporation shall
have the burden of proving that the requirements of subsec-:
tion (a) have been met
(e) Upon motion by the corporation, the court may appoint a
panel of one or more individuals to make a determination
whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in
the best interests of the corporation. In such case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of
subsection (a) have not been met
CROSS-REFERENCES
Board of directors:
committees, see § 8.25.
meetings, see § 8.20.
quorum and voting, see § 8.24.
Demand, see § 7.41.
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40.
"Qualified director" defined, see § 1.43.
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
At one time, the Model Act did not expressly provide what
happens when a board of directors properly rejects a demand to
bring an action. In such event, judicial decisions indicate that the
rejection should be honored and any ensuing derivative action
should be dismissed. SeeAronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,813 (Del.
1984). The Model Act was also'silent on the effect of a determination by a special litigation committee of qualified directors that
a previously commenced derivative action should be dismissed.
Section 7.44(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be
dismissed if there is a proper determination that the maintenance
of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.
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That determination can be made prior to commencement of the
derivative action in response to a demand or after commencement of the action upon examination of the allegations of the
complaint.
Ihe procedures set forth in section 7.44 are not intended
to be exclusive. As noted in the comment to section 7.42, there
may be instances where a decision to commence an action falls
within the authority of an officer of the corporation, depending
•upon the amount of the claim and the identity of the potential
defendants.
I . The Persons Making the Determination
Section 7.44(b) prescribes the persons by whom the determination in subsection (a) may be made. Subsection (b) provides
that the determination may be made (1) at a board meeting by
a majority vote of qualified directors if the qualified directors
constitute a quorum, or (2) by a majority vote of a committee
consisting of two or more qualified directors appointed at a board
meeting by a vote of the qualified directors in attendance, regardless of whether they constitute a quorum. (For the definition of
"qualified director," see section 1.43 and the related official comment) These provisions parallel the mechanics for determining
entitlement to indemnification (section 8.55), for authorizing
directors' conflicting interest transactions (section 8.62), and for
renunciation of the corporations interests in a business opportunity (section 8.70). Subsection (b)(2) is an exception to section
8.25 of the Model Act, which requires the approval of at least a
majority of all the directors in office to create a committee and
appoint members. This approach has been taken to respond to
the criticism expressed in a few cases that special litigation committees suffer from a structural bias because of their appointment
by vote of directors who at that time are not qualified directors.
See Hasan v. Trust Realty Investors, 729 E2d 372,376-77 (6th Or.
1984).
Subsection (e) provides, as an alternative, for a determination
by a panel of one or more individuals appointed by the court The
subsection
provides for the appointment only upon motion by
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the corporation. This would not, however, prevent the court on
its own initiative from appointing a special master pursuant to
applicable'state rules of procedure. (Although subsection (b)(2)
requires a committee of at least two qualified directors, subsection (e) permits the appointment by the court of only one person
in recognition of the potentially increased costs to the corporation for the fees and expenses of an outside person.)
This panel procedure may be desirable in a number of circumstances. If there are no qualified directors available, the
corporation may not wish to enlarge the board to add qualified
directors or may be unable to find persons willing to serve as
qualified directors. In addition, even if there are directors who
ire qualified, they may not be in a position to conduct the inquiry
in an expeditious manner.
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question about the qualifications of the individual or individuals
constituting the panel making the determination. Although the
corporation may wish to suggest to the court possible appointees,
the court will not be bound by those suggestions and, in any case,
will want to satisfy itself with respect to each candidates impartiality .When the court appoints a panel, subsection (e) places the
Durden on the plaintiff to prove that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.
2. Standards to Be Applied
Section 7.44(a) requires that the determination, by the appropriate person or persons, be made "in good faith, after conducting
i reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based"
Ihe phrase "in good faith" modifies both the determination and
:he inquiry This standard, which is also found in sections 8.30
'general standards of conduct for directors) and 8.51 (author.ty to indemnify) of the Model Act, is a subjective one, meaning
"honestly or in an honest manner" See also Corporate Directors
Guidebook (Fifth Edition), 59 Bus. LAW 1057, 1068 (2007). As
jtated in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 E Supp. 795,
300 (ED. Va. 1982), "the inquiry intended by this phrase goes
:o the spirit and sincerity with which the investigation was
f
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conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures or
basis for conclusions."
The word "inquiry"—rather than "investigation"—has been
used to make it clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend
upon the issues raised and the knowledge of the group making
the determination with respect to those issues. In some cases, the
issues may be so simple or the knowledge of the group so extensive that little additional inquiry is required In other cases, the
group may need to engage counsel and possibly-other professionals to make an investigation and assist the group in its evaluation
of the issues.
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically This standard authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden
of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever party
has the burden under subsection (d). This phrase does not require
the persons making the determination to prepare a written report
that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, since
circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There
will be, in all likelihood, many instances where good corporate
practice will commend such a procedure.
Section 7.44 is not intended to modify the general standards
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8.30 of the Model
Act, but rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit
in the derivative proceeding context. In this regard, the qualified
directors making the determination would be entitled to rely on
information and reports from other persons in accordance with
section 8.30(d).
Section 7.44 is similar in several respects and differs in
certain other respects from the law as it has developed in Delaware and been followed in a number of other states. Under the
Delaware cases, the role of the court in reviewing the directors'
determination varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is in a
demand-required or demand-excused situation.
Since section 7.42 requires demand in all cases, the distinction
between
demand-excused
cases
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does not apply Subsections (c) and (d) carry forward that distinction, however, by establishing pleading rules and allocating
the burden of proof depending on whether there is a majority
of qualified directors on the board. Subsection (c), like Delaware
law, assigns to the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts
estabhshing that the majority of the directors on the. board are
not qualified. If there is a majority then the burden remains with
the plaintiff to plead and establish that the requirements of subsection (a) section 7.44(a) have not been met If there is not a
majority of qualified directors on the board, then the burden is on
the corporation to prove that the issues delineated in subsection
(a) have been satisfied; that is, the corporation must prove both
the eligibility of the decision makers to act on the matter and the
propriety of their inquiry and determination.
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in several
situations. First, where the determination to dismiss the derivative proceeding is made in accordance with subsection (b)(1), the
burden of proof will generally remain with the plaintiff since the
subsection requires a quorum of qualified directors and a quorum is.normally a majority See section 8.24. The burden will also
remain with the plaintiff if a majority of qualified directors has
appointed a committee under subsection (b)(2), and the qualified
directors constitute a majority of the board. Under subsection (e),
the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in the case of a
determination by a panel appointed by the court.
The burden of proof will shift to the corporation, however,
where a majority of the board members are not qualified and the
determination is made by a committee under subsection (b)(2).
It can be argued that, if the directors making the determination
under subsection (b)(2) are qualified and have been delegated
full responsibility for making the decision, the composition of
the entire board is irrelevant. This argument is buttressed by the
sections method of appointing the group specified in subsection
(b)(2), since it departs from the general method of appointing
committees and allows only qualified directors, rather than a
majority of the entire board, to appoint the committee that will
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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make the determination. Subsection. (d)s response to objections
suggesting structural bias is to place the burden of proof on the
corporation (despite the fact that the committee making the
determination is composed exclusively of qualified directors).
Finally, section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review
the reasonableness of "the determination to reject a demand or
seek dismissal. This contrasts with the approach in some states
that permits a court, at least in some circumstances, to review the
merits of the determination (see Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430
A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981)) and is similar to the approach taken
in other states [see Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002-03
(N.Y. 1979)).
3.

Pleading
The Model Act previously provided that the complaint in a
derivative proceeding must allege with particularity either that
demand had been made on the board of directors, together with
the boards response, or why demand was excused. This requirement is similar to rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Since demand is now required in all cases, this provision is no
longer necessary.
Subsection (c) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover the
typical situation where the plaintiff makes demand on the board,
the board rejects that demand, and the plaintiff commences an,
action. In that scenario, in order to state a cause of action, subsection (c) requires the complaint to allege with particularity facts
demonstrating either (1) that no majority of qualified directors
exists or (2) why the determination made by qualified directors
does not meet the standards in subsection (a). Discovery should
be available to the plaintiff only after the plaintiffhas successfully
stated a cause of action by making either of these two showings.
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ANNOTATION
HISTORY
Model Act Derivation
1984 Act
§ 7.44 amended, proposed 60 Bus. LAW. 341
(2005), adopted 60 Bus. LAW. 943 (2005)
See also the Annotation to section 7.40.
STATUTES
Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 10-744
Conn. Gen, Stat. Ann. § 33-724 (West)
Ha. Stat Ann. § 607.07401(3)
Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-744
Haw. Rev. Stat § 414-175
Idaho Code § 30-1-744
Iowa Code Ann. § 490.744 (West)
Me. Rev. Stat Ann. tit 13-C, § 755
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156D, § 7.44 (West)
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 450.1491a, 450.1495 (West)
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.44
Mont Code Ann. § 35-1-545
Neb. Rev. Stat § 21-2074
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.44
N.C. Gen. Stat § 55-7-44
R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.2-710(E)
S.D. Codified Laws §§ 47-1A-744-47-1A-744.5 •
Tex. Bus. Org. Code Ann. § 21.558 (Vernon)
Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-672.4
• Wis, Stat Ann. § 180.0744 (West)
Wyo. Stat §17-16-744
For a list of other statutes dealing with derivative proceedings,
see the Annotation to section 7.40.
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SECTION 1.43

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
the circumstances, which would include oral notice through voice
mail or other similar means. It also deals with situations where
notice may be sought to be given to persons for whom no current
address is available, or where personal notice is impractical. Notice delivered to the person*s last known address is effective as
described in section L41(e) even though never actually received
by the person. Section 1.41(b) also authorizes notice by publication in some circumstances, including radio, television, or other
form of public wire or wireless communication.
Section 1.4.1(g) recognizes that other sections of the Act prescribe specific notice requirements for particular situations—e.g.,
service of process on a corporation's registered agent under section 5.04—and that these specific requirements, rather than the
general requirements of section 1.41, control. Finally, the second
sentence of subsection 1.41(g) permits a corporation's articles of
incorporation or bylaws to prescribe the corporation's own notice
requirements, if they are not inconsistent with the general requirements of this section or specific requirements of other sections of the Act.
The rules set forth in section 1,41 permit many other sections
of the Model Act to be phrased simply in terms of giving or
delivering notice without repeating details with respect to how
notice should be given and when it is effective in various circumstances,

reasonable to believe that the names represent the same
person,

CROSS-REFERENCES
Board of directors, see § 8<QL
Close corporations, see Model Statutory Close Corporation

Supplement
"Entity" defined, see § 1.40.
Record of shareholders, see §§ 7.20 & 16.01.
"Shareholder" defined, see § 1,40.
Voting trusts, see § 7.30.

OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 1.42 provides rules for determining the number of
shareholders in a corporation. The Model Act generally avoids
provisions that are based on the number of shareholders of a
corporation, since these provisions may encourage individual
shareholders to divide or combine their holdings for private strategic advantage. But in one instance the number of shareholders
is important: to permit a corporation to elect close corporation
status under the Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement,
The determination of the precise number of shareholders may also
become important in other contexts in the future*

§ 1,42. NUMBER OF SHAREHOLDERS
(a)

(b)

For purposes of this Act, the following identified as a shareholder in a corporation's current record of shareholders constitutes one shareholder:

§ 1,43,
(a)

(1)

three or fewer co-owners;

(2)

a corporation, partnership, trust estate, or other entity;

(3)

the trustees, guardians, custodians, or other fiduciaries
of a single trust, estate, or account

For purposes of this Act, shareholdings registered in substantially similar names constitute one shareholder if it is

QUALIFIED DIRECTOR

A "qualified director" is a director who, at the time action is
to be taken under;
(1)

section 7.44, does not have (i) a material interest in the
outcome of the proceeding, or (ii) a material relationship with a person who has such an interest;

(2)

section 8.53 or 8,55, (i) is not a party to the proceeding,
(ii) is not a director as to whom a transaction is a dh
1-51

1-50
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rector's conflicting interest transaction or who sought
a disclaimer of the corporation's interest in a business
opportunity under section 8.70, which transaction or
disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding, and (rii)
does not have a material relationship with a director
described in either clause (i) or clause (ii) of this subsection (a)(2);
(3) section 8.62, is not a director (i) as to whom the transaction is a director's conflicting interest transaction, or
(ii) who has a material relationship with another director as to whom the transaction is a director's conflicting
interest transaction; or
(4)

(b)

(2)

"material relationship" means a familial, financial, professional, employment or other relationship that would
reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the
director's judgment when participating in the action to
be taken; and
"material interest" means an actual or potential benefit
or detriment (other than one which would devolve on
the corporation or the shareholders generally) that
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity
of the director's judgment when participating in the action to betaken.

The presence of o n e or more of the following circumstances
shall not automatically prevent a director from being a qualified director:
(1) nomination or election of the director to the current
board by any director w h o is not a qualified director
w i t h respect to the matter (or by any person that has
a material relationship with that director), acting alone
or participating with others;
(2)

(3) with respect to action to be taken under section 7.44,
status as a named defendant, as a director against
whom action is demanded, or as a director who approved the conduct being challenged.

CROSS-REFERENCES
Advance for expenses, see § 8,53
Determination and authorization for indemnification, see
§8.55
Directors' action in director's conflicting interest transaction,
see § 8.62
Dismissal of derivative proceeding, see § 7.44

For purposes of this section,
(1)

(c)

section 8.70, would be a qualified director under subsection (a)(3) If the business opportunity were a director's conflicting interest transaction,

the matter (or any individual who has a material relationship with that director), is or was also a director; or

service as a director of another corporation of w h i c h a
director w h o is not a qualified director with respect to

OFFICIAL COMMENT
The definition of the term *'qualified director" identifies those
directors; (i) who may take action on the dismissal of a derivative
proceeding (section 7.44); (ii) who are eligible to make, in the
first instance, the authorization and determination required in connection with the decision on a request for advance for expenses
(section 8.53(c)) or for indemnification (sections 8.55(b) and (c));
(iii) who may authorize a director's conflicting interest transaction (section 8.62); and (iv) who may disclaim the corporation's
interest in a business opportunity (section 8.70(a)).
The judicial decisions that have examined the qualifications
of directors for such purposes have generally required that directors be both, disinterested, in the sense of not having exposure to
an actual or potential benefit or detriment arising out of the action
being taken (as opposed to an actual or potential benefit or detriment to the corporation or all shareholders generally), and independent, in the sense of having no personal or other relationship
with an interested director (e.g., a director who is a party to a
transaction with the corporation) that presents a reasonable likelihood that the director's objectivity will be impaired. The "qualified director" concept embraces both of those requirements, and
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whose interest, knowledge or status results in the transaction being treated as. a "director's conflicting interest..transaction." See section 8.60(1) for the definition of "director's conflicting interest transaction."
—Finally, in the case of action under section 8.70(a) to disclaim corporate interest in a business opportunity, the definition excludes any director who would not be considered
a "qualified director" if the business opportunity were a
"director's-conflicting interest transaction/'

its application is situation-specific; that is, "qualified director"
determinations will depend upon the directly relevant facts and
circumstances, and the disqualification of a director to act arises
from factors that would reasonably be expected to impair the
objectivity of the director's judgment. On the other hand, the
concept does not suggest that a "qualified director" has or should
have special expertise to act on the matter in question,
L

DISQUALIFTCATION DUE TO CONFLICTING INTEREST

The "qualified director" concept prescribes significant disqualifications, depending upon the purpose for which a director
might be considered eligible to participate in the action to be
taken. In each context in which the definition applies, it excludes
directors who should not be considered disinterested:
—In the case of action on dismissal of a derivative proceeding
under section 7.44, the definition excludes directors who
have a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding,
such as where the proceeding involves a challenge to the
validity of a transaction in which the director has a material
financial interest. As defined in subsection (b)(2), a "material interest" in the outcome of the proceeding involves
an actual or potential benefit (other than one that would
devolve on the corporation of the shareholders generally)
that would arise from dismissal of the proceeding and
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of
the director's judgment in acting on dismissal of the proceeding,
—In the case of action to approve indemnification or advance
of funds for expenses, the definition excludes directors who
are parties to the proceeding (see section 8.50(6) for the
definition of "party" and section 8.50(7) for the definition
of "proceeding"). It also excludes a director who is not a
party to the proceeding but as to whom a transaction is a
director's conflicting interest transaction or who sought a
disclaimer of the. corporation's interest in a business opportunity, where that transaction or disclaimer is challenged in the proceeding.
—In the case of action to approve a director's conflicting
interest transaction, the definition excludes any director

Whether a director has a material interest In the outcome of
a proceeding in which the director does not have a conflicting
persona] interest is heavily fact-dependent. Such cases lie along
a spectrum. At one end of the spectrum, if a claim against a
director is clearly frivolous or is not supported by particularized
and well-pleaded facts, the director should not be deemed to have
a "material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" within the
meaning of subsection (a)(1), even though the director is named
as a defendant. At the other end of the spectrum, a director normally should be deemed to have a *'material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" within the meaning of subsection (a)(1)
if a claim against the director is supported by particularized and
well-pleaded facts which, if true, would be likely to give rise to
a significant adverse outcome against the director. Whether a director should be deemed to have a "material interest in the outcome of the proceeding" based on. a claim that lies between these
two ends of the spectrum will depend on the application of that
test to the claim, given all the facts and circumstances.
2,

DISQUALIFICATION DUE TO RELATIONSHIPS WITH
INTERESTED PERSONS

In each context in which the "qualified director" definition
applies, it also excludes a director who has a *'material relationship 0 with another director who is not disinterested for one or
more of the reasons outlined in the preceding paragraph. Any
relationship with such a director, whether the relationship is familial,- financial, professional, employment or otherwise, is a
"material relationship," as that term is defined in subsection
(b)(1), where it would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity of the director's judgment when voting or otherwise par-
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icipating in action to be taken on a matter referred to in subsecion (a)? The determination of whether them is a 44material
elationship" should be based on the practicalities of the situation
ather than on formalistic considerations, For example, a director
mployed by a corporation controlled by a director should be
sgarded as having an employment relationship with that director,
)n the other hand, a casual social acquaintance with another director should not be regarded as a disqualifying relationship. See
-earn ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart,
45 A,2d 1040, 1050 (Del 2004).
Although the term "qualified director" embraces the concept
f independence, it does so only in relation to the director's insrest or involvement in the specific situations to which the deflition applies. Thus, the term "qualified director" is distinct
:Om the generic term "independent director" used in section
.01(c) of the Act to describe a director's general status. As a
asult, an "independent director" may in some circumstances not
e a "qualified director," and vice versa. For example, in action
eing taken under section 8:70 concerning a business opportunity,
2 "independent' * director who has a material interest in the busie s opportunity would not be a "qualified director" eligible to
Dte on the matter. Conversely, a director who does not have
independent!' status may be a "qualified director" for purposes
F voting on that action. See also the Official Comment to section
01(c).
ELIMINATION OF AUTOMATIC DISQUALIFICATION IN CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES

—Subsection (c) of the definition of "qualified director" addresses three categories of circumstances that, if present
alone or together, do not automatically prevent a director
from being a qualified director.
—Subsection (c)(1) makes it clear that the participation of
non-qualified directors (or interested shareholders or other
interested persons) in the nomination or election of a director does not automatically prevent the director so nominated or elected from being qualified. Special litigation
committees acting upon the dismissal of derivative litigation often consist of directors elected (after the alleged
56

wrongful acts) by directors named as defendants in the action. In other settings, directors who are seeking indemnification, or who are interested in a director's conflicting
interest transaction, may have participated in the nomination or election of an individual director who is otherwise
a "qualified director/'
—Subsection (c)(2) provides, in a similar fashion, that the
mere fact that an individual director is or was a director of
another corporation—on the board of which a director who
is not a "qualified-director" also serves or has served—
does not automatically prevent qualification to act.
—Subsection (c)(3) confirms a number of decisions, involving dismissal of derivative proceedings, in which the court
rejected a disqualification claim predicated on the mere fact
that a director had been named as a defendant, was an individual against whom action has been demanded, or had
approved the action being challenged. These cases have
held that, where a director* s approval of the challenged
action is at issue, approval does not automatically make the
director ineligible to act, SctAronsan v. Lewis, 473 A, 2d
805, 816 (Del. 1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 R2d 245 (2d
Cir.1983). On the other hand, for example, director approval of a challenged transaction, in combination with
other particularized facts showing that the director's ability
to act objectively on a proposal to dismiss a derivative proceeding is impaired by a material conflicting personal interest in the transaction, disqualifies a director from acting
on the proposal to dismiss the proceeding.
Where status as a qualified director is challenged in a litigation
context, the court must assess the likelihood that an interest or
relationship has impaired a director's objectivity, without the
need for any presumption arising from the presence of one or
more of the three specified circumstances. Thus, the effect of
subsection (c) of the definition, while significant, is limited. It
merely precludes an automatic inference of director disqualification from the circumstances specified in clauses (I), (2) and (3)
of subsection (c).
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SECTION 7*44
inquiry is completed or, if suit is commenced, the corporation can
apply to the court for a stay under section 7.43.
Two exceptions are provided to the 90-day waiting period.
The first exception is the situation where the shareholder has been
notified of the rejection of the demand prior to the end of the 90
days. The second exception is where irreparable injury to the
corporation would otherwise result if the commencement of the
proceeding is delayed for the 90-day period. The standard to be
applied is intended to be the same as that governing the entry of
a preliminary injunction. Compare Gimbel v\ Signal Gw„,'316
A.2d 599 (Del. Ch. 1974) with Gelco Corp. v, Coniston Partners,
811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1987). Other factors may also be considered, such as the possible expiration of the statute of limitations,
although this would depend on the period of time during which
the shareholder was aware of the grounds for the proceeding.
It should be noted that the shareholder bringing suit does not
necessarily have to be the person making the demand, Only one
demand need be made in order for the corporation to consider
whether to take corrective action.
4.

erence to directors* judgments may also result, in the termination of meritless actions brought solely for their settlement
or harassment value. Moreover, where litigation is appropriate, the derivative corporation will often be in a better position
to bring or assume the suit because of superior financial resources and knowledge of the challenged transactions, [Citations omitted.]

JT7.43. STAY OF PROCEEDINGS
If the corporation commences an inquiry into the allegations
made in the demand or complaint the court may stay any derivative proceeding for such period as the court deems appropriate*
CROSS-REFERENCES
Demand, see §7-41.
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40.

RESPONSE BY THE CORPORATION

There is no obligation on the part of the corporation to respond to the demand. However, if the corporation, after receiving
the demand, decides to institute litigation or, after a derivative
proceeding has commenced, decides to assume control of the litigation, the shareholder's right to commence or control the proceeding ends unless it can be shown that the corporation will not
adequately pursue the matter. As stated in Lewis- v, Graves, 701
R2d 245, 247-48 (2d Cir. 1983):
The [demand] rule is intended "to give the derivative corporation itself the opportunity to take over a suit which was
brought on its behalf in the first place, and thus to allow the ? M
directors the chance to occupy their normal status as conducg^*?|
tors of the corporation's affairs/' Permitting corporations^
assume control over shareholder derivative suits also has T
merous practical advantages. Corporate management way^^g
in a better position to pursue alternative remedies, resolving^
grievances without burdensome and expensive litigation. D ^ i |
&Sr

OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 7.43 provides that if the corporation undertakes an
inquiry, the court may in its discretion stay the proceeding for
such period as the court deems appropriate. This might occur
where the complaint is filed 90 days after demand but the inquiry
into matters raised by the demand has not been completed or
.where a demand has not been investigated but the corporation
'commences the inquiry after the complaint has been filed. In either case, it is expected that the court will monitor the course of
;the inquiry to ensure that it is proceeding expeditiously and in
'good faith.

m S n 1 ^ h P r o C e e d l r i 8 . S h a I ' b e d i s ™ ^ d by the court-on
motion by the corporation if one of the groups s p e £ ° n
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subsection (b) or subsection (e) has determined in good
faith, after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its
conclusions are based, that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by:
(1) a majority vote of qualified directors present at a meeting of the board of directors if the qualified directors
constitute a quorum; or
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or
more qualified directors appointed by majority vote of
qualified directors present at a meeting of the board of
directors, regardless of whether such qualified directors
constitute a quorum.
(c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder,
the complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing either (1) that a majority of the board of directors did
not consist of qualified directors at the time the determination was made or (2) that the requirements of subsection
(a) have not been met
(d) If a majority of the board of directors consisted of qualified
directors at the time the determination was made, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements
of subsection (a) have not been met; if not the corporation
shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of
subsection (a) have been met
(e) Upon motion by the corporation, the court may appoint a
panel of one or more individuals to make a determination
whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in
the best interests of the corporation. In such case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the requirements
of subsection (a) have not been met
CROSS-REFERENCES
Board of directors:
committees, see § 8.25.

meetings, see § 8.20.
quorum and voting, see § 8*24.
Demand, see §7.41.
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40.
"Qualified director" defined, see §1.43.
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
At one time, the Model Act did not expressly provide what
happens when a board of directors properly rejects a demand to
bring an action. In such event, judicial decisions indicate that the
rejection should be honored and any ensuing derivative action
should be dismissed. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813
(Del 1984). The Model Act was also silent on the effect of a
determination by a special litigation committee of qualified directors that a previously commenced derivative action should be
dismissed. Section 7.44(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be dismissed if there is a proper determination that the
maintenance of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the
corporation. That determination can be made prior to commencement of the derivative action in response to a demand or after
commencement of the action upon examination of the allegations
of the complaint.
The procedures set forth in section 7,44 are not intended to
be exclusive. As noted in the comment to section 7.42, there may
be instances where a decision to commence an action falls within
the authority of an officer of the corporation, depending upon the
amount of the claim and the identity of the potential defendants,
L

THE PERSONS MAKING THE DETERMINATION

Section 7.44(b) prescribes the persons by whom the determination in subsection (a) may be made. Subsection (b) provides
that the determination may be made (1) at a board meeting by a
majority vote of qualified directors if the qualified directors constitute a quorum, or (2) by a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more qualified directors appointed at a board
7-91
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meeting by a vote of the qualified directors in attendance, regardless of whether they constitute a quorum. (For the definition
of'"qualified director/* see section L43 and the related official
comment.) These provisions parallel the mechanics for determining entitlement to indemnification (section 8.55) and for authorizirig directors* conflicting interest transactions (section 8.62).
Subsection (b)(2) is an exception to section 8,25 of the Model
Act, which requires the approval of at least a majority of all the
directors in office to create a committee and appoint members.
This approach has been taken to respond to the criticism expressed in a lew cases that special litigation committees suffer
from a structural bias because of their appointment by vote of
directors who at that time are not qualified directors. See Hasan
v. Trust Realty Investors, 729 R2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984).
Subsection (e) provides, as an alternative, for a determination
by a panel of one or more individuals appointed by the court. The
subsection provides for the appointment only upon motion by the
corporation. This would not, however, prevent the court on its
own initiative from appointing a special master pursuant to applicable state rules of procedure, (Although subsection (b)(2) requires a committee of at least two qualified directors, subsection
(e) permits the appointment by the court of only one person in
recognition of the potentially increased costs to the corporation
for the fees and expenses of an outside person.)
This panel procedure may be desirable in a number of circumstances. If there are no qualified directors available, the corporation may not wish to enlarge the board to add qualified directors or may be unable to find persons willing to serve as
qualified directors. In addition, even if there are directors who are
qualified, they may not be in a position to conduct the inquiry in
an expeditious manner.
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question
about the qualifications of the individual or individuals constituting the panel making the determination. Although the corporation may wish to suggest to the court possible appointees, the
court will not be bound by those suggestions and, in any case,
will want to satisfy itself with respect to each candidate's impartiality. When the court appoints a panel, subsection (e) places the
burden on the plaintiff to prove that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.

2.

STANDARDS TO B E APPLIED

Section 7.44(a) requires that the determination, by the appropriate person or persons, be made "in good faith, after conducting
a reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based."
The phrase "in good faith** modifies both the determination and
the inquiry. This standard, which is also found in. sections 830
(general standards of conduct for directors) and 8,51 (authority
to indemnify) of the Model Act, is a subjective one, meaning
"honestly or in an honest manner/' See-also * 'Corporate Director's Guidebook (Fourth Edition)," 59 Bus. Law, 1057, 1068
(2004). As stated in Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., 546
R Supp. 795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982), "the inquiry intended by this
phrase goes to the spirit and sincerity with which the investigation
was conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures
or basis for conclusions."
The word "inquiry" —rather than "investigation" —has
been used to make it clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues raised and the knowledge of the group making the determination with respect to those issues. In some cases,
the issues may be so simple or the knowledge of the group so
extensive that little additional inquiry is required. In other cases,
the group may need to engage counsel and possibly other professionals to make an investigation and assist the group in its
evaluation of the issues.
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically. This standard authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden
of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever party
has the burden, under subsection (d). This phrase does not require
the persons making the determination to prepare a written report
that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, since
circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There
will be, in all likelihood, many instances where good corporatepractice will commend such a procedure.
Section 7,44 is not. intended to modify the general standards
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8,30 of the Model
Act, but rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit
in the derivative proceeding context. In this regard, the qualified
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directors making the determination would be entitled to rely on
information and reports from other persons in accordance with
section 8.30(d).
Section 744 is similar in several respects and differs in certain
other respects from the law as it has developed in Delaware and
been followed in a number of other states. Under the Delaware
cases, the role of the court in reviewing the directors' determination varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is in. a
demand-required or demand-excused situation.
Since section 7.42 requires demand in all cases, the distinction
between demand-excused and demand-required cases does not
apply. Subsections (c) and (d) carry forward that distinction, however, by establishing pleading rules and allocating the burden of
proof depending on whether there is a majority of qualified directors on the board* Subsection (c), like Delaware law, assigns
to the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts establishing
that the majority of the directors on the board are not qualified.
If there is a majority, then the burden remains with the plaintiff
to plead and establish that the requirements of subsection (a) section 7.44(a) have not been met. If there is not a majority of qualified directors on the board, then the burden is on the corporation
to prove that the issues delineated in subsection (a) have been
satisfied; that is, .the corporation must prove both the eligibility
of the decision makers to act on the matter and the propriety of
their inquiry and determination.
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in several
situations. First, where the determination to dismiss the derivative
proceeding is made in accordance with subsection (b)(1), the burden of proof will generally remain, with the plaintiff since the
subsection requires a quorum of qualified directors and a quorum
is normally a majority. See section 8.24. The burden will also
remain with the plaintiff if a majority of qualified directors has
appointed a committee under subsection (b)(2), and the qualified
directors constitute a majority of the board. Under subsection (e),
the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in the case of
a determination by a panel appointed by the court.
The burden of proof will shift to the corporation, however,
where a majority of the board members are not qualified and the
determination is made by a committee under subsection (b)(2). It

can be argued that, if the directors making the determination under subsection (b)(2) are qualified and have been delegated full
responsibility for making the decision, the composition of the
entire board is irrelevant; This argument is buttressed by the section's method of appointing the group specified in subsection
(b)(2), since it departs from the general method of appointing
committees and allows only qualified directors, rather than a majority of the entire board, to appoint the committee that will make
the determination. Subsection (d)'s response to objections suggesting structural, bias is to place the burden of proof on the corporation (despite the fact that the committee making the determination is composed exclusively of qualified directors).
Finally, section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review
the reasonableness of the determination to reject a demand or seek
dismissal. This contrasts with the approach in some states that
permits a court, at least in some circumstances, to review the
merits of the determination (see Zapata Corp. u. Maldonado, 430
A. 2d 779, 789 (Dei 1981) and is similar to the approach taken
in other states (see Auerbach v, Bennett, 393 N*E. 2d 994, 100203 (NX1979).
3.

PLEADING

The Model Act previously provided that the complaint in a
derivative proceeding must allege with particularity either that
demand had been made on the board of directors, together with
the board's response, or why demand was excused. This requirement is similar to rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Since demand is now required in all cases, this provision is
no longer necessary.
Subsection (c) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover the
typical situation where the plaintiff makes demand on the board,
the board rejects that demand, and the plaintiff commences an
action. In that scenario, in order to state a cause-of-action, subsection (c) requires the complaint to allege with particularity facts
demonstrating either (1.) that no majority of qualified directors
exists or (2) why the determination made by qualified directors
does not meet the standards in subsection (a). Discovery should
be available to the plaintiff only after the plaintiff has successfully
stated a cause of action by making either of these two showings,
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additional time is needed. The Texas statute also describes the
effect of filing demand on the applicable statute of hmitations.
For comparison to other state statutes, see the Annotation to
section 7.40.

§7.44.

DISMISSAL

(a)

A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on
motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in
subsections (b) or (f) has determined in good faith after
conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions
are based that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding
is not in the best interests of the corporation.

(b)

Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (f), the
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by:

(c)

(1)

a majority vote of independent directors present at a
meeting of the board of directors if the independent
directors constitute a quorum; or

(2)

a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or
more independent directors appointed by majority
vote of independent directors present at a meeting of
the board of directors, whether or not such independent directors constituted a quorum.

None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be
considered not independent for purposes of this section:
(1)

the nomination or election of the director by persons
who are defendants in the derivative proceeding or
against whom action is demanded;

(2)

the naming of the director as a defendant in the derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action
is demanded; or

(3)

the approval by the director of the act being challenged
in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted in no personal benefit to the director.
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(d)

If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determination has been made rejecting a demand by a shareholder,
the complaint shall allege with particularity facts establishing either (1) that a majority of the board of directors did
not consist of independent directors at the time the determination was made or (2) that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.

(e)

If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of
independent directors at the time the determination is
made, the corporation shall have the burden of proving that
the requirements of subsection (a) have been met. If a majority of the board of directors consists of independent directors at the time the determination is made, the plaintiff
shall have the burden of proving that the requirements of
subsection (a) have not been met.

(f)

The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent
persons upon motion by the corporation to make a determination whether the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation. In such
case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the
requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.

CRQSS-REFERENCES
Board of directors:
committees, see § 8.25.
meetings, see § 8.20.
quorum and voting, see § 8.24.
Demand, see §7.41.
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40.
"Shareholder" defined, see § 7.40.

OFFICIAL COMMENT
The prior version of the Model Act did not expressly provide
what happens when a board of directors properly rejects a demand
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1997 SUPPLEMENT

7-341

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT ANNOTATED
to bring an action. Judicial decisions indicate that a derivative
action should be dismissed in these circumstances. See Aronson
v. Lewis, A13> A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). The prior version of the
Model Act was also silent on the effect of a detennination by a
special litigation committee of independent directors that a previously commenced derivative action can be dismissed. Several
state corporation laws have been amended to provide for action
by such a committee. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-32-4 (Burns 1984
& Supp. 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-49 (1985). Section
7.44(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be dismissed if there is a proper determination that the maintenance of
the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation. This
determination can be made prior to commencement of the suit in
response to a demand or after commencement upon examination
of the allegations of the complaint.
The procedures set forth in section 7.44 are not intended to
be exclusive. As noted in the comment to section 7.42, there may
be instances where a decision to commence an action falls within
the authority of an officer of the corporation depending upon the
amount of the claim and the identity of the potential defendants.
1.

THE PERSONS MAKING THE DETERMINATION

Section 7.44(b) prescribes the persons by whom the determination in subsection (a) may be made. The subsection provides
that the determination may be made by a majority vote of independent directors if there is a quorum of independent directors,
or by a committee of independent directors appointed by a vote
of the independent directors. These provisions parallel the mechanics for determining entitlement to indemnification in section
8.55 of the Model Act. In this respect this clause is an exception
to section 8.25 of the Model Act which requires the approval of
at least a majority of all the directors in office to create a committee and appoint members. This approach has been taken to
respond to the criticism expressed in a few cases that special
htigation committees suffer from a structural bias because of their
appointment by vote of non-independent directors. See Hasan v.
Cleve Trust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 376-77 (6th Cir.
1984).
The decisions which have examined the qualifications of directors making the determination have required that they be both
7-342
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"disinterested" in the sense of not having a personal interest in
the transaction being challenged as opposed to a benefit which
devolves upon the corporation or all shareholders generally, and
"independent" in the sense of not being influenced in favor of
the defendants by reason of personal or other relationships. See,
e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16 (Del. 1984). Only
the word * 'independent'' has been used in section 7.44(b) because
it is believed that this word necessarily also includes the requirement that a person have no interest in the transaction. The concept
of an independent director is not intended to be limited to nonofficer or "outside" directors but may in appropriate circumstances include directors who are also officers.
Many of the special litigation committees involved in the reported cases consisted of directors who were elected after the
alleged wrongful acts by the directors who were named as defendants in the action. Subsection (c)(1) makes it clear that the participation of non-independent directors or shareholders in the
nomination or election of a new director shall not prevent the new
director from being considered independent. This sentence therefore rejects the concept that the mere appointment of new directors by the non-independent directors makes the new directors
not independent in making the necessary determination because
of an inherent structural bias. Clauses (2) and (3) also confirm
the decisions by a number of courts that the mere fact that a
director has been named as a defendant or approved the action
being challenged does not cause the director to be considered not
independent. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del.
1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1983). It is believed that a court will be able to assess any actual bias in deciding
whether the director is independent without any presumption arising out of the method of the director's appointment, the mere
naming of the director as a defendant, or the director's approval
of the act where the director received no personal benefit from
the transaction.
Subsection (f) also provides for a determination by a panel of
one or more independent persons appointed by the court. Cf. VIRGINIA STOCK CORP. ACT § 13.1-672D (1987) (court may appoint
a committee of two or more persons). The subsection provides
for the appointment only upon motion by the corporation. This
would not, however, prevent the court on its own initiative from
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appointing a special master pursuant to applicable state rules of
procedure.
This procedure may be desirable in a number of circumstances. If there are no independent directors available, the corporation may not wish to enlarge the board to add independent
directors or may be unable to find persons willing to serve as
independent directors. In addition, if there are independent directors, they may not have the available time to conduct the inquiry
in an expeditious manner.
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question
about the independence of the person making the determination. Although the corporation may wish to suggest to the court
possible appointees, the court will not be bound by these suggestions and, in any case, will want to satisfy itself with respect
to independence at the time the person is appointed. When the
court appoints a panel, section 7.44(f) places the burden on the
plaintiff to prove that the requirements of section 7.44(a) have
not been met.
Although subsection (b)(2) requires a committee of at least
two directors, subsection (f) permits the appointment of only one
person in recognition of the potentially increased costs to the
corporation for the fees and expenses of an outside person.
2.

STANDARD TO BE APPLIED

Section 7.44(a) requires that the determination be made by
the appropriate persons in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based. The word
"inquiry" rather than "investigation" has been used to make it
clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues
raised and the knowledge of the group making the determination
with respect to the issues. In some cases, the issues may be so
simple or the knowledge of the group so extensive that little additional inquiry is required. In other cases, the group may need
to engage counsel and other professionals to make an investigation and assist the group in its evaluation of the issues.
The phrase "in good faith" modifies both the determination
and the inquiry. The test, which is also included in sections 8.30
(general standards of conduct for directors) and 8.51 (authority
to indemnify), is a subjective one, meaning "honestly or in an
7-344
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honest manner." "The Corporate Director's Guidebook," 33
Bus. LAW. 1595, 1601 (1978). As stated in Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F. Supp. 795, 800 (E.D. Va. 1982), "the
inquiry intended by this phrase goes to the spirit and sincerity
with which the investigation was conducted, rather than the reasonableness of its procedures or basis for conclusions."
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically. This provision authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden
of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever party
has the burden under section 7.44(e). This phrase does not require
the persons making the determination to prepare a written report
that sets forth their determination and the bases therefor, since
circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report. There
may, however, be many instances where good corporate practice
will commend such a procedure.
Section 7.44 is not intended to modify the general standards
of conduct for directors set forth in section 8.30 of the Model
Act, but rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit
in the derivative proceeding context. In this regard, the independent directors making the determination would be entitled to rely
on information and reports from other persons in accordance with
section 8.30(b).
Section 7.44 is similar in several respects and differs in certain
other respects from the law as it has developed in Delaware and
been followed in a number of other states. Under the Delaware
cases, the role of the court in reviewing the board's determination
varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is in a demand-required or demand-excused situation. Demand is excused only if
the plaintiff pleads particularized facts that create a reasonable
doubt that a majority of directors at the time demand would be
made are independent or disinterested, or that the challenged
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment by the approving board. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
814 (Del. 1984); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194 (Del. 1991). If
the plaintiff fails to make these two showings, demand is required. Since the Aronson requirements are difficult to satisfy, the
plaintiff normally must make demand on the board.
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In the unusual case where the plaintiffs demand is excused
under either of the Aronson tests, the plaintiff has standing to
bring the derivative suit. If the corporation seeks to reassert its
right to control the litigation, the corporation will form a special
litigation committee to determine if the litigation is in the best
interests of the corporation. If the corporation files a motion to
dismiss the litigation based upon the recommendation of the special committee, Delaware law requires the corporation to bear the
burden of proving the independence of the committee, the reasonableness of its investigation, and the reasonableness of the
bases of its decision reflected in the motion. Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). Zapata also permits the
court a discretionary second step to review the special committee's decision by invoking the court's "independent business
judgment." Id. at 789.
In the usual scenario where demand is not excused, the shareholder must demand that the board take action and the Zapata
principles do not apply. The board or special committee of independent directors decides whether the corporation should take
the action the shareholder requests or respond in some other way.
As in the case of all board decisions, the board's response to the
shareholder's demand is presumptively protected by the traditional business judgment rule. Allison v. General Motors Corp.,
604 F. Su£>p. 1106, 1122 (D. Del. 1985). As a result, the shareholder in filing suit bears the normal burden of creating by particularized pleadings a reasonable doubt that the board's response
to the demand was wrongful. Levine v. Smith, No. 591 A.2d 194,
210 (Del. 1991). The plaintiff must allege with particularity a
lack of good faith, care, independence, or disinterestedness by the
directors in responding to the demand.
In contrast to Delaware's approach, some jurisdictions have
adopted uniform tests to judge both demand-required and demand-excused situations. For example, in New York, judicial review is always limited to an analysis of the independence and
good faith of the board or committee and the reasonableness of
its investigation; the court does not examine the reasonableness
of the bases for the board's decision, nor does the court have the
discretionary authority to use its independent business judgment.
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,633-34,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
928-29, 393 N.E.2d 994,1002-03 (1979). In contrast, the North
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Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted that state's statutory provisions on derivative actions as requiring the application of the
Zapata criteria in both demand-required and demand-excused
cases. Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.R2d 323, 327 (N.C. 1987).
Since section 7.42 requires demand in all cases, the distinction
between demand-excused and demand-required cases does not
apply. Subsections (d) and (e) of section 7.44 carry forward the
distinction, however, by establishing pleading rules and allocating the burden of proof depending on whether there is a majority
of independent directors. Subsection (d), like Delaware law, assigns the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging facts establishing that majority of the board is not independent. If there is
an independent majority, the burden remains with the plaintiff to
plead and establish that the requirements of section 7.44(a) have
not been met. If there is no independent majority, the burden is
on the corporation on the issues delineated in section 7.44(a). In
this case, the corporation must prove both the independence of
the decisionmakers and the propriety of the inquiry and determination.
Subsections (d) and (e) of section 7.44 thus follow the first
Aronson standard in allocating the burden of proof depending on
whether the majority of the board is independent. The Committee
on Corporate Laws decided, however, not to adopt the second
Aronson standard for excusing demand (and thus shifting the burden to the corporation) based on whether the decision of the board
that decided the challenged transaction is protected by the business judgment rule. The committee believes that the only appropriate concern in the context of derivative litigation is whether
the board considering the demand has a disabling conflict See
Starrels v. First Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1172-76 (7th Cir.
1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of 7.44(a)
have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in several situations. First, in subsection (b)(1), the burden of proof will generally remain with the plaintiff since the subsection requires a
quorum of independent directors and a quorum is normally a
majority. See section 8.24. The burden will also remain with the
plaintiff if there is a majority of independent directors which appoints the committee under subsection (b)(2). Under section
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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7.44(f), the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in the
case of a determination by a panel appointed by the court.
The burden of proof will shift to the corporation, however,
where a majority of directors is not independent, and the determination is made by the group specified in subsection (b)(2). It
can be argued that, if the directors making the determination under subsection (b)(2) are independent and have been delegated
full responsibility for making the decision, the composition of the
entire board is irrelevant. This argument is buttressed by the section's method of appointing the group specified in subsection
(b)(2) since subsection (b)(2) departs from the general method of
appointing committees and allows only independent directors,
rather than a majority of the entire board, to appoint the committee which will make the determination. Nevertheless, despite
the argument that the composition of the board is irrevelant in
these circumstances, the Committee on Corporate Laws adopted
the provisions of subsections (b)(2) and (e) of section 7.44 to
respond to concerns of structural bias.
Finally, section 7.44 does not authorize the court to review
the reasonableness of the determination. As discussed above, the
phrase in section 7.44(a)' 'upon which its conclusions are based''
limits judicial review to whether the determination has some support in the findings of the inquiry.
3.

PLEADING

Former section 7.40(b) provided that the complaint in a derivative proceeding must allege with particularity whether demand has been made on the board of directors and the board's
response or why demand was excused. This requirement is similar to rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Since
demand is now required in all cases, this provision is no longer
necessary.
Subsection (d) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover the
typical situation where plaintiff makes demand on the board, the
board rejects that demand, and the plaintiff commences an action.
In that scenario, in order to state a cause of action, subsection (d)
requires the complaint to allege facts with particularity demonstrating either (1) that no majority of independent directors exists
or (2) why the determination does not meet the standards in subsection (a).Digitized
Discovery
is available to the plaintiff only after the
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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SECTION 7.44
plaintiff has successfully stated a cause of action by making either
of these two showings.
ANNOTATION
HISTORY
See the Annotation to section 7.40.
STATUTES
Ariz. Rev. Stat Ann. § 10-744
Conn. Bus. Corp. Act § 33-724 (West)
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.07401 (3)
Ca. Code Ann. § 14-2-744
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 414-175
Idaho Code §30-1-744
Iowa Code Ann. § 490.744
13-C Me. Rev. Stat Ann. § 755
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §§ 450.1491a, 450.1495 (West)
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-4-7.44
Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-545
Neb. Rev. Stat. §21-2074
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.44
N.C. Gen. Stat § 55-7-44
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. art. 5.14G, H (Vernon)
Va. Code §13.1-672.4
Wis. Stat Ann. § 180.0744 (West)
Wyo. Stat §17-16-744

For a list of other statutes dealing with derivative proceedings,
see the Annotation to section 7.40.
STATUTORY COMPARISON
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Carolina, and Wisconsin have adopted section 7.44 with little substantive change.
Florida has no counterpart to subsection (c); its statute further
provides that the court "may," rather than "shall," dismiss the
proceeding, refers to "investigation," rather than "inquiry," and
imposes the burden of showing good faith and reasonable investigation on the corporation in all instances. Michigan has no provision similar to section 7.44(c) and also requires that the corporation bear the burden of establishing good faith and reasonable
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or more disinterested persons or ''all" disinterested directors; a
"disinterested" person is defined as someone who is not a party
to the proceeding or against whom the claim asserted is "frivolous or insubstantial."
In Texas, one or more "disinterested and independent" directors may appoint a committee consisting of two or more disinterested and independent directors; plaintiff bears the burden of
proof if the determination to dismiss is made by a majority of
independent and disinterested directors or by a panel of independent persons; if a majority of the board is not independent and
disinterested and a committee makes the determination, the burden of proof is on the corporation unless it provides "prima facie
evidence'' that the committee members making the determination
were independent and disinterested.
The Virginia provision substitutes a ' 'review and evaluation
of the allegations made in the complaint" and requires that the
reviewing body submit in support of its motion to dismiss "a
short and concise statement of the reasons for its determination'';
the plaintiff has the burden of proof in all cases, except where
the complaint pleads with particularity' 'facts raising a substantial
question" concerning the independence of the board or board
committee making the determination to dismiss.
In Wyoming, a determination to dismiss may be made only
by an independent panel appointed by the court.
For comparison to other state statutes, see the Annotation to
section 7.40.

§7.45. DISCONTINUANCE OR SETTLEMENT
A derivative proceeding may not be discontinued or settled without the court's approval. If the court determines that a proposed
discontinuance or settlement will substantially affect the interests
of the corporation's shareholders or a class of shareholders, the
court shall direct that notice be given to the shareholders affected.

CROSS-REFERENCES
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 7.40.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
"Shareholder"
defined,
see § 7.40.
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[Subchapter] C
SECRETARY OF STATE
§ 1.30. Powers.

SECTION 1.40

[Subchapter] D
DEFINITIONS
§ 1,40. [Act] definitions.
§ 1.41. Notice.

§1.30. POWERS
The secretary of state has the powers reasonably necessary to perform the duties required of the secretary of state by this [act].
Source Note; Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.30. Reenactment of Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.30.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Administrative dissolution, see § 14.20,
Revocation of certificate of authority of foreign nonprofit
corporation, see Subch. 15C.
Secretary of state's filing duty, see § 1,25.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 1.30 is intended to grant the secretary of state the
authority necessary for the efficient performance of thefilingand
other duties imposed by the act but is not intended to give the
secretary of state general authority to establish public policy. The
most important aspects of a modern corporation statute relate
to the creation and maintenance of relationships among persons
interested in or involved with a corporation, These relationships
basically should be a matter of concern to the parties involved
and not subject to regulation or interpretation by the secretary of
state. Further, even in situations where it is claimed that the corporation has been formed or is being operated for purposes that
may violate the public policies of the state, the secretary of state
generally should not be the governmental official who determines the scope of public policy through administration of the
filing responsibilities under the act. Rather, the attorney general
may seek to .enjoin the illegal conduct or to dissolve involuntarily
the offending corporation.
1-30

§1.40. [ACT] DEFINITIONS
In this [act], unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
(1) "Articles" or "articles of incorporation" means the original articles of incorporation, all amendments thereof,
and any other records filed with the secretary of state
with respect to a domestic nonprofit corporation under
any provision of this [act] except Section 16.21, If any
record filed under this [act] restates the articles in their
entirety, thenceforth the articles shall not include any
prior filings.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (20Q2) § 1.40(1). Compare Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (1987) § 1,40.
(2) "Board" or "board of directors" means the group of individuals responsible for the management of the activities
and affairs of the nonprofit corporation, regardless of
the name used to refer to the group. The term includes a
designated body to the extent:
(i) the authority, powers, or functions of the board
have been vested in, or are exercised by, the designated body; and
(ii) the provision of this [act] in which the term appears
is relevant to the discharge by the designated body
of its authority, powers, or functions.
Source Note; Patterned in part after first two sentences of
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5103 (2008) ("board of directors").
Compare Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987)
§ 1.40(3).
(3) "Business corporation" or "domestic business corporation" means a corporation incorporated under the laws
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Source Note: New.
(26) "Governmental subdivision" includes an authority,
county, district, and municipality.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(11)', Reenactment of Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(17).
(27) "Governor" means a person by or under whose authority the powers of an unincorporated entity are exercised
and under whose direction the business, activities, or
affairs of the entity are managed pursuant to the organic
law and organic records of the entity.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Entity Transactions Act
§ 102(16).
(28) "Includes" denotes a partial definition.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(12). Reenactment of Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(18).
(29) "Individual" means a natural person.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(13). Compare Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(19).
(30)"Interest" means either or both of the following rights
under the organic law of an unincorporated entity;
(i) the right to receive distributions from the entity
either in the ordinary course or upon liquidation; or
(ii) the right to receive notice or vote on issues involving
its internal affairs, other than as an agent, assignee,
proxy, or person responsible for managing its business, activities, or affairs.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(13A).
(31)"Interest holder" means a person who holds of record
an interest,

36

Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(13B).
(32)"Interest holder liability" means personal liability for
a debt, obligation, or liability of a domestic or foreign
business or nonprofit corporation or unincorporated
entity that is imposed on a person:
(i) solely by reason of the person's status as a shareholder, interest holder, or member; or
(ii) by the articles of incorporation, bylaws, or an organic
record pursuant to a provision of the organic law
authorizing the articles, bylaws, or an organic record
to make one or more specified shareholders, interest
holders, or members liable in their capacity as shareholders, interest holders, or members for all or specified debts, obligations, or liabilities of the entity.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3dEd. (2002) § 1.40(15C),
(33) "Internal Revenue Code" means the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (Public Law 99-514, 26 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.),
as amended.
Source Note: New.
(34) "Material interest" means an actual or potential benefit
or detriment, other than one that would devolve on the
nonprofit corporation or the members generally, that
would reasonably be expected to impair the objectivity
of an individual's judgment when participating in the
action to be taken.
Source Note: Patterned.after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (2005) § 1.43(b)(2).
(35) "Material relationship" means a familial, financial, professional, employment, or other relationship that would
reasonably be expected to impair the.objectivity of an
individual's judgment when participating in'the action
to be taken.
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Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed. (2005) § 1.43(b)(1).

Source Note: Patterned after proposed Model Business Corporation Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(14B).

j
i
j
j
j
i

(36) "Means" denotes an exhaustive definition.
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation
Act, 3d Ed, (2002) § 1.40(14), Substantially a reenactment of
Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(20).
(37) "Member" means:
(i) A person who has the right, in accordance with the.;
articles of incorporation or bylaws and n o t as a delegate, to select or vote for the election of directors
or delegates or to vote on any type of fundamental
transaction. See Section 6.02(d) (admission).
(ii) A designated body to the extent:
(A) the authority, powers, or functions of the m e m bers have been vested in, or are exercised by,
• the designated body; and
(B) the provision of this [act] in which the term
appears is relevant to the discharge by the
designated body of its authority, powers, or
functions.
Source Note: Compare Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation
Act (1987) § 1.40(21).
(38) "Membership" means the rights and any obligations of a
member in a nonprofit corporation.
Source Note: Patterned in part after Revised Model Nonprofit
Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(22), Compare Model Business
Corporation Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § i.40(14A),
(39) "Membership corporation" means a nonprofit corporation whose articles of incorporation or bylaws provide
that it shall have members.
Source Note: New.
(40) "Nonfiling entity" means an unincorporated entity that
is n o t created by filing a public organic record.

1-38

(41)"Nonmembership corporation" means a nonprofit corporation whose articles of incorporation or bylaws do
n o t provide that it shall have members,
Source Note: New.
•

1
|.
|1

(42) "Nonqualified foreign corporation" means a foreign
corporation that is n o t authorized to conduct activities
in this state.

j
!
ij
H

Source Note; New.
(43) "Notice" is provided for in Section 1.41,
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 1.40(15), Reenactment of Revised Model
Nonprofit Corporation Act (1987) § 1.40(24).

ii
j
||
j
||

(44) "Officer" includes:
' (i) a person who is an officer as provided in Section

;.J
1

8.40; and

-

j]

(ii) if a nonprofit corporation is in the hands of a custodian, receiver, trustee or other court-appointed
fiduciary, that fiduciary or any person appointed
by that fiduciary to act as an officer for any purpose
under this [act],

;
'
j
;
r

Source Note: Patterned after 15 PA, CONS. STAT, § 5103 (2008)
("officer").
•

J
|

(45)"Organic law" means the statute principally governing
the internal affairs of a domestic or foreign business or
nonprofit corporation or unincorporated entity,

j
;
j

Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed, (2002) § 1.40(15B).

1

(46) "Organic record" means a public organic record or the
private organic rules,

H
I

Source Note; Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed, (2002) § 1.40(15A).

i.
j]
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SECTION 13.03

CROSS-REFERENCES
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13.01.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
The act and the statutes of many states have long required
that a plaintiff must have been a member at the time of the transaction in question. This rule has been criticized as being unduly
narrow and technical and unnecessary to prevent the transfer or
purchase of lawsuits.
The decision to retain the rule of contemporaneous status as
a member in Section 13.02(b) was based primarily on the view
that it was simple, clear, and easy to apply. Further, there has.
been no persuasive showing that the contemporaneous membership rule has prevented the litigation of substantial suits. Where
the plaintiff is a director or member of a designated body, however, the plaintiff need only have that status at the time the proceeding is commenced.
Section 13.02 does not permit a creditor to commence a
derivative proceeding.

j

OFFICIAL COMMENT.
Section 13.03 requires a demand on the nonprofit corporation in all cases. The demand must be made at least 90 days
before commencement of suit unless irreparable injury to the
corporation would result, This approach has been adopted for
two reasons, First, even though no director may be independent,
the demand will give the board of directors the opportunity to
re-examine the act complained of in the light of a potential lawsuit and take corrective action. Secondly, the provision eliminates
the time and expense of the litigants and the court involved in
litigating the question whether demand is required. It is believed
that requiring a demand in all cases does not impose an onerous
burden since a relatively short waiting period of 90 days is provided and this period may be shortened if irreparable injury to
the corporation would result by waiting for the expiration of the
90-day period. Moreover, the cases in which demand is excused
are relatively rare. Many plaintiffs' counsel as a matter of practice
make a demand in all cases rather than litigate the issue whether
demand is excused.

!
|j

L Form of Demand
Section 13,03 specifies only that the demand must be in
the form of a record. The demand should, however, set forth

\'\

the facts concerning membership and be sufficiently specific

'•!

to apprise the nonprofit corporation of "the action sought to be
taken and the ground for that action so that the demand can be
evaluated. See Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. SUPP. 1106,
1117 (D. Del. 1985), Detailed pleading is not required since the
corporation can contact the member for clarification if there are
any questions, In keeping with the spirit of this section, the specificity of the demand should not become a new source of dilatory
motions.
2. Upon Whom Demand Should Be Made
Section 13.03 states that demand shall be made upon the
nonprofit corporation. Reference is not made specifically to the
board of directors since there may be instances, such as a decision

;|
j
j

n
j
r
;
:
j]
:
-|
~
\\
i1
j.
j
ii
H
r4
jj
i!

§ 13.03, DEMAND
A person may not commence a derivative proceeding until;
(1) a demand in the form of a record has been delivered to the '.
nonprofit corporation to take-suitable action; and
(2) 90 days have expired from the date the demand was effective 7
unless the person has earlier been notified that the demand
has been rejected by the corporation or unless irreparable ,
injury to the corporation would result by waiting for the.."
expiration of the 90-day period.
••
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation.1
Act, 3d Ed. (2002) § 7.42. Compare Revised Model Nonprofit.-;.
Corporation Act (1987) § 6.30(c).
4;
CROSS-REFERENCES
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13,01,
13-4
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SECTION 13.05

j
1

(b) See Section 13.06 (applicability to foreign corporations).
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business CorporationAct, 3d Ed. (2002) § 7,43, Compare Revised Model NonprofitCorporation Act (1987) § 6;30(c). Subsection (b) is new.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Demand, see § 13.03.
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13.01.
OFFICIAL COMMENT
Section 13.04 provides that if the nonprofit corporationundertakes an inquiry, the court may in its discretion stay the ;
proceeding for such period as the court deems appropriate, This:
might occur where the complaint is filed 90 days after demandbut the inquiry into matters raised by the demand has not been;
completed or where a demand has not been investigated but the.!
corporation commences the inquiry after the complaint has been/.'
filed. In either case, it is expected that the court will monitor the-'
course of the inquiry to ensure that it is proceeding expeditiously.;
and in good faith.
•;;
§ 13.05. DISMISSAL
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court oft','
motion by the nonprofit corporation if one of the groups/}
specified in subsection (b) or (e) has determined in good:i
. faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its';*
conclusions are based that the maintenance of the derivative;
proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.
;i
(b) Unless a panel is appointed pursuant to subsection (e), the;"'?
determination in subsection (a) shall be made by:
'4
(1) a majority vote of independent directors present at &*
meeting of the board of directors if the independent;'
directors constitute a quorum; or
C;
(2) a majority vote of a committee consisting of two or more •':
independent directors appointed by majority vote ofl

13-8

f
j
I

independent directors present at a meeting of the board
of directors, whether or not such independent directors
!.:.
-constituted a quorum.
"v. (c) If a derivative proceeding is commenced after a determina- ;tion has been made rejecting a demand by a member, the n
complaint must allege with particularity facts establishing j.
either:
!'
(1) that a majority of the board of directors did not consist |,
of independent directors at the time the determination
j
was made; or
||
(2) that the requirements of subsection (a) have not been !-j
met.
p;
'" (d) If a majority of the board of directors does not consist of \\
independent directors at the time the determination is made, j;
the nonprofit corporation has the burden of proving that the
|j
requirements of subsection (a) have been met. If a majority
jj
of the board of directors consists of independent directors at
jl
the time the determination is made, the plaintiff has the bur;|
den of proving that the requirements of subsection (a) have
;i
not been met
•
\\
;
• (e) The court may appoint a panel of one or more independent
:
persons upon motion by the nonprofit corporation to make
:
a determination whether the maintenance of the derivative
I
proceeding is in the best interests of the corporation. In such
;
case, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the M
requirements of subsection (a) have not been met.
J
(f) A person is independent for purposes of this section if the
j]
person does not have:
:.
(1) a material interest in the outcome of the proceeding, or
1
(2) a material relationship with a person who has such an
;
interest.
!
(g) None of the following shall by itself cause a director to be
ii
considered not independent for purposes of this section:
J
(1) the nomination, election, or appointment of the direcj;
tor byivpersons who are defendants in the derivative proj]
ceeding or against whom action is demanded;
jj
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(2) the naming of the director as' a defendant in the derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action is
demanded; or
(3) the approval by the director of the act being challenged
in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted
in no personal benefit to the director,
Source Note: Patterned after Model Business Corporation Act,
3d Ed, (2002) §7.44.
CROSS-REFERENCES
Board of directors;
committees, see § 8.25.
meetings, see § 8,20.
quorum and voting, see § 8.24.
Demand, see § 13.03.
"Derivative proceeding" defined, see § 13.01.
"Material interest" defined, see § 1.40.
."Material relationship" defined, see § 1.40.
OFFICIAL C O M M E N T
When a board of directors properly rejects a demand to bring, i
an action, judicial decisions indicate that the derivative action.?
should be dismissed. See Aronson v. Lewis, 743 A.2D 805, 813 ^i
(Del, 1984). The prior version of the act was silent on the effect $
of a determination by a special litigation committee of indepenvj-'
dent directors that a previously commenced derivative action can.'.?;
be dismissed. Several state business corporation laws have been;;}-;
amended to provide for action by such a committee. See, e.g. IND.'V*
CODE AKN. § 23-1-32-4 (Burns 1984 & Supp. 1988); N.D. CENX,:;S
CODE § 10-19.149 (1985). This section adopts for nonprofit cor^Jd
porations those developments in business corporation law. Secj?-^
tion 13.05(a) specifically provides that the proceeding shall be|J|
dismissed if there is a proper determination that the ftiaintenanoe$|
of the proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporationf||
This determination can be made prior to commencement of th&*J

SECTION 13.05

suit in response to a d e m a n d o r after t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t u p o n
examination of the allegations of t h e complaint.
The procedures set forth i n Section 13,05 are n o t intended
to b e exclusive. As n o t e d i n the c o m m e n t t o Section 13.03, there
m a y b e instances where a decision to c o m m e n c e an action falls
within the authority of an officer of t h e nonprofit corporation
. depending u p o n the a m o u n t of the claim and the identity of the
potential defendants.
\: L The Persons Making the Determination
;•.
Section 13.05(b) prescribes the persons by whom the deterr ruination in subsection (a) may be made. The subsection pro"'•• vides that the determination may be made by a majority vote of
L independent directors if there is a quorum of independent direc.;- tors, or by a committee of independent directors appointed by a
-.vote of the independent directors. These provisions parallel the
mechanics for determining entitlement to indemnification in
r Section 8.55. I n this respect this clause is a n exception to Sec• tion 8.25 which required the approval of at least a majority of all
.. the directors in office to create a committee and appoint mem.-•bers. This approach has been taken to respond to the criticism
•/'expressed in a few cases that special litigation committees suf*': fer from a structural bias because of their appointment by a vote
.-.:of non-independent directors, See Hasan v. Cleve Trust Realty
.;• Investors, 729 F.2D 372, 376-77 (6th Cir. 1984).
The decisions that have examined the qualifications of direc•.•tors making the determination have required that the directors
.'.be both "disinterested" in the sense of not having a personal
\ interest in the transaction being challenged (as opposed to a benefit which devolves upon the corporation or all shareholders gen.eraliy) and "independent" in the sense of not being influenced
:,in favor of the defendants by reason of personal or other relationships. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 743 A,2D 805, 812-16 (Del,
:1984). Only the word "independent" has been used in Section
-'.13.05(b) because it is believed that a person who has an interest
••in the transaction would not be independent. The concept of an
.independent director is not intended to be limited to nonofficer

1
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or "outside" directors but may in appropriate circumstances
include directors who are also officers.
Many of the special litigation committees involved in the
reported cases consisted of directors who were elected after the
alleged wrongful acts by the directors who were named as defendants in the action. Section 13.05(g)(1) makes it clear that the
participation of non-independent directors or members in the
nomination, election, or appointment of a new director will
not prevent the new director from being considered independent. This sentence therefore rejects the concept that the mere
appointment of new directors by the non-independent directors
makes the new directors not independent in making the necessary determination because of an inherent structural bias. Clauses
(2) and (3) also confirm the decisions by a number of courts that
the mere fact that a director has been named as a defendant or
approved the action being challenged does not cause the director to be considered not independent. See Aronson v. Lewis, 743
A,2D 805, 816 (Del. 1984); Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2D 245 (2d Cir.
1983). It is believed that a court will be able to assess any actual
bias in deciding whether the director is independent without any
presumption arising out of the method of the director's appointment, the mere naming of the director as a defendant, or the
director's approval of the act where the director received no personal benefit from the transaction.
Section 13.05(e) also provides for a determination by a panel
of one or more independent persons appointed by the court Cf.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672D (1987) (court may appoint a committee of two or more persons). The subsection provides for the
appointment only upon motion by the nonprofit corporation.
This would not, however, prevent the court on its own initiative
from appointing a special master pursuant to applicable state
rules of procedure.
This procedure may be desirable in a number of circumstances. If there are no independent directors available, the nonprofit corporation may not wish to enlarge the board to add
independent directors or may be unable to find persons willing
to serve as independent directors. In addition, if there are inde13-12

pendent directors, they may not have the available time to conduct the inquiry in an expeditious manner.
Appointment by the court should also eliminate any question
;. about the independence of the person making the determination,
Although the nonprofit corporation may wish to suggest to the
• court possible appointees, the court will not be bound by these
..'..suggestions and, in any case, will want to satisfy itself with respect
ftp independence at the same time the person is appointed,
•/' Although subsection (b)(2) requires a committee of at least
;'.two directors, subsection (e) permits the appointment of only
;
-pne person in recognition of the potentially increased costs to
vthe nonprofit corporation for the fees and expenses of an outside
tlperson.
-}i. Under Section 8.12, a designated body may perform the
^-functions of the"boar3~oFSiiectors under this section,
y2, • Standards to Be Applied
*??'" Section 13.05(a) requires that the determination be made by
vtHe appropriate persons in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which their conclusions are based. The word
^•inquiry" rather than "investigation" has been used to make it
".clear that the scope of the inquiry will depend upon the issues
Raised and knowledge of the group making the determination
Ivwith respect to the issues. In some cases, the issues may be so
jimple or the knowledge of the group so extensive that little addi.itibnal inquiry-is required, In other cases, the group may need to
•••"engage counsel and other professionals to make an investigation
Jand assist the group in its evaluation of the issues.
£•;-• The phrase "in jgood faith" modifies both the determination and inquiry. The test, which is also included in Section 8.30
^general standards of conduct for directors) and 8.51 (authority
|to indemnijEy), is a subjective one, meaning "honestly or in an
fhonest manner," The American Bar Association, The Corporate
^Director's Guidebook 33 Bus. LAW. 1595, 1601 (1978). As stated
viri Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co.} 546 F. Supp. 795, 800
J:(E.D. Va. 1982), "the inquiry intended by this phrase goes to the
.jjjJirit and sincerity with which the investigation was conducted,
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rather than the reasonableness of its procedures or basis for
conclusions."
The phrase "upon which its conclusions are based" requires
that the inquiry and the conclusions follow logically. This provision authorizes the court to examine the determination to ensure
that it has some support in the findings of the inquiry. The burden of convincing the court about this issue lies with whichever
party has the burden under Section 13.05(d). This phrase does
not require the persons maJking the determination to prepare a
report that sets forth their determination and the bases therefore,
since circumstances will vary as to the need for such a report
There may, however, be many instances where good corporate
practice will commend such a procedure.
Section 13.05 is not intended to modify the general standards
of conduct for directors set forth in Section 8.30 of the act, but
rather to make those standards somewhat more explicit in the
derivative proceeding contest, In this regard, the independent
directors making the determination would be entitled to rely on
information and reports from other persons in accordance with
Section 8.30(b).
Section 13.05 is similar in several respects and differs in
certain other respects from the law as it has developed in Delaware and been followed in a number of other states. Under the
Delaware cases, the role of the court in reviewing the board's
determination varies depending upon whether the plaintiff is
in a demand-required or demand-excused situation. Demand is
excused only if the plaintiff pleads particularized facts that create a reasonable doubt that a majority of directors at the time
demand would be made are independent or disinterested, or that
the challenged transaction was the product of a valid exercise of
business judgment by the approving board. Aronson v. Lewis, 743
A.2D 805, 814 (Del. 1984); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2D 194 (Del.
1991). If the plaintiff fails to make these two showings, demand
is required. Since the Aronson requirements are difficult to satisfy, the plaintiff normally must make demand on the board.
In the unusual case where the plaintiffs demand is excused
under either of the Aronson tests, the plaintiff has standing to

j
-i
•>•
•$
•*.
;j;
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bring the derivative suit. If the nonprofit corporation seeks to !j
reassert its right to control the litigation, the corporation will ...
form a special litigation committee to determine if the litigation :
is in the best interests of the corporation. If the corporation files j:
a motion to dismiss the litigation based upon the recommenda- :•
tion of the special committee, Delaware law requires the corpo- j
ration to bear the burden of proving the independence of -the I.
committee, the reasonableness of its investigation, and the rea- i\
sonableness of the bases of its decision reflected in the motion. J
Zapata Corp, v. Maldonado, 430 A.2D 779 (Del. 1981). Zapata j
also permits the court a discretionaiy second step to review the I]
special committee's decision by invoking the court's C(indepen- i
dent business judgment." Id, at 789.
i
In the usual scenario where*demand is not excused, the mem- j
ber must demand that the board take action and the Zapata prin- j
ciples do not apply. The board or special committee of indepen- J
dent directors decides whether the nonprofit corporation should j
take the action the member requests or respond in some other n
way. As in the case of all board decisions, the board's response .
to the member's demand is presumptively protected by the tra- I'
ditional business judgment rule. Allison v. General Motors Corp., !
604 R SUPP. 1106, 1122 (D.Del. 1985). As a result, the member !;
in filing suit bears the normal burden of creating by particular- H
ized pleadings a reasonable doubt that the board's response to H
the demand was wrongful, Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2D 194, 210 II
(Del. 1991), The plaintiff must allege with particularity a lack of h
good faith, care, independence, or disinterestedness by the direcjj
tors in responding to the demand.
j.
In contrast to Delaware's approach, some jurisdictions have
!
adopted uniform tests to judge both demand-required and
demand-excused situations. For example, in New York, judicial
[
review'is always limited to an analysis of the independence and jgood faith of the board or committee and the reasonableness of
;
the bases for the board's decision, and the court does not have
j
ihe discretionaiy authority to use itsindependent business judgj
nent. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y,2D 619, 633-34, 419 N.Y.S. 2D
i
)20, 928-29, 393 N.E.2D 994, 1002-03 (1979). In contrast, the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

' 13-15

i

MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT, THIRD EDITION
SECTION 13,05

North Carolina Supreme Court has interpreted that state's statutory provisions on derivative actions as requiring the application
of the Zapata criteria in both demand-required and demand- • •
excused cases, Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2D 323, 327 (N.C. 1987).
Since Section 13.03 requires demand in all cases, the distinction between demand-excused and demand-required cases .
does not apply. Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 13.05 carry
forward the distinction, however, by establishing pleading rules ,
and allocating the burden of proof depending on whether there •
is a majority of independent directions. Subsection (c), like Del- .'[
aware law, assigns the plaintiff the threshold burden of alleging ;
facts establishing that a majority of the board is not independent.' \
If there is an independent majority, the burden remains with the.'
plaintiff to plead and establish that the requirements of Section ,':
13,05(a) have not been met. If there is no independent major- ••'
ity, the burden is on the nonprofit corporation on the issues £
delineated in Section 13.05(a). In this case, the corporation must »j
prove both the independence of the decision makers and the :j
propriety of the inquiry and determination.
Subsections (c) and (d) of Section 13.05 thus follow the first-;'".
Aronson standard in allocating the burden of proof depending o n |
whether the majority of the board is independent. The commitr ;<
tee decided, however, not to adopt the second Aronson standard :£
for excusing demand (and thus shifting the burden to the corpor.V
ration) based on whether the decision of the board that decided.^
the challenged transaction is protected by the business judgment.;!:
rule. The committee believes that the only appropriate concern-';
in the context of derivative litigation is whether the board con?"^
sidering the demand has a disabling conflict. See Starrels v. First?.*
Nat'lBank, 870 F,2D 1168, 1172-76 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook,£
J. concurring).
;;*
Thus, the burden of proving that the requirements of Section I
13.05(a) have not been met will remain with the plaintiff in sey-^?
eral situations. First, in subsection (b)(1), the burden of proof wilPj
generally remain with the plaintiff since the subsection requires^
a quorum of independent directors and a quorum is normally^
a majority. See Section 8.24. The burden will also remain witft;^
13-16

•:.• the plaintiff if there is a majority of independent directors that
%-.- appoints the committee under subsection (b)(2), Under Section
$ 13.05(e), the burden of proof also remains with the plaintiff in
!& the case of a determination by a panel appointed by the court.
wi , The burden of proof will shift to the nonprofit corporation,
if.-however, where a majority of directors is not independent, and
%:. the determination is made by the group specified in subsection
&;' (b)(2). It can be argued that, if the directors making the deter.J.'mination under subsection (b)(2) are independent and have
:
W.ybeen delegated full responsibility for making the decision, the
••^composition of the entire board is irrelevant. This argument
Cg.js buttressed by the section's method of appointing the group
^..specified in subsection (b)(2) since subsection (b)(2) departs
§;'from the general method of appointing committees and allows
f J; only independent directors, rather than a majority of the entire
^Jboard, to appoint the committee which will make the determi.^nation. Nevertheless, despite the argument that the composition
jyibf the board is irrelevant in these circumstances, the committee
^adopted the provisions of subsections (b)(2) and (d) of Section
i'; 13.05 to response to concerns of structural bias.
£$. ' Finally, Section 13.05 does n o t authorize t h e court to review
|\the reasonableness of the determination. As discussed above,
&the phrase i n Section 13.44(a) " u p o n w h i c h its conclusions are
leased" limits judicial review to whether the determination has
pspme support in finding of the inquiry.
£;3.' Pleading
|r;/:v; Section 13.05(c) sets forth a modified pleading rule to cover
jjjhe typical situation where a plaintiff makes d e m a n d on t h e
|£>bard, t h e b o a r d rejects that d e m a n d , a n d t h e plaintiff com?*nences an action. I n that scenario, i n order to state a cause of
Action; subsection (c) requires the complaint to allege facts with
|;p4rticularity demonstrating either (1) that n o majority of indep e n d e n t directors exists or (2) w h y the determination does n o t
iSn'eet the standards in subsection (a). Discovery is available to
!
t{ie plaintiff only after the plaintiff has successfully stated a cause
#f-action b y m a k i n g either of these two showings.
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l Principles of Corp. Governance § 1.23
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
As Adopted and Promulgated by The American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 13, 1992
Current through April 2012
Copyright © 1994-2012 by The American Law Institute
Part I. Definitions
§ 1.23 Interested

Link to Case Citations

(a) A director [§ 1.13] or officer [§ 1.27] is "interested" in a transaction or conduct if either:
(1) The director or officer, or an associate [§ 1.03] of the director or officer, is a party to the transaction or
conduct;
(2) The director or officer has a business, financial, or familial relationship with a party to the transaction or
conduct, and that relationship would reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with
respect to the transaction or conduct in a manner adverse to the corporation;
(3) The director or officer, an associate of the director or officer, or a person with whom the director or officer has
a business, financial, or familial relationship, has a material pecuniary interest in the transaction or conduct (other
than usual and customary directors' fees and benefits) and that interest and (if present) that relationship would
reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment in a manner adverse to the corporation; or
(4) The director or officer is subject to a controlling influence by a party to the transaction or conduct or a person
who has a material pecuniary interest in the transaction or conduct, and that controlling influence could
reasonably be expected to affect the director's or officer's judgment with respect to the transaction or conduct in a
manner adverse to the corporation.
(b) A shareholder is interested in a transaction or conduct if either the shareholder or, to the shareholder's
knowledge, an associate of the shareholder is a party to the transaction or conduct, or the shareholder is also an
interested director or officer with respect to the same transaction or conduct.
(c) A director is interested in an action within the meaning of Part VII, Chapter 1 (The Derivative Action), but not
elsewhere in these Principles, if:
(1) The director is interested, within the meaning of Subsection (a), in the transaction or conduct that is the subject
of the action, or
(2) The director is a defendant in the action, except that the fact a director is named as a defendant does not make
the director interested under this section if the complaint against the director:
(A) is based only on the fact that the director approved of or acquiesced in the transaction or conduct that is the
subject of the action, and
(B) does not otherwise allege with particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect that the director
would be adjudged liable to the corporation or its shareholders.
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2 Principles of Corp. Governance § 7.09
Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations
As Adopted and Promulgated by The American Law Institute at Washington, D.C., May 13, 1992
Current through April 2012
Copyright © 1994-2012 by The American Law Institute
Part VH. Remedies
Chapter 1. The Derivative Action
§ 7.09 Procedures For Requesting Dismissal Of A Derivative Action
Link to Case Citations
(a) The following procedural standards should apply to the review and evaluation of a derivative action by the
board or committee under § 7.08 (Dismissal of a Derivative Action Against Directors, Senior Executives, Controlling
Persons, or Associates Based on a Motion Requesting Dismissal by the Board or a Committee) or § 7.11 (Dismissal
of a Derivative Action Based Upon Action by the Shareholders):
(1) The board or committee should be composed of two or more persons, no participating member of which was
interested [§ 1.23] in the action, and should as a group be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances;
(2) The board or committee should be assisted by counsel of its choice and such other agents as it reasonably considers
necessary;
(3) The determinations of the board or committee should be based upon a review and evaluation that was sufficiently
informed to satisfy the standards applicable under § 7.10(a); and
(4) If the board or committee determines to request dismissal of the derivative action, it shall prepare and file with the
court a report or other written submission setting forth its determinations in a manner sufficient to enable the court
to conduct the review required under § 7.10 (Standard of Judicial Review with Regard to a Board or Committee
Motion Requesting Dismissal of a Derivative Action Under § 7.08).
(b) If the court is unwilling to grant a motion to dismiss under § 7.08 or § 7.11 because the procedures followed by
the board or committee departed materially from the standards specified in § 7.09(a), the court should permit the
board or committee to supplement its procedures, and make such further reports or other written submissions, as will
satisfy the standards specified in § 7.09(a), unless the court decides that (i) the board or committee did not act on the
basis of a good faith belief that its procedures and report were justified in the circumstances; (ii) unreasonable delay
or prejudice would result; or (iii) there is no reasonable prospect that such further steps would support dismissal
of the action.
Comment:
a. Comparison with existing law. Section 7.09(a) establishes four prerequisites to an objective review and evaluation that the
court may normally rely upon for purposes of a motion under § 7.08: (1) a disinterested decisionmaker "capable of objective
judgment in the circumstances"; (2) the assistance of counsel and other agents as may be reasonably necessary to assist the
board or committee to reach an informed judgment; (3) an evaluative process that meets the standard of review applicable under
§ 7.10; and (4) the preparation of a report or other written submission setting forth the board's or committee's determinations
in a manner sufficient to enable meaningful judicial review. These procedural elements have been emphasized by a number of
cases, and decisions generally concur that a court may examine the procedures followed by a board or committee in reaching
a decision to seek dismissal of a derivative action.
Section 7.09(b) recognizes that inadvertent, good faith errors need not be penalized, and therefore permits the board or
committee to supplement its procedures when it has acted in good faith unless the court determines that one of the conditions
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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in § 7.09(b)(1)—(iii) is present. Relatively few cases have considered this issue of supplementation, but judicial discretion to
permit defendants to renew a motion to dismiss a derivative action is generally recognized, particularly when the motion had
earlier been denied for lack of compliance with procedural standards.
b. Implementation. Section 7.09 can be implemented by judicial decision.
c. Rationale. This Chapter prescribes a two-step test that must be satisfied before a court dismisses a derivative action under
§ 7.08 as adverse to the best interests of the corporation in whose name it is brought. First, a procedural test must be passed:
the tests of Subsection (a)(l)-(4) must be satisfied. The most logical way to accomplish this is for the board or committee to
provide a description of the procedures followed by the board or committee in order to satisfy § 7.09(a)(l)-(4) in the report or
other written statement required by § 7.09(a)(4). Second, a substantive standard must be satisfied, with the court determining
either that the board's or committee's determinations satisfy the standards of review set forth in § 7.10, or, in the case of a
shareholder-adopted resolution, that the decision did not amount to waste under § 7.11(d). Section 7.09 addresses simply the
first step; its effect is only to qualify the report or other written submission for judicial consideration, not to set the standard
under which the report or written submission will be reviewed.
Section 7.09(a) is not, however, exclusive. Section 7.08(b) provides that a derivative action may be dismissed even though the
standards of § 7.09 have not been fully satisfied, if the departures are "justified under the circumstances."
d. Relationship to other corporate organs. Section 7.09 does not require that the review and evaluation that it contemplates be
conducted wholly subsequent to the plaintiffs demand or the filing of the action. Nor need it be performed exclusively by one
corporate organ. In particular, a committee delegated the board's authority under § 7.08 need not retrace all the steps already
taken by the board or another committee at an earlier stage. For example, the board may have responded to the plaintiffs demand
by engaging counsel and itself undertaking an investigation of some of the charges raised in the demand. When the action is later
filed, the board may decide to delegate its authority to a committee of directors (possibly because a question has arisen whether
one or more members of the board was interested in the action). Under these circumstances, there is no need to duplicate the
work earlier performed, and the committee may retain the counsel who earlier served the board to advise it further. Of course,
the circumstances would be different if the earlier inquiry and evaluation were conducted or guided by interested directors.
In general, if the board or committee relies upon earlier performed work or findings, it should satisfy itself as to (i) the sufficiency
of the inquiry, (ii) the absence of intervening factors or developments, and (iii) the independence of those conducting the initial
inquiry. If an earlier motion made by the corporation under § 7.04(a)(2) has been denied by the court, special considerations
apply, because the court may have found that the earlier determination to reject demand either did not comply with the business
judgment rule or was unreasonable in the circumstances. In such a context, the committee conducting the review and evaluation
under § 7.09 should take care to make certain that its determinations do not rest on an inadequate or flawed informational base.
In addition, the court should not delay the action if the end result will only be to place the same flawed determinations before
it a second time. Still, the burden rests on the plaintiff to show bias or prove some other deficiency in work that the committee
incorporates in its report or other written submission from prior corporate efforts at the demand stage. In general, apart from
the special care needed in the case of a § 7.09 inquiry following an earlier failed motion under § 7.04(a)(2), § 7.09 requires
only a reasonable review of work done at an earlier stage before that work is relied upon for purposes of this section. Thus,
earlier prepared legal or other expert opinions may be used and need not be duplicated if the board or committee finds that
they continue to be relevant and reliable.
Similarly, § 7.09 does not preclude a committee from reporting back to the board with its determinations for approval by the
board as a whole, minus any members whose status as defendants in the action would impair their objectivity. (Some recent
statutes have taken a contrary position and barred such an advisory use of the committee. See Reporter's Note 5.) If such an
advisory procedure is used, however, all members of the board participating in a decision to approve the committee's report
would have to satisfy the criteria set forth in § 7.09(a)(1). See Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo.App. 1988).
Also, during the period that any committee is conducting its evaluation, care should be taken to minimize the contacts between
the committee and the remainder of the board with respect to the committee's deliberations. In at least one instance such an
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attempt to predispose the committee has led a court to reject a committee's decision. See Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App.
77,250S.E.2d279(1978).
e. Short-form report. On occasion, derivative actions will be brought that are either plainly frivolous or otherwise clearly
deficient of legal or factual merit, but which are nevertheless not easily dismissed on a motion for summary judgment. In such
cases, the board might sometimes face the following dilemma: it may hope that a court would dismiss the action under § 7.08
based on a relatively short report or other written submission and a limited consideration of the action, but it may also fear
that if the court were to find some procedural infirmity in this process, it would not later permit a fuller-scale evaluation of the
action by the same board or committee. Based on such a fear, boards and committees might engage in unnecessary overkill,
conducting lengthy studies and writing overlong reports, for fear that any procedural blemish on the evaluation process could
deprive the board or committee of its ability to speak for the corporation.
Section 7.08(b) attempts to guard against this result by requiring only substantial compliance with the procedures of § 7.09 and
expressly permitting even material departures if they were justified under the circumstances. Yet, there might still be a residual
concern about the consequences of a material departure if the departure were later found to be unjustified and the law were that
it could not be corrected. Section 7.09(b) resolves this problem by providing that any inadequacy in the board's or committee's
initial evaluation will not bar the board or committee from correcting this deficiency and submitting a fuller study for purposes
of § 7.08 or § 7.09, unless the board or committee did not act in good faith or the other circumstances specified in the final
clauses of § 7.09(b) are present. The rationale for this position is that good faith mistakes should not be penalized and that
expedited procedures should be encouraged where they are appropriate.
The practical impact of § 7.09(b) is to permit a board or committee to rely on procedures that do not technically comply with
§ 7.09(a), but that can be "justified under the circumstances" under § 7.08(b). Thus, in a given case, it might seem appropriate
to rely on an "interested" counsel or to dispense with other experts whose advice might be deemed reasonably necessary. If the
court determined that these procedures were not justified under the circumstances or that the report or other written submission
submitted to it contained discrepancies or left important questions unanswered, it could still either withhold its decision on the
motion to dismiss the action, pending supplementation, or deny the motion, with leave to replead it once a fuller study was
conducted.
Section 7.09(b) does not mean, however, to invite deliberate delay or dilatory tactics. Before a board or committee knowingly
departs from the standards of § 7.09(a), it should determine that expedited procedures are justified or that the departure is
necessary for other reasons. The reviewing court should also consider both the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff from
the delay incident to a recommittal to the board or committee and whether a reasonable prospect exists that further steps or
procedures would support termination. To be sure, it is difficult for a court to predict the likely effect of steps or procedures to
be taken in the future, but the burden is placed on the plaintiff to show why the court should not permit supplementation. At this
stage, the court may set time limits and structure further inquiry so that the evaluation process does not drag on unnecessarily.
When an earlier motion has been unsuccessfully made under § 7.04(a)(2), such time limits may be particularly appropriate in
order to prevent unnecessary delay.
Precedent supports the supplementing procedure contemplated by § 7.09(b). In Watts v. Des Moines Register and Tribune,
525 F.Supp. 1311 (S.D.Iowa 1981), the trial court was satisfied as to independence of the committee and the adequacy of
the procedures it followed, but still found that certain inconsistencies in the record precluded dismissal of the action. Thus, it
ordered a "further development of the record with regard to the committee's determinations." Id. This is the position taken by
§§ 7.08 and 7.09: namely, that the court may allow the corporation an additional period to correct any deficiencies. See also
Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., 546 F.Supp. 795, 797 (E.D.Va.1982) (court has discretion to allow the corporation
to renew its motion for dismissal).
/ Use of "expansion " directors. A few decisions—most notably, Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709
(Iowa 1983)—have held that when all, or nearly all, the directors are named as defendants, the board cannot create a litigation
committee by expanding its ranks and appointing the newly added directors to the committee. Section 7.09 does not adopt this
sweeping a rule, which could prevent the corporation from advancing legitimate justifications for dismissal. Nevertheless, the
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court should consider any relevant evidence relating to the selection of a committee appointed to consider demand or a litigation
committee, including the participation of the actual or prospective defendants (other than nominal ones) in that process. If this
participation was unnecessary, because other disinterested directors were available, the fact of such involvement should weigh
heavily against acceptance of the report. But, when disinterested directors are not available to appoint the committee, then
necessity justifies the involvement of the interested director, at least when the panel option discussed in § 7.12 is foreclosed or
its availability is uncertain. This doctrine of necessity is a limited one. If quorum requirements necessitate the vote of interested
directors, they should limit their participation to voting to ratify the choice of the other directors. In cases where all or a
substantial majority of the board are interested, the optimal procedure would be an application for the appointment by the court
of a special panel under § 7.12 (Special Panel or Special Committee Members).
g. Committee composition. Section 7.09(a) requires that a litigation committee or a committee appointed to consider a demand
be composed of two or more directors. Although three directors has been the more common practice, decisions have upheld the
use of a litigation committee of two. See Reporter's Note 2. Use of a single individual is, however, disapproved, partly because
of the importance of collegial interchange and deliberation. Some cases have also expressed doubt about the ability of a single
individual to withstand pressure under these circumstances.
Section 7.09 requires, first, that the committee members not be "interested," as this term is defined in § 1.23, and, second, that
the committee "as a group be capable of objective judgment in the circumstances." This latter provision has a dual significance:
First, it requires that the committee be able to understand and evaluate the transaction at issue. The absence of a disabling
conflict of interest alone is insufficient; some affirmative capacity to judge the issues in dispute is necessary. Second, although
the definition of "interested" looks only to economic and familial associations, the requirement of a capacity for "objective
judgment" invites the court to look to other relationships that may also bias the inquiry. For example, a director who was the
close personal friend and next-door neighbor of the defendant would probably lack this capacity and should not serve on the
committee. See Reporter's Note 6.
A difficult issue surrounds the question whether a director who is named as a defendant in the action must always be considered
"interested" and hence disqualified from serving. Cases have recognized that mere acquiescence in, or approval of, the
challenged transaction should not alone disqualify a board member. See Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.1983). Thus, §
1.23(c) adopts a special definition of "interested" for purposes of this Chapter in order to allow directors who are only in effect
nominal defendants to serve on a committee or to participate in the frill board's deliberations for purposes of approving board
or committee action with respect to a derivative action. Although it is recognized that any director who has been sued will have
a natural desire to secure the early termination of even a meritorious case, a broader rule that automatically disqualified such
a director whenever the director was named as a defendant would create an incentive for the plaintiff to sue all the incumbent
directors in order to disqualify them. Under § 1.23(c), a director is not "interested" if liability is asserted against the director
"based only on the fact that the director approved of or acquiesced in the transaction or conduct that is the subject of the
action" and the complaint "does not otherwise allege with particularity facts that, if true, raise a significant prospect that the
director would be adjudged liable to the corporation or its shareholders." In effect, § 1.23(c) supplies a definition of the nominal
defendant who should not be disqualified from serving on a committee based simply on plaintiffs creative manipulation of
the pleadings. Operationally, the trial court could determine that there was no significant prospect of liability against such a
defendant in much the same way as it would pass on a motion for summary judgment. If certainty is desired, the corporation
could bring an early motion for a declaratory judgment that a specific director was not "interested" and thus could serve on a
committee or participate on the board for purposes of § 7.09.
h. Counsel. The role of counsel is especially sensitive in internal corporate evaluations of the type dealt with in § 7.09.
Accordingly, § 7.09(a)(2) specifies that the board or committee should select a counsel of its choice to coordinate and advise
such an inquiry. Case law has also placed considerable weight on the objectivity and ability of the special counsel retained
by the committee. At least one decision has rejected the report of a special litigation committee in part because the committee
failed to engage such a special counsel. See Grynberg v. Farmer, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) K 97,683, at p. 98,584 (D.Colo. 1980).
See also cases cited at Reporter's Notes 3 and 4.
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Section 7.09(a)(2) does not require that the counsel who assists the board or committee be "independent" of the corporation
and thus it does not preclude house counsel from serving the board or committee in some circumstances. However, it assumes
that such counsel must be capable of exercising independent professional judgment under the circumstances. Thus, whether the
corporation's house counsel could advise the board or committee with respect to the conduct of corporate officers depends in the
first instance on whether the counsel was in a subordinate or reporting position to those officers. If a counsel is in such a position,
then the logic of § 1.23(a)(4), which deems "interested" a person subject to a "controlling influence," strongly suggests that
an in-house counsel would not be in a position to exercise independent professional judgment with respect to the liability of a
direct superior. Similarly, the corporation's principal outside corporate or securities counsel may also be disabled on these facts.
Conversely, if the action were against an outside director or a corporate official below the general counsel's rank or position
in the corporation, the general counsel or the corporation's regular outside counsel could serve the board or committee. In all
cases, however, the committee or board should be free to make its own choice of counsel and should not allow this selection
to be imposed upon it by others.
/. Adequate evaluation. Section 7.09 does not specify the precise procedures the committee should follow in reaching an
"evaluation that was sufficiently informed to satisfy the standards applicable under § 7.10(a)." In some cases, a relatively
abbreviated process will demonstrate that the allegations are plainlyfrivolousand without support. In other cases, the committee
will need to conduct detailed interviews with relevant witnesses and should preserve a record of such oral evidence. Affidavits
or sworn depositions may also be desirable in many instances, particularly when dealing with corporate employees or agents
who can be required to cooperate. Although reliance on the unsworn testimony of persons interested in a lawsuit seems generally
ill-advised, sworn testimony is not a necessary element of § 7.09's procedures because it would be impractical in some cases
and might chill the willingness to be interviewed of third parties not subject to the corporation's authority. However, the court
should consider the justifications for dispensing with such testimony. In general, the nature of the inquiry that is required under
§ 7.09(a)(1) depends on all of the circumstances, including such factors as the gravity and plausibility of the complaint, the
detail with which the claims are alleged, and the underlying nature of the claim. Where the gravamen of a complaint concerns
a claim that would be reviewed under the business judgment rule in the absence of a board or committee recommendation, the
inquiry by the board or committee should be that which would be necessary to satisfy the informational component of that rule,
and the board or committee should inform itself in a manner sufficient to satisfy that rule. See § 4.01(c)(2). If the gravamen
of a complaint concerns a claim that would be reviewed under a more exacting standard than the business judgment rule in
the absence of a board or committee recommendation, the inquiry may have to be more substantial to satisfy the standards
of § 7.10(a).
In all cases in which the board delegates authority to a committee, the committee should have unrestricted access to all corporate
records, memoranda, files, correspondence, and witnesses that it deems relevant for purposes of its inquiry. No other person
should define the limits of relevancy for the committee or its counsel. The cooperation of corporate officials in making available
employees (who may often be located at remote or even foreign sites) is also essential to an adequate investigation on which
a court may reasonably rely.
Although termination of a derivative action may ultimately be justified even when the action is factually and legally wellfounded, the committee should evaluate the factual and legal basis of the action before determining that dismissal is justified,
even when the basis for dismissal rests on extrinsic business justifications. However, when a request for injunctive relief
constrains the time available for inquiry and the status quo cannot be otherwise preserved, this evaluative process might properly
be an abbreviated one.
The board's or committee's review and evaluation necessarily have a broader scope than those which the court must undertake
in evaluating its report or other written submission. Under § 7.10, the court need not resolve all contested factual issues. The
board or committee must, however, satisfy itself as to the action's factual and legal merit and not simply compute the cost and
delay to which the action will subject the corporation. Although not all factual issues can be resolved, a reasonable effort to
establish the relevant facts is required.
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That degree of confidentiality should surround the board's or committee's proceedings as is necessary to assure the integrity of
its evaluative process. Section 7.09 does not attempt to formulate precise rules in this regard, and certainly does not bar reports
to the board by the committee or confrontation of the principal defendants with the charges raised against them. Still, in general,
disclosure of confidential information, particularly that derived from witnesses appearing before the board or committee, should
be restricted on a "need to know" basis.
REPORTERS NOTE
1. Most of the decisions that have rejected a litigation committee's motion to dismiss have identified inadequacies in the
procedures followed or in the independence of the participating directors. See Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App. 77, 250
S.E.2d 279 (1978); Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372 (6th Cir.1984); Miller v. Register & Tribune
Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983); Holmstrom v. Coastal Ind., Inc., 645 F.Supp. 963 (N.D.Ohio 1984). Two
other cases have declined to accept a committee's recommendation for dismissal pending a fuller explanation of its reasons
for seeking termination: Maldonado v. Flynn, 671 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.1982), and Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune,
525 F.Supp. 1311 (S.D.Iowa 1981). In Swenson, it was deemed significant that the board had not delegated its full authority
to the committee, but had only made an advisor/ referral. In Holmstrom, the court found the report inadequate because it
was "devoid of factual findings to support the conclusions reached." It added:
The summary treatment of the issue of self-dealing and the use of the power as directors to perpetuate their self-control
negate the possibility of judicial approval of the work of the [committee].
645 F.Supp. at 972. In Hasan, a single director served as the litigation committee, and the Circuit Court found his prior
relationship to the defendant to have been sufficiently close to bar reliance on his findings, even though it is not clear whether
he would have been "interested" within the meaning of § 1.23(c).
2. Although three-member committees have been more common, a number of decisions and a Minnesota statute have
expressly approved two-member committees. See Minn. Bus. Corp. Act § 302 (1981) (two or more members); Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del.1981); Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 573 F.Supp. 169 (N.D.I11.1983); Abella v. Universal
Leaf Tobacco Co., 546 F.Supp. 795 (E.D.Va.1982). In Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378-80 (6th
Cir. 1984), the lower court had approved a one-member committee when the other eight members of the board had been
named as defendants. However, this result was reversed on appeal because the committee member had been a minority
investor in a real estate venture with one of the principal defendants (one being a 10% partner; the other, a 2% partner) and
had had other business dealings in past years with him. See also Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch.1985). ("If a
single member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be above reproach."); Houie v. Low, 407
Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 59 (1990) ("number of committee members should be a factor in determining the committee's
ability to act independently"). Under the Indiana statute, the committee must have at least three members. See Ind. Code
Ann. § 23-2-32-4.
3. Recent decisions have also required that a litigation committee "conduct a thorough and careful analysis regarding the
plaintiffs derivative suit." Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (1990); David- owitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d
853, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y.Sup.1992) (committee's investigation rejected when it "did not fulfill the requirements of
a thorough and reasonable inquiry"). Even though the court's own substantive power of review was limited under New
York law, the Davidowitz court emphasized that it remained the committee's obligation to satisfy "the careful, diligent and
meticulous standard required of a committee scmtinizing a possible breach of fiduciary duty." When this standard was not
complied with, such a failure "vitiates the usefulness of the committee's findings as a defense to the action." Id. at 344.
4. Judicial review of the procedures by which a board committee conducts its evaluation of the plaintiffs allegations
has focused in particular on the interaction between the board and its special counsel. Some decisions have criticized
excessive reliance on such counsel. See Rosengarten v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 466 F.Supp. 817, 82425 (S.D.N.Y.1979). In rejecting the committee's determinations in Davidowitz v. Edelman, supra, the New York Supreme
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Court emphasized that the corporation's general counsel had selected the attorney for the committee and that "the committee
did not join in their counsel's investigation or review, save in the most perfunctory manner..." Id. at 344. See also Peller v.
Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1538 (11th Cir.1990) (rejecting committee's report when committee relied almost exclusively
on its special counsel to conduct the substance of the investigation). Decisions have also placed substantial weight on the
independence and legal ability of the special counsel retained by the committee. For example, in In re Par Pharmaceutical,
Inc. Derivative Litigation, 750 F.Supp. 641 (S.D.N. Y. 1990), the failure to appoint such a counsel was one of the salient facts
relied upon by the court in failing to dismiss the action. See also Lasker v. Burks, 426 F.Supp. 844, 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 635, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 929, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (1979); Grynberg v. Farmer,
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 197,683, at 98,586 (D.Colo.1980) (decision rejected when committee failed to retain independent
counsel). One statute has adopted a more severe test of independence for a counsel in another context. See Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 1701.13(E)(4)(C) (1979) (disqualifying any attorney who previously served the corporation over the prior five years
from delivering an opinion on which indemnification can be awarded).
5. Courts have also placed considerable weight on the extent of the power delegated to the full board by the committee. Where
the committee has only advisory authority, rather than being vested with the board's full plenary authority, its independence
has been found inadequate by some courts. See Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C.App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279, 297-98 (1978);
Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664 (Colo.App.1988). Midstream changes in the committee's composition or
authority, or the scope of the investigation it was charged to make, have also produced judicial rejection of the committee's
determinations. See Reilly Mortg. Group v. Mount Vernon Savings & Loan Ass'n, 568 F.Supp. 1067, 1072 (E.D.Va.1983).
Recent statutory provisions authorizing the use of litigation committees have placed limitations on their composition and
performance that do not apply to other board committees. For example, under the Minnesota statute, a committee member
may not own more than one percent of the corporation's stock, may not be a present or former officer, employee, or agent
of the corporation or any related corporation, and may not be a party to the action or a person who has been threatened
with being named as such a party. See Minn. Stat. § 302A.243. Once a committee is appointed, it may not be suspended,
terminated, or instructed by the board as to its findings; its determination binds the corporation and its directors, officers,
and shareholders. In short, the committee cannot be confined to an advisory role.
Under the Virginia statute, the committee directly reports its findings to the court. See Va. Code § 13.1-673(D). This
seemingly bars the use of such a litigation committee as an advisory body to the board, and implies that no other procedure
is acceptable.
6. Section 7.09's requirement that committee members "should as a group be capable of objective judgment in the
circumstances" is supported by Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962 (Del.Ch.1985). There, the principal defendant had been a
major donor to a university whose president was selected as the one-person litigation committee that reviewed the pending
action. Although no continuing economic relationship between the two individuals or specific bias was shown, the Delaware
Chancery Court found that there had been a long association between the two individuals. It therefore declined to find that
the litigation committee was independent, and, in so doing, specified a high standard for independence:
The only instance in American Jurisprudence where a defendant can free itself from a suit by merely appointing a committee
to review the allegations of the complaint is in the context of a stockholder derivative suit. A defendant who desires to
avail itself of this unique power to self-destruct a suit brought against it ought to make certain that its Special Litigation
Committee is truly independent.
Similarly, in Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340 (N.Y.Sup.1992), the court found that the chairman
of the "special litigation committee was the president of a college to whom the principal defendant (the corporation's CEO) had
recently donated $1.5 million; in addition, the committee chairman had participated with the CEO's investment group in prior
takeovers and takeover attempts engineered by the CEO. Another committee member was the CEO's personal tax attorney. On
this basis, the court concluded:
The close business and personal relations demonstrated among the committee members, the board and [the CEO] preclude
this court from finding that the committee possessed the required disinterested independence...."
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Id. at 343.
7. New York decisions have generally required that committee members not stand "in a dual relation which prevents an
unprejudicial exercise of judgment." Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 927, 393 N.E.2d 994,
1001 (1979); Parkoff v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 53 N.Y.2d 412, 417, 442 N.Y.S.2d 432, 425 N.E.2d 820
(1981). While Davidowitz suggests that reciprocal directorships may offend this standard, other decisions have been less
restrictive. In Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F.Supp. 1493 (D.Md.1985), the court accepted a committee's recommendation to
dismiss when one committee member was the chief executive officer of another corporation of which a principal defendant
was also a director. The court rejected the theory that this relationship of reciprocal board membership gave the defendant
control over the committee member's salary. In Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F.Supp. 682 (E.D.Mich. 1980), a paid consultant
to the corporation was found to be independent for purposes of litigation committee membership, and in In re General Tire
& Rubber Co. Sec. Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075,1084 (6th Cir.1984), the committee was found to be independent even though
one member was a partner in a law firm retained by the corporation who had performed prior investigative services for the
corporation. Although the decision in Rosengarten seems correct on its facts, both Genzer and General Tire involve more
questionably entangling prior relationships. It would be a close question of fact in such cases whether these individuals
qualified under § 7.09(a)(l)'s test of "capable of objective judgment in the circumstances." For decisions holding that purely
nominal defendants may serve on a litigation committee, see Mills v. Esmark, Inc., 544 F.Supp. 1275, 1283 (N.D.I11.1982);
Klotz v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 386 F.Supp. 577, 580-82 (S.D.N. Y. 1974); In re General Tire & Rubber
Co. Securities Litigation, 726 F.2d 1075 (6th Cir.1984). But see Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51,61 (2d Cir.1980) ("[WJhere
the directors, themselves, are subject to personal liability in the action, [they] cannot be expected to determine impartially
whether it is warranted." (quoting Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S.
1017, 100 S.Ct. 670, 62 L.Ed.2d 647 (1980)) (emphasis only in Galef)).
Research References
1. Digest System Key Numbers
Corporations €M* 206(1), 299; Pretrial Procedure # ^ 551, 644, 675.
2. A.L.R. Annotation
Propriety of termination of properly initiated derivative action by "independent committee" appointed by board of directors
whose actions (or inaction) are under attack. 22 ALR4th 1206.
Case Citations
Case Citations through June 2011
Case Citations through June 2011:
D.Md.1985. § 7.03 (T.D. No. 1, 1982) cit. in case cit. in disc. § 7.03(b) is now under § 7.09; § 7.10, com. (d) (Discussion
Draft No. 1, 1985) quot. in sup. § 7.10, com. (d) is now § 7.09, com. (f). Stockholders brought a derivative suit against
the corporation, alleging that corporation's purchase of stock in a foreign company was a waste of corporate assets. The
corporation's board of directors formed an independent committee to evaluate the suit. This court granted defendant's motion
to dismiss, holding that the committee's composition, investigation, and conclusions passed muster under the pertinent
nationwide majority rule, which permitted an interested board of directors to appoint a special litigation committee of
independent directors to review a pending derivative suit. The court reasoned that Maryland did not have statutory provisions
similar to states that favored suits by minority shareholders. It also stated that one shareholder should not be able to
incapacitate an entire board merely by leveling charges against it. Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F.Supp. 1493, 1498, 1499.
E.D.Pa.2003. Subsec. (a) cit. and quot. but dist. Minority shareholders of mortgage company created through merger brought
derivative action against acquiring bank and bank's officers and directors, alleging, inter alia, that defendants interfered
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with prospective economic advantage and breached fiduciary duty to mortgage company by frustrating sale of company's
assets. District court, inter alia, granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that business-judgment rule
shielded individual defendants from liability for not pursuing derivative action on company's behalf based on independent
investigator's determination that shareholders had no viable claim, notwithstanding that investigator was hired by interested
directors who adopted his report. Powell v. First Republic Bank, 274 F.Supp.2d 660, 669.
Colo.App.1988. Cit. in disc, corns, cit. generally in disc, (citing § 7.10, T.D. No. 8, 1988, which is now covered under §
7.09 of the official text). Shareholders brought a derivative action against a corporation after an outside corporation acquired
a block of the corporation's capital stock from its president. Plaintiffs asserted that the acquisition agreement constituted a
sale of corporation's assets, which president siphoned off for personal gain, in violation of his duty to corporation. They also
asserted that corporation's board violated duty of loyalty by taking position of neutrality concerning acquisition offer. Trial
court dismissed claims because corporation's special litigation committee determined that claims lacked merit. Reversing
and remanding, this court held that, even assuming that Colorado would adopt the special litigation committee rule and that
the committee members met the fairness and impartiality tests, defendants could not obtain dismissal because the ultimate
decision to dismiss was made by those persons who, as defendants in the litigation, had a vital personal interest in the
decision. Greenfield v. Hamilton Oil Corp., 760 P.2d 664, 667, 668.
Iowa, 1983. Cit. in sup., cit. in spec. cone. op. (citing § 7.03(b), (c), and (e), T.D. No. 1,1982, which is now covered under
§§ 7.08-7.10 of the official text). Shareholder brought federal court derivative action on behalf of corporation alleging
that it had sold its stock at fraudulently low prices and for grossly inadequate consideration to key employees. All four
members of corporation's board of directors were named as individual defendants. After board subsequently expanded to
six members, it established an independent litigation committee to investigate shareholder's derivative action. Pursuant to
committee's conclusion that there was no justification to pursue derivative action, corporation filed motion for summary
judgment. Answering federal court's certified question in the negative, this court held that corporate directors who were
parties to a derivative action could not confer upon a special committee the power to bind corporation as to its conduct of
the litigation. Special concurrence argued that litigation committee device was unavailable because the four directors had
controlling influence over corporation's management and engaged in self-dealing. Miller v. Register and Tribune Syndicate,
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 717-719.
Mass. 1990. Cit. in disc. § 7.10 (T.D. No. 9,1989), which is now covered under § 7.09 of the official text. Ophthalmologist
who formed corporation with other ophthalmologists sued, individually and derivatively as a minority shareholder, the
corporation, the other ophthalmologists, and two affiliated corporations, alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and
misappropriation of corporate opportunities. Nondefendant director and shareholder of corporation, who was appointed by
corporation's directors to serve as a special litigation committee, recommended that no action be taken on plaintiffs derivative
claims. Trial court entered summary judgment for defendants. Affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding, this court
held, inter alia, that the special litigation committee device was permissible under Massachusetts law, and that trial judge, on
remand, must determine whether committee was independent and unbiased, and whether committee reached a reasonable
and principled decision. While declining to adopt a per se rule that special litigation committees should have more than one
director, the court noted that the number of committee members should be a factor in determining committee's ability to act
independently. Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 56, 59.
Pa.1997. Cit. generally in synopsis and in headnote, quot. in appendix, cit. in sup., cit. in sup. and adopted §§ 7.02-7.10 and
§ 7.13. In minority shareholders' derivative actions, a corporation moved for summary judgment, seeking termination of the
lawsuits. After the trial court denied the corporation's motion, this court granted the corporation's petition for extraordinary
relief. Reversing the trial court's order and remanding, this court held that the business judgment rule applied in Pennsylvania
and permitted the board of directors of a Pennsylvania corporation to terminate derivative lawsuits brought by minority
shareholders. The court adopted § § 7.02-7.10 and § 7.13 of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance
with respect to the determination of whether the board's decision to reject or terminate litigation by or on behalf of the
corporation was properly made and thus whether the business judgment rule protected the board's decision. Cuker v.
Mikalauskas, 547 Pa. 600, 692 A.2d 1042, 1043, 1049, 1053.
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Pa.Super.2008. Cit. in sup., adopted in case cit. in sup. §§ 7.07-7.10; cit. in sup., subsecs. (a) and (a)(2) and com. (f) quot.
in sup., com. (g) quot. in disc. Minority shareholders filed a derivative action against controlling officers, shareholders,
and company, alleging that members of a special litigation committee, formed to determine whether prosecution of certain
self-dealing claims brought against controlling shareholders would be in the best interest of the company, breached their
fiduciary duties in investigating those claims. The trial court sustained defendants' preliminary objections and granted their
motion to dismiss the derivative suit with prejudice. Affirming, this court held, inter alia, that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in determining, based largely on guidelines for judicial review as set forth in the American Law Institute's
Principles of Corporate Governance, that the committee's decision to seek dismissal of the derivative suit was entitled to
protection under the business-judgment rule; the committee was properly formed, independent, disinterested, and adequately
informed, conducted an investigation that was adequate in scope, properly used assistance of outside counsel, acted in good
faith, and produced an extensive report that facilitated court review. Lemenestrel v. Warden, 964 A.2d 902, 904, 912-914,
921.
Tenn.App.1992. Subsec. (a) cit. in disc, (citing § 7.10, T.D. No. 8, 1988, which is now covered under § 7.09 of the official
text). Former bank president filed a shareholder's derivative action, alleging mismanagement and self-dealing by several
bank directors and officers of bank whose chairman of the board of directors effectively controlled more than one-half of
bank's stock. This court affirmed the trial court's dismissal, holding that it had no basis on which to find that the one-person
special litigation committee appointed to review plaintiffs allegations and to determine whether maintaining the suit was in
the bank's best interest failed to exercise sound business judgment when it determined that the derivative complaint should
be dismissed. Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 223.
(1994)
End of Document
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Einhorn v. Culea, 235 Wis.2d 646 (2000)

_ _ _ _
This is a review of a published decision of the court of
235 Wis.2d 646
Editor's Note: Additions are indicated by Text and deletions
by Text .
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Stephen EINHORN, Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
James D. CULEA, Northern Labs, Inc. and Northern
Labs Manufacturing, Inc., Defendants-Respondents.
No. 97-3592. I Argued Jan. 5,
2000. I Decided June 22, 2000.
Minority shareholder brought direct action against majority
shareholder who received retroactive bonus, alleging breach
of fiduciary duty. After requiring minority shareholder to
bring derivative action and special litigation committee
determined derivative action was not in corporation's best
interest, the Circuit Court, Ozaukee County, Joseph D.
McCormack, J., dismissed action based on committee's
recommendation, and minority shareholder appealed. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, 591 N.W.2d 908, and review was
granted. The Supreme Court, Shirley S. Abrahamson, Chief
Justice, held that: (1) addressing an issue of first impression,
objective test, considering totality of the circumstances,
applied in determining whether committee members were
independent, and (2) evidence raised significant questions
concerning whether committee members were independent,
requiring remand for sufficient findings of fact and
application of proper legal standard.
Reversed and remanded.
Attorneys and Law Firms
**80 *648 For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there
were briefs by Robert H. Friebert, Matthew W. O'Neill and
Friebert, Finerty & St. John, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral
argument by Matthew W. O'Neill.
For the defendants-respondents, there was a brief by Dean P.
Laing and O'Neil, Cannon & Hollman, S.C., Milwaukee, and
oral argument by Dean P. Laing.
Opinion
K 1 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, Chief Justice.

appeals affirming a judgment and order of the circuit
court for Ozaukee County, Joseph D. McCormack, Circuit
Judge. The circuit court dismissed the derivative shareholder
action of Stephen Einhorn, a minority shareholder and
member of the board of directors of Northern Labs. The
circuit court concluded that the threshold for determining
whether a member of the special litigation committee is
independent within the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744
(1997-98) is "extremely low" and found that the special
litigation committee was independent. Accordingly, the
circuit court dismissed Einhorn's derivative action pursuant
to §180.0744(1).3
**81 *649 f 2 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
of the circuit court, concluding that the circuit court's
assessment of whether each member of the special litigation
committee was independent was based on facts supported by
the record and was not clearly erroneous.
U 3 The issue raised in the present case is the proper
interpretation and application of the standard set forth in
Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 of whether a member of a special
litigation committee is independent. The issue is not whether
the derivative action will succeed, but whether the derivative
action should be dismissed on the basis of the decision of the
special litigation committee. For the reasons set forth, we
conclude that the circuit court and the court of appeals erred
in declaring that the threshold established by the legislature
in § 180.0744 in determining whether a member of a special
litigation committee is independent is "extremely low." We
further conclude that in deciding whether members of the
special litigation committee are independent, the circuit court
should determine whether, considering the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the
member of the special litigation committee can base his or her
decision on the merits of the issue rather than on extraneous
considerations or influences. In other words, the *650 test
is whether a member of the committee has a relationship
with an individual defendant or the corporation that would
reasonably be expected to affect the member's judgment with
respect to the litigation at issue. Because the circuit court did
not make sufficient findings of fact and did not apply the
correct legal standard to determine whether the members of
the special litigation committee were independent, we reverse
the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to
the circuit court for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this decision.
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I
If 4 We set forth the background of the dispute here.
Additional facts relevant to the issue of whether the members
of the special litigation committee were independent are set
forth later in the opinion.
1f 5 In December 1985, James D. Culea (the defendant),
Stephen Einhorn (the plaintiff), and Einhorn's business
partner, Orville Mertz, acquired Northern Labs. The Northern
Labs stock was distributed as follows: Culea 56.09%, Einhorn
20.60% and Mertz 20.06%. The remaining stock was
owned by other managers and directors. Culea has served
as president, manager, director and majority shareholder of
Northern Labs since 1986. Einhorn has been a director and
minority shareholder.
If 6 At the time of its acquisition in 1985, Northern Labs
had annual sales of $16 million and generated little profit.
During the period between 1986 and 1992, Northern Labs'
sales and profits increased. In the 1993 *651 fiscal year,
Northern Labs generated $33 million in sales and $1.9 million
in profits.
1f 7 In 1992, Culea sought a retroactive performance bonus,
asserting that he had been undercompensated in the years
following **82 the acquisition. In May 1992, he sent a
notice to the directors scheduling a compensation committee
meeting and a board of directors meeting for July 29, 1992.
At that time the board of directors consisted of Culea, his
wife Shelly Culea, Einhorn, Mertz, and the company's vice
president of finance, Robert Bonk. Culea, Mertz and Bonk
comprised the compensation committee.
1f 8 On July 29, 1992, the compensation committee
unanimously approved a retroactive bonus to Culea of
approximately $300,000, a portion of which was to be paid
with Northern Labs stock. A board of directors meeting was
held immediately after the compensation committee meeting.
The four directors in attendance - Culea, Mertz, Bonk and
Shelly Culea - voted unanimously to ratify the compensation
committee's decisions. Einhorn did not attend the July 29,
1992, board of directors meeting. Following Culea's stock
compensation, the stock was allocated as follows: Culea 76%,
Einhorn 22%, and Bonk 2%. 6
f 9 On December 9, 1993, Einhorn filed a direct action
against Culea, alleging that Culea had willfully breached his
fiduciary duty to Einhorn by participating in and causing the

corporation to award a self-dealing retroactive bonus to Culea
of $300,000 and to issue stock for no consideration or at a
grossly inadequate price. Einhorn alleged that he had been
"damaged by the dilution of his percentage of ownership in
the companies and by a reduction in the value of his interest in
*652 the companies...." Einhorn sought a judgment ordering
Culea to surrender stock to Northern Labs and to reimburse
Northern Labs for all cash payments received by him for the
retroactive bonus.
1 10 On May 3, 1994, Culea filed a motion for
summary judgment arguing, among other things, that Einhorn
improperly filed his suit as a direct action instead of a
derivative action. The circuit court agreed with Culea and
gave Einhorn 30 days to amend his complaint.
1f 11 Einhorn amended his complaint in November 1994 to
state a derivative action with allegations similar to those in
his original complaint. The members of the board of directors
in November 1994 were, pursuant to a stock agreement,
appointees of Culea and Einhorn. In addition to himself and
his wife, Culea appointed his neighbor Dwight Chewning,
Northern Labs CFO Robert Bonk, and Lolita Chua, a friend
of Shelly Culea. Einhorn appointed himself and his business
partner, John Beagle.
Tf 12 Following Einhorn's amended complaint, on December
9, 1994, Culea issued a notice of a special meeting of the
board of directors for December 16, 1994. Culea's notice
indicated that Chewning and Chua were new members of
the board and that the board would be voting on whether
the maintenance of Einhorn's derivative action was in the
best interests of the corporation. Einhorn requested to bring
an attorney to the meeting but his request was denied by
the corporate counsel for Northern Labs. Corporate counsel's
firm represented Culea in the action filed by Einhorn.
1) 13 The board of directors met as scheduled on December
16, 1994. Northern Labs' corporate counsel advised that
because Einhom, Culea and Shelly Culea *653 had an
interest in the dispute, they should not participate in any
vote, whether as directors or as potential members of any
special litigation committee. The board then created a special
litigation committee composed of Chewning, Bonk, Chua and
Beagle. 7
**83 If 14 After five months of meetings and approximately
500 hours of inquiry, the special litigation committee voted
three to one that continuation of Einhorn's derivative action
was not in the best interests of the corporation. Based on this
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vote and pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(1), Culea moved
the circuit court to dismiss Einhom's derivative action.
If 15 In a decision and order dated October 30,1995, the circuit
court denied Culea's motion to dismiss the action, stating that
it was not prepared to find that the special litigation committee
met the criteria of being independent set forth in Wis. Stat.
§ 180.0744. After a seven-day trial to the circuit court on
the issue of whether the members of the special litigation
committee were independent under § 180.0744, the circuit
court concluded that the threshold established by the *654
legislature in determining whether members of the special
litigation committee were independent is "extremely low."
The circuit court found that the members of the committee
were independent within the meaning of § 180.0744, that they
acted in good faith and that they made their determination
from conclusions based upon a reasonable inquiry. The
circuit court dismissed the derivative action. The court of
appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court.

II
[1] f 16 The present case is a derivative action. A derivative
action differs from ordinary commercial litigation and from
a representative action such as a class action. In a derivative
action, the claims belong to the corporation, not to the
complaining shareholder. The complaining shareholder is
challenging, on behalf of the corporation that has been
unwilling to bring the suit, specific corporate conduct. 10
[2]
*655 H 17 A derivative action reflects competing
interests: On the one hand, the action allows shareholders to
assert the corporation's rights when corporate management
refuses to do so. On the other hand, the board of
directors or majority shareholders of a corporation, not
the courts or minority shareholders, should resolve internal
conflicts. A derivative action raises the specter of undue
judicial interference with the business judgment of corporate
management. In other words, a derivative action is a means
to curb managerial misconduct, yet it also undermines the
basic principle of corporate governance that the decisions
of a corporation, including the decision to initiate litigation,
should be made by the board of directors.
If 18 Courts and legislatures have allowed corporations to
use special litigation committees to dismiss derivative actions
in an attempt to balance the competing interests at issue:
the shareholders' need to protect the corporation and the
corporation's need to prevent meritless or harmful **84

litigation. If the special litigation committee is independent
from the alleged wrongdoers, acts in good faith and conducts
a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusion is based, the
committee's recommendation not to proceed with a derivative
action is viewed as a proper exercise of the directors' business
judgment and the court will dismiss the action. 12
[3] [4] *656 Tf 19 The concept of the special litigation
oversight committee flows from the business judgment rule,
a judicially created doctrine that limits judicial review of
corporate decision-making when corporate directors make
business decisions on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken is in the best
interests of the company. 13 The business judgment rule
shields, to a large extent, the substantive bases for a corporate
decision from judicial inquiry. The business judgment rule
also ensures that management remains in the hands of the
board of directors and protects courts from becoming too
deeply implicated in internal corporate matters. 14
If 20 Under Wis. Stat. § 180.0744, the corporation may
create a special litigation committee *657 consisting of
two or more independent directors appointed by a majority
vote of independent directors present at a meeting of
the board of directors. The independent special litigation
committee determines whether the derivative action is in the
best interests of the corporation. If the independent special
litigation committee acts in good faith, conducts a reasonable
inquiry upon which it bases its conclusions and concludes
that the maintenance of the derivative action is not in the best
interests of the corporation, the circuit court shall dismiss the
derivative action. The statute thus requires the circuit court to
defer to the business judgment of a properly composed and
properly operating special litigation committee.
1f 21 The provisions of the Wisconsin statute relevant to the
present case read as follows:
180.0744. Dismissal
(1) The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding on
motion by the corporation if the court finds, subject to the
burden of proof assigned under sub. (5) or (6), that one
of the groups specified in sub. (2) or (6) has determined,
acting in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry
upon which its conclusions are based, that maintenance of
the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the
corporation.
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(2) Unless a panel is appointed under sub. (6), the
determination in sub. (1) shall be made by any of the
following:
**85 ...
*658 b) A majority vote of a committee consisting of 2 or
more independent directors appointed by majority vote of
independent directors present at a meeting of the board of
directors, whether or not the voting, independent directors
constitute a quorum.
U 22 The most common challenge to the decision of a special
litigation committee, and the one made in the present case, is
that the members are not independent. Given the finality of
the ultimate decision of the committee to dismiss the action,
judicial oversight is necessary to ensure that the special
litigation committee is independent so that it acts in the
corporation's best interest. At issue is whether the special
litigation committee created in the present case under Wis.
Stat. § 180.0744 was composed of independent directors as
required by statute.
[5] K 23 Although the plain language of Wis. Stat. §
180.0744 requires the directors who are members of the
special litigation committee to be independent, the statute
1n

does not define the word "independent."
Rather, §
180.0744(3) merely instructs that whether a director on the
committee is independent should not be determined solely on
the basis of any of the following three factors set forth in the
statute: (1) whether the director is nominated to the special
litigation committee or elected by persons who are defendants
in the derivative action, (2) whether the director is a defendant
in the action, or (3) whether the act being challenged in the
derivative action was approved by *659 the director if the
act resulted in no personal benefit to the director.
\ 24 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744(3) provides as follows:
(3) Whether a director is independent for purposes of this
section may not be determined solely on the basis of any
one or more of the following factors:

(c) The approval by the director of the act being challenged
in the derivative proceeding or demand if the act resulted
in no personal benefit to the director.
\ 25 To determine the meaning of the word "independent" in
Wis. Stat. § 180.0744, we examine the language of the statute,
and its history, context, subject matter and purpose. See UFE,
Inc. v. LIRC, 201 Wis.2d 274, 282, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).
t 26 The factors identified in Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3)
that cannot be solely determinative of whether a director is
independent would appear at first blush to render a director
not independent. For example, by instructing a court that
whether a director is independent may not be determined
solely on the basis that the director is a named defendant in
the derivative action, Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3)(b) appears to
direct a court to adopt a relaxed, lenient standard for the word
"independent." Relying on this subsection and reviewing
the legislative history, the circuit court concluded that "the
threshold established by the legislature is *660 extremely
low. This conclusion is inescapable under a statute where
a director who is a defendant in a derivative suit cannot
be excluded from an independent committee by that fact
alone „18
**86 H 27 A more nuanced examination of the statute shows,
however, that the circuit court's reliance on Wis. Stat. §
180.0744(3) for an "extremely low threshold" standard is
incorrect. The legislature understood the significance of the
factors it listed. It allows the circuit court to give weight to
these factors; the statute simply states that the presence of one
or more of these factors is not solely determinative of the issue
of whether a director is independent.
f 28 The legislature recognized, for example, that a
shareholder could prevent the entire board of directors from
serving on the special litigation committee merely by naming
all the directors as defendants in the derivative action. Section
180.0744(3)(b) instructs *661 a court to examine whether a
director who is a member of the special litigation committee is
a nominal defendant or a defendant with a personal interest in
the dispute. The statute thus instructs the court that this factor
is not solely determinative.

(a) The nomination or election of the director by persons
who are defendants in the derivative proceeding or against
whom action is demanded.

[6] \ 29 The Official Comment to § 7.44 of the Model
Business Corporation Act upon which Wis. Stat. § 180.0744

(b) The naming of the director as a defendant in the
derivative proceeding or as a person against whom action
is demanded.

is based 19 explains that "the mere fact that a director has
been named as a defendant... does not cause the director to
be considered not independent.... It is believed that a court
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will be able to assess any actual bias in deciding whether the
director is independent without any presumption arising out
of... the mere naming of the director as a defendant.

„20

K 30 We conclude that the circuit court's interpretation
that the statute sets forth an "extremely low" threshold
for determining whether a director is independent does not
comport with the statute. The legislature directs in Wis. Stat.
§ 180.0744(3) that a court is not to adopt a. per se exclusion
of directors from the special litigation committee when
these directors have certain relations with the corporation.
Instead *662 the legislature directs a court to examine the
characteristics of each member's relationship to a defendant
director and the corporation carefully to determine whether
the member is independent.

Corporation Act in its final phrase. The final phrase of §
180.0744(1) as originally adopted, in contrast to the Model
Business Corporation Act, provided that a court shall adhere
to the decision of the special litigation committee to dismiss
the derivative action "unless the court finds that the
members of the group so voting were not independent or
were not acting in good faith"

(emphasis added).

*664 U 35 According to the bill-drafting file for Wis. Stat.
§ 180.0744, the purpose of the final clause, which could be
considered merely redundant, was to make explicit that under
the statute a court is to examine the rationality of the decisionmaking process and whether the members of the group were
25

independent and acted in good faith.
The final clause
"strikes a proper balance between shareholders' rights „26
and the
business
judgment
principle
of
corporate
governance.
[7] Tf 31 The statute requires judicial adherence to the
decision of a special litigation committee that is independent
**88 1f 36 According to the legislative history, the
and is operating in accordance with the statute. Judicial
statute does not dictate judicial adherence to the decision
review to determine whether the members of the committee
of a special litigation committee unless the committee
are independent and whether the committee's procedure
members are independent under the statute.
A court is
complies with the statute is of utmost **87 importance,
required
to
adhere
to
the
decision
of
the
special
litigation
because the court is bound by the substantive decision of a
committee
regarding
dismissal
of
a
derivative
action
on the
properly constituted and acting committee. The power of a
ground that the committee's decision constitutes a matter of
corporate defendant to obtain a dismissal of an action by the
business
judgment delegated by the board of directors to
ruling of a committee of independent directors selected by
the committee. Thus, under the Wisconsin statute, judicial
the board of directors is unique in the law. The threshold
oversight is necessary to determine whether the members of
established by the legislature in Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 to
the special litigation committee are independent.
determine whether members of a committee are independent
is decidedly not "extremely low," as the circuit court stated.
*665 K 37 In October 1991, the Committee on Business
We conclude the legislature intended a circuit court to
Corporation Law of the State Bar of Wisconsin sought
examine carefully whether members of a special litigation
amendment of Wis. Stat. § 180.744(1), as the attorneys
committee are independent.
explained, to retain the purpose of the final phrase but to
H 32 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 supports
our interpretation of the word "independent" and the role of
the circuit court.

22

1 33 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 is based on § 7.44 of
23

the Model Business Corporation Act, which *663 was
adopted in 1989. The Wisconsin version of the Model
Business Corporation Act, Wis. Stat. § 180.0744, was created
by 1991 Act 16, § 27, effective May 13, 1991. Thus our
inquiry into the meaning of the word "independent" under
the Wisconsin statute considers the history of the enactment
of both the Wisconsin statute and the Model Business
Corporation Act.
134 The language of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(1), as originally
adopted, differed from § 7.44 of the Model Business

clarify that the final phrase of the Wisconsin statute did
not change the burden of proof set forth in the statute.28
The amendment proposed by the lawyers, described as
"nonsubstantive and 'housekeeping' in nature," and adopted
by the legislature, thus expressly retains the concept of
judicial review of whether members of the special litigation
committee are independent. 29
U 38 The legislative history contradicts the conclusion of
the circuit court and court of appeals in the present case
that the legislature intended an "extremely low" threshold
for determining whether members of a special litigation
committee are independent. The legislative history of Wis.
Stat. § 180.0744 demonstrates the legislature's intent that
the courts scrutinize whether the members of a special
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litigation committee are independent in order to protect the
shareholders' and the corporation's interests.

participated in the transaction or events underlying the
derivative action. Innocent or pro forma

involvement

does not necessarily render a member not independent,
but substantial participation or approval or personal

Ill

financial benefit should.

Tf 39 We now discuss the appropriate test to be applied to
determine whether directors who are members of a special
litigation committee are independent *666 under Wis. Stat.
§ 180.0744. This question is one of first impression in
Wisconsin. Nothing in the statute expressly states the factors
to be examined to determine whether directors who are

(3) A committee

member's past or present

or economic dealings with an individual

business
defendant.

Evidence of a committee member's employment and
financial relations with an individual defendant should
be considered in determining whether the member is
independent.

members of a committee are independent.
K 40 The Model Business Corporation Act (upon which
Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 is based) builds on the law relating
to special litigation committees developed by a number of
states. We are therefore informed by the case law of other
30

(4) A committee member's past or present
family, or social relations with individual
Evidence of a committee member's
relations with an individual defendant

personal,
defendants.

non-financial
should be

considered in determining whether the member is

and we derive from this case law the following

independent. A determination of whether a member is

test to determine whether a member of a special litigation
committee is independent. 31

independent is affected by the extent to which a member

states,

is directly or indirectly dominated by, controlled by or
beholden to an individual defendant.

*89

U 41 Whether members are
independent is tested on an objective basis ^32z as of the

(5) A committee member's past or present business or

time they are

economic relations with the corporation. For example,

[8]

committee.

[9]

*667

[10]

appointed to the special litigation

Considering the totality of the circumstances,

a court shall determine whether a reasonable person in the
position of a member of a special litigation committee can
base his or her decision on the merits of the issue rather
than on extraneous considerations or influences.

if a member of the special litigation committee was
outside counsel or a consultant to the corporation, this
factor should be considered in determining whether the
member is independent.

In other

**90 (6) The number of members on a special litigation

words, the test is whether a member of a committee has a

committee. The more members on a special litigation

relationship with an individual defendant or the corporation

committee, the less weight a circuit court may assign to

that would reasonably be expected to affect the member's

a particular disabling interest affecting a single member

judgment with respect to the litigation in issue. The factors

of the committee.

a court should examine to determine whether a committee
member is independent include, but are not limited to, the

(7) The roles of corporate counsel and

following:

counsel.

independent

Courts should be more likely to find a

special litigation committee independent if the *669
(1) A committee member's status as a defendant
potential

liability.

and

Optimally members of a special

committee retains counsel who has not represented
individual defendants or the corporation in the past.

35

litigation committee should not be defendants in the
derivative action and should not be exposed to personal

f 42 Some courts and commentators have suggested that

liability as a result of the action.

a "structural bias" exists in special litigation committees
•2/r

(2) A committee member's participation

in or approval

of the alleged wrongdoing orfinancial benefits from the

that taints their decisions.

They argue that members of

a committee, appointed by the directors of the corporation,

challenged transaction. Optimally members of a special

are instinctively sympathetic and empathetic towards their

litigation committee should not have been members of

colleagues on the board of directors and can be expected to

the board of directors when the transaction in question

vote for dismissal of any but the most egregious charges.

occurred or was *668 approved. Nor should they have

They assert that the committees are inherently biased and
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untrustworthy.37 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 and the Model
Business Corporation Act are designed to combat this
possibility 38
t 43 Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 requires that only
independent directors vote to create a special litigation
committee and only independent directors serve on the
committee. The statute recognizes that independent directors
serving as members of a special *670 litigation committee
are capable of rendering an independent decision even though
they are members of the board of directors which includes
defendants in the derivative action.
[11] If 44 A court should not presuppose that a special
litigation committee is inherently biased. Although members
of a special litigation committee may have experiences
similar to those of the defendant directors and serve with them
on the board of directors, the legislature has declared that
independent members of a special litigation committee are
capable of rendering an independent decision. The test we
set forth today is designed, as is the statute, to overcome the
effects of any "structural bias."

judgments, courts are well suited by experience to evaluate
whether members of a special litigation committee are
independent.
1f 47 The test we set forth attains the balance the legislature
intended by empowering corporations to dismiss meritless
derivative litigation through special litigation committees,
while checking this power with appropriate judicial oversight
over the composition and conduct of the special litigation
committee.

IV
[15] If 48 The circuit court declined to grant summary
judgment for the defendant because there was a *672 dispute
of material facts. After seven days of testimony on the issue
of whether the members of the special litigation committee
were independent, the circuit court made findings of fact
and concluded that the threshold the legislature established
for determining whether the members of the committee were
independent is "extremely low." Applying this "extremely
low" standard, the circuit court determined that the members
of the special litigation committee in the present case were

[12] [13] 1f 45 A circuit court is to look at the totality of
independent 42
the circumstances. A finding that a member of the special
litigation committee is independent does not require the
1f 49 We briefly explore the relations of the members of
complete absence of any facts that *671 might point to nonthe special litigation committee to the corporation and the
objectivity. A director may be independent even if he or she
defendant Culea. In this case no member of the special
has had some personal or business relation with an individual
litigation committee is a named defendant in the derivative
action.
director accused of wrongdoing.
Although the totality
of **91 the circumstances test does not necessitate the
1f 50 One member of the committee, Robert Bonk, received
complete absence of any facts that might point to a member
a $25,000 bonus at the same meeting of the compensation
not being independent, a circuit court is required to apply the
committee at which Culea's challenged bonus was approved.
test for determining whether a member is independent with
The circuit court found that "while [Bonk] did receive a bonus
care and rigor. If the members are not independent, the court
at the same meeting of the board where Mr. Culea received
will, in effect, be allowing the defendant directors to render
his
bonus, it does not appear that there was a quid pro quo or
a judgment on their own alleged misconduct. The value of a
any
other type of linkage between the two bonuses. In fact,
special litigation committee depends on the extent to which
it should be noted that the plaintiff [Einhorn] has not made
the members of the committee are independent.
Bonk's $25,000 bonus a subject of this lawsuit." Einhorn has
[14] Tf 46 It is vital for a circuit court to review whether made the bonus an issue in this court.
each member of a special litigation committee is independent.
*673 1f 51 Bonk is an employee of the corporation, is a
The special litigation committee is, after all, the "only
subordinate of Culea and considers Culea a friend. Bonk
instance in American Jurisprudence where a defendant can
acknowledged
that it would be "very difficult for [him] to
free itself from a suit by merely appointing a committee to
even consider the possibility that **92 Mr. Culea would
review the allegations of the complaint...."40 We agree with
do something improper...." 4 3 Bonk's ability to independently
the Delaware Court of Chancery that the trial court must
evaluate the litigation may have been compromised by his
be "certain that the SLC [special litigation committee] is
own admission. The circuit court merely stated that "with
truly independent." While ill suited to assessing business
the exception of him being an employee of Northern Labs,
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this Court fails to find any inherent basis upon which his
independence could be challenged."

is critical. "Good faith, reasonable inquiry, and the best
interests ofthe corporation are not enough. „47

K 52 Outside counsel retained by the special
litigation committee questioned whether Robert Bonk was
independent: "[Bonk's] independence is questionable....
Because his interests in the financial outcome - would
[strikethrough in original] was affected but it is such
a small amount.... The input of [Bonk] throughout the
process may taint the vote because his independence may

**93 [16]
H 56 As we stated previously, mere
acquaintanceship and social interaction are not per se bars
to finding a member independent. Relationships with an
individual defendant and the corporation are, however,
factors the circuit court must consider in the totality of
circumstances.

be questioned."
Whether Bonk was independent should
be determined on the basis of his employment status, his
financial interest in the outcome and his personal relation with
Culea.

U 57 Einhorn also argues strenuously that the role of
the corporation's counsel tainted the formation of the
special litigation committee, in that the corporation's counsel
was acting both as Culea's personal counsel and as the
corporation's counsel. Relatively late in its investigation the
special litigation committee retained a separate law firm from
Washington, D.C., to act as its counsel. But the exact extent
of the corporation's counsel's role in advising the special
litigation committee is contested. The circuit court did not
make findings about the roles ofthe corporation's counsel and
outside counsel. The role ofthe corporation's counsel should
be considered as one of the circumstances in determining
whether the committee is independent. Several courts have
stated that retention of objectively independent counsel is
highly recommended, although failure to do so does not
necessarily prevent a special litigation committee from being

K 53 Another member of the committee, John Beagle, was
characterized by the circuit court as Einhorn's "right-hand
man." Beagle admitted that he and Einhorn "have a very
good business relationship" and are "also very good friends."
Beagle wrote, in explaining his lone vote to maintain the
derivative action, that "the special litigation committee is not,
and never was, unbiased or independent... each of us is too
close to one party or the other to have a chance at being
independent...."
*674 John Beagle, plaintiff Einhorn's
good friend and close business partner, openly admits that he
was not independent. 46

independent 48

K 54 The other two members of the special litigation
committee had personal and social relationships with Culea
and Culea's wife. Einhorn argues strenuously that Culea's
neighbor and friend, Dwight Chewning, and Culea's wife's
friend, Lolita Chua, were not independent. The exact extent
of these friendships is vigorously contested by the parties, but
the existence of some relationship is evidenced in the record.
K 55 The circuit court did not make findings of fact specifying
the relationships of Chewning and Chua to Culea other
than describing Chewning as a "neighbor" and Chua as a
"social friend" of Mrs. Culea. In its discussion of Chewning
and Chua, the circuit court examined their performance
as witnesses and as members of the special litigation
committee. While the care, attention and sense of individual
responsibility of a member may touch on the issue of whether
the member was independent, the test is primarily concerned
with whether factors exist at the time the committee was
formed that would prevent a reasonable person from *675
basing his or her decisions on the merits ofthe issue. Whether
members ofthe special litigation committee are independent

*676 \ 58 The circuit court did not apply the totality of
the circumstances standard to determine whether a reasonable
person in the position of the member of the special litigation
committee could base his or her decision on the merits of
the issue rather than on extraneous conditions or influences.
Considered together, the relationships in the present case raise
significant questions concerning whether the members of
the special litigation committee were independent.
*677
The decision of this court is not intended to cast doubt on
any committee member's integrity, honesty or hard work on
the special litigation committee. Rather, we are concerned
that, at the time of the formation of the special litigation
committee, the members of the committee had relationships
with the individual defendant and the corporation that call into
question whether a reasonable person could base his or her
decision on the merits of the issue rather than on extraneous
considerations or influences.
[17] f 59 The application of a statute to undisputed facts
is ordinarily a question of law that this court determines
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals,
benefiting from the analyses of these courts. But in this case
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the facts are in dispute, and the circuit court has not made

The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and the cause

sufficient findings of fact upon which **94 this court can

is remanded.

apply the legal test set forth. Accordingly, we remand the
cause to the circuit court to make findings of fact and to apply

Parallel Citations

the proper legal standard to the facts of this case.
612N.W.2d78,2000WI65

Footnotes
1
Einhorn v. Culea, 224 Wis.2d 856, 591 N.W.2d 908 (Ct.App.1999).
2

For purposes of this opinion, Northern Labs, Inc., and Northern Labs Manufacturing, Inc., are treated as the same corporate entity,
and will be referred to collectively as "Northern Labs."
Unless otherwise noted, all references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1997-98 volumes. Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744, the sole
statute in question in this appeal, was adopted and amended in 1991. It has not been amended thereafter.

3

5

Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744(1) reads as follows:
180.0744. Dismissal
(1) The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding on motion by the corporation if the court finds that [a special litigation
committee]... has determined, acting in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based,
that maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation....
Culea's motion to strike Einhorn's brief because it purportedly exceeds the 11,000-word limit by 234 words, Wis. Stat. § (Rule)
809.19(8)(c), is denied. No costs are awarded.
Any disagreements among the parties about the exact percentages of ownership are not material to our discussion or holding.

6

Prior to the board meeting, Mertz and two other stockholders had sold their holdings.

7

In addition to asserting that the four directors who became members of the special litigation committee were not independent, Einhorn
also asserts that no vote was taken to appoint the special litigation committee, as required by Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(2)(b). While the
court of appeals recognized that "the creation of the SLC [special litigation committee] could have been better documented," the
court of appeals rejected this argument. Einhorn v. Culea, 224 Wis.2d 856, 869-70,591 N.W.2d 908 (Ct. App. 1999). While the record
does not reflect that a formal vote was taken to create the special litigation committee, it suggests that the formation of the committee
was done by consensus of the four directors who ultimately served on the special litigation committee.

4

8

The lone dissenting vote was John Beagle, Einhorn's business partner.

9

The issues of whether the members acted in good faith and conducted a reasonable inquiry are not before us. Einhorn does not
challenge these conclusions.
A derivative action is defined in Wis. Stat. § 180.0740(2). For a discussion of derivative actions and special litigation committees, see,
e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., and Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposalfor Legislative
Reform, 81 Colum. L.Rev. 261 (1981); Michael P. Dooley and E. Norman Veasley, The Role of the Board in Derivative Litigation:
Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. Law. 503 (1989); James L. Rudolph and Gustavo A. del Puerto,
The Special Litigation Committee: Origin, Development, and Adoption Under Massachusetts Law, 83 Mass. L.Rev. 47 (1998);
Meg Shevach, Deciding Who Should Decide to Dismiss Derivative Suits, 39 Emory L.J. 937 (1990); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling
Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 11 Minn. L.Rev. 1339 (1993).
2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Introductory Comment to Subchapter D, Derivative Proceedings, § 7.40 at 7-252-253
(3ded. 1997 Supp.).
Holmstrom v. Coastal Indus., Inc., 645 F.Supp. 963, 965 (N.D.Ohio 1984).

10

11
12
13

14

"The concept of the litigation oversight committee flows from the business judgment rule which, in short, constitutes judicial
recognition of the fact that a private corporation should, generally speaking, have the right to control its destiny respecting the
prosecution of claims held by the corporation." Holmstrom v. Coastal Indus., Inc., 645 F.Supp. 963, 964 (N.D.Ohio 1984).
In United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64, 37 S.Ct. 509, 61 L.Ed. 1119 (1917), in which
Justice Brandeis contemplated the question of whether the business judgment rule could be employed to insulate from judicial scrutiny
the conclusions of management not to initiate litigation, he wrote:
Whether or not a corporation shall seek to enforce in the courts a cause of action for damages is, like other business questions,
ordinarily a matter of internal management, and is left to the discretion of the directors, in the absence of instruction by vote
of the stockholders. Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the directors

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•-.-•-

K (-.,*-

/P>, O A ^ O T l

r-k _

i

Einhorn v. Culea, 235 Wis.2d 646 (2000)

15
16
17
18

19

20

are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudiced
exercise of judgment....
2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Introductory Comment to Subchapter D, Derivative Proceedings, § 7.40 at 7-253 (3d
ed. 1997 Supp.).
2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Introductory Comment to Subchapter D, Derivative Proceedings, § 7.40 at 7-253 (3d
ed. 1997 Supp.).
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this court determines independently of the circuit court and court of appeals,
benefiting from their analyses.
The circuit court declared:
While reasonable persons may take issue in a generic sense with the findings made above [regarding the independence of the
members of the special litigation committee], what is abundantly clear from the record and not even subject to interpretation is
that the criteria for independence established under Wisconsin Statute 180.0744(3) was met. Indeed, independence is so broadly
defined that the independence of a director may not be judged solely upon: (1) whether a director was elected by a defendant in
the derivative suit, (2) whether an elected director is a defendant in the suit, or (3) whether an elected director approved of the
challenged act, as long as that director received no personal benefit from the act.
After a review of the legislative history submitted by the plaintiff, there does not appear to be anything within that history of
the statute that would challenge the conclusion that the threshold established by the legislature in determining independence is
extremely low. The conclusion is inescapable under a statute where a director who is a defendant in a derivative suit cannot be
excluded from an independent committee by that fact alone.
A court may examine official comments that accompany a statute to determine legislative intent. See, e.g., Armor All Prod. v. Amoco
Oil Co., 194 Wis.2d 35, 50, 533 N.W.2d 720 (1995); Sterman v. Hornbeck, 156 Wis.2d 556, 564, 457 N.W.2d 874 (Ct.App.1990)
(examining Model Business Corporation Act to interpret statute); Lyons v. Menominee Enter., Inc., 61 Wis.2d 504, 509, 227 N.W.2d
108 (1975) (same).
See 2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Official Comment to § 7.44 at 7-343 (3d ed. 1997 Supp.). The Official Comment
refers to subsection (c)(2) of § 7.44 of the Model Business Corporation Act. The Wisconsin legislature renumbered the Act while
retaining the language of (c)(2) verbatim, and references in this opinion are to Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3)(b).

21

Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch.1985).

22

The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744 is available on microfiche at the Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.

23

See Christopher S. Berry, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. Williams, Wisconsin Business Corporation Law at
7-107 (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books 1992).
The original enactment of Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(1) provided:
(1) The court shall dismiss a derivative proceeding on motion by the corporation if one or more of the groups specified in sub. (2)
or (6) has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based that maintenance
of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation, unless the court finds that the members of the
group so voting were not independent or were not acting in good faith (emphasis of the final phrase added).
See 1991 Wis. Act 16, § 27.
Section 7.44(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act reads as follows:
(a) A derivative proceeding shall be dismissed by the court on motion by the corporation if one of the groups specified in
subsections (b) or (f) has determined in good faith after conducting a reasonable inquiry upon which its conclusions are based
that the maintenance of the derivative proceeding is not in the best interests of the corporation.
Letter from Attorney Jeffrey Bartell to Senator Charles Chvala dated January 23, 1991, Bill-Drafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 16,
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.
Letter from Attorney Jeffrey Bartell to Senator Charles Chvala dated January 23, 1991, Bill-Drafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 16,
Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.
InHoule v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (1990), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court explained:
The value of a special litigation committee is coextensive with the extent to which that committee truly exercises business
judgment. In order to ensure that special litigation committees do act for the corporation's best interest, a good deal of judicial
oversight is necessary in each case.... At a minimum, a special litigation committee must be independent, unbiased, and act in
good faith.
Memorandum to the Committee on Business Corporation Law from Jeffrey Bartell and Molly Martin dated October 31, 1991, BillDrafting File, 1991 Wis. Act 16, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, Wisconsin.
See 1991 Wis. Act 173, § 2 (effective April 28, 1992).
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31

32
33
34

35

36

37
38
39

See also Christopher S. Berry, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. Williams, Wisconsin Business Corporation
Law at 7-116 (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books 1992).
Seel Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Official Comment to § 7.44 at 7-341-349 (3d ed. 1997 Supp.).
For discussions and applications of various versions of this test, see, e.g., Strougo v. Padegs, 27 F.Supp.2d 442, 448-451 (1998); In
re Oracle Sec. Litig, 852 F.Supp. 1437, 1441-42 (1994); Johnson v. Hui, 811 F.Supp. 479, 486-87 (N.D.Cal.1991); Peller v. The
Southern Co., 707 F.Supp. 525,527-28 (1988); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184,1189-90 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 413 A.2d 805,
814-16 (Del.1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981); Millsap v. American Fam. Corp., 208 Ga.App. 230,430 S.E.2d
385, 387-88 (1993); Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58-59 (1990); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001-02 (1979); Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 583 N.Y.S.2d 340, 343-44 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1992);
Lewis v. Boyd, 838 S.W.2d 215, 224-25 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1992). See also James L. Rudolph & Gustavo A. del Puerto, The Special
Litigation Committee: Origin, Development, and Adoption Under Massachusetts Law, 83 Mass. L.Rev. 47, 51-52 (1998).
"[Courts] have looked to an array of objective factors ... as criteria for evaluating the disinterestedness and independence of
directors...." 1 Roger J. Magnuson, Shareholder Litigation § 8.17.60 (1993).
An independent member might stop being independent while serving on a special litigation committee.
This standard for determining whether a person is independent fits the dictionary definitions of independent. Black's Law Dictionary
at 774 (7th ed. 1999) defines "independent" as "not subject to the control or influence of another." The American Heritage Dictionary
of the English Language at 917 (3d ed.1992) defines "independent" as, among other things, "free from the influence, guidance, or
control of another or others."
For a discussion of cases involving the independent standard for members of special litigation committees, see Jay M. Zitter, Propriety
of Termination ofProperly Initiated Derivative Action by "Independent Committee" Appointed by Board ofDirectors Whose Actions
(Or Inaction) Are Under Attack, 22 A.L.R. 4th (1983 and 1999 Supp.).
See, e.g., Houle v. Low, 407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 54 (1990); Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709,
718 (Iowa 1983); Carol B. Swanson, Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball,
11 Minn. L.Rev. 1339, 1356-59 (1993).
See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75
Nw.U.L.Rev.96,98(1980).
See 2 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, Official Comment to § 7.44 at 7-342 (3d ed. 1997 Supp.).

40

See In re Oracle Securities Litigation, 852 F.Supp. 1437, 1442 (N.D.Cal.1994), stating:
A "totality of the circumstances" test does not, however, necessitate the complete absence of any facts which might point to
non-objectivity. In any business setting, associations and contacts of the type which [the committee member] has had with
some of the individual defendants and [the corporation] are certainly neither inappropriate nor such as to suggest that [the
committee member] would not faithfully discharge his obligations to [the corporation's] shareholders. Business dealings seldom
take place between complete strangers and it would be a strained and artificial rule which required a director to be unacquainted
or uninvolved with fellow directors in order to be regarded as independent.
Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch.1985).

41

Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del.Ch. 1985).

42

43

The question of which party has the burden of proving, Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(5), whether members of the special litigation committee
in the present case were independent has been raised in this case. At the trial before the circuit court, plaintiff Einhorn presented his
case first. We do not address the issue of burden of proof because it was not fully analyzed or fully briefed by the parties.
See 12/19/96 Bonk testimony, R. 206 at 35 (reproduced at Einhom's Appendix at 168).

44
45

See "Chewning Notes of 5/22/95 Conversations With Outside Counsel," Einhorn's Appendix at 95.
See letter from Beagle to Chewning, June 14, 1995, Einhorn's Appendix at 127.

46

At oral argument, counsel for Culea asserted that Einhorn's trial counsel conceded that Beagle was independent. It was only when
new appellate counsel was hired, Culea argues, that Einhorn challenged whether Beagle was independent.
Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744(3) focuses the inquiry of "independent" on the connections of a member of a special litigation
committee to an individual defendant and the corporation, not on the connections with a plaintiff. See Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(3).
We do not address the issue of a member's relationship with the plaintiff.
See Christopher S. Berry, Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Frank C. DeGuire and Clay R. Williams, Wisconsin Business Corporation Law at
7-116 (State Bar of Wisconsin CLE Books 1992).
See, e.g., In reParPharm. Inc., 750 F.Supp. 641,647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("Both New York and Delaware law contemplate that a special
litigation committee be represented by independent counsel."); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1190 (Del. 1985) (although use of
in-house counsel is not recommended, it is not fatal to the special litigation committee's investigation).
A comment to Wis. SCR 20:1.13 of the Code of Professional Conduct states the following about derivative actions:

47
48
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The question can arise whether counsel for the organization may defend such an action. The proposition that the organization
is the lawyer's client does not alone resolve the issue. Most derivative actions are a normal incident of an organization's affairs,
to be defended by the organization's lawyer like any other suit. However, if the claim involves serious charges of wrongdoing
by those in control of the organization, a conflict may arise between the lawyer's duty to the organization and the lawyer's
relationship with the board. In those circumstances, Rule 1.7 [relating to conflict of interest] governs who should represent the
directors and the organization.
Wisconsin Stat. § 180.0744 draws no distinction between publicly held corporations and closely held corporations. See §§
180.1801-180.1837 relating to close corporations. We acknowledge that it may be difficult for closely held corporations to assemble
special litigation committees. If it is difficult for the corporation to create an independent special litigation committee, the remedy
has been provided by the legislature. The corporation may move the court, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 180.0744(6), to "appoint a panel
of one or more independent persons to determine whether maintenance of the derivative proceedings is in the best interests of the
corporation."
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4. When the committee authorized with making a business
6 6 2 N.W.2d 876

decision for the corporation lacks independence and good

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

faith, a member's derivative suit proceeds on its merits.

George JANSSEN, et al., Respondents,

Attorneys and Law Firms

v.
*879

BEST & FLANAGAN, et a l , Defendants,

Patrick J. McLaughlin, Eric Moutz, Dorsey &

Whitney, LLP, Minneapolis, for appellant.

and
Minneapolis Police Relief

William J. Mavity, Pamela Marie Miller, Mavity &

Association, Petitioner, Appellant.

Associates, Minneapolis, for respondents.

No. CX-01-2207. I

Martin J. Costello, Hughes & Costello, St. Paul, for Amicus

May 22, 2 0 0 3 .

Former members and trustees of police pension fund, a
nonprofit corporation, brought derivative action against law

Curiae, Minnesota Teamsters Joint Council 32, et al.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

firm for legal malpractice, naming corporation as nominal
defendant. The District Court, Hennepin County, Bruce A.

Opinion

Peterson, J., dismissed action. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court
of Appeals, 645 N.W.2d 495, reversed and remanded. Upon

OPINION

further appeal, the Supreme Court, Meyer, J., held that: (1) as
a matter of first impression, boards of nonprofit corporations

MEYER, Justice.

could receive the protection of the business judgment rule;
(2) Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act did not prohibit

We are called on to decide certain questions of first

corporations from appointing independent committees with

impression regarding the law of nonprofit corporations in

authority to decide whether the corporation should join a

Minnesota. The principal issue concerns how a nonprofit

member's derivative suit; (3) board failed to establish that

board may respond to a member's demand to commence

investigator, appointed to determine whether corporation

legal action on behalf of the association. We also consider

should join member's derivative suit, was independent and

the degree of deference that a district court may give to a

acted in good faith; and (4) board was not entitled to remedy

nonprofit board's decision to reject a member's demand to

defect in first investigation.

commence legal action.
The board of directors of the Minneapolis Police Relief

Affirmed.

Association (MPRA) made an improvident investment in
Hanson, J., concurred in part and dissent in part with opinion
in which Blatz, C.J., joined.

a company known as Technimar and lost approximately
fifteen million dollars. Certain members of MPRA (Janssen,
et al., whom we will refer to collectively as "Janssen")

*878 Syllabus by the court

brought a derivative suit on behalf of MPRA against Best

1. The boards of nonprofit corporations may receive the

the Technimar investment. MPRA appointed special counsel

& Flanagan alleging attorney malpractice with respect to
protection of the business judgment rule.

to review the merits of the derivative suit. Special counsel
concluded that proceeding with the derivative suit would
not

not be in the best interests of MPRA and MPRA moved to

prohibit nonprofit corporations from appointing independent

2. Minnesota

Statutes

§ 317A.241

(2002)

does

dismiss the suit. The district court treated special counsel as

committees with the authority to decide whether the

a special litigation committee, applied the business judgment

corporation should join a member's derivative suit.

rule to the committee's decision not to proceed with the

3. Because the investigation conducted by appellant's
litigation committee lacked independence and good faith, the
conclusion of that committee does not deserve deference from
the court as a business decision.

derivative action, and dismissed Janssen's suit. The court
of appeals reversed, concluding that the legislature had not
granted nonprofit corporations authority to appoint special
litigation committees, and the district court was precluded
from deferring to the decision of MPRA's special counsel.
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MPRA petitioned for review, seeking a reversal of the court
of appeals' decision.
MPRA is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation that administers
a pension plan for Minneapolis police officers hired before
June 15, 1980. Minn.Stat. § 423B.01-.04 (2002). MPRA was
formed under and is subject to Minn.Stat. ch. 317A (2002),
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporation Act, and is governed by
a board of nine directors. See Minn.Stat. § 423B.05, subd. 1
(2002).
In 1996 and 1997, MPRA lost approximately fifteen million
dollars that it had invested with David Welliver in a company
called Technimar. The circumstances surrounding this loss
were the subject of several investigations and at least two
prior lawsuits. The most important aspect of this history for
the instant case is that two law firms, Jones, Day, Reavis
and Pogue (Jones Day) and Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Dorsey
Whitney), had already conducted investigations surrounding
some of the issues.
Janssen alleges in this action that MPRA's former attorneys,
Best & Flanagan, committed malpractice in representing
MPRA during and after the Welliver investments were made
in 1996 and 1997. Janssen alleges, among other claims,
that Best & Flanagan attorneys served as general counsel to
MPRA and were negligent *880 in failing to conduct a "due
diligence" inquiry into the Welliver investment. In bringing
this derivative suit, Janssen did not have an attorney-client
relationship with Best & Flanagan, so their suit depended
upon MPRA joining them as a plaintiff.
In response to this lawsuit, MPRA appointed attorney Robert
A. Murnane (Murnane) as special counsel to investigate
Janssen's claims and determine whether MPRA should join
the derivative suit. The MPRA board issued a resolution in
June of 2000 instructing Murnane to conduct an independent
review and evaluate the derivative lawsuit to determine
on behalf of MPRA's board of directors whether or not
MPRA should join in legal action against Best & Flanagan.
The resolution specifically instructed Murnane to "not
reinvestigate, verify or otherwise attempt to prove or disprove
the factual findings, determinations, events or circumstances"
described in the prior investigative reports of Jones Day
and Dorsey Whitney and a set of discovery materials in
a related lawsuit. Murnane was specifically instructed to
"accept as correct" the factual findings of these reports and
discovery materials. Murnane was not limited, however, by
the conclusions of the previous reports.

Murnane reviewed "thousands of pages of reports, documents
and deposition transcripts" over a few months in investigating
the merits of a malpractice action against Best & Flanagan.
However, the record does not indicate that he conducted any
of his own investigation, nor did he personally speak to the
Janssen claimants or their counsel. Murnane submitted his
report to the MPRA board on September 26,2000, concluding
that "the totality of the materials reviewed does not support a
finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal malpractice in
its handling of the MPRA affairs," and that "to spend money
in the pursuit of a legal malpractice claim against Best &
Flanagan would not be prudent use of the MPRA funds."
Following submission of Murnane's report, the MPRA board
brought a motion to dismiss the instant lawsuit under the
principle of law that the court should defer to the business
judgment of Murnane, MPRA's special litigation committee.
In considering MPRA's motion to dismiss, the district
court described the appropriate role that special litigation
committees play in acting on behalf of for-profit corporations.
The court determined that a nonprofit corporation is
also authorized to utilize the special litigation committee
procedure. The court treated Murnane as a special litigation
committee and applied the business judgment rule to
the committee's report. Under the business judgment rule
enunciated by the court, it examined only whether the
committee conducted its investigation with independence
and good faith. The court concluded that "[Murnane's]
investigation cannot survive even this limited review." The
court could not find that Murnane was independent because
"he was told by the board of directors what to believe."
The court could not find good faith because there was no
indication from Murnane that he sought or received input
from the plaintiffs and the court was left to assume that such
input was not sought because the board's instructions limited
the scope of the investigation. Finally, the court could not
clearly discern whether Murnane was offering legal advice or,
in fact, rendering a business judgment decision.
Rather than deny MPRA's motion to dismiss the Janssen
lawsuit, the district court postponed a decision on the
motion *881 to allow MPRA an opportunity to remedy
the deficiencies in MPRA's delegation of authority to its
special litigation committee. The court instructed MPRA
that if it sought deference for its committee's litigation
decision, the court would not grant such deference unless and
"until adequate evidence of independence and good faith is
submitted by the MPRA, and until it is clear that Murnane has
rendered a business judgment."
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Consequently, MPRA issued a second resolution in
December of 2000 to Murnane, declaring that he was to
function as a special litigation committee, not being limited
in any way as to how to conduct his investigation or
what material he may consider: "[sjpecial counsel shall
have complete independence and may undertake whatever
good faith investigation he chooses." The resolution asked
Murnane to exercise his "business judgment" regarding
whether it was in the best interest of MPRA to join in
the derivative suit. Murnane conducted an investigation that
included meeting with certain of the named plaintiffs in
the action and the involved attorneys at Best & Flanagan.
Murnane submitted a second report and in that report
concluded it would be a "poor business judgment" for MPRA
to join in litigation against Best & Flanagan. MPRA renewed
its motion to dismiss. The district court reviewed Murnane's
second report and concluded that MPRA's special litigation
committee (Murnane) had conducted an investigation that
was independent and conducted in good faith. The court
deferred to the committee's business judgment and granted
MPRA's motion to dismiss the complaint against Best &
Flanagan.
Janssen appealed and the court of appeals reversed. It
concluded that a nonprofit corporation lacks the statutory
authority to appoint a special litigation committee to evaluate
derivative claims. Additionally, the court concluded that even
if a nonprofit corporation has the authority to appoint a
special litigation committee, in this case the special litigation
committee failed to meet the threshold test of the business
judgment rule. The court reversed and remanded for trial. This
appeal followed.
I.
[1] We concern ourselves with two questions: (1) whether
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act prohibits a
nonprofit corporation's board of directors from establishing
an independent committee with authority to make decisions
about derivative lawsuits; and (2) whether Murnane, as
special counsel, displayed sufficient independence and good
faith to be entitled to the deference of the business judgment
rule. We exercise de novo review of the primary issues
in this case, as they involve statutory interpretation and
novel questions of law. State v. Loge, 608 N.W.2d 152, 155
(Minn.2000). We also note that other states have recently held
that they will review de novo a decision of a district court to
dismiss a derivative suit. SeeBrehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,

<KW-<*-:- ^ o n - i o

253 (Del.2000); In re PSE & G S'holder Litig., 173 N.J. 258,
801 A.2d 295, 313 (2002).
A. The Business Judgment Rule and Derivative Lawsuits
To resolve this case we must strike a balance between
two competing interests in the judicial review of corporate
decisions. See PSE & G, 801 A.2d at 306. On one hand,
courts recognize the authority of corporate directors and
want corporations to control their own destiny. Stoner v.
*882 Walsh, 772 F.Supp. 790, 796 (S.D.N.Y.1991). On
the other hand, courts provide a critical mechanism to
hold directors accountable for their decisions by allowing
shareholder derivative suits. See Barrett v. Southern Conn.
Gas Co., Ill Conn. 362, 374 A2d 1051, 1055 (1977)
(remarking that " '[i]f the duties of care and loyalty which
directors owe to their corporations could be enforced only
in suits by the corporation, many wrongs done by directors
would never be remedied' " (citation omitted)); Brown v.
Tenney, 125 I11.2d 348, 126 Ill.Dec. 545, 532 N.E.2d 230,
232 (1988) (stating that "[t]he derivative suit is a device to
protect shareholders against abuses by the corporation, its
officers and directors, and is a vehicle to ensure corporate
accountability"). Because shareholder-derivative litigation is
not an everyday occurrence in Minnesota's courts, we address
these issues for the first time.
Courts have attempted to balance these two competing
concerns by establishing a "business judgment rule" that
grants a degree of deference to the decisions of corporate
directors. The business judgment rule was developed by
state and federal courts to protect boards of directors against
shareholder claims that the board made unprofitable business
decisions. "The business judgment rule is a presumption
protecting conduct by directors that can be attributed to
any rational business purpose." Dennis J. Block, et al, The
Business Judgment Rule: Fiduciary Duties of Corporate
Directors 18 (5th ed.1998). The business judgment rule
means that as long as the disinterested directors) made an
informed business decision, in good faith, without an abuse
of discretion, he or she will not be liable for corporate losses
resulting from his or her decision. Id. at 39. Two major
reasons buttress the decision to grant a degree of deference
to corporate boards. First, protecting directors' reasonable
risks is considered positive for the economy overall, as those
risks allow businesses to attract risk-averse managers, adapt
to changing markets, and capitalize on emerging trends.1
Second, courts are ill-equipped to judge the wisdom of
business ventures and have been reticent to replace a wellmeaning decision by a corporate board with their own. See,
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e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,
393 N.E.2d 994, 1000(1979).

primary rationales for applying the business judgment rule in
the for-profit context apply in the nonprofit context as well.
Organizations are autonomous agents that should control
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
^ ^ W r P o w n destiny. See Auerbach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393
shareholders of a corporation believe the board has acted
N.E.2d at 1000-01. Directors of nonprofits may take fewer
improperly, corporate law recognizes the shareholders'
risks than would be optimal if they were overly concerned
ability to bring a derivative lawsuit. Derivative suits allow
about liability for well-meaning decisions. See Daniel R.
shareholders to bring suit against wrongdoers on behalf of
Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules
the corporation, and force liable parties to compensate the
and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical
corporation for injuries so caused. Tenney, 126 111.Dec. 545,
and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L.Rev. 261, 270 (1986).
532 N.E.2d at 233. A derivative action actually belongs to
Additionally, courts are not well-equipped to scrutinize the
the corporation, but the shareholders are permitted to bring
decisions of a corporation; judges should not be caught in the
the action where the corporation has failed to take action for
middle of fighting factions of nonprofits any more than they
itself. See id. Because of the business judgment rule, however, should be thrust between dissatisfied shareholders and profitnot all shareholders' derivative *883 suits proceed on their
seeking boards. See id. at 273. Therefore, we conclude that the
merits. While derivative suits may benefit a corporation,
boards of nonprofit corporations may receive the protection
any benefit must be weighed against the possibility that
of the business judgment rule.
disgruntled shareholders will bring nuisance lawsuits with
little merit and that even legitimate suits may not be worth
B. Special Litigation Committees
pursuing when the likelihood of victory is compared with the
We turn now to consider whether a nonprofit board of
time, money, and hostility necessary to win. The substantive
directors that is not sufficiently *884 independent to decide
decision about whether to pursue the claims advanced in a
whether to join a member's derivative lawsuit may establish
shareholder's derivative action involves "the weighing and
a special litigation committee with authority to make the
balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional, public
relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution
decision. Janssen claims a nonprofit may not appoint a
of many if not most corporate problems." Auerbach, 419
special litigation committee because the Minnesota Nonprofit
N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d at 1002. The careful balancing of
Corporation Act (Nonprofit Act) provides no such authority.
those factors is best done by the board of directors, which is
Minn.Stat. § 317A.241 (2002). MPRA argues that the
familiar with the appropriate weight to attribute to each factor
Nonprofit Act permitted them to appoint Murnane as its
given the company's product and history. Thus, courts apply
special litigation committee, and the district court agreed.
the business judgment rule when evaluating the decision by
The court of appeals concluded that the statute prohibited
a board of directors whether to join or quash a derivative suit
nonprofits from appointing special litigation committees. We
belonging to the corporation. Block, supra, at 1702-03.
agree with the district court.
Having established the principles by which we apply the
business judgment rule to a for-profit corporate board's
decision whether to join a derivative lawsuit, we consider
whether to grant similar deference to nonprofit boards of
directors. The parties in this case have presumed the business
judgment rule will apply to MPRA. Other states have
applied the business judgment rule to decisions of nonprofit
corporations, explicitly or implicitly. The highest courts of
Alabama, Hawaii, and South Dakota have done so, as have
intermediate appellate courts of Colorado, New York, Ohio,
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. We find no
case denying a nonprofit organization the protection of the
business judgment rule.
[10] In addition to finding support in other jurisdictions for
giving judicial deference to nonprofit corporate decisions, the

[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Special litigation committees are
made up of disinterested board members or individuals
appointed by the board who are charged with informing
themselves fully on the issues underlying the derivative
suit and deciding whether pursuit of litigation is in the
best interests of the corporation. See, e.g., Houle v. Low,
407 Mass. 810, 556 N.E.2d 51, 53 (1990); Drilling v.
Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 505-07 (Minn.App.1999); PSE
& G, 801 A.2d at 303. The key element is that the board
delegates to a committee of disinterested persons the board's
power to control the litigation. Block, supra, at 1689.
A mere advisory role of the special litigation committee
fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant deference
to the committee's decision by the court. If the board
properly delegates its authority to act to the special litigation
committee, the court will extend deference to the committee's
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decision under the business judgment rule. See Drilling, 589
N.W.2d at 510; Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 22
(Minn.App.1995); Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203,
211 (Minn App. 1988).
C. Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act
We look to the Nonprofit Act to determine whether MPRA
had statutory authority to appoint its special litigation
committee. The relevant part of the statute reads:
A resolution approved by the affirmative
vote of a majority of the board may establish
committees having the authority of the
board in the management of the business
of the corporation to the extent provided
in the resolution. Committees are subject at
all times to the direction and control of the
board.
Minn.Stat § 317A.241, subd. 1 (2002).

board has a duty to oversee the work of the committees.
The former interpretation would make true independence
impossible, while the latter interpretation is flexible enough
to allow for independent committees. As both parties'
interpretations are plausible, we conclude the statute is not
clear and free from all ambiguity.
If the words of a statute are not explicit, we interpret the
statute's meaning by considering the intent of the legislature
in drafting the law. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). There are
three overarching considerations we consider in discerning
legislative intent in this case: the context of the 1989 revision
of the Nonprofit Act, contemporaneous legislative history,
and consequences of a particular interpretation. Id. We will
address each of these in turn. In addition, we presume that
the legislature did not intend an absurd result or to violate
the Constitution, and that it intended the entire statute to
have effect and favor the public interest. Minn.Stat. § 645.17
(2002).

Janssen also argues that the statute is unambiguous but urges
a contrary meaning: a committee that must be "subject to"
the "control" of the board cannot be sufficiently independent
from the board to deserve the protection of the business
judgment rule. Janssen also points to subdivision 5 of the
statute, noting that a director cannot fulfill his or her standard
of conduct by delegating authority to the board, as an
indication that nonprofit directors have to retain control over
all board committees.

The 1989 revision of the Nonprofit Act was carried out
eight years after the legislature enacted a wholesale revision
of the Minnesota Business Corporation Act (Business Act),
Minn.Stat. ch. 302A (2002), in 1981. See Minnesota Business
Corporation Act of 1981, ch. 270, §§ 1-125, 1981 Minn.
Laws 1141-1222. Shortly after the revised Business Act
was adopted, the Minnesota State Bar Association organized
a group to study the counterpart statute for nonprofits,
and found it was outdated and unworkable, with many
ambiguities. Hearing on H.F. 1203, H. Subcomm. Civil Law,
76th Minn. Leg., April 24, 1989 (audio tape) (comments
of Kathleen Pontius). The act had not been revised since
1951, when the archetypal nonprofit in legislators' minds was
a social club like the Jaycees or Rotary. Hearing on H.F.
1203, H. Subcomm. Civil Law, 76th Minn. Leg., April 24,
1989 (audio tape) (comments of Patrick Plunkett, president
of Ramsey County Bar Ass'n). This original conception made
the statute a poor fit for the growing number and variety of
nonprofit organizations, and for the lawyers who served them.
Id. A legislative committee drafted a new statute governing
nonprofits, with three major sources: the Business Act, the
ABA's Revised Model Nonprofit Act, and Minnesota's old
nonprofit act. Hearing on H.F. 1203, H. Subcomm. Civil Law,
76th Minn. Leg., April 24, 1989 (audio tape) (comments of
Rep. Thomas Pugh, bill's sponsor).

The language in subdivision 1 indicating that committees
must be subject to the board's control and direction could
reasonably be interpreted to mean either that the board must
control every move of the committees, or simply that the

Minnesota Statutes § 317.241 was passed in the context of
a wholesale revision of the Nonprofit Act. The legislature
did not pass the statute to specifically address the committee
structure of nonprofits *886 or their ability to control

The first inquiry in statutory interpretation is whether the law
is ambiguous. See Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2002). If the words
are clear and unambiguous, "the letter of the law shall not
be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit." Id.
MPRA argues the statute unambiguously allows nonprofit
boards to create independent committees. It maintains that the
statute does not limit the types of committees that nonprofits
can create in any way, thereby making litigation committees
acceptable. In addition, MPRA posits that the phrase "subject
at all times to the direction and control of the board" does
not strip the committees of the independence necessary for
the protection of the business judgment rule. Instead, it argues
that "subject *885 * * * to" simply indicates a "possibility
of control," not a necessity of constant control.
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derivative suits. We conclude that the legislature's purpose in
revising the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act in 1989
had nothing to do with special litigation committees, and
sheds little light on our inquiry.
We next examine the contemporaneous legislative history
to determine legislative intent. In reaching its decision that
the legislature did not intend to empower nonprofit boards
to create special litigation committees, the court of appeals
emphasized the difference between the Business Act and the
Nonprofit Act on this subject. The Business Act specifically
says a board of directors may establish special litigation
committees of one or more directors "to consider legal rights
or remedies of the corporation and whether those rights and
remedies should be pursued. Committees other than special
litigation committees * * * are subject at all times to the
direction and control of the board." Minn.Stat. § 302A.241,
subd. 1 (2002) (emphasis added). The court of appeals was
concerned that not only does the Nonprofit Act lack a specific
provision for special litigation committees, it also does not
exempt any committees from board control.
The comparison between the Business Act and the Nonprofit
Act does not illuminate as much legislative intent as the court
of appeals derived, however. The Nonprofit Act was passed
eight years after the Business Act, making any attempt to infer
meaning from a comparison between the two less convincing.
A careful review of the available legislative history produced
no discernible indication why the special litigation committee
language was dropped. The absence of the special litigation
language in the nonprofit statute could mean several things,
including that the drafters did not think derivative suits were
an issue for nonprofits and therefore did not address litigation
committees in the Nonprofit Act.
[15] Given that little legislative intent concerning section
317A.241 can be inferred from either the purpose of the 1989
revision of the Nonprofit Act or the comparison with the
Business Act, we are left with one remaining consideration
in discerning legislative intent under Minn.Stat. § 645.16:
the consequences of a particular interpretation. On this point
it becomes clear that the district court reached the correct
result. The district court noted that if nonprofit corporate
boards are unable to establish independent committees
whose informed business judgments merit deference from
the courts, the judiciary would be forced to review the
merits of every lawsuit brought by a member of a nonprofit
corporation. Reviewing all derivative suits for nonprofit
corporations would intrude on the authority of nonprofit
boards, significantly tax our court system's limited resources,

and require judges to step significantly beyond their expertise.
The district court concluded that "[s]uch a procedure-totally
removing from the board of directors any control over
litigation brought on behalf of the organization the board
is supposed to govern-is clearly untenable." We agree. We
see no reason to assume that the courts are better equipped
to make business judgments about the merits of a lawsuit
brought by a member of a nonprofit corporation than is a
properly functioning board of directors whose duty it is to
govern and promote the nonprofit corporation's best interests.
There are no characteristics of nonprofits that justify treating
nonprofit and for-profit corporations differently in terms
of their ability to delegate board authority to independent
committees to review the *887 merits of derivative suits.
There are nonprofits, like MPRA, that function very much
like for-profit corporations and would benefit from the
ability to weed out nuisance suits. In addition to pension
funds, these nonprofits may include hospitals, schools, and
homeowners associations. We are not alone in reaching this
conclusion; two other states have used the business judgment
rule when reviewing decisions by nonprofit litigation
committees: Finley v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 1152,
96 Cal.Rptr.2d 128, 132 (2000); Miller v. Bargaheiser, 70
Ohio App.3d 702, 591 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (1990).
Refusing nonprofit corporations the ability to create special
litigation committees is counter to our common law tradition
as well. While statutes govern certain aspects of corporate
life, including the initial incorporation, corporate litigation
has been largely a creature of the common law. Derivative
suits developed during the nineteenth century as an equitable
means of protecting corporations and minority shareholders
from fraudulent directors. Block, supra, at 1380. The first
judicial opinions to apply the business judgment rule to
the decision of a special litigation committee did not rely
on statutory authority, but rather relied upon case law to
determine whether a committee could terminate a shareholder
lawsuit. Block, supra, at 1690-93.
[16]
[17] A nonprofit corporation's power to appoint a
special litigation committee, in the absence of a statutory
prohibition, may also spring from the existence of corporate
"incidental" powers to carry out corporate purposes. Aiple
v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 45, 143
N.W.2d 374, 378 (1966) (identifying corporate powers as
being limited to "those actions expressly authorized by statute
and such as are incidental thereto and necessary to carry
them into effect"). It is now universally accepted in corporate
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jurisprudence that corporations have the ability to exercise
incidental or necessary powers:
Formerly, corporations were viewed as possessing only
such powers as were specifically granted to them by the
state. This grant of powers was found in the certificate
of incorporation * * * or in the special statute granting a
charter to the corporation.

*** *
Today, in all the states, a corporation is deemed to possess
all the powers of a natural person except those powers
which are specifically forbidden to such corporations by
the law. The old concept of a corporation as a bundle of
only a few, specifically granted powers, has been replaced
by the concept of a corporation as an artificial person,
lacking only those powers which the law specifically
denies to it.
Howard L. Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations,
& Associations § 168 (6th ed.1994); see also 13 William
Meade Fletcher, et al., Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of
Private Corporations § 5963 (perm.ed., rev.vol.1984).
The untenable consequence of concluding the Nonprofit
Act prohibits litigation *888 committees, in combination
with the common law tradition favoring corporate control
of derivative actions, leads us to conclude that nonprofit
corporations have the power to create committees that are
sufficiently independent to merit judicial deference. We hold
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act does not prohibit
corporations from appointing independent committees with
the authority to decide whether the corporation should join a
member's derivative suit.
II.
Having determined that nonprofit corporations have the
power to create special litigation committees, the question
remains whether Murnane deserved the deference of the
business judgment rule. The court of appeals concluded that
Murnane, as a special litigation committee, failed to meet the
threshold test of independence and good faith, and ordered
the lawsuit to proceed. We agree and affirm.
[18] All the state variations upon the business judgment
rule as applied to committees reviewing litigation have two
common elements. At a minimum, the board must establish
that the committee acted in good faith and was sufficiently
independent from the board of directors to dispassionately

review the derivative lawsuit. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald,
673 A.2d 1207, 1219 (Dei. 1996); Houle, 556 N.E.2d at 59;
PSE&G, 801 A.2dat312;Auerbach, 419N.Y.S.2d920,393
N.E.2d at 1000. A key factor in evaluating independence is
whether the board delegates to a committee of disinterested
persons the board's power to control the litigation. Block,
supra, at 1689. A mere advisory role of the special litigation
committee fails to bestow a sufficient legitimacy to warrant
deference to the committee's decision by a court. Thus,
we consider whether Murnane conducted his investigation
with sufficient independence and good faith to deserve the
deference of the business judgment rule. If not, the committee
does not receive the court's deference and the derivative suit
proceeds.
[19] In reviewing Murnane's first report, we conclude that
the board failed to establish the independence and good
faith of Murnane's investigation. We agree with the district
court's determination that Murnane lacked independence
because the MPRA's initial resolution restricted his factual
investigation. Murnane was told to rely on facts developed
by law firms that had been hired to represent MPRA in
lawsuits about other legal issues. Additionally, Murnane's
independence is suspect because his conduct suggests that
he saw his role in conformance with his title: special
counsel. Murnane did not talk to Janssen or their attorneys in
investigating the suit and gave a conclusion that sounds like
legal advice. That behavior belies MPRA's attempt to portray
Murnane as a special litigation committee; instead MPRA
hired Murnane to serve as its special counsel and he acted
more like a legal advisor than a neutral decision maker.
*889 In addition, we conclude that Murnane did not engage
in a good faith attempt to deduce the best interest of MPRA
with respect to the litigation against Best & Flanagan.
Murnane never interviewed Janssen or their attorneys, a
fundamental task in reaching an informed decision about the
merits of their complaints. Murnane also gave no indication
that he had undertaken the careful consideration of all the
germane benefits and detriments to MPRA that is indicative
of a good faith business decision. Murnane opined that
"the totality of the materials reviewed does not support a
finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal malpractice
in its handling of the MPRA affairs," and that "to spend
money in the pursuit of a legal malpractice claim against
Best & Flanagan would not be prudent use of the MPRA
funds." The language of his conclusion hints that his decision
was that of a special counsel evaluating the likelihood of
a legal victory. But a much more comprehensive weighing
and balancing of factors is expected in situations like this,
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taking into consideration how joining or quashing the lawsuit
could affect MPRA's economic health, relations between the
board of directors and members, MPRA's public relations,
and other factors common to reasoned business decisions.
See Auerbach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d at 1002. We
conclude that Murnane's initial investigation of the derivative
action instituted by Janssen against Best & Flanagan lacked
the independence and good faith necessary to merit deference
from this court.

shareholder plaintiff may resume immediate control of the
litigation"). If the courts allow corporate boards to continually
improve their investigation to bolster their business decision,
the rights of shareholders and members will be effectively
nullified. We conclude that the district court erred in deferring
MPRA's motion to dismiss and permitting the board to
remedy defects in its first grant of authority to Murnane. We
further conclude that Murnane failed to conduct his initial
investigation with sufficient independence and good faith to
deserve the deference of the business judgment rule and,
[20]
[21] Implicitly acknowledging the failures in therefore, hold that the district court erred when it granted
its first resolution and investigation, the MPRA board
MPRA's motion to dismiss the suit against Best & Flanagan.
urges us to consider the second resolution and improved
Affirmed.
investigation. We decline to do so. Generally, when the
committee authorized with making a business decision for
the corporation is found to lack the independence needed
to grant summary judgment, or where the independence
is uncertain, the derivative suit proceeds on its merits.
See, e.g., Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d
372, 380 (6th Cir.1984); Will v. Engebretson & Co.,
Inc., 213 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1043-45, 261 Cal.Rptr. 868
(1989); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 972 (Del.Ch.1985);
Davidowitz v. Edelman, 153 Misc.2d 853, 858, 583 N.Y.S.2d
340 (Sup.Ct.1992). See also Houle, 556 N.E.2d at 58-60
(reversing summary judgment in favor of defendant board
of directors and remanding for an evidentiary hearing before
a judge regarding a committee member's independence, and
noting that "[u]nless the defendant sustains its burden of proof
as to both of those questions, the case should proceed to
trial."). The Auerbach court was blunt in its assessment of
the consequences when proof of an investigation shows that
the investigation is too restricted in scope or so shallow in
execution as to constitute a pretext; such proof "would raise
questions of good faith * * * which would never be shielded
by that doctrine." Auerbach, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 393 N.E.2d
at 1003 (emphasis added).
The practice of allowing derivative suits to proceed to trial
if a corporate board's initial attempt at a business decision
fails the minimal requirements for judicial deference *890
is supported by the principles underlying the application of
the business judgment doctrine. We strike a balance between
allowing corporations to control their own destiny and
permitting meritorious suits by shareholders and members by
limiting a board of directors to one opportunity to exercise its
business judgment. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501,
508 (Del.Ch.1984) (explaining that if the court determines
the litigation committee failed the minimal review of the
business judgment rule, the "court shall deny the motion for
such reason and need go no farther, the result being that the

GILBERT, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of
this case.
HANSON, Justice (concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Although I concur with the decisions that boards of nonprofit
corporations are protected by the business judgment rule,
that nonprofit corporations may avail themselves of that
rule by appointing a special litigation committee to decide
whether the corporation should join a members' derivative
suit, and that Murnane may be viewed as a special litigation
committee, I respectfully dissent on the decision to limit our
review to Murnane's first report. The district court did not
base its dismissal order on Murnane's first report because it
concluded that procedural deficiencies precluded deference
to Murnane's recommendations. The district court granted
MPRA's motion to dismiss specifically on the basis of
Murnane's second report, concluding that it was entitled to
deference because it reflected an independent investigation
that was conducted in good faith.
I find no authority to support the majority opinion's
development of a "one strike you're out" rule for conducting
an investigation of claims made in a derivative action. The
cases cited by the majority stand only for the proposition
that the derivative action proceeds to trial when a motion to
dismiss, based on the recommendation of a special litigation
committee, is denied. They do not address the question
of whether such denial is with prejudice to later renewal
or, more specifically applicable here, whether the district
court has discretion to defer ruling on the motion to dismiss
to allow further investigation. Drawing on the analogy to
summary judgment motions generally, the federal decisions
are unanimous in holding that the denial of a motion for
summary judgment does not become the "law of the case"
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so as to preclude the later grant of a renewed motion. See,
e.g., Paulson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 628 F.Supp. 888,
891 (D.Minn. 1986), and cases cited in *891 10A Charles
Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary Kay Kane, Federal
Practice and Procedure. § 2718 n. 6 (1998). This rule has been
recognized by the Minnesota Court of Appeals in Invest Cast,
Inc. v. City of Blaine, All N.W.2d368,370 (Minn.App.1991);
Brantner v. Fruehauf Corp., 1991 WL 10225 (Minn.App.).
Even more to the point are those cases which hold that it
is within the trial court's discretion to deny a motion for
summary judgment without prejudice to it being renewed at a
later time. See Wright, Miller and Kane § 2718 n. 5; 2 David
F. Herr & Roger S. Hay dock, Minnesota Practice § 56.11
(1998).
For these reasons, I would not limit review to Mumane's
first report. Under these facts, where the deficiencies of the
first report resulted from structural impediments imposed
by the corporation upon the scope of the special litigation
committee's investigation, I would conclude that the district
court has discretion to defer (or to deny without prejudice) a
motion to dismiss to allow the corporation an opportunity to
remove those structural impediments.
Moreover, I would conclude that MPRA did remove the
structural impediments to Mumane's investigation and that
Mumane's second report did reflect sufficient independence
and good faith to warrant dismissal.
In reaching this conclusion, I am persuaded that the
deficiencies in Mumane's first report were not the product of
any wrongdoing by Mumane, but instead were the necessary
result of the structural impediments imposed by MPRA.
That conclusion is confirmed by the majority opinion's
review of Mumane's first report, which concludes that
"Mumane lacked independence because the MPRA's initial
resolution restricted his factual investigation." The resolution
of the MPRA board, authorizing Mumane's continuing
investigation after his first report, was appropriately broad:
Special Counsel is not required to assume
as correct any portion of the previous
reports prepared on behalf of the Board of
Directors. Special Counsel is encouraged
to solicit facts, argument and other input
from the parties to the litigation in such
manner and form as Special Counsel
deems appropriate. Special Counsel is
not limited in any way as to how to
conduct his investigation or what material

he may consider. Special Counsel shall
have complete independence and may
undertake whatever good faith investigation
he chooses.
The fault in Mumane's first report was cured by his
further investigation and second report. Mumane interviewed
Janssen and their attorneys, reviewed documents they
provided and analyzed the arguments they presented.
Mumane considered all of the germane benefits and
detriments to MPRA of participating in the litigation.
There may be situations where an initial investigation by a
special litigation committee is so tainted that an expanded
investigation, at least by the same committee, could not
cure the deficiencies in the required independence and good
faith. For example, if there was evidence that Mumane had
developed some bias or was committed to reach the same
recommendation no matter what facts or arguments were
brought to his attention, the second report would stand no
better than the first. However, I see no evidence that this was
the case.
Finally, I cannot agree with the majority opinion's view
that Mumane's legal evaluation of the likely outcome of the
derivative action somehow discredited the independence or
good faith of his investigation. *892 Although Mumane, as
a special litigation committee, was expected to exercise the
"business judgment" of a board of directors, that business
judgment must be applied to the merits of the derivative
action. The best interests of MPRA depend upon an objective
assessment of whether the likely outcome of the derivative
action justifies the expenditure of time, effort and collegiality.
In such a cost-benefit analysis, the potential benefit depends
directly upon the likelihood of a favorable outcome in the
litigation-the less likely a favorable outcome, the less benefit.
Mumane's report concludes that there would be no benefit to
participating in the derivative action-"the association would
be unsuccessful in prosecuting a cause of action against Best
& Flanagan, Brian Rice and Charles Berquist"-but that the
cost would be significant, despite the willingness of Janssen's
counsel to proceed on a contingent fee basis-"the ongoing
viability of the association and a harmonious relationship
between its board of directors and legal counsel" would be
adversely affected. This is precisely the type of business
judgment that a special litigation committee is expected to
make and, when made in good faith by a committee that
is independent of the corporation's board, it is entitled to
deference by the court. Accordingly, I would reverse the court
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of appeals and conclude that the district court did not err when
it dismissed the derivative action based on Murnane's second

B L A T Z C h i e f Justice

'

( c o n c u ™ g i n Part> dissenting in part).

• • • *u
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I join m the concurrence and dissent of Justice Hanson.

T

report and recommendation.
Footnotes
1

2

3

4

5

6

For a thorough discussion of the rationale behind judicial deference to business decisions, see Peter V. Letsou, Implications of
Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 11 Chi.-Kent L.Rev.
179, 181-82 (2001); Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 1565, 1588 (1993);
Ralph K. Winter, On 'Protecting the Ordinary Investor,' 63 Wash. L.Rev. 881, 895 (1988); Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley,
The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Tlieoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 Cornell L.Rev.
261,270-71(1986).
SeeFairhope Single Tax Corp. v. Rezner, 527 So.2d 1232, 1236 (Ala. 1987); Chun v. Bd. of Trustees of the Employees'Ret. Sys. of the
State of Hawaii, 87 Hawai'i 152,952 P.2d 1215,1226-27 (1998); Mahan v. Avera St. Luke's, 621 N.W.2d 150,154 (S.D.2001); Rywalt
v. Writer Corp., 34 Colo.App. 334, 526 P.2d 316, 317 (1974); Scheuer Family Foundation Inc. v. 61 Associates, 179 A.D.2d 65, 582
N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (1992); Solomon v. Edgewater Yacht Club, Inc., 35 Ohio Misc.2d 1,519 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Mun.1987); Dockside
Ass'n, Inc. v. Detyens, 291 S.C. 214, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (App.1987); Burke v. Tennessee Walking Horse Breeders' & Exhibitors'
Ass'n, 1997 WL 277999, *9 (Tenn.Ct.App.1997); John v. John, 153 Wis.2d 343, 450 N.W.2d 795, 801-02 (Wis.Ct.App. 1989).
Both Janssen and MPRA accepted the premise that the full MPRA board was not independent enough to merit judicial deference as
a decision maker, and made no arguments about deferring to the decision of the board of directors to accept Murnane's report. Thus,
we are focusing on whether Murnane's decision is entitled to deference.
See Peter Frumkin & Alice Andre-Clark, Nonprofit Compensation and the Market, 21 U. Haw. L.Rev. 425, 427 (1999) (describing a
lawsuit by a trustee of an educational organization against another trustee); Miller v. Bargaheiser, 70 Ohio App.3d 702, 591 N.E.2d
1339, 1341 (1990) (involving a derivative suit on behalf of a nonprofit hospital); Dockside Ass'n, 352 S.E.2d at 714 (involving a
suit against a property association).
We do not adopt a particular version of the business judgment rule for use with Minnesota nonprofit organizations today. Because we
hold that Murnane's investigation failed the most minimal version of a business judgment rule, requiring that a litigation committee
act in good faith, with independence, we need not reach the question of whether a more exacting standard of judicial review may be
appropriate for nonprofit corporations than in the case of for-profit corporations. The members of nonprofits are not akin to diversified
shareholders-any risk sustained by them cannot necessarily be spread among their other investments. Nor can they necessarily protect
themselves by taking their assets elsewhere.
We note that the district court could have deferred the motion in order to simply supplement the record. However, there is a marked
difference between allowing a corporation to supply documents that better indicate the process it employed in reaching its business
decision, and allowing the corporation to reconstitute its litigation committee and revamp its investigation. The former is permitted
by a judge's authority to continue a summary judgment motion to more fully develop the record; the latter is not supported by the
principles underlying the application of the business judgment doctrine.
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Opinion
CHANDLER, Chancellor.
*1 After a four-month investigation of plaintiffs' claims
in this derivative action, a special litigation committee
(the "SLC") formed by nominal defendant iGov has
recommended dismissal of plaintiffs' suit. I deny the SLC's
motion to dismiss because there are material questions of fact
regarding (1) the SLC's independence, (2) the good faith of
its investigation, and (3) whether the grounds upon which
it recommended dismissal of this lawsuit are reasonable.
Accordingly, plaintiffs may continue to pursue this action.

I. FACTS
This dispute springs from the approval and implementation
of an equity incentive plan on January 30, 2007 (the "2007
Plan") by defendants in their role as iGov directors. To better
understand the context of that approval, I begin our review of
the facts at an earlier date and tell the story chronologically.
A. iGov Begins to Reinvent Itself and Wins the TACLAN
Contract
In 1996, plaintiffs Craig London and James Hunt, defendants
Patrick Neven and Walter Hupalo, and others founded MA
Federal, Inc., which does business as iGov ("iGov" or
the "Company"). iGov is a government contracting firm
that initially focused on the reseller market for information
technology hardware, primarily selling to federal military
and civilian agencies. After nine years in the low margin,
highly competitive reseller market, however, the Company
decided to change its focus from product sales to the highermargin government services market. This shift in focus,
which occurred in 2005, was driven by management's view
that iGov could not sustain itself over the long term in
the reseller business because of increasing competition from
larger players.
In October 2005, iGov won its first government services
contract with the United States Special Operations Command.
iGov refers to this agreement as the TACLAN contract,
which stands for Tactical Local Area Network Production.
TACLAN units are portable centers capable of coordinating
communications for special operations forces ail over
the world. Under the TACLAN contract, iGov was to
engineer, manufacture, test, train, and support TACLAN
units, something it had little to no previous experience doing.
Plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the TACLAN contract was
a 5-year, $300 million competitive contract that would
likely provide iGov with a substantial stream of highmargin services revenue. The $300 million figure in the
TACLAN contract was an expenditure ceiling that could
not be exceeded without government authorization, not a
guarantee that the government would actually spend $300
million. iGov's ongoing performance under the TACLAN
contract would largely determine how much the government
spent. iGov's gross profit margins on the TACLAN contract
would, of course, depend on how well iGov managed its
costs. Thus, profitability under the TACLAN contract was
driven by the volume of government orders and iGov's cost
management.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
M~>_«* r7^\ o n - f o -rt

~ r-> — i

M _ _ I _ ? - - ,.

London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported in A.2d (2010)

_ _ _
B. Tyrrell is Hired to Help Solve iGov's Financial

D. Tyrrell Becomes CFO after Textron Financing is

Difficulties

Obtained

*2 iGov incurred substantial non-recurring expenses when

By July 2006 negotiations with Textron were nearing

it began to reinvent itself as a service provider in 2005. These

completion. To finalize a $12 million line of credit, London

expenses placed iGov in a financially precarious position. In

was asked to execute a personal guarantee required by

an effort to lift the Company out of its fiscal doldrums, iGov's

Textron's lending guidelines. Defendants allege that on the

CEO, Neven, sought help from a professional "turn-around

due date of the guarantee, London demanded an employment

expert" called Tatum LLC. Tatum provided Michael Tyrrell

contract in exchange for signing. Apparently Neven did not

for the job and Tyrrell began to work for iGov as a consultant

look favorably on this demand and decided to remove London
from his position as CFO in response. Shortly thereafter,

in September 2005.

Neven asked Tyrrell to become iGov's full-time CFO. Neven
As a result of the financial difficulties iGov experienced in

signed the personal guarantee and the $12 million line of

2005, its relationship with its primary lender soured. By May

credit was obtained.

2006, iGov was searching for a new lender to supply it with
an operating line of credit. Textron Financial ("Textron")

E. The Second Textron Forecast

emerged as a promising source of credit. To induce Textron
to extend the needed credit, Tyrrell kept Textron apprised

*3 On August 15, 2006, Tyrrell sent Textron an updated

of iGov's financial condition on an ongoing basis. Tyrrell

FY07 forecast showing an EBITDA of roughly $3 million

created and approved the financial information transmitted to

(the "Second Textron Forecast"). The major

Textron, which included monthly income statements, balance

between the Second Textron Forecast and the First Textron

sheets, and forecasts for fiscal years 2006 and 2007.

Forecast were that projected revenues for the GCG subsidiary

differences

were lowered to $25 million and projected revenues from the
C. The First Textron Forecast and the DHS Contract

TACLAN contract were lowered to $ 183 million.

On May 4, 2006, Tyrrell sent Textron an email with a

F. The Original Chessiecap

Forecast

fiscal year 2007 ("FY07") forecast reflecting an EBITDA of
approximately $3.5 million (the "First Textron Forecast"). In

At some point in 2006 defendants decided that it would

the email Tyrrell explained that the First Textron Forecast

be advisable to implement the 2007 Plan for the benefit of

assumed iGov "will be successful in winning the Department

key members of management. Defendants caused iGov to

of Homeland Security (DHS) contract."

The DHS contract

retain Chessiecap Securities, Inc. ("Chessiecap") to value

is a competitive contract under which multiple vendors

iGov stock for purposes of setting the exercise price of

compete to provide information technology hardware to the

options under the 2007 Plan. Plaintiffs complaint alleges that

various agencies directed by the DHS. Tyrrell included $10

defendants "secretly decided to implement [the 2007 Plan]

million in DHS contract revenue in the First Textron Forecast.

at an unfair price to benefit themselves at the expense of the

Tyrrell explained to Textron that he was normally "very

other stockholders."

hesitant to put unawarded contracts into [iGov] forecasts" but
nevertheless included $10 million in DHS contract revenue

Chessiecap was to perform a valuation of iGov as of July

because he had "been pretty conservative in other areas"

31, 2006. To support the valuation, Tyrrell sent Chessiecap a

of the First Textron Forecast and felt that $10 million was

FY07 forecast on August 23, 2006 that showed an EBITDA
of roughly $3 million (the "Original Chessiecap Forecast").

"a reasonable figure."

He further noted that if iGov was

The Original Chessiecap Forecast was identical to the Second

awarded the DHS contract it would probably yield $30-50
million in first year business. Other important line items in
the First Textron Forecast included $6 million in revenue
for iGov's Air Force unit, $35 million in revenue for GCG
(an iGov subsidiary), and $195 million in revenue for the
TACLAN contract.

Textron Forecast.
G. The Revised Chessiecap Forecast and the Final
Valuation
On October 2, 2006, Chessiecap completed its

Draft

Valuation, concluding that iGov equity was worth $5.5
million. After reviewing the Draft Valuation, Tyrrell sent an
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email to Chessiecap expressing his view that it was "probably
on the high side." Tyrrell gave various reasons for this view.
Three of these reasons are of note. First, Tyrrell asserted that
the projected $10 million in revenue (and associated costs)
for FY07 from the DHS contract should not be considered
in the valuation because the DHS contract had not been
formally awarded. Second, Tyrrell asserted that the projected
$25 million in revenues (and associated costs) from the GCG
subsidiary for FY07 should be removed because GCG would
be closed before year-end. Third, Tyrrell asserted that most of
the projected $6 million in revenues and associated costs from
the Air Force unit for FY07 should be removed because iGov
was also likely to close down that unit before year-end. On
October 18, 2006, Tyrrell sent Chessiecap a revised forecast
that eliminated the revenues and expenses from these three
line items. 7 This updated FY07 forecast showed an EBITDA
of $1.8 million (the "Revised Chessiecap Forecast"), 40%
less than the $3 million EBITDA reflected in the Original
Chessiecap Forecast.
Plaintiffs' complaint asserts that in preparing the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast, Tyrrell made material changes based
on developments that had occurred after the July 31, 2006
valuation date. For example, iGov did not announce that
it was going to close down GCG until October 4, 2006,
but Tyrrell incorporated this development into the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast. Thus, Chessiecap's Final Valuation, of
which more will be said momentarily, was not strictly an
evaluation based on what was known or anticipated as of July
31,2006. According to plaintiffs, this is problematic because,
although the Revised Chessiecap Forecast accounted for
negative developments that occurred after July 31, 2006, it
did not reflect positive developments that occurred after the
valuation date. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that iGov had
been awarded a $7 million contract with the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office ("PTO") in September 2006, but this
was not reflected in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. Also,
plaintiffs allege that by October 2006 the TACLAN contract
was generating higher profits than management had originally
expected but this was ignored when preparing the Revised
o

Chessiecap Forecast.
*4 Plaintiffs contend that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast
was never disclosed to Textron. Plaintiffs also allege that the
Revised Chessiecap Forecast was never used by the Company
in managing its business. Rather, the Revised Chessiecap
Forecast was purposely designed to suppress the value of the
Company and was only used by Chessiecap.

On October 31,2006, Chessiecap certified its Final Valuation
of iGov, which was partially based on the Revised Chessiecap
Forecast. The Final Valuation placed the value of iGov equity
at $4.7 million, approximately 15% lower than Chessiecap's
Draft Valuation of $5.5 million. At the time the Final
Valuation was issued, Chessiecap did not calculate the fair
market value per share of iGov equity. This was done later to
support approval of the 2007 Plan on January 30, 2007.
H. The Third Textron Forecast
After the Final Valuation was issued, Tyrrell continued
to update Textron on iGov's finances. Tyrrell's updates
portrayed a brighter outlook on the EBITDA front than had
been communicated to Chessiecap in the Revised Chessiecap
Forecast. For example, on December 1, 2006, Tyrrell resent
the Second Textron Forecast to a different Textron employee.
In the accompanying email Tyrrell explained that iGov was
in the process of further updating its FY07 forecast and that
he expected the revised forecast to be "just as good, if not
better."9
On December 8, 2006, as promised, Tyrrell sent Textron
an updated FY07 forecast that showed an EBITDA of
approximately $3.1 million (the "Third Textron Forecast").
The individual line items in the Third Textron Forecast
differed in many respects from the Second Textron Forecast,
though the overall EBITDA was substantially the same. 10
The important factual consideration for present purposes
is the many respects in which the Third Textron Forecast
differed from the Revised Chessiecap Forecast. For instance,
the Third Textron Forecast included approximately $1.9
million in revenue for the Air Force unit (as opposed to
$900,000), $950,000 in revenue for GCG (as opposed to
$0), and $15 million in revenue for the DHS contract (as
opposed to $0). The Third Textron Forecast also reflected
$7 million higher projected revenues for the Navy unit.
Although TACLAN revenues were projected to be roughly $8
million lower, the projected gross profit from the TACLAN
contract was $2 million higher. The net result of all these
changes was a stark difference in EBITDA between the Third
Textron Forecast and the Revised Chessiecap Forecast: $3.1
million versus $1.8 million.
/. The Tyrrell Baseline Forecast
Defendants allege that in December 2006 Tyrrell developed
three additional forecasts, presumably for internal purposes.
Each forecast was based on different assumptions about
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the future and accordingly yielded different results. The
"Baseline Forecast" showed an EBITDA of $2.1 million (the
"Tyrrell Baseline Forecast"). It was nearly identical to the
Third Textron Forecast. The one major difference was that the
$15 million in revenue from the DHS contract and associated
expenses were eliminated from the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast.
The gross profit margin on the DHS contract accounted for
most of the $1 million difference in EBITDA between the two
12

projections.
In addition to the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast,
Tyrrell allegedly developed a $4.3 million EBITDA forecast
which he dubbed the "Better Forecast" and a $6.1 million
EBITDA forecast which he dubbed the "Stretch Forecast."
From the record, it is not entirely clear what, if anything, these
latter two forecasts were used for.
J. iGov's Internal Forecasts Remain Higher than the
Revised Chessiecap Forecast
*5 In addition to showing that the First, Second, and
Third Textron Forecasts were decidedly more positive
than the Revised Chessiecap Forecast, plaintiffs proffered
evidence that iGov continued to project a FY07 EBITDA
of approximately $3-4 million internally after Chessiecap
had been given the Revised Chessiecap Forecast showing an
EBITDA of only $1.8 million. For example, in December
2006, a strategic management plan prepared by Hupalo
included a goal to "exceed $3 million in EBITDA by yearend FY#07." 13 On December 15, 2006, Neven represented
in an email to a stockholder that "iGov is financially healthy
again, ... we expect to be at $150 million this coming year
with an EBITAD [sic] of $3 million ..." 14 On January 7,
2007, Tyrrell sent the Third Textron Forecast to the incoming
CFO Rich Marksberry and informed him that it was "the
baseline case forecast for iGov for FY07" and that iGov
was "currently updating a version that shows EBITDA of
over $4 million, which we think is possibly achievable this
year." OnJanuary 12,2007, Tyrrell made a presentation at
a business development strategy meeting that projected FY07
EBITDA at over $4 million.17 And on February 10, 2007,
Tyrrell sent an email to a strategic consultant representing that
18

"our working internal forecast shows EBITDA of $3MM."
K. Plaintiffs Object to the Final Valuation
On December 22,2006, Tyrrell became concerned that nearly
half a year had passed since the July 31, 2006 valuation date
on Chessiecap's Final Valuation. The 2007 Plan was taking
longer to implement than defendants had anticipated. Tyrrell
contacted Chessiecap and asked them if the Final Valuation

needed to be updated "since our 2006 valuation is dated July
31, 2006 and the stock options will not be given until the
end of next month ... ?" Chessiecap replied that the Final
Valuation was good for one year, unless significant events
had occurred that would materially change the financial
20

prospects of the Company.
On December 29, 2006, plaintiffs were provided a copy of
Chessiecap's Final Valuation placing iGov's equity value at
$4.7 million. After reviewing the Final Valuation plaintiffs
requested copies of the information Chessiecap had relied on.
Among other things, they were given the Revised Chessiecap
Forecast. In the meantime, on January 7,2007, Tyrrell sent an
email to iGov management regarding a proposal to purchase
London's shares for $4 per share, plus a "kicker" down the
road if iGov was sold. In the email, Tyrrell expressed the view
that "since [iGov's] valuation is a few months old, [iGov] will
probably have to have it updated and the valuation will likely
21

be higher than $4.7 million...." Tyrrell concluded that the
$4 per share figure would still be fair to London because the
number of iGov's issued shares was soon to be increased by
the 2007 Plan. On January 16,2007, however, after reviewing
the Revised Chessiecap Forecast, London objected to iGov
relying on Chessiecap's Final Valuation for purposes of the
2007 Plan because he felt the information upon which the
Final Valuation was based was stale and inaccurate. The
next day, Hunt, who also believed the Final Valuation was
unreliable, made an offer to buy all of Neven's stock at $28 per
share. Hunt later made the same offer to other shareholders,
apparently with the design of purchasing enough shares to
gain voting control of iGov.
L. Plaintiffs are Removedfrom the Board
*6 At this point, in a narrative much belabored with
disorienting descriptions of multiple financial forecasts, the
human controversy begins. Plaintiffs London and Hunt
comprised half of the iGov board on January 16 and 17, when
it became clear that they disagreed with using Chessiecap's
Final Valuation in its then-current form. The other half of
the iGov board consisted of defendants Neven and Hupalo.
Collectively, Neven and Hupalo owned 42.5% of iGov's
voting stock. On January 19,2007, Neven and Hupalo teamed
up with iGov officer and shareholder Jack Pooley, the three of
them collectively owning 50.1% of iGov's voting stock, and
executed written stockholder consents removing plaintiffs
from the board. At the same time, they elected Tyrrell to the
board. Thus, after January 19, 2007, defendants made up the
entire iGov board.
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M. The 2007 Plan is Adopted
On January 30, 2007, the core series of events occurred
that gave rise to this litigation. To address Hunt's $28 per
share offer, defendants engaged Chessiecap to prepare an
addendum to its Final Valuation. In the addendum, dated
January 30, 2007, Chessiecap opined that Hunt's offer did
not affect or change Chessiecap's opinion that iGov's equity
value was $4.7 million. The addendum stated that Hunt's offer
was conditioned on his receiving enough shares to own a
majority of iGov's voting stock and that this excluded Hunt's
offer "from any consideration in Chessiecap's valuation of the
Company, which was premised upon privately-held, minority
discounted stock."
The addendum then determined for
the first time the share price of iGov stock, concluding
that the fair market value per share as of July 31, 2006
was $4.92. In calculating this per-share price, the addendum
incorrectly included 65,000 shares and 300,000 options that
were not outstanding as of the July 31, 2006 valuation date.
These shares and options were not approved until January
30, 2007 (the day the addendum was issued) as part of
the 2007 Plan, which I will describe in detail momentarily.
Plaintiffs assert that defendants knew these shares and options
were inappropriately included in Chessiecap's per share
calculation, but ignored the purported error as it resulted in a
lower value that benefitted defendants.
Defendants also held a special meeting of the iGov board
on January 30, 2007. As Hunt, the former chairman, had
just been removed as a director, the first order of business
was appointing a new chairman. Neven was appointed by
unanimous consent and he then called the meeting to order.
During the meeting Tyrrell was named President, Chief
Operating Officer, and Treasurer of iGov and Marksberry was
named CFO.
The primary purpose of the meeting was to consider the
2007 Plan. Under the 2007 Plan, 300,000 stock options were
to be issued to various directors and senior executives. Of
the 300,000 options, Tyrrell was to receive 80,000, Neven
50,000, and Hupalo 50,000. Thus, collectively, defendants
were to be given 60% of the options granted under the
2007 Plan. In addition, the 2007 Plan contemplated the sale
of 65,000 shares of stock to Tyrrell. In contrast, plaintiffs
were not to be given any options or shares under the 2007
Plan, presumably because they had been removed from their
director and management positions.

*7 The 2007 Plan provided that the exercise price of the
options could not be less than 100% of the fair market
value of iGov common stock on the date the options were
granted and that the sale of shares to Tyrrell would be
at their fair market value on the date of sale. Defendants
unanimously voted as directors to approve the 2007 Plan.
Defendants simultaneously adopted $4.92 per share as the
fair market value of iGov shares on January 30, 2007 based
on Chessiecap's Final Valuation, dated July 31, 2006, and
the associated addendum. Before approving the 2007 Plan,
Tyrrell represented to Chessiecap that no material change
had occurred and so it was still appropriate, in his view, to
rely on the Final Valuation. 23 All defendants then implicitly
accepted that no material change had occurred by approving
$4.92 per share as the fair market value. Tyrrell purchased his
65,000 shares the next day.
Plaintiffs allege that the 2007 Plan was designed to
substantially reduce their ownership interests in iGov and
increase defendants' interests to a level that would permit
defendants to entrench themselves as iGov directors and
managers. In support of this theory, plaintiffs assert that
implementation of the 2007 Plan immediately reduced their
collective ownership interests from 44% to 40%. On a fully
diluted basis, the 2007 Plan allegedly reduced plaintiffs'
collective ownership interests from 42.3% to 28.7%. At the
same time, the 2007 Plan allegedly increased defendants'
collective ownership interests from 50.1% to 54.1% and, on a
fully diluted basis, defendants' collective ownership interests
allegedly increased from 48.2% to 54.2%. 24
As we have discussed, plaintiffs contend that defendants
manipulated the Final Valuation by excluding positive
developments which occurred after July 31, 2006 from the
Revised Chessiecap Forecast. Plaintiffs also contend that
defendants wrongfully declined to update either the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast or the Final Valuation before approving
the 2007 Plan, falsely representing that no material change
had occurred between July 31, 2006 and January 30, 2007.
Plaintiffs point to three specific developments which were
purportedly ignored. First, the $7 million PTO contract had
been awarded on September 29, 2006, but was not reflected
in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast or the Final Valuation.
Second, on December 20, 2006, iGov received a pre-award
notice that it had been selected as one of the vendors
under the DHS contract, putting the Company one step
further towards realizing DHS revenue in 2007, but no such
revenues were included in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast
or the Final Valuation. And third, by January 30, 2007,
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iGov was aware that the TACLAN contract was performing
better than expected but did not have Chessiecap update its
Final Valuation to reflect the increased profitability of the

Finally, the 2007 Plan provided that stockholder approval
would be obtained within twelve months. Plaintiffs, who
remained stockholders in iGov after their removal from the

TACLAN contract.25

board, allege that they never voted on the 2007 Plan.
Other features of the 2007 Plan should be noted to tell the
full story. For starters, the 2007 Plan replaced an existing
equity incentive plan at iGov. In February 2001, the iGov
board had approved the 2000 Stock Option and Incentive Plan
(the "2000 Plan"). The 2000 Plan gave iGov the power to
grant stock options to various officers, directors, consultants,
and other employees at an exercise price of $5.00 per share.
No formal valuation appears to have supported the $5.00
strike price, though options were granted to employees and
exercised at this price. A few years later, on February 26,
2003, London proposed that Neven, Hupalo, and London
should each be awarded 50,000 options under the 2000 Plan at
an exercise price of $1.25 per share as compensation for their
services to iGov. The board approved London's proposal, but
these options were never exercised. In fact, there is a dispute
over whether they were ever actually granted. Evidently,
in 2005 iGov's auditors noted that the marked difference
between the $5.00 and $1.25 strike prices under the 2000 Plan
had not been properly accounted for, and would give rise to
a substantial charge on the financial statements if iGov was
determined to leave the $1.25 options in place.
*8 Defendants contend that the 2007 Plan was an effort
to revamp the 2000 Plan, which was imperfectly structured,
and to replace the $1.25 options granted to Neven, Hupalo,
and London. Accordingly, defendants assert that in adopting
the 2007 Plan Neven and Hupalo gave up options with a
strike price of $1.25 for options with a strike price of $4.92,
sacrificing personally for the good of the Company. Plaintiffs,
on the other hand, contend that the $1.25 options were never
actually granted and so Neven and Hupalo gave up nothing. I
will explore this dispute later. For now, I simply note that the
2007 Plan as adopted explicitly superseded the 2000 Plan (at
least to the extent it was legitimate).
The 2007 Plan also gave Neven and Tyrrell the collective
authority to grant up to 25,000 options to the new CFO,
Marksberry, at an exercise price equal to the fair market value
of the shares on the date of the grant. If Neven and Tyrrell
both wished to grant Marksberry these options, the 2007 Plan
required them to do it by April 15, 2007. Marksberry did
not receive a grant of options by that date and the delegated
authority to Neven and Tyrrell expired.

N. The DHS Contract is Awarded
A few months later, in March 2007, iGov announced that it
had formally been awarded the DHS contract. This placed
the Company firmly in the position of being able to realize
DHS revenues in 2007. The amount of DHS revenues to
be realized, of course, would depend on how well iGov
performed under the DHS contract relative to the other
approved vendors. As we have seen, Tyrrell had excluded
DHS revenues from the Revised Chessiecap Forecast because
the DHS contract had not been formally awarded.
O. Marksberry is Granted 25, 000 Shares
Despite having formally secured the DHS contract, on May
30, 2007, defendants approved the grant of 25,000 options to
27

Marksberry at a strike price of $4.92 per share. Apparently
cognizant that ten months had passed since the date of
Chessiecap's Final Valuation, defendants explicitly stated
in the board resolution approving the grants that "there
ha[d] been no material changes affecting the Company's
financial operations or prospects which would affect [the
Final] Valuation since the date of its last determination of
28

Fair Market Value." Thus, in approving the option grants
to Marksberry, defendants relied on Chessiecap's advice that
the Final Valuation was good for one year absent any material
changes and on its own determination that no material
changes had occurred between July 31, 2006 and May 30,
2007. Defendants made this determination even though the
DHS contract had been formally awarded in the interim.
P. Plaintiffs'Suit
After the 2007 Plan was approved, plaintiffs made a books
and records request under 8 Del C. § 220. The ground for the
request was plaintiffs' objection to iGov using Chessiecap's
Final Valuation as the basis for the $4.92 per share strike
price. Plaintiffs also engaged the McLean Group, a valuation
firm, to conduct separate valuations of iGov's equity as of
October 31, 2006 and December 31, 2006 (the "McLean
Valuations"). In performing the McLean Valuations, McLean
used the Second Textron Forecast rather than the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast. McLean noted that Chessiecap's Final
Valuation incorrectly included in its option-pricing model
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_ _
the 300,000 options and the 65,000 shares approved by the
2007 Plan, rather than the outstanding 745,000 shares that
actually existed as of July 31, 2006. The McLean Valuations
placed the per share value of iGov equity at $13.32 on
October 31, 2006 and $15.45 on December 31, 2006. The
McLean Valuations were sent to iGov on September 18,2007,
along with McLean's separate critique of Chessiecap's Final
Valuation.
*9 While the McLean Valuations were being conducted,
iGov expanded the size of its board from three members
to five. In August 2007, Vincent Salvatori and John Vinter
became iGov directors. Both men were first approached by
Tyrrell and both had connections to him, which I will discuss
at some length later. Both men also had extensive experience
in government contracting that understandably made them
attractive candidates for iGov's board.
On October 31, 2007, after attempts to resolve the dispute
failed, plaintiffs filed their complaint. The counts in the
complaint are characterized as derivative and individual,
alleging harm to iGov as a company and to plaintiffs in
their personal capacity. In February 2008, the complaint was
amended in response to defendants' motion to dismiss.
The amended complaint contains three counts. Count I is
a derivative claim for breach of fiduciary duty alleging
defendants failed to honor their duties of care and loyalty.
With regards to the duty of loyalty, Count I alleges
that defendants materially misrepresented iGov's business
prospects to Chessiecap in order to ensure a low valuation so
that they could personally obtain iGov stock at an artificially
low price. Count I also alleges that defendants breached
their duty of loyalty by approving the 2007 Plan with the
intent that it would firmly entrench them in their positions as
directors and managers of iGov. Regarding the duty of care,
Count I alleges that defendants failed to consider all material
information available to them in determining the value of
iGov stock for purposes of the 2007 Plan. In that vein, Count
I alleges that defendants knew when they approved the 2007
Plan that Chessiecap's Final Valuation was based on stale and
inaccurate information and was therefore an inappropriate
tool for determining the fair value of iGov shares as of January
30, 2007. Count I also alleges that defendants had even more
reason to believe the Final Valuation was outdated by May
30, 2007 because the DHS contract had been definitively
awarded by that date, but defendants still declined to have
the Final Valuation updated. Count II is a request for relief
rather than a cause of action. It seeks rescission of the option
grants to defendants and the stock sale to Tyrrell based on the

breaches of fiduciary duty described in Count I. Count III is
characterized by plaintiffs as an individual claim, the personal
harm being that defendants improperly diluted plaintiffs'
ownership interests by implementing the 2007 Plan, thereby
expropriating economic value and voting power from them.
For their part, defendants contend that Count III is a derivative
claim.
Q. iGov Forms a Special Litigation Committee after its
Motion to Dismiss is Denied
After plaintiffs' complaint was amended, defendants again
filed a motion to dismiss on several grounds, including
plaintiffs' failure to make a demand on the board before filing
suit. In my June 24, 2008 Opinion, I found that plaintiffs'
complaint "easily survived" defendants' motion to dismiss;
demand being excused because a majority of the board was
interested in the transaction. Thereafter, on November 21,
2008, the iGov board voted to form a two-member SLC
comprised of Salvatori and Vinter to consider whether it
was in iGov's best interest to pursue the derivative claims in
plaintiffs' complaint.
*10 After its formation, the SLC obtained advisors. In
February 2009 the SLC engaged Blank Rome LLC as
independent counsel and in March 2009 the SLC engaged
Stout Risius Ross ("SRR") as its independent financial
advisor.
From April 2009 to July 2009 the SLC conducted its
investigation. Discovery was stayed during this time. In
conducting the investigation the SLC interviewed twelve
witnesses and reviewed relevant documentation produced by
the parties, iGov, Textron, Chessiecap, McLean, and others,
including the documents provided to plaintiffs in response
to their § 220 action. To inform their investigation, the
SLC sought counsel's advice as to the legal principles that
determine whether defendants complied with their fiduciary
duties.
During the investigation, the SLC charged SRR with two
tasks. First, SRR was instructed to perform independent
valuations of iGov as of October 31, 2006 and as of January
30, 2007 (the "SRR Valuations"). The SLC required SRR
to complete the SRR Valuations without reviewing the work
done by Chessiecap and McLean, presumably to ensure that
SRR would not be influenced by any previous valuation
work performed. The SLC determined that October 31, 2006
was an appropriate valuation date because it believed that
Chessiecap's Final Valuation was essentially current as of
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October 31, 2006, despite being dated July 31, 2006. 3l The
SLC determined that January 30, 2007 was an appropriate
date for more obvious reasons; it was the date the challenged
2007 Plan was adopted. I will discuss the SRR Valuations at
greater length later but for now I note that the FY07 EBITDA
forecast SRR used was the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast. The
SRR Valuations concluded that iGov was worth $3.90-$4 .15
per share as of October 31, 2006 and $5.24-55.39 per share
as of January 30, 2007. The SLC concluded that the $4.92
per share price was "within the range of fair market value"
based on the SRR Valuations as well as Salvatori and Vinter's
own professional experience in government contracting. 3?
Notably, despite the SRR Valuations, the SLC reasoned that
$4.92 per share "was likely too high, from a practical, real

to the duty of loyalty, the SLC concluded that defendants'
approval of the 2007 Plan and actions leading to that approval
would satisfy the entire fairness standard because the process
employed was fair and the $4.92 strike price was fair. As to
Count II the SLC determined that no rescission of the options
granted and shares sold to defendants under the 2007 Plan
should occur because $4.92 was in the range of fair market
value. Finally, the SLC determined that Count III should
be dismissed based on its belief that any dilution plaintiffs
suffered was experienced equally by other shareholders and
thus, no individual claim exists. Count III, according to the
SLC, is a derivative claim arising out of the conduct alleged
in Count I and should be dismissed for the same reasons that
Count I should be dismissed.

world perspective, to express the Company's value."

After reviewing the SLC Report plaintiffs filed an opposition
brief arguing that the SLC has not met the standard required

The second task SRR was charged with was to review the
Chessiecap Final Valuation and the McLean Valuations and
opine on them. SRR did this and helped the SLC prepare a
summary comparison between the Chessiecap Valuation and
McLean Valuations that was included in the SLC Report. The
SLC concluded that both sets of valuations were "tainted"
and reasoned that it was not necessary to determine which

by Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado35 and its progeny for
dismissal of a claim based on an SLC's recommendation in a
demand-excused case. I now consider whether the SLC has
met the Zapata standard and, consequently, whether the suit
should be dismissed or permitted to proceed.

set of valuations was better.
The SLC concluded that it
could make a recommendation respecting this suit and iGov's
best interests without declaring a winner in the battle between
plaintiffs' and defendants' experts.

II. STANDARD

On August 5, 2009, the SLC Report was filed. The SLC
Report concludes that the suit is not in the best interests
of the Company and recommends that it be dismissed. The
SLC believes that the discovery that will resume if the
suit is allowed to continue will be extremely disruptive
to iGov's operations. The SLC also believes that negative
publicity associated with the suit will immediately damage
the Company's goodwill and reputation in the government
contracting community.
*11 As to the actual claims asserted in plaintiffs' complaint,
the SLC Report concludes as follows. First, as to Count I,
the SLC concluded that defendants acted properly in adopting
the 2007 Plan and did not breach their duties of care or
loyalty. With regards to the duty of care, the SLC found that
the 8 Del. C. § 102(b)(7) provision in iGov's certificate of
incorporation exculpates directors from personal liability not
involving intentional misconduct or knowing violations of the
law. The SLC concluded that a duty of care claim should not
be pursued because defendants breach of care conduct, if it
occurred, would be covered by the § 102(b)(7) provision. As

« : .—v r-. /-% j . ts

The Supreme Court's decision in Zapata governs demandexcused derivative cases in which the board sets up an SLC
that investigates whether a derivative suit should proceed
and recommends dismissal after its investigation.
In
Zapata, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that the SLC's
recommendation, made in the form of a motion to dismiss,
37

should be subject to business judgment review. Rather, the
Supreme Court established a two-step analysis that must be
applied to the SLC's motion to dismiss. The first step of the
analysis is mandatory. The Court reviews the independence
of SLC members and considers whether the SLC conducted
a good faith investigation of reasonable scope that yielded
38

reasonable bases supporting its conclusions.
The second
step of the analysis is discretionary. The Court applies its
own business judgment to the facts to determine whether the
corporation's best interests would be served by dismissing the
suit. The second step is designed for situations in which the
technical requirements of step one are met but the result does
not appear to satisfy the spirit of the requirements.
*12 An SLC's motion to dismiss is a bit of a curiosity,
procedurally speaking. It does not arise directly out of one
of our rules of civil procedure. Rather, it is derived by
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analogy to a motion to dismiss a derivative suit based
upon a voluntary settlement between parties and by analogy
to a Rule 41(a)(2) motion whereby a plaintiff unilaterally
seeks voluntary dismissal of a complaint after the defendant
files an answer.
The Court treats the SLCs motion in a
manner akin to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment;
the SLC bears the burden of demonstrating that there are
no genuine issues of material fact as to its independence,
the reasonableness and good faith of its investigation, and
that there are reasonable bases for its conclusions. If the
Court determines that a material fact is in dispute on any
of these issues it must deny the SLCs motion. When an
SLCs motion to dismiss is denied, control of the litigation
is returned to the plaintiff shareholder. With the relevant
standard broadly articulated, I now proceed to step one of
Zapata.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Were the SLC Members Independent?
Whether an SLC member is independent "is a fact-specific
determination made in the context of a particular case."
When an SLC member has no personal interest in the disputed
transactions, the Court scrutinizes the members' relationship
with the interested directors, as that would be the source of
any independence impairment that might exist. The Court
considers the relationship between each SLC member and the
interested directors.
An SLC member does not have to be unacquainted
or uninvolved with fellow directors to be regarded as
independent.
But an SLC member is not independent
if he or she is incapable, for any substantial reason, of
making a decision with only the best interests of the
48

corporation in mind.
Essentially, this means that the
independence inquiry goes beyond determining whether SLC
members are under the "domination and control" of an
49

interested director.
Independence can be impaired by
lesser affiliations, so long as those affiliations are substantial
enough to present a material question of fact as to whether
the SLC member can make a totally unbiased decision. For
example, independence could be impaired if the SLC member
senses that he owes something to the interested director based
on prior events. This sense of obligation need not be of a
financial nature.

The independence inquiry under the Zapata standard has
often been informed by case law addressing independence in
the pre-suit demand context and vice-versa. This is a useful
exercise but not one without limits. As the Supreme Court
noted in Beam v. Stewart:
Unlike the demand-excusal context, where the board is
presumed to be independent, the SLC has the burden
of establishing its own independence by a yardstick that
must be "like Caesar's wife"-"above reproach." Moreover,
unlike the presuit demand context, the SLC analysis
contemplates not only a shift in the burden of persuasion
but also the availability of discovery into various issues,
including independence.
*13 Unlike a board in the pre-suit demand context, SLC
members are not given the benefit of the doubt as to their
impartiality and objectivity. They, rather than plaintiffs, bear
the burden of proving that there is no material question
of fact about their independence. The composition of an
SLC must be such that it fully convinces the Court that
the SLC can act with integrity and objectivity, because the
situation is typically one in which the board as a whole
is incapable of impartially considering the merits of the
suit.
Thus, it is conceivable that a court might find a
director to be independent in the pre-suit demand context but
not independent in the Zapata context based on the same
set of factual allegations made by the two parties. This is
not because the substantive contours of the independence
doctrine are different in these two contexts. Rather, it is
primarily a function of the shift in the burden of proof from
the plaintiff to the corporation when the suit moves from the
pre-suit demand zone to the Zapata zone.
It is undisputed that neither SLC member had a personal
stake in the challenged transactions. Neither Salvatori nor
Vinter received shares of stock or options under the 2007
Plan and neither faces any risk of personal liability in this
suit. Moreover, Salvatori and Vinter were not appointed
to the board until after the 2007 Plan was adopted. In
addition, plaintiffs do not allege that any of the defendants
dominate or control Salvatori or Vinter. Thus, the focus
must be on whether the relationships Salvatori and Vinter
have with defendants are of such a nature that they might
have caused Salvatori and Vinter to consider factors other
than the best interests of the corporation in making their
decision to move for dismissal. Such a relationship would
raise a material question as to the SLCs independence. After
carefully reviewing the evidence produced by the limited
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discovery thus far permitted, I conclude that there is a material
question of fact as to the independence of both SLC members
based on their relationships to Tyrrell.

difficult challenge for a corporation than confronting a broad
allegation of personal or business relationships in pre-suit
demand territory.

I begin by discussing Vinter. Plaintiffs argue that Vinter's
independence is impaired by one simple fact; Vinter's wife
is Tyrrell's cousin. According to plaintiffs, it was that
association that caused Tyrrell to approach Vinter about

I admit that it is not possible, at this stage of the proceedings,
to say unequivocally that Vinter's independence is impaired.
On the one hand, the relationship between Vinter's wife
and Tyrrell does not seem to be particularly close. They do
not frequently associate with one another as some cousins
are wont to do. On the other hand, they do see each
other regularly, albeit infrequently, at family functions. For
example, each year Vinter and his wife attend a large family
party at Tyrrell's in honor of Tyrrell's mother, who has passed

joining the iGov board.
Defendants counter that this
familial relationship does not impair Vinter's independence
because Tyrrell and Vinter's wife are not close cousins;
they only occasionally cross paths at large family functions
once or twice each year. Plaintiffs respond that, even though
Tyrrell and Vinter's wife may not be particularly close,
it would have been impossible for Vinter not to think of
Tyrrell as "my wife's cousin" when grappling with the
difficult decision of recommending whether civil litigation
against him should proceed. According to plaintiffs, this is a
sufficient connection to create an unacceptable risk of bias in
Vinter's mind.
*14 Defendants cite Beam v. Stewart, a case in which
the Supreme Court stated that "allegations of mere personal
friendship or a mere outside business relationship, standing
alone, are insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about a
en

director's independence."
Defendants argue that, under
Beam, the familial connection between Tyrrell and Vinter
is simply not enough to raise a material question of fact
as to Vinter's independence. I disagree. Beam was a presuit demand case, and the burden in that case was on the
plaintiffs to allege facts sufficient to create a reasonable
doubt that the board could not objectively consider a suit
against its Chairman, Martha Stewart. In their complaint,
the plaintiffs broadly alleged that Stewart had personal
friendships or outside business dealings with certain of the
directors. This was not enough, standing alone, to create
a reasonable doubt about the ability of the directors to
objectively consider the merits of a suit against Stewart. In
this case, however, the burden is on iGov to show that it
has appointed SLC members whose independence cannot
seriously be doubted. The Company, not plaintiffs, must do
the explaining in the first instance if there are associations
that cast a shadow on independence. Frankly, appointing an
interested director's family member to an SLC will always
position a corporation on the low ground. From there, the
corporation must fight an uphill battle to demonstrate that,
notwithstanding kinship, there is no material question as
to the SLC member's objectivity. Put simply, explaining
away a familial association in Zapata territory is a more

58

away. Vinter also testified in his deposition that, while he
did not see Tyrrell on a regular basis or personally discuss
Tyrrell's work with him before joining the iGov board, he
"sort of knew where he was at any given time...." Thus,
the familial relationship appears to be close enough that
Vinter has been kept apprised of Tyrrell's comings and goings
through the family grapevine. To my mind, there is a material
question of fact as to how much Vinter's family association
with Tyrrell may have influenced his objectivity. I cannot
say with certainty that Vinter would not have considered
the potentially awkward situation of showing up to Tyrrell's
annual party after the family rumor mill had spread the word
that Vinter had recommended that a lawsuit should proceed
against the host.
Therefore, I am not convinced, as I
must be under Zapata, that Vinter's recommendation would
have been solely influenced by considerations of iGov's best
interests.
*15 Now to Salvatori. Like Vinter, Salvatori's contact with
iGov was based on an association with Tyrrell. In 1993,
Tyrrell was hired by Salvatori to work as an internal auditor
for a company called QuesTech. Salvatori was a QuesTech
cofounder and served as its President, CEO, and Chairman
while Tyrrell was employed there for six years. During that
time, Salvatori promoted Tyrrell to CFO, in which role he
reported directly to Salvatori. Tyrrell worked as QuesTech's
CFO until it was sold in 1998. Tyrrell appears to have made
a significant and valued contribution to the efforts to sell
QuesTech. In his deposition, Salvatori testified that he has "a
great respect for [Tyrrell]. And he was very helpful in helping
me get a good price for my company. Very helpful."
Tyrrell's employment with QuesTech ended when it was
sold. After the sale, Tyrrell and Salvatori maintained minimal
connections. Their professional association was reinstated
when Tyrrell approached Salvatori about joining the iGov
board.
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As noted, the independence of an SLC member may be
impaired if that member feels he owes something to an
interested director.

That sense of obligation does not have

to be financial in nature. In this case, I believe there is
a material question of fact as to Salvatori's independence
because his earlier associations with Tyrrell may have given
rise to a sense of obligation or loyalty to him. Salvatori
appears to have been satisfied with the price he received
for QuesTech, and he continues to feel that Tyrrell was an
important factor in securing that price. In saying this, I do not
find that Salvatori in fact does feel a sense of obligation to
Tyrrell, but there is certainly a strong possibility that he does,
and that is enough under Zapata to preclude dismissal.
Before moving on I note a few pieces of evidence that
buttress my conclusion that there is a material question
of fact regarding the SLC's independence. First, the SLC
members appear to have reviewed the merits of plaintiffs'
claims before the SLC was ever formed. In September 2007,
plaintiffs' counsel sent a letter to iGov outlining many of the
allegations that ultimately appeared in plaintiffs' complaint
and requesting a meeting to begin resolving the dispute.
The McLean Valuations were attached to the letter. In
response, iGov's counsel sent a letter explaining that iGov
disagreed with plaintiffs' allegations and would not meet
until defendants and "iGov's new board members, John
Vinter and Vincent Salvatori, had time to review the McLean
Valuations." Vinter and Salvatori both testified that they
could not remember reviewing the McLean Valuations, but
it is clear that the iGov audit committee, on which both
men sit, reviewed the McLean Valuations on October 29,
2007.
When SLC members are simply exposed to or
become familiar with a derivative suit before the SLC is
formed this may not be enough to create a material question
of fact as to the SLC's independence. But if evidence suggests
that the SLC members prejudged the merits of the suit based
on that prior exposure or familiarity, and then conducted the
investigation with the object of putting together a report that
demonstrates the suit has no merit, this will create a material
question of fact as to the SLC's independence. In this case,
that is what has occurred.
*16 Two similar pieces of evidence suggest that Vinter
and Salvatori may not have conducted their investigation
objectively after having considered plaintiffs' claims. First,
Salvatori was asked in his deposition about the SLC's efforts
to investigate the allegations in plaintiffs' complaint. Salvatori
responded "I know we read it all over and I know we

attacked it all." Plaintiffs' counsel followed up with "[y]ou
did what it all?" to which Salvatori answered "[ajttacked
it all."
Salvatori's counsel then repeated "[a] Hacked
it all" after which Salvatori changed his answer to "[w]e
/TO

considered it."
To my mind, the word "attack" in this
context suggests something other than objectivity. But I
readily admit that expressions can be misinterpreted and
words can be inadvertently misused. In fact, if this were the
only piece of evidence suggesting that the SLC might have
engaged in a combative assault rather than an investigation
I would be inclined to consider Salvatori's use of the verb
"attack" as ambiguous. But the second piece of evidence has
Vinter using the same verb-"attack"-in relation to the McLean
Valuations.
Vinter's notes from a June 26, 2009 meeting, at which SRR
gave an update of its views of the $4.92 strike price, state as
follows:
McLean attack
-forecast
-low margin 1.3 # 1.5
-marketability discount
-fully diluted approach
As one can see, this appears to be a bullet-point summary
of what is purportedly wrong with the McLean Valuations.
Some of these criticisms of the McLean Valuations ended
up in the SLC Report. In his deposition, Vinter stated his
belief that he thought the word "attack" in the notes really
said "attach." 70 But "attach" does not make any sense in the
context of the note.
Plaintiffs characterize Salvatori and Vinter's uses of the
word "attack" as an indication that from the outset of the
investigation the SLC was gathering information with the
object of putting together a report that cast doubt on the merits
of plaintiffs' claims, rather than objectively considering
plaintiffs' claims. Given the SLC members' relationships to
Tyrrell, their exposure to the merits of plaintiffs' suit well
before the SLC was formed,7i and the unsatisfactory scope
of the investigation conducted (of which more will be said
below), Salvatori and Vinter's use of the word "attack" does
not help to fully convince me that the SLC was independent.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported in A.2d (2010)

———————^—^^
In sum, the independence inquiry under Zapata is critically
important if the SLC process is to remain a legitimate
7?

mechanism in our corporate law. SLC members should be
selected with the utmost care to ensure that they can, in both
fact and appearance, carry out the extraordinary responsibility
placed on them to determine the merits of the suit and the
best interests of the corporation, acting as proxy for a disabled
board. In this case, I am not satisfied that the independence
prong of the Zapata standard has been met.
B. Did the SLC Conduct an Investigation of Reasonable
Scope in Good Faith and Did the SLC Have Reasonable
Bases for its Conclusions?
*17 Because the manner in which the SLC investigated
plaintiffs' complaint bears directly on whether it had
reasonable bases for its conclusions, I will address both of
these aspects of the Zapata test together. I begin with an
overview of the legal standards for these two components of
the test.
To conduct a good faith investigation of reasonable scope,
the SLC must investigate all theories of recovery asserted
in the plaintiffs' complaint. In doing this, the SLC should
explore all relevant facts and sources of information that bear
on the central allegations in the complaint. If the SLC fails
to investigate facts or sources of information that cut at the
heart of plaintiffs' complaint this will usually give rise to a
material question about the reasonableness and good faith of
75

the SLC's investigation. In addition, before an SLC decides
not to explore specific acts of alleged misconduct because
the costs of a full investigation outweigh any harm that may
have been caused by those specific acts, the SLC should
carefully analyze whether a summary investigation of those
specific acts could shed light on the more serious allegations
in the plaintiffs' complaint.
A total failure to explore
the less serious allegations in plaintiffs' complaint may cast
doubt on the reasonableness and good faith of an SLC's
investigation when exploring those less serious allegations,
at least in summary fashion, would have helped the SLC
gain a full understanding of the more serious allegations
in plaintiffs' complaint.77 Finally, an SLC fails to conduct
a reasonable investigation if it simply accepts defendants'
version of disputed facts without consulting independent
sources to verify defendants' assertions. 78
To demonstrate that its recommendations are supported
by reasonable bases, the SLC must show that it correctly

understood the law relevant to the case. If the SLC's
recommendation is based on an error of law then the basis
70

for that recommendation is not reasonable.
Moreover,
if the SLC gets the undisputed facts wrong in its report,
and then relies on its erroneous recitation of the undisputed
facts in making its dismissal recommendation, it also goes
without saying that the basis for the recommendation is not
80

reasonable.
Having articulated the relevant standards I turn to the
SLC Report to determine if it demonstrates a reasonable
investigation conducted in good faith and reasonable bases
for the SLC's recommendation that this case be dismissed.
The SLC Report identifies the SLC's recommendations
for each of the three counts in plaintiffs' complaint. As
we have seen, Count I alleges that defendants breached
their fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by adopting the
2007 Plan. The duty of care claims are based on the
allegation that defendants approved the 2007 Plan knowing
that Chessiecap's Final Valuation was based on stale and
incomplete information in the Revised Chessiecap Forecast.
The duty of loyalty claims are based on the allegation that
defendants intentionally provided misleading and incomplete
information to Chessiecap in order to artificially depress
iGov's value so that defendants would receive underpriced
options and shares when the 2007 Plan was implemented.
Count II seeks rescission of the 2007 Plan and is essentially
dependent on the success of Count I. Count III is styled as
an individual claim, the personal harm being that defendants
improperly diluted plaintiffs' ownership interests, thereby
expropriating economic value and voting power from them. I
analyze the SLC's recommendation on each count in turn.
1. The Duty of Care Claims in Count I
*18 The SLC first addressed Count I, ultimately concluding
that it should be dismissed. As to the duty of care claims
in Count I, the SLC found that the 8 Del C. § 102(b)(7)
provision in iGov's corporate charter exculpates directors
from personal liability for monetary damages so long as the
director did not engage in intentional misconduct or knowing
O1

violations of the law. The SLC concluded that a duty of
care claim should not be pursued because defendants breach
of care conduct, if it occurred, would be covered by the §
102(b)(7) provision.
I take this opportunity to note the first of many concerns
I have with the conclusions in the SLC Report. In finding
that the action should not be pursued on the basis of duty of
care claims, the SLC noted that § 102(b)(7) provisions such
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as iGov's are routinely upheld by Delaware courts and that
such a provision protects defendants from personal liability,
in the form of money damages, for gross negligence. On
that basis alone, the SLC concluded that duty of care claims
against defendants should not be pursued. I find this to
be an unreasonable conclusion because the SLC failed to
consider that the requested relief in plaintiffs' complaint is
not limited to money damages; it specifically requests that
the 2007 Plan be rescinded. Under Delaware law, exculpatory
provisions do not bar duty of care claims "in remedial
contexts ..., such as in injunction or rescission cases." 82
Thus, if I became convinced at the summary judgment stage
or after a trial on the merits that defendants breached their
duty of care the exculpatory provision in the iGov charter
would not preclude me from ordering rescission of the 2007
Plan, even though it might preclude me from entering a
judgment for monetary damages against defendants. 83 It was
unreasonable, therefore, for the SLC to conclude that the duty
of care claims in Count I should not go forward solely on
the basis of iGov's § 102(b)(7) provision. The SLC simply
fails to understand that Delaware law permits a suit seeking
rescission to go forward despite a § 102(b)(7) provision
protecting directors against monetary judgments.
2. The Duty of Loyalty Claims in Count I
The SLC's investigation of plaintiffs' duty of loyalty claims,
as well as its conclusion that those claims should be
dismissed, merits the most discussion in my analysis of the
Zapata requirements. The SLC concluded that plaintiffs' duty
of loyalty claims should be dismissed because it believes
the 2007 Plan was entirely fair to iGov. Underlying this
conclusion are the SLC's findings that (1) the process
defendants' employed to secure approval of the 2007 Plan,
particularly the process employed to develop the exercise
price, was entirely fair, and (2) $4.92 was a fair exercise price.
a. Fair Process
I begin by analyzing whether the SLC's investigation of
defendants' process was reasonable in scope. I also analyze
whether the SLC's conclusion that the process was fair is
supported by reasonable bases. In conducting this analysis
I avoid considering the merits of plaintiffs' claims.
findings here relate only to the SLC's investigation.

My

*19 In concluding that defendants would be able to show
fair dealing, the SLC first determined that plaintiffs' claims
can be:

distilled... to one key issue. Can a CFO have
one forecasting model for the purpose of
seeking an increase in the Company's credit
availability and for [internal] goal-setting
while, at the same time, have a substantially
lower forecast for the purpose of valuing the
Company's equity? 85
A natural place for me to begin my inquiry is with the SLC's
own characterization of the key issue underlying plaintiffs'
complaint. Namely, was it acceptable for Tyrrell to provide
Chessiecap with the Revised Chessiecap Forecast showing
an EBITDA of $1.8 million while simultaneously providing
Textron with multiple iterations of EBITDA forecasts, all of
which showed an EBITDA of at least $3 million, and using
internal EBITDA forecasts that also projected an EBITDA
of at least $3 million? The SLC concluded that this was an
acceptable thing for Tyrrell to do. The SLC Report explains
this conclusion as follows:
The existence of multiple forecasts
circulated internally and externally during
the same time frame, in and of itself, is
not indicative of anything nefarious or illmotivated. It is not unusual for CFOs to
analyze and estimate a company's future
performance and test their predictions and
assumptions. It is also not unusual for CFOs
to provide an optimistic outlook to its lender
when the goal is to instill confidence in
the company's ability to comply with its
covenant requirements and seek an increase
in the availability of the credit line. A
forecast that is optimistic is not misleading,
it merely reflects the guessing of what
the Company may accomplish if certain
favorable events occur as the management
hopes they will. We see no value for a CFO
to present a pessimistic case when seeking
financing. By the same token, an optimistic
forecast is often used by management as a
goal setting tool to inspire and incentivize
the company's employees who may have
incentive based compensation rooted in
hitting certain set benchmarks. Setting a
high goal is a necessary tool to motivate
performance. Such practice is widespread
and not misleading, ill-motivated or selfdealing. On the other hand, a CFO can also
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have a forecast that he believes the company
will actually achieve, rather than a wishful
"may" achieve. It is that forecast that the
Committee believes should be utilized for
estimating the value of the Company's
equity.86
Elsewhere in the SLC Report this conclusion is reemphasized:
With regard to the forecasts identified by
Plaintiff but not provided to Chessiecap,
[ ] Tyrrell stated to the SLC that it was
his usual practice regularly to create such
varying forecasts for purpose of motivating
employees and testing "what i f scenarios.
He also created optimistic forecasts
showing "the art of the possible " to
instill confidence in the Company's lender
by showing what the Company hoped to
achieve, and to illustrate to management
how best to position the Company for
future growth. The Committee finds that it
is not uncommon for CEOs of companies
to run varies (sic) scenarios and forecasts
particularly for a company like iGov that
remained in transition mode through 2006
and 2007. Moreover, the record compiled
by the SLC for the period 2006-2007 and
the SLC's experience serving on the Board
of iGov, corroborate [ ] Tyrrell's statements
and confirm his business practices 87
*20 As is evident from the SLC Report, the SLC concluded
that the process of adopting the 2007 Plan was fair primarily
because the SLC believes it was perfectly normal for Tyrrell
to provide "optimistic" and "art of the possible" forecasts
to Textron and use those forecasts internally, while at the
same time providing a forecast to its valuation expert that
was "substantially lower" but something the Company could
"actually achieve," rather than being "wishful." To put it
mildly, this is an interesting conclusion, especially in light
of the current credit environment. One would suspect that
lenders would prefer a forecast projecting what management
believes is actually achievable as opposed to wishful. In and
of itself, this conclusion does not inspire confidence that the
SLC conducted a good faith investigation. But I need not rest
my decision solely on the merits of this crucial conclusion,
because, broadly speaking, I do not believe that the SLC's
investigation was sufficient in scope to adequately address
plaintiffs' duty of loyalty claims. Nor do I believe the SLC

developed reasonable bases for concluding plaintiffs' duty of
loyalty claims should be dismissed.
An obvious first question that was not adequately explored
by the SLC is this: why did Tyrrell provide Chessiecap with
the Original Chessiecap Forecast (showing an EBITDA of
roughly $3 million) if he did not believe that the projections in
that forecast were actually achievable? Why put Chessiecap
to the time, expense, and effort of developing a valuation
based on an overly optimistic projection? The SLC addresses
this question, but provides an answer that contradicts the
key conclusion of its investigation. Specifically, the SLC
Report states that the Original Chessiecap Forecast was the
"only operating forecast available" to give to Chessiecap
in August 2006. 88 Of course, that is inconsistent with the
SLC's finding that it was Tyrrell's "usual practice regularly
to create [ ] varying forecasts...." 89 By August 2006, Tyrrell
had worked at iGov for nearly a year, plenty of time to have
developed more than one forecast if he actually did that on
a regular basis. Moreover, iGov was nearing the end of its
fiscal year at that time and so, if it was Tyrrell's usual practice
to create varying forecasts, one would assume he would
have developed more than one forecast for the next year by
then. The SLC does not explain this inconsistency, and it is
the only basis on which it attempts to explain away Tyrrell
first providing Chessiecap with the Original Chessiecap
Forecast, a projection that was identical to the Second Textron
Forecast that iGov had sent to its lender the same month. The
SLC's finding that the Original Chessiecap Forecast was the
only one available actually provides evidentiary support for
plaintiffs' assertion that Tyrrell began manipulating forecasts
to depress iGov's valuation. This cannot be a reasonable basis
upon which to conclude that plaintiffs' complaint should be
dismissed.
*21 A second question that was not adequately investigated
by the SLC is why did Tyrrell provide Textron with the
Third Textron Forecast (showing an EBITDA of 3.1 million)
after he provided Chessiecap with the Revised Chessiecap
Forecast (showing an EBITDA of $1.8 million)? The SLC
Report explains that the SLC interviewed Tyrrell multiple
times and that in those interviews Tyrrell testified that he
provided Chessiecap with the Revised Chessiecap Forecast
on October 18, 2006 because he believed it was a more
realistic projection for FY07. The SLC accepted Tyrrell's
testimony on this point as true without adequately exploring
contrary evidence. For example, why would Tyrrell have been
comfortable continuing to provide Textron with forecasts that
were higher than what he believed was realistic?90 The SLC

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
^r^^t

\A/.orL-«

14

London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported in A.2d (2010)

36DeTj. ^0f^j^b§~~

——— —

found that Tyrrell provided Textron with the Third Textron
Forecast because he wanted to ensure that financing would
be obtained.
But the SLC never tested whether Tyrrell
genuinely believed he was sending Textron overly optimistic
forecasts by asking him why he was comfortable providing a
potential creditor with data he did not believe was realistic. It
was not reasonable for the SLC to accept Tyrrell's assertion
that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast was the most realistic
without exploring Tyrrell's conduct that suggests otherwise.
The SLC also did not adequately address the ample evidence
that internal forecasts continued to project EBITDA of
roughly $3-4 million, a figure much higher than the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast.
As we have seen, Tyrrell's own
emails suggest that he believed these higher internal forecasts
where achievable, in direct contradiction to the testimony
he provided the SLC, but the SLC does not appear to have
questioned him thoroughly about these emails. Instead, the
SLC explains away these internal forecasts with its finding
that they were used to motivate and inspire management by
demonstrating what might be achievable, rather than what
Tyrrell actually believed was achievable. The SLC's finding
on this point appears to be completely based on Tyrrell's
assertions about the purpose of the internal forecasts. Nothing
in the SLC Report suggests that management was questioned
to see if they understood that the internal projections being
circulated were not what the CFO believed was actually
achievable. In fact, there was evidence that iGov management
generally believed that an EBITDA of $3 million or more was
realistic for FY07. 93
Based on the SLC's own investigation, it appears that the
only character in this story to rely on the relatively lower,
but "actually achievable" numbers reflected in the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast was Chessiecap-the firm that, according
to plaintiffs' complaint, was manipulated to provide a low
valuation that directly benefitted defendants. Per the SLC's
own findings, then, all other characters were relying on
projections that were "art of the possible" but probably
not achievable. From the point of view of an objective
SLC conducting a good faith investigation, this discovery
is clearly problematic. Absent some further explanation, it
inferentially supports plaintiffs' allegations that manipulation
had occurred. An objective SLC would have been duty
bound at this point to thoroughly explore why management
pervasively used forecasts it did not believe were realistic, but
the SLC failed to do this. Rather, it appears to have accepted
Tyrrell's representations that the Revised Chessiecap Forecast
was the most accurate without pressing him on why he felt the

only appropriate use of the most accurate forecast was valuing
iGov's equity in connection with the 2007 Plan.
*22 A third question the SLC Report did not adequately
address was the assertion in plaintiffs' complaint that Tyrrell
only considered negative developments that had occurred
after the July 31, 2006 valuation date when preparing the
Revised Chessiecap Forecast. Plaintiffs' complaint provides
examples of positive developments that had occurred but
were purportedly ignored by Tyrrell; specifically, the $7
million PTO contract that was awarded in September 2006
and the increased profitability in the TACLAN contract
that was becoming apparent. Moreover, plaintiffs' complaint
alleges that when the 2007 Plan was finally approved on
January 31, 2007, defendants were even more aware of the
TACLAN contract's better-than-expected performance, as
well as the increasing likelihood that the DHS contract would
be awarded, but made no efforts to have Chessiecap update
its Final Valuation to reflect this.
Nothing in the SLC Report indicates that the SLC
seriously investigated plaintiffs' allegations that the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast ignored positive developments while
incorporating negative developments. Nor does the SLC
Report provide me with any comfort that the SLC adequately
investigated whether defendants adopted the 2007 Plan
despite knowing that the Final Valuation upon which it was
based failed to reflect the positive developments that had
occurred since July 31, 2006. Tyrrell had specifically stated
his belief on January 7, 2007 that the Final Valuation was old
and would likely be higher when it was updated and then just
a few days later represented to Chessiecap that no material
changes had occurred since July 31, 2006. Likewise, Neven
and Hupalo implicitly represented that no material changes
had occurred by adopting the 2007 Plan based on the Final
Valuation. There is no evidence that the SLC questioned
any of defendants as to why they felt the PTO contract, the
increased TACLAN profitability, or the increasing likelihood
of a DHS contract award were not material developments.
Perhaps there would have been defensible reasons for
defendants to come to these conclusions, but we are left
wondering because the SLC did not investigate it. This was
a failure to investigate a fundamental theory of recovery
in plaintiffs' complaint that precludes me from granting the
SLC's motion to dismiss.
While I am on the subject of the absence of "material
changes" I should discuss a fourth question that the SLC
did not investigate; namely, the award of 25,000 options to
Marksberry in May 2007. These options were awarded at

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
h !-.=.- h /7?< o n A o -r«

r^ _ . .*.

London v. Tyrrell, Not Reported In A.2d (2010)

$4.92 per share, the same price as the options under the
2007 Plan. The SLC reasoned that it would not have been
useful to explore this grant because Marksberry was no longer
employed by iGov at the time of the investigation and could
not exercise any of the 25,000 shares he had been granted. The
SLC believed that iGov was in no danger of being harmed
by this grant and therefore it would not be cost-beneficial to
investigate it.
*23 The SLC is undoubtedly correct that the 25,000 option
grant to Marksberry does not threaten iGov economically.
But that does not mean investigating the option grant would
not have shed light on the merits of plaintiffs' complaint.
The grant occurred ten months after the Final Valuation
upon which the $4.92 per share price was based. Plaintiffs
allege that by that time it was abundantly clear that positive,
material developments had occurred that made the Final
Valuation upon which the $4.92 strike price was based
unreliable. Among other things, plaintiffs point out that the
DHS contract had been formally awarded in March 2007.
Tyrrell's rationale for excluding the DHS contract from the
Revised Chessiecap Forecast was that it had not been formally
awarded. Thus, it at least seems reasonable that once the
DHS contract was formally awarded the Revised Chessiecap
Forecast should have been revised again to account for profits
from the DHS contract. Nevertheless, defendants did not
provide Chessiecap with any revised forecast or ask them to
update their Final Valuation. Rather, defendants adopted a
formal resolution that specifically stated no material changes
had occurred since July 31, 2006 and awarded Marksberry
options on that basis.
The SLC declined altogether to investigate this transaction.
They did not question defendants about their resolution
that no material change had occurred as of May 2007,
despite the DHS contract having been formally awarded. If
the SLC had investigated this transaction, it likely would
have shed light on the broader allegations in plaintiffs'
complaint. Specifically, the SLC could have gained insight
into defendants' motivations with respect to the 2007 Plan.
By simply asking defendants why they believed no "material
change" had occurred for equity valuation purposes since the
Final Valuation, the SLC could have determined what sort
of change defendants needed to see before they would feel
it necessary to update the Final Valuation and could have
evaluated whether defendants' assessments were being made
in good faith or whether they were ill-motivated. Defendants
were willing to award Marksberry options at the $4.92 strike
price despite the formal award of the DHS contract. This
behavior calls into question the sincerity of Tyrrell's earlier

assertion that the DHS contract should not be included in
a forecast until it was formally awarded. The SLC should
have challenged defendants on this point. It may have taken
nothing more than a few questions. But the SLC declined to
do so. Seeing this omission, I must conclude that the SLC's
investigation into plaintiffs' duty of loyalty claims was not
reasonable in scope.
A fifth problem is that the SLC Report fails to investigate
the timing of plaintiffs' removal from the board. As we've
seen, plaintiffs were removed from the board just days after
they protested the use of the Final Valuation, alleging that it
was based on stale and inaccurate information in the Revised
Chessiecap Forecast. Plaintiffs' complaint contends that
defendants' plan was to procure iGov shares for themselves
at artificially low prices and to entrench themselves in
management and directorship positions through the increased
ownership percentages they would realize under the 2007
Plan. To that end, plaintiffs allege that they did not receive
any shares under the 2007 Plan, which was adopted just
days after their removal from the board, and that their
ownership percentages were decreased by the 2007 Plan
while defendants' ownership increased.
*24 The SLC Report characterizes plaintiffs' removal from
the board as the product of a disagreement between plaintiffs
and defendants over the direction that iGov should take.
The SLC Report characterizes plaintiffs, specifically Hunt, as
wanting iGov to drop all other pursuits so that it could "milk"
the TACLAN contract. In contrast, the SLC Report describes
defendants, specifically Neven and Hupalo, as wanting to
grow iGov and use the TACLAN contract as a stepping stone
to reinvent the Company from a low-margin information
technology reseller into a higher-margin service provider. The
SLC Report states:
During their interviews, Neven and Hupalo
displayed a sense of personal responsibility
for the employment of almost one
hundred people and felt that the Company
had become the home to hardworking
individuals who were committed to serving
the government and building a great
product. It was that sense of long-term
commitment to iGov by Neven and Hupalo,
in contrast to Hunt's short-term objectives,
that divided ... and ultimately shattered the
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Conspicuously absent from the SLC Report are any citations
to interview notes or other evidence supporting the SLC's
finding that this disagreement was the cause of plaintiffs'
removal from the board. In fact, there is evidence in the
record that shows defendants may have been just as interested
in maximizing short-term profits from iGov as plaintiffs'
purportedly were, but the SLC Report fails to investigate
Q7

or explain this. The biggest problem, though, is that the
SLC Report wholly fails to analyze or explain why plaintiffs
were removed from the board only three days after objecting
to the Final Valuation and a little less then two weeks
before the 2007 Plan was adopted. There is no indication
that the SLC probed defendants on why they felt it was
necessary or advisable to remove plaintiffs from the board
almost immediately after they objected to the Final Valuation
and then shortly thereafter approve the 2007 Plan, which
plaintiffs were certain to vote against. In fact, the SLC Report
gets the date of plaintiffs' removal from the board wrong.
It states: "By the end of December 2006, the relationship
among the Founders had deteriorated and Neven and Hupalo,
acting as majority shareholders removed London and Hunt
98

from the Board of Directors." Thus, the SLC Report gets
a fundamental, undisputed fact from plaintiffs' complaint
wrong and then fails to conduct the investigation that would
have been necessary if the SLC had the facts right. This does
not demonstrate that the SLC conducted an investigation of

options he had purportedly been granted under the 2000 Plan.
According to the SLC, London, Neven, and Hupalo had all
been given defective options under the 2000 Plan. Yet only
Neven and Hupalo had those defective options replaced when
they voted to adopt the 2007 Plan. London was not permitted
to vote on the 2007 Plan (because he had been removed
from the board) and was not given replacement options under
the 2007 Plan. Surely this should have suggested something
about the fairness of the 2007 Plan adoption process from the
SLC's perspective. And yet the SLC did nothing to investigate
this.
I could go on, but I decline to.
What I have written is
sufficient to demonstrate that there is a material question
of fact as to whether the SLC conducted a good faith
investigation of reasonable scope into the fairness of the 2007
Plan's adoption process.
b. Fair Price
Having determined that the SLC did not conduct a reasonably
thorough investigation into defendants' process for adopting
the 2007 Plan and did not have reasonable bases for
concluding that the process was fair, I could dispense with
the remainder of the entire fairness inquiry. Nevertheless, to
be thorough, I will briefly explore the SLC's investigation of
price and whether it had reasonable bases to conclude that
$4.92 per share was a fair price.

reasonable scope. 99
A sixth area of inadequate investigation deserves mention.
The SLC Report assumes that defendants Neven and Hupalo
gave up options with a $1.25 strike price from the 2000
Plan for options with a strike price of $4.92 in adopting
the 2007 Plan. Presumably this finding is included in the
SLC Report to demonstrate the good faith of defendants in
adopting the 2007 Plan. The SLC concludes that ail parties
agreed that the 2007 Plan was adopted to replace the 2000
Plan to correct the defects in the 2000 Plan. The SLC fails to
acknowledge, however, evidence suggesting that defendants'
knew the options under the 2000 Plan were never granted
to them. Specifically, in September 2006, Tyrrell told Neven
that the options under the 2000 plan were never issued.
In
addition, on October 26,2006, iGov's corporate counsel gave
the opinion that the options were never granted.101
*25 Since the SLC believed that the 2007 Plan was designed
to replace the problematic $ 1.25 options that had been granted
under the 2000 Plan, it should have investigated why London
did not receive options under the 2007 Plan to replace the

The SLC ultimately determined that both the Chessiecap
Final Valuation and McLean Valuations were "tainted" and
did not rely on either valuation in concluding that $4.92 was a
fair price.
The SLC partially relied on the SRR Valuations
in concluding that $4.92 was a fair price. I say "partially"
because the SLC Report summarily marginalizes the SRR
Valuations, which concluded that iGov equity was worth
$3.90-$4.15 as of October 31, 2006 and $5.24-$ 5.30 as of
January 30, 2007. The SLC Report concludes that $4.92 was
in the range of fair market value based on the SRR Valuations,
but then states that "$4.92 ... was likely too high, from
a practical, real world perspective...." 104 The SLC Report
takes the position that the SRR Valuations $5.24-$5.30 per
share estimate for January 30,2007 was largely a function of
iGov's cash position on that date, and was not an indication
of the real value of the Company. This disagreement about
the effect of iGov's cash position on value, combined with
the SLC's hunches about the Company's value, led the SLC
to conclude that even the SRR Valuations missed the mark.
Thus, the SLC is left with no professional valuation upon
which to hang its hat entirely. That is certainly enough to
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create a material question of fact about whether the SLC had
a reasonable basis to conclude that $4.92 was a fair price.
Compounding this problem though is the fact that SRR
utilized the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast (showing an EBITDA
of $2.1 million) in preparing its valuation. The SLC Report
indicates that SRR was given the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast
because:
*26 ... Tyrrell testified that he viewed
the [Tyrrell Baseline Forecast] as a more
realistic projection for FY2007. Tyrrell
testified that this forecast was a revision
of the [Revised Chessiecap Forecast]
previously provided to Chessiecap and did
not contain the operational or motivational
assumptions found in the [Third Textron
Forecast]. The SLC concluded, therefore,
that as of December 2006, the [Tyrrell
Baseline Forecast] was the most accurate
prediction of the Company's likely
performance.... 105
There are at least two problems with the SLC's decision
to provide SRR with the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast for its
analysis. First, as is evident from the language cited, the
SLC determined that the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast was the
most appropriate forecast for SRR to use solely based on
Tyrrell's testimony. This was not a reasonable basis for such
a determination. Serious doubts are raised about an SLC's
investigation where it does not consult sources of information
other than one of the defendants to make conclusions. 106
The second problem is related to the first. The SLC does
not appear to have actually understood the Tyrrell Baseline
Forecast. Tyrrell described the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast as
being a revision of the Revised Chessiecap Forecast, but
this was inaccurate. The SLC appears to have accepted this
characterization, and included it in the SLC Report, without
actually testing it. A close comparison reveals that the Tyrrell
Baseline Forecast was identical to the Third Textron Forecast
with the exception that two line items differed. The principal
difference between the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast and the
Third Textron Forecast was the revenues and expenses from
the DHS contract. As we have seen, the DHS contract was
one of the major line items, if not the major line item,
that plaintiffs accuse Tyrrell of adjusting to manipulate the
valuations. If the SLC had compared the Tyrrell Baseline
Forecast to the Third Textron Forecast it would have noticed
that the two were substantially identical with the exception

that DHS contract revenue and expenses were omitted from
the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast. This omission largely caused
the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast to project an EBITDA of
$2.1 million, 32% lower than the Third Textron Forecast's
EBITDA projection of $3.1 million. This difference should
have been addressed by the SLC because it provides
evidentiary support for plaintiffs' assertion that Tyrrell was
manipulating the DHS contract in his projections. But the
SLC did not do this because it accepted Tyrrell's inaccurate
description of the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast at face value.
SRR's consequent reliance on the Tyrrell Baseline Forecast
leaves me with a material doubt as to the bases upon which
the SLC grounded its conclusion that $4.92 was a fair price.
I cannot grant the SLC's motion under the Zapata standard
where such doubts exist.
Before moving on to Counts II and III I wish to make
something clear. I have no opinion at this stage of the
proceedings as to the fair market value of iGov shares on
January 30, 2007. I have not attempted to determine which
valuation is the most accurate. I have simply evaluated the
scope of the SLC's investigation into the $4.92 price and the
bases of its conclusions regarding the $4.92 price and have
found that it leads me to conclude that the SLC's investigation
did not meet the Zapata requirements.
3. Counts II and III
*27 I briefly address Counts II and III before concluding
my Zapata step-one analysis. The SLC recommended that
Count II be dismissed because it believed adoption of the
2007 Plan was entirely fair to iGov and, therefore, plaintiffs
would not prevail on Count I. Because the SLC failed to meet
the Zapata standard its recommendation to dismiss Count I
is denied. Accordingly, Count II, which seeks rescission of
the 2007 Plan, will not be dismissed for the obvious reason
that rescission may be the appropriate remedy if plaintiffs
ultimately prevail on the merits of Count I.
With respect to Count III, the SLC concluded it was a
derivative claim and should be dismissed along with Count
I (and for the same reasons). Plaintiffs assert that this is an
individual claim over which the SLC has no power. Because I
am permitting plaintiffs to continue piloting derivative claims
through this litigation, I will not spend time at this juncture
attempting to resolve whether Count III alleges individual
or derivative claims. Either way the claims survive. We can
leave determination of the exact nature of Count III for
another day. In fact, a more accurate determination may be
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made at a later time when the benefits of full discovery have
enlarged the record.

IV. CONCLUSION

C. The Court9s Independent Business Judgment

Because there are material questions of fact as to the SLCs

Having determined that I will not grant the SLCs motion

whether it had reasonable bases for its conclusions, the SLCs

to dismiss after fully applying the first step of the Zapata

motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint is DENIED.

independence, the reasonableness of its investigation, and

standard to the motion, I find it unnecessary to apply the
second step of Zapata. In my view, this is not a case where

IT IS SO ORDERED.

application of the second step will add anything of value, and
so I exercise my discretion not to apply this step.
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36 Del. J. Corp. L. 359
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A director of the corporation shall not be personally liable to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, except for liability (i) for any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the Coiporation
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation
of law; (iii) under Section 174 of the Delaware General Corporation Law; or (iv)for any transaction from which the director
derived an improper personal benefit. If the Delaware General Corporation Law is amended to authorize corporate action further
eliminating or limiting the personal liability of directors, then the liability of a director of the corporation shall be eliminated or
limited to the fullest extent permitted by the Delaware General Corporation Law, as so amended (emphasis added).
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adoption of the 2007 Plan. I simply mention this to highlight that it was not considered by the SLC.
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del.Ch.1984).
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For example, the SLC's interview notes indicate that Neven and Hupalo both made statements to the SLC that it was their goal to sell
or merge the Company. Pis.' Answer Ex. 5 at 38, 47. Similarly, Mr. Tyrrell told Chessiecap in an email dated September 19, 2006
that "[tjhere are very few people here with knowledge of our plan to sell in 2 or 3 years...." Id. Ex. 55.
SLC Report 24.
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See Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 968 (Del.Ch. 1985).
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MExs. 57,58.
For example, at one point in the SLC Report the SLC speculates that the adoption of the 2007 Plan might actually be subject to
business judgment review, rather than entire fairness review. The SLC bases this conclusion on the theory that the option grants and
direct share purchases under the 2007 Plan might not have been "material" to defendants. Of course, this speculation is irrelevant
because defendants stood on both sides of the transaction in adopting the 2007 Plan and entire fairness review would thus apply
regardless of whether the options and direct share purchases were "material" to defendants. London v. Tyrrell, 2008 WL 2505435,
at *5 (Del.Ch. June 24, 2008) (citing Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 2, 25 n. 50 (Del. Ch.2002)). But in speculating as to materiality
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the SLC failed to conduct any investigation into the net worth or income of defendants so it had no basis in any event upon which
to conclude that the options and direct share purchases might not have been "material."
SLC Report 47.
SLC Report 50.
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SLC Report 21.
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Court of Chancery denied corporation's alternative motions to
dismiss complaint or for summaryjudgment, and corporation
took interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court, Quillen, J.,
held that: (1) even though demand was not made on board of
directors to sue and the initial decision of whether to litigate
was not placed before the board, it retained all of its corporate
power concerning litigation decisions; (2) self-interest taint
of majority of the board was not per se a bar to delegation
of board's power over litigation decisions to independent
committee composed of two disinterested board members;
and (3) in ruling on the motions, Court of Chancery was to
inquire into independence and good faith of the committee
and the bases supporting its conclusions, and, if independence
and good faith were found, Court was to exercise its own
independent business judgment in determining whether a
motion should be granted.
Reversed and remanded.
*780 Upon appeal from the Court of Chancery. Reversed
and Remanded.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Robert K. Payson, (argued) of Potter, Anderson & Corroon,
Wilmington, and Thomas F. Cumin, Thomas J. Kavaler, P.
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Opinion
QUILLEN, Justice:
This is an interlocutory appeal from an order entered on
April 9, 1980, by the Court of Chancery denying appellantdefendant Zapata Corporation's (Zapata) alternative motions
to dismiss the complaint or for summaryjudgment. The issue
to be addressed has reached this Court by way of a rather
convoluted path.
In June, 1975, William Maldonado, a stockholder of Zapata,
instituted a derivative action in the Court of Chancery on
behalf of Zapata against ten officers and/or directors of
Zapata, alleging, essentially, breaches of fiduciary duty.
Maldonado did not first demand that the board bring this
action, stating instead such demand's futility because all
directors were named as defendants and allegedly participated
in the acts specified. In June, 1977, Maldonado commenced
an action in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York against the same defendants, save
one, alleging federal security law violations as well as the
same common law claims made previously in the Court of
Chancery.
*781 By June, 1979, four of the defendant-directors were
no longer on the board, and the remaining directors appointed
two new outside directors to the board. The board then created
an "Independent Investigation Committee" (Committee),
composed solely of the two new directors, to investigate
Maldonado's actions, as well as a similar derivative action
then pending in Texas, and to determine whether the
corporation should continue any or all of the litigation. The
Committee's determination was stated to be "final, ... not...
subject to review by the Board of Directors and ... in all
respects ... binding upon the Corporation."
Following an investigation, the Committee concluded, in
September, 1979, that each action should "be dismissed
forthwith as their continued maintenance is inimical to the
Company's best interests ...." Consequently, Zapata moved
for dismissal or summary judgment in the three derivative
actions. On January 24, 1980, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York granted Zapata's motion for
summary judgment, Maldonado v. Flynn, S.D.N.Y., 485

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (1981)

F.Supp. 274 (1980), holding, under its interpretation of
Delaware law, that the Committee had the authority, under
the "business judgment" rule, to require the termination of
the derivative action. Maldonado appealed that decision to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
On March 18, 1980, the Court of Chancery, in a reported
opinion, the basis for the order of April 9, 1980, denied
Zapata's motions, holding that Delaware law does not
sanction this means of dismissal. More specifically, it held
that the "business judgment" rule is not a grant of authority
to dismiss derivative actions and that a stockholder has an
individual right to maintain derivative actions in certain
instances. Maldonado v. Flynn, Del.Ch., 413 A.2d 1251
(1980) (herein Maldonado). Pursuant to the provisions of
Supreme Court Rule 42, Zapata filed an interlocutory appeal
with this Court shortly thereafter. The appeal was accepted by
this Court on June 5, 1980. On May 29, 1980, however, the
Court of Chancery dismissed Maldonado's cause of action,
its decision based on principles of res judicata, expressly
conditioned upon the Second Circuit affirming the earlier
New York District Court's decision. The Second Circuit
appeal was ordered stayed, however, pending this Court's
resolution of the appeal from the April 9th Court of Chancery
order denying dismissal and summary judgment.
[1] Thus, Zapata's observation that it sits "in a procedural
gridlock" appears quite accurate, and we agree that this Court
can and should attempt to resolve the particular question
of Delaware law. As the Vice Chancellor noted, 413
A.2d at 1257, "it is the law of the State of incorporation
which determines whether the directors have this power
of dismissal, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 99 S.Ct.
1831, 60 L.Ed.2d 404 (1979)". We limit our review in this
interlocutory appeal to whether the Committee has the power
to cause the present action to be dismissed.
We begin with an examination of the carefully considered
opinion of the Vice Chancellor which states, in part, that
the "business judgment" rule does not confer power "to a
corporate board of directors to terminate a derivative suit",
413 A.2d at 1257. His conclusion is particularly pertinent
because several federal courts, applying Delaware law, have
held that the business judgment rule enables boards (or their
committees) to terminate derivative suits, decisions now in
conflict with the holding below.
*782 As the term is most commonly used, and given the
disposition below, we can understand the Vice Chancellor's
comment that "the business judgment rule is irrelevant to

the question of whether the Committee has the authority
to compel the dismissal of this suit". 413 A.2d at 1257.
Corporations, existing because of legislative grace, possess
authority as granted by the legislature. Directors of Delaware
corporations derive their managerial decision making power,
which encompasses decisions whether to initiate, or refrain
from entering, litigation, from 8 Del.C. s 141 (a). 6 This
statute is the fount of directorial powers. The "business
judgment" rule is a judicial creation that presumes propriety,
under certain circumstances, in a board's decision. Viewed
defensively, it does not create authority. In this sense the
"business judgment" rule is not relevant in corporate decision
making until after a decision is made. It is generally used
as a defense to an attack on the decision's soundness. The
board's managerial decision making power, however, comes
from s 141(a). The judicial creation and legislative grant
are related because the "business judgment" rule evolved to
give recognition and deference to directors' business expertise
when exercising their managerial power under s 141(a).
In the case before us, although the corporation's decision
to move to dismiss or for summary judgment was, literally,
a decision resulting from an exercise of the directors' (as
delegated to the Committee) business judgment, the question
of "business judgment", in a defensive sense, would not
become relevant until and unless the decision to seek
termination of the derivative lawsuit was attacked as
improper. Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1257. Accord, Abella
v. Universal Leaf Tobacco Co., Inc., E.D.Va., 495 F.Supp.
713 (1980) (applying Virginia law); Maher v. Zapata Corp.,
S.D.Tex., 490 F.Supp. 348 (1980) (applying Delaware law).
See also, Dent, supra note 5, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 101-02, 135.
This question was not reached by the Vice Chancellor because
he determined that the stockholder had an individual right to
maintain this derivative action. Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262.
Thus, the focus in this case is on the power to speak
for the corporation as to whether the lawsuit should be
continued or terminated. As we see it, this issue in the
current appellate posture of this case has three aspects: the
conclusions of the Court below concerning the continuing
right of a stockholder to maintain a derivative action; the
corporate power under Delaware law of an authorized board
committee to cause dismissal of litigation instituted for the
benefit of the corporation; and the role of the Court of
Chancery in resolving conflicts between the stockholder and
the committee.
Accordingly, we turn first to the Court of Chancery's
conclusions concerning the right of a plaintiff stockholder
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in a derivative action. We find that its determination that a
stockholder, once demand is made and refused, possesses an
independent, individual right to continue a derivative suit for
breaches of fiduciary duty over objection by the corporation,
Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262-63, as an absolute rule, is
erroneous. The Court of Chancery relied principally upon
*783 Sohland v. Baker, Del.Supr., 141 A. 277 (1927), for
this statement of the Delaware rule. Maldonado, 413 A.2d at
1260-61. Sohland is sound law. But Sohland cannot be fairly
read as supporting the broad proposition which evolved in the
opinion below.
In Sohland, the complaining stockholder was allowed to file
the derivative action in equity after making demand and
after the board refused to bring the lawsuit. But the question
before us relates to the power of the corporation by motion
to terminate a lawsuit properly commenced by a stockholder
without prior demand. No Delaware statute or case cited to
us directly determines this new question and we do not think
that Sohland addresses it by implication.
The language in Sohland relied on by the Vice Chancellor
negates the contention that the case stands for the broad rule
of stockholder right which evolved below. This Court therein
stated that "a stockholder may sue in his own name for the
purpose of enforcing corporate rights ... in a proper case if
the corporation on the demand of the stockholder refuses to
bring suit." 141 A. at 281 (emphasis added). The Court also
stated that "whether ("(t)he right of a stockholder to file a bill
to litigate corporate rights") exists necessarily depends on the
facts of each particular case." 141 A. at 282 (emphasis added).
Thus, the precise language only supports the stockholder's
right to initiate the lawsuit. It does not support an absolute
right to continue to control it.
Additionally, the issue and context in Sohland are simply
different from this case. Baker, a stockholder, suing on behalf
of Bankers' Mortgage Co., sought cancellation of stock issued
to Sohland, a director of Bankers', in a transaction participated
in by a "great majority" of Bankers' board. Before instituting
his suit, Baker requested the board to assert the cause of
action. The board refused. Interestingly, though, on the same
day the board refused, it authorized payment of Baker's
attorneys fees so that he could pursue the claim; one director
actually escorted Baker to the attorneys suggested by the
board. At this chronological point, Sohland had resigned from
the board, and it was he, not the board, who was protesting
Baker's ability to bring suit. In sum, despite the board's refusal
to bring suit, it is clear that the board supported Baker in

proceed as the corporation's representative "for the prevention
of injustice", because "the corporation itself refused to litigate
an apparent corporate right." 141 A. at 282.
Moreover, McKee v. Rogers, Del.Ch., 156 A. 191 (1931),
stated "as a general rule" that "a stockholder cannot be
permitted... to invade the discretionary field committed to the
judgment of the directors and sue in the corporation's behalf
when the managing body refuses. This rule is a well settled
one." 156 A. at 193. 9
[2] The McKee rule, of course, should not be read so
broadly that the board's refusal will be determinative in every
instance. Board members, owing a well-established fiduciary
duty to the corporation, will not be allowed to cause a
derivative suit to be dismissed when it would be a breach of
their fiduciary duty. Generally *784 disputes pertaining to
control of the suit arise in two contexts.
[3] Consistent with the purpose of requiring a demand, a
board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as
detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and
refused, will be respected unless it was wrongful. See, e. g.,
United Copper Securities Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co.,
244 U.S. 261, 263-64, 37 S.Ct. 509, 510, 61 L.Ed. 1119,
1124 (1917); Stockholder Derivative Actions, supra note 5,
44 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 169, 191-92; Note, Demand on Directors
and Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73
Har.L.Rev. 746, 748, 759 (1960); 13 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia
of the Law of Private Corporations s 5969 (rev.perm.ed.
1980). A claim of a wrongful decision not to sue is thus
the first exception and the first context of dispute. Absent a
wrongful refusal, the stockholder in such a situation simply
lacks legal managerial power. Compare Maldonado, 413
A.2d at 1259-60.
[4] But it cannot be implied that, absent a wrongful board
refusal, a stockholder can never have an individual right to
initiate an action. For, as is stated in McKee, a "well settled"
exception exists to the general rule.
"(A) stockholder may sue in equity in his
derivative right to assert a cause of action
in behalf of the corporation, without prior
demand upon the directors to sue, when it
is apparent that a demand would be futile,
that the officers are under an influence that
sterilizes discretion and could not be proper
persons to conduct the litigation."

o

his efforts.

It is not surprising then that he was allowed to
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156 A. at 193 (emphasis added). This exception, the second
context for dispute, is consistent with the Court of Chancery's
statement below, that "(t) he stockholders' individual right to
bring the action does not ripen, however, ... unless he can
show a demand to be futile." Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262.
11

These comments in McKee and in the opinion below make
obvious sense. A demand, when required and refused (if not
wrongful), terminates a stockholder's legal ability to initiate a

stockholder in an extreme case might control the destiny of
the entire corporation. This concern was bluntly expressed by
the Ninth Circuit in Lewis v. Anderson, 9th Cir., 615 F.2d
778, 783 (1979), cert, denied, - U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 206, 66
L.Ed.2d 89 (1980): "To allow one shareholder to incapacitate
an entire board of directors merely by leveling charges against
them gives too much leverage to dissident shareholders."
But, when examining the means, including the committee
mechanism examined in this case, potentials for abuse must
be recognized. This takes us to the second and third aspects
of the issue on appeal.

12

derivative action. But where demand is properly excused,
the stockholder does possess the ability to initiate the action
on his corporation's behalf.
[5] These conclusions, however, do not determine the
question before us. Rather, they merely bring us to the
question to be decided. It is here that we part company with
the Court below. Derivative suits enforce corporaterightsand
any recovery obtained goes to the corporation. Taormina v.
Taormina Corp., Del.Ch., 78 A.2d 473, 476 (1951); Keenan
v. Eshleman, Del.Supr., 2 A.2d 904, 912-13 (1938). "The
right of a stockholder to file a bill to litigate corporate rights
is, therefore, solely for the purpose of preventing injustice
where it is apparent that material corporate rights would not
otherwise be protected." Sohland, 141 A. at 282. We see
no inherent reason why the "two phases" of a derivative
suit, the stockholder's suit to compel the corporation to sue
and the corporation's suit (see 413 A.2d at 1261-62), should
automatically result in the placement in the hands of the
*785 litigating stockholder sole control of the corporate
right throughout the litigation. To the contrary, it seems to
us that such an inflexible rule would recognize the interest
of one person or group to the exclusion of all others within
the corporate entity. Thus, we reject the view of the Vice
Chancellor as to the first aspect of the issue on appeal.
The question to be decided becomes: When, if at all, should an
authorized board committee be permitted to cause litigation,
properly initiated by a derivative stockholder in his own right,
to be dismissed? As noted above, a board has the power
to choose not to pursue litigation when demand is made
upon it, so long as the decision is not wrongful. If the board
determines that a suit would be detrimental to the company,
the board's determination prevails. Even when demand is
excusable, circumstances may arise when continuation of the
litigation would not be in the corporation's best interests.
Our inquiry is whether, under such circumstances, there is a
permissible procedure under s 141(a) by which a corporation
can rid itself of detrimental litigation. If there is not, a single

'f !V*

[6] Before we pass to equitable considerations as to
the mechanism at issue here, it must be clear that an
independent committee possesses the corporate power to seek
the termination of a derivative suit. Section 141(c) allows
a board to delegate all of its authority to a committee.
Accordingly, a committee with properly delegated authority
would have the power to move for dismissal or summary
judgment if the entire board did.
[7] Even though demand was not made in this case and
the initial decision of whether to litigate was not placed
before the board, Zapata's board, it seems to us, retained
all of its corporate power concerning litigation decisions.
If Maldonado had made demand on the board in this case,
it could have refused to bring suit. Maldonado could then
have asserted that the decision not to sue was wrongful
and, if correct, would have been allowed to maintain
the suit. The board, however, never would have lost its
statutory managerial authority. The demand requirement
itself evidences that the managerial power is retained *786
by the board. When a derivative plaintiff is allowed to bring
suit after a wrongful refusal, the board's authority to choose
whether to pursue the litigation is not challenged although
its conclusion reached through the exercise of that authority
is not respected since it is wrongful. Similarly, Rule 23.1,
by excusing demand in certain instances, does not strip the
board of its corporate power. It merely saves the plaintiff the
expense and delay of making a futile demand resulting in a
probable tainted exercise of that authority in a refusal by the
board or in giving control of litigation to the opposing side.
But the board entity remains empowered under s 141(a) to
make decisions regarding corporate litigation. The problem is
one of member disqualification, not the absence of power in
the board.
[8] The corporate power inquiry then focuses on whether the
board, tainted by the self-interest of a majority of its members,
can legally delegate its authority to a committee of two
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disinterested directors. We find our statute clearly requires an
affirmative answer to this question. As has been noted, under
an express provision of the statute, s 141(c), a committee can
exercise all of the authority of the board to the extent provided
in the resolution of the board. Moreover, at lest by analogy to
our statutory section on interested directors, 8 Del.C. s 141,
it seems clear that the Delaware statute is designed to permit
disinterested directors to act for the board. Compare Puma
v. Marriott, Del.Ch., 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (1971).
We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority
is per se a legal bar to the delegation of the board's power to
an independent committee composed of disinterested board
members. The committee can properly act for the corporation
to move to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be
detrimental to the corporation's best interest.
Our focus now switches to the Court of Chancery which
is faced with a stockholder assertion that a derivative suit,
properly instituted, should continue for the benefit of the
corporation and a corporate assertion, properly made by a
board committee acting with board authority, that the same
derivative suit should be dismissed as inimical to the best
interests of the corporation.
At the risk of stating the obvious, the problem is relatively
simple. If, on the one hand, corporations can consistently
wrest bona fide derivative actions away from well-meaning
derivative plaintiffs through the use of the committee
mechanism, the derivative suit will lose much, if not all, of
its generally-recognized effectiveness as an intra-corporate
means of policing boards of directors. See Dent, supra note 5,
75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 96 & n. 3, 144 & n. 241. If, on the other
hand, corporations are unable toridthemselves of meritless
or harmful litigation *787 and strike suits, the derivative
action, created to benefit the corporation, will produce the
opposite, unintended result. For a discussion of strike suits,
see Dent, supra, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 137. See also Cramer v.
General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 3d Cir., 582 F.2d
259, 275 (1978), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 1129, 99 S.Ct. 1048,
59 L.Ed.2d 90 (1979). It thus appears desirable to us to find a
balancing point where bona fide stockholder power to bring
corporate causes of action cannot be unfairly trampled on by
the board of directors, but the corporation can rid itself of
detrimental litigation.
As we noted, the question has been treated by other courts
as one of the "business judgment" of the board committee.
If a "committee, composed of independent and disinterested
directors, conducted a proper review of the matters before

it, considered a variety of factors and reached, in good faith,
a business judgment that (the) action was not in the best
interest of (the corporation)", the action must be dismissed.
See, e. g., Maldonado v. Flynn, supra, 485 F.Supp. at 282,
286. The issues become solely independence, good faith,
and reasonable investigation. The ultimate conclusion of the
committee, under that view, is not subject to judicial review.
We are not satisfied, however, that acceptance of the
"business judgment" rationale at this stage of derivative
litigation is a proper balancing point. While we admit an
analogy with a normal case respecting board judgment, it
seems to us that there is sufficient risk in the realities of a
situation like the one presented in this case to justify caution
beyond adherence to the theory of business judgment.
The context here is a suit against directors where demand
on the board is excused. We think some tribute must be
paid to the fact that the lawsuit was properly initiated. It is
not a board refusal case. Moreover, this complaint was filed
in June of 1975 and, while the parties undoubtedly would
take differing views on the degree of litigation activity, we
have to be concerned about the creation of an "Independent
Investigation Committee" four years later, after the election
of two new outside directors. Situations could develop where
such motions could be filed after years of vigorous litigation
for reasons unconnected with the merits of the lawsuit.
Moreover, notwithstanding our conviction that Delaware
law entrusts the corporate power to a properly authorized
committee, we must be mindful that directors are passing
judgment on fellow directors in the same corporation and
fellow directors, in this instance, who designated them to
serve both as directors and committee members. The question
naturally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God go
I" empathy might not play a role. And the further question
arises whether inquiry as to independence, good faith and
reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard against abuse,
perhaps subconscious abuse.
There is another line of exploration besides the factual context
of this litigation which we find helpful. The nature of this
motion finds no ready pigeonhole, as perhaps illustrated by its
being set forth in the alternative. It is perhaps best considered
as a hybrid summary judgment motion for dismissal because
the stockholder plaintiffs standing to maintain the suit has
been lost. But it does not fit neatly into a category described
in Rule 12(b) of the Court of Chancery Rules nor does
it correspond directly with Rule 56 since the question of
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genuine issues of fact on the merits of the stockholder's claim
are not reached.
It seems to us that there are two other procedural analogies
that are helpful in addition to reference to Rules 12 and 56.
There is some analogy to a settlement in that there is a request
to terminate litigation without a judicial determination of the
merits. See Perrine v. Pennroad Corp., Del.Supr., 47 A.2d
479, 487 (1946). "In determining whether or not to approve
a proposed settlement of a derivative stockholders' action
(when directors are on both sides of the transaction), the
Court ofChancery is called upon to exercise its own business
judgment." Neponsit Investment Co. v. Abramson, Del.Supr.,
405 A.2d 97, 100 (1979) and cases therein cited. In this case,
*788 the litigating stockholder plaintiff facing dismissal of a
lawsuit properly commenced ought, in our judgment, to have
sufficient status for strict Court review.
Finally, if the committee is in effect given status to speak for
the corporation as the plaintiff in interest, then it seems to us
there is an analogy to Court ofChancery Rule 41(a)(2) where
the plaintiff seeks a dismissal after an answer. Certainly, the
position of record of the litigating stockholder is adverse to
the position advocated by the corporation in the motion to
dismiss. Accordingly, there is perhaps some wisdom to be
gained by the direction in Rule 41(a)(2) that "an action shall
not be dismissed at the plaintiffs instance save upon order of
the Court and upon such terms and conditions as the Court
deems proper."
Whether the Court of Chancery will be persuaded by the
exercise of a committee power resulting in a summary motion
for dismissal of a derivative action, where a demand has
not been initially made, should rest, in our judgment, in the
independent discretion of the Court of Chancery. We thus
steer a middle course between those cases which yield to
the independent business judgment of a board committee
and this case as determined below which would yield to
unbridled plaintiff stockholder control. In pursuit of the
course, we recognize that "(t)he final substantive judgment
whether a particular lawsuit should be maintained requires
a balance of many factors ethical, commercial, promotional,
public relations, employee relations, fiscal as well as legal."
Maldonado v. Flynn, supra, 485 F.Supp. at 285. But we are
content that such factors are not "beyond the judicial reach" of
the Court ofChancery which regularly and competently deals
with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust property,
approval of settlements and scores of similar problems.
We recognize the danger of judicial overreaching but the
alternatives seem to us to be outweighed by the fresh view

of a judicial outsider. Moreover, if we failed to balance all
the interests involved, we would in the name of practicality
and judicial economy foreclose a judicial decision on the
merits. At this point, we are not convinced that is necessary
or desirable.
[9] After an objective and thorough investigation of a
derivative suit, an independent committee may cause its
corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss in the
Court of Chancery. The basis of the motion is the best
interests of the corporation, as determined by the committee.
The motion should include a thorough written record of
the investigation and its findings and recommendations.
Under appropriate Court supervision, akin to proceedings on
summary judgment, each side should have an opportunity
to make a record on the motion. As to the limited issues
presented by the motion noted below, the moving party
should be prepared to meet the normal burden under Rule 56
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to dismiss as a matter of law. 15
The Court should apply a two-step test to the motion.
[10] First, the Court should inquire into the independence
and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its
conclusions. Limited discovery may be ordered to facilitate
such inquiries.
The corporation should have the burden
of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable
investigation, rather than presuming independence, good faith
and reasonableness.
*789 If the Court determines either
that the committee is not independent or has not shown
reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the Court is not
satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including
but not limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court
shall deny the corporation's motion. If, however, the Court
is satisfied under Rule 56 standards that the committee was
independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith
findings and recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its
discretion, to the next step.
The second step provides, we believe, the essential key in
striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims as
expressed in a derivative stockholder suit and a corporation's
best interests as expressed by an independent investigating
committee. The Court should determine, applying its own
independent business judgment, whether the motion should
1R

be granted.
This means, of course, that instances could
arise where a committee can establish its independence and
sound bases for its good faith decisions and still have the
corporation's motion denied. The second step is intended to
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thwart instances where corporate actions meet the criteria of

If the Court's independent business judgment is satisfied, the

step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or

Court may proceed to grant the motion, subject, of course, to

where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate

any equitable terms or conditions the Court finds necessary

a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration

or desirable.

in the corporation's interest. The Court of Chancery of
course must carefully consider and weigh how compelling

The interlocutory order of the Court of Chancery is reversed

the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a

and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent

non-frivolous lawsuit. The Court of Chancery should, when

with this opinion.

appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and
public policy in addition to the corporation's best interests.

Parallel Citations
22A.L.R.4thll90

Footnotes
*
The appeal was argued on Oct. 16, 1980 but certain procedural matters required by this Court were not accomplished until the date
indicated.
1
Court of Chancery Rule 23.1 states in part: "The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff
to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for
not making the effort."
2
Maldonado v. Flynn, Del.Ch., 417 A.2d 378 (1980). Proceedings in the Trial Court are not automatically stayed during the pendency
of an interlocutory appeal. Supreme Court Rule 42(d).
3
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in Maher v. Zapata Corp., S.D.Tex., 490 F.Supp. 348 (1980), denied Zapata's
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment in an opinion consistent with Maldonado.
4
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 8th Cir., 603 F.2d 724 (1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1017, 100 S.Ct. 670, 62 L.Ed.2d 647 (1980);
Lewis v. Adams, N.D.OkL, No. 77-266C (November 15, 1979); Siegal v. Merrick, S.D.N. Y., 84 F.R.D. 106 (1979); and, of course,
Maldonado v. Flynn, S.D.N.Y., 485 F.Supp. 274 (1980). See also Abramowitz v. Posner, S.D.N.Y., 513 F.Supp. 120, (1981) which
specifically rejected the result reached by the Vice Chancellor in this case.
5
See Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Derivative Suit? 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. 96, 98
& n. 14 (1980); Comment, The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 168, 192
& nn. 153-54 (1976) (herein Stockholder Derivative Actions).
6
8DeLC.s 141(a) states:
"The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation. If any such provision is made in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or
imposed upon the board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by such
person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation."
7

See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 Hofstra L.Rev. 93, 97, 130-33 (1979).

8

Compare Baker v. Bankers' Mortgage Co., Del.Ch., 129 A. 775, 776-77 (1925), the lower Sohland. In Baker, Chancellor Wolcott
posed a rhetorical question that is entirely consistent with the result we reach today: "(W)hy should not a stockholder, if the managing
body absolutely refuses to act, be permitted to assert on behalf of himself and other stockholders a complaint, not against matters
lying in sound discretion and honest judgment, but against frauds perpetrated by an officer in clear breach of his trust?" 129 A. at 777.
To the extent that Mayer v. Adams, Del.Supr., 141 A.2d 458, 462 (1958) and Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of America, Del.Ch., 180
A. 614, 615 (1935), relied upon in Maldonado, 413 A.2d at 1262, contain language relating to the rule in McKee, we note that
each decision is dissimilar from the one we examine today. Mayer held that demand on the stockholders was not required before
maintaining a derivative suit if the wrong alleged could not be ratified by the stockholders. Ainscow found defective a complaint that
neither alleged demand on the directors, nor reasons why demand was excusable.
In other words, when stockholders, after making demand and having their suit rejected, attack the board's decision as improper, the
board's decision falls under the "business judgment" rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met. See Dent, supra
note 5, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 100-01 & nn. 24-25. That situation should be distinguished from the instant case, where demand was not
made, and the power of the board to seek a dismissal, due to disqualification, presents a threshold issue. For examples of what has

9

10
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been held to be a wrongful decision not to sue, see Stockholder Derivative Actions, supra note 5, 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 193-98. We
recognize that the two contexts can overlap in practice.
These statements are consistent with Rule 23.l's "reasons for ... failure" to make demand. See also the other cases cited by the Vice
Chancellor, 413 A.2d at 1262: Ainscow v. Sanitary Co. of America, supra note 9, 180 A. at 615; Mayer v. Adams, supra note 9, 141
A.2d at 462; Dann v. Chrysler Corp., Del.Ch., 174 A.2d 696, 699-700 (1961).
Even in this situation, it may take litigation to determine the stockholder's lack of power, i. e., standing.

13

8Del.C. s 141(c) states:

11

"The board of directors may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate 1 or more committees,
each committee to consist of 1 or more of the directors of the corporation. The board may designate 1 or more
directors as alternative members of any committee, who may replace any absent or disqualified member at any
meeting of the committee. The bylaws may provide that in the absence or disqualification of a member of a
committee, the member or members present at any meeting and not disqualified from voting, whether or not he
or they constitute a quorum, may unanimously appoint another member of the board of directors to act at the
meeting in the place of any such absent or disqualified member. Any such committee, to the extent provided in
the resolution of the board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business and affairs of the corporation, and
may authorize the seal of the corporation to be affixed to all papers which may require it; but no such committee
shall have the power or authority in reference to amending the certificate of incorporation, adopting an agreement
of merger or consolidation, recommending to the stockholders the sale, lease or exchange of all or substantially
all of the corporation's property and assets, recommending to the stockholders a dissolution of the corporation or
a revocation of a dissolution, or amending the bylaws of the corporation; and, unless the resolution, bylaws, or
certificate of incorporation expressly so provide, no such committee shall have the power or authority to declare
a dividend or to authorize the issuance of stock."
14

15

16

17

18

8Del.C. s 144 states:
"s 144. Interested directors; quorum.
(a) No contract or transaction between a corporation and 1 or more of its directors or officers, or between a corporation and any
other corporation, partnership, association, or other organization in which 1 or more of its directors or officers are directors or
officers, or have a financial interest, shall be void or voidable solely for this reason, or solely because the director or officer is
present at or participates in the meeting of the board or committee which authorizes the contract or transaction, or solely because
his or their votes are counted for such purpose, if:
(1) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to the board
of directors or the committee, and the board or committee in good faith authorizes the contract or transaction by the- affirmative
votes of a majority of the disinterested directors, even though the disinterested directors be less than a quorum; or
(2) The material facts as to his relationship or interest and as to the contract or transaction are disclosed or are known to
the shareholders entitled to vote thereon, and the contract or transaction is specifically approved in good faith by vote of the
shareholders; or
(3) The contract or transaction is fair to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors,
a committee, or the shareholders.
(b) Common or interested directors may be counted in determining the presence of a quorum at a meeting of the board of directors
or of a committee which authorizes the contract or transaction."
We do not foreclose a discretionary trial of factual issues but that issue is not presented in this appeal. See Lewis v. Anderson, supra,
615 F.2d at 780. Nor do we foreclose the possibility that other motions may proceed or be joined with such a pretrial summary
judgment motion to dismiss, e. g., a partial motion for summary judgment on the merits.
See, e. g., Galef v. Alexander, 2d Cir., 615 F.2d 51, 56 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, supra, 485 F.Supp. at 285-86; Rosengarten v.
International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., S.D.N.Y., 466 F.Supp. 817, 823 (1979); Gall v. Exxon Corp., S.D.N.Y., 418 F.Supp.
508, 520 (1976). Compare Dent, supra note 5, 75 Nw.U.L.Rev. at 131-33.
Compare Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,419 N.Y.S.2d 920,928-29,393 N.E.2d 994 (1979). Our approach here is analogous to
and consistent with the Delaware approach to "interested director" transactions, where the directors, once the transaction is attacked,
have the burden of establishing its "intrinsic fairness" to a court's careful scrutiny. See, e. g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.,
Del.Supr, 93 A.2d 107 (1952).
This step shares some of the same spirit and philosophy of the statement by the Vice Chancellor: "Under our system of law, courts
and not litigants should decide the merits of litigation." 413 A.2d at 1263.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Special Litigation Committee Report
May 29, 2010

To:

T h e Hi Country Estates Homeowners Association Board of
Directors and Members

From:

Kim Wilson, Chair, Special Litigation Committee

This report contains the results of inquiries into 1) the claim and demand
set forth by Lindsay Atwood, Dave Moore, T o m C h a c e , Lenell C h a c e ,
Branden Frank and Jerry Gilmore in a letter to Hi Country Estates Phase I!
Homeowers Association dated June 12, 2009 and 2) the claim filed in Third
District Court on November 25, 2009, Hi-Country Property Rights Group,
Lindsay Atwood, Jerry Gilmore and Brandon Frank V S Keith Emmer, T o m
Williams, Anthony Sarra, Arlene Johnson, Carol Dean and Hi Country
Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II.

Special Litigation Committee Members:
Kim Wilson, Chair
Tony Sarra
Arlene P. Johnson
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I.

Methodology
A.

During the fall of 2009, the Special Litigation Committee (SLC) members individually began
reviewing the complaint documents, meeting minutes, governing documents, email
communication, miscellaneous other communication, statistical data and past expenditures
related to Hi Country Estates Phase II Homeowners1 Association. (HCE1I).

B. The SLC asked Keith Emmer and the Architectural Control Committee (ACC) to print out emails
and to collect any records relating the complaint Their emails and other information are used as
supporting documentation for this report
C.

In November 2009 the SLC completed a study comparing the volume of traffic on different roads
within the association with the amount of money spent on roads over the pastfifteenyears.1

D. It was determined by the SLC that information gleaned from interviewing members of the
association would be an important element in determining if there was evidence supporting the
plaintiffs' claims.2 A postcard was mailed on February 9,2010 to everyone owning property in Hi
Country Estates Phase IL The content of the postcard read as follows:

Dear HCII Member,
A group of HCII property owners has recently asserted certain claims regarding the board
of director's decisions regarding road maintenance and improvement, snow removal, livestock
housing and management policies in connection with greenbelt tax status and whether or not a
member who does not own a home In HCII is eligible to serve as a member of the board of
directors. For information on the claim and to review the demand letter, go to the HCII website
www.hi-country2.com
Pursuant to Utah law, the board has appointed a special litigation committee to
investigate these claims and demands to determine if they have merit In an effort to obtain as
much information on these issues as is possible, we are inviting property owners to meet with
the special litigation committee to discuss these issues. We plan to be available for these
interviews on: March 16 and March 17, 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. If you have information regarding these
claims and are willing to discuss that information with us, please call Kim Wilson, Chairperson of
the Committee, at 801-571-5490 to arrange an appointment Leave a message and your call will
be returned.
We appreciate your participation.
Kim Wilson, Chair Special Litigation Committee

1

Various Documents HCEII, Hi-Country li Road Maintenance Patterns 1994-2009, Pages 99-104
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, Kim Wilson informed the plaintiffs that the SLC is trying to get
their support for the claim, Page 2, Line 74
2
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E.

Select individuals were contacted by telephone for interviews. They included:
1.

Keith Emmer, President of H\ Country Estates II

2.

Rex Facer, Road grading and snow removal contractor

3.

Tern" Williams, Architectural Control Committee

4.

Walter and Ronna Hoffman, Former Chair of the Greenbelt Committee and former owners

5.

Tom Chace, Chair of the Greenbelt/ Property Rights Committee. He declined the interview.3

of Lindsey Attwood's property
6.

Lindsay Atwood declined then later agreed to meet with the committee but only if
accompanied with Jerry Gilmore, Brandon Frank and their attorney, Wade Budge.

F.

G.

Individuals were contacted to answer written questions. They included:
1.

Susan Yoshinaga, Salt Lake County Assessor's Office4

2.

Ca! Schneller, Former Director of Salt Lake County Development Services5

3.

Tom Williams, Board Member6

In response to the postcard sent on February 9, 2010, four HCEH members contacted the
Special Litigation Committee for Interviews: (One did not show up for the interview)
1.

Richard and Dorothy Mittlestaedt, residents located on Rose Canyon Road

2.

Robert Messmer, resident located on a HCEII maintained road.

H. The SLC identified and listed claims as they understood them from the June 12, 2009 demand
letter and the complaint document. Using the data available to them, they attempted to find facts
that would either validate or invalidate claims.
1.

The plaintiffs are listed in the claim as Hi-Country Property Rights Group, Lindsay Atwood,
Brandon Frank and Jerry Gilmore. Tom and Lenell Chace and Dave Moore are included with
the three plaintiffs in the June 12, 2009 Demandtetter.The plaintiffs are part of the Property
Rights/ Greenbelt Committee^and Tom Chace is the leader of the Property Rights/
Greenbelt Committee9. No other names of plaintiffs were given to the S LC by the plaintiffs
or their Attorney but they stated that there were 29 members of their legal litigation
committee.10

2.

The Special Litigation Committee did not explore annexation to the sewer district and the

3.

Annexation into Herriman and the Salt Lake County Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone

installation of sewer because these items were not included in the complaint.
(FCOZ) are mentioned in several of Tom Chace's emails. FCOZ is a Salt Lake County zone
and annexation to Herriman is addressed where it was offered by the plaintiffs and Tom
Chace as a way to avoid filing the claim.
I.

This report is the result of the Special Litigation Committee's findings.

3

Various Documents HCEII, Notes.from telephone conversation between Arlene Johnson and Tom Chace. 2/1012/10 Tom felt that the Committee was not independent and they were collecting information for their Attorney
and for their own defense, February 10, 2010, Page 106
4
Various Documents HCEII, Notes from Communication between Arlene Johnson and Susan Yoshinaga regarding
Greenbelt, March 3 & 17, 2010, Pages 109-110
5
Various Documents HCEII, Notes from Communication between Arlene Johnson and Cal Schneller, Mr. Schneller
regarding subdivisions and the Foothill and Canyons Overlay Zone (FCOZ), March 10 &. 23,2010, Pages 111-114
6
Various Documents HCE II, Letter from Tom Williams to HCEII HOA regarding distributing gate keys, March 6,
2010, Page 108
7
Keith Emmet's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, August 18, 2008, Page 7 & 8
8
Keith Emrner's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, September 1-9, 2008, Page 12
9
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, March 31, 2009, Page 52
10
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Plaintiffs, Page 1, Line 45
2
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If.

Demographics
There are 460.5tots(voting units) in the HECII development11 A voting unit is a lot. An equal annual
assessment ts assigned to each voting unit 39% percent of the units have houses. 61% of the units
are not developed.

Percent of Units according to level of Road Maintenance and Land Use
11%
4%

Houses on Rose Canyon Rd (Maintained by SLCo)
Unbuilt Lots on Rose Canyon Rd (Maintained by SLCo)

28%
41%

Houses on Roads Maintained by HCEII
Unbuilt Lots on Roads Maintained by HCEII

0%
16%

Houses on Roads not maintained
Unbuilt Lots on Roads not maintained

Percentage of Units with Greenbelt Status
30%
23%
47%

On Greenbelt Qualified by Bob Chew's Horses12
On Greenbelt Qualified by other
Not on Greenbelt

Unpaid Assessments as of January 2010, (133.5 units or 33% owe HCEII assessments)
69 Units are on Rose Canyon Road (Maintained by SLCo)
16 units out of 69 units owe a total of $7,251 in assessments
24% of resident units were past due on assessments
15% of nonresident units were past due on assessments
319.5 Units are on roads maintained by HCEII
89.5 units out of 319.5 units owe a total of $62,326
19% of resident units were past due on assessments
34% of nonresident units were past due on assessments
72 Units are on roads not maintained
29 units out of 72 owe a total of $63,300,
There are no residents
40% of nonresident units were past due on assessments

u

The smallest unit Is 2.5 acres. The largest unit is a five to 9.9 acre portion of a larger lot
Documentation for the ACQ Letter from Tom Chace to the ACC, January 7,2009; Bob Chew is the man used by
the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee to qualify their members for greenbelt with his horses. Page 34
12
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III.

Favoritism
Claim: The Board has adopted an informal, non-written policy favoring resident lot owners over
those who have not yet developed their properties. The Association adopted this policy even though
assessments are based on lot size, not improvements. The Board has imposed a de facto residency
requirement for members before they can serve on the governing boards of the Association.

A.

In the interview with the SLC Lindsay Atwood stated "And if we are paying the same dues as
someone with a home we should get the same service$pi3.

Lindsay Atwood is actually paying

less in assessments than other members with similar lot sizes. Lindsay Attwood's property is
located on Step Mountain.14 Geologically this is a 36HniHion-year-old volcano.15 In 1993 Lot 99,
27.92 acres, was assessed for five units and Lot 98, 23,17 acres, was assessed for four units.16
In 2007 Lot 99 was assessed for two units and Lot 98 was assessed for two units.17 This likely
happened in 1993 as the result of Directors' Proposition 1992-C. 18 No documentation has been
found showing Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning determination of the number of buildable
Jots or that Board approval was obtained for the removal of assessments per the requirements
outlined in the proposition 1992-C. 19
B.

Brandon Frank owns Lot 102 on an unmaintained portion of Step Mountain Road and he owns
or represents Lots 112 and 122C on a regularly maintained portion of Step Mountain Road. ^

21

(Tom Chace's records show that he represents lot 122C under the name of Ryan Frank that has
been qualified for greenbelt by Bob Chew.22) As of April 2010, Mr. Frank owed $1,270 in back
assessments on lot 112 and $635 on Lot 122C. He paid $1,372 for back assessments owed on
Lot 102 on December 2, 2009 after the complaint was filed on November 25, 2009.23 Mr. Frank
benefits from a longer distance of maintained roads to his lots 112 and 122C than any of the
defendants and he has not paid assessments on those lots.

24

Between 1994 and 2009 the Area D roads which access the plaintiffs' lots have received
47.92% of the maintenance funds spent by HCEI1 and they convey 26.69% of the traffic on

13

Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 13, Line 618
Section XII this report, Photograph #2
15
Various Documents HCEII, The Canyon Breeze. February 2010, Fascinating Geologic Features Surround Rose
Canyon, Pat Renrie, Page 105
16
Various Documents HCEII, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association, Phase II Membership list as of 5/21/93,
Randy Anderson, Lot 98, Units 4, Page 29, Earl Dillman Lot 99, Units 5, Page 30
17
Various Documents HCEII, Hi Country Estates Phase It, Home/lot owners as of June 2, 2007. Lindsay Atwood Lot
98 - Units 2, Lot 99 - Units 2, Page 72.
18
Various Documents HCEU, Directors Proposition 1992-C, "The primary justification for a change in assessable
units would be based on the maximum numbers ofparceb with buildable home sites, as determined by the Salt
take County Planning and Zoning Commission*' Page 27
15
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Walt Hoffman, the owners previous to him never requested the
assessment change, it was just changed. Page 36, Line 1636
u

20

Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Plaintiffs' Property
Section XII of this report, Photograph #9
22
Documentation For the ACC, Attachment to letter from Greenbelt Committee to ACC, January 7,2009, Page 35
21

23
24

Hi Country Estates Financial Records
Map, Status of HCEII Roads
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HCEH maintained roads. In comparison, Mountain Top Road and roads feeding into it received
29.31% of the maintenance funds and Mountain Top Road conveyed 22.43% of the traffic on
HCEII roads. Rose Creek Road received 4.49% of the maintenance funds and it conveyed
16.74% of the traffic on HECII maintained roads and 14900 South received 6.21% of the
maintenance funds and it conveyed 12.68% of the traffic on HCEII maintained roads.25
D.

Lindsay Atwood stated that he has requested financial documentation and records many times
and has not gained access to accounting records of the HOA26 27 . The Bylaws state that "the
books, records, ledgers and papers of the Association shall... be subject to inspection by any
member"

28

SLC Recommendation #1: Only one place could be found in the association records where
Lindsay Atwood asked about financial records and that was for an analysis. The Board does not
need to provide any analysis but the financial records are to be available to the membership per
the Bylaws. In order to clear up any communication problems, the SLC recommends that Mr.
Emmer contact Mr. Atwood and suggest that he set a time with the Association Treasurer to
review the records so that he can find the information that he needs.
SLC Recommendation #2: The Association has information including unlisted phone numbers
and addresses, members who owe the association money, bank account numbers, who is
paving bills on behalf of another and other information that may be considered confidential. The
Board has made a judgment that some of this information is confidential. It is recommended that
they seek legal counsel regarding what is confidential and request advice as to the procedures
for distributing this information when it is requested.
1.

Lindsay Atwood requested that the Association supply him an income statement broken
down by landowners VS homeowners.29 Keith Emmer never did this analysis.

2.

Tom and Lenell Chace asked Keith Emmer for a list of people who owed HCEII money and
how much. ^

S1

^ . Mr. Emmer responded to the Chaces* requests with the statement 'Out

of privacy concerns we will not give specifics as to who owes what to the association. We
have a yearly audit and that you can examine. That tells how much assessments are
owed.'*3 Tom Chace made another request for unpaid assessments and stated that he did
not think the information was sensitive or confidential.

u

25

Various Documents HCEII, HCEII Road Maintenance Patterns 1994 to 2009. Spread Sheet, Page 104
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 16, Line 718
27
Special Litigatron Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Jerry Gllmore cited Tom and Lenell Chace's
requests for records as proof, Page 16, Line 730
28
HCEII Bylaws, Article XI: Books and Records
29
Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes September 29, 2008
30
Keith Emmerys Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom &Lenelf Chace, December 19,2008, Page 43
31
Keith Ernrner's emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, January 8, 2009, Page 46
52
Keith Ernrner's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, March 4,2009, Page 48
53
Keith Ernrner's emails, Keith Emmer to Tom & Lenell Chace, March 4, 2009, Page 49 & 50
34
Keith Ernrner's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, April 25, 2009, Page 76
26
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3.

On May 11. 2010 Tom Chace sent an email asking for access to records. Keith Emmer
referred him to.the HCEII Treasurer. ^ This is the only request outside of items 1 and 2
above that could be found.

£.

Tom Chace has presented himself as the lead for both the Property Rights and the Greenbelt
Committees36 At the September 29, 2008 monthly meeting, he requested that HCEH fund the
following three items and the Board responded in writing on October 5, 2008
1.

37 38

Provide $20,000 for a property survey to find lot corners. The Property Rights Committee
felt that the Board owed them this survey because they (the owners of undeveloped land)
have funded roads for other property owners over the years. The board responded that
there are not funds in the 2003-2009 budget to do the survey.

2.

Fund five fire hydrant water meters so that greenbelt properties that do not have a water
connection but need horses to qualify for greenbelt can get water.,The Board responded
that they would allow two meters for a $5,000 deposit. The deposit would insure against
damage to the Fire hydrant as well as insure payment for the water at the same rate
charged to residential users.

3.

Provide $20,000 to hire a consultant to look at the feasibility of incorporating into a city.
The Board responded thai the Association did not have $20,000 to fund a study to
incorporate and it is an individual property owners concern to consider incorporation, not
the Board's.

F.

On October 16, 2008, Tom Chace sent out an email "Hi Country Greenbelt Letter" to a group of
landowners. He stated "Residents of Hi Country get a newsletter in their water bill. Those of us
who are non- residents remain uninformed and it is up to each of us to pay attention if we ever
hope to build on or sell our property. ...To access the Board minutes you need to register This
means someone can track who goes into different areas on the Hi Country web site. Therefore,
if you want to use the group registration we have set up... when you log in screen,, the User
Name is- Kilroy was here....'39

G.

The plaintiffs believe that there is de facto residency requirement to be on the board.
S L C Observation #1: The Plaintiffs did not show that there is or has been a de facto residency
requirement to be on the Board.
1.

The majority of past Board members and officers have been residents of HCEII however
there have been individuals that were not residents at the time they were on the Board or
the ACC. Some of them include Terry Shobe, Joe Chivala, Ray Meyers, Marty Philips,
Warren Cole, Dale Jones, Eldon Howard, Kim Wilson, Lionel Brown, Ray Meyers, Gus
Colovos, Larry Fuller and Ken Johnson.40

35

Various Documents HCEII, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, May 11, 2010, Page 144
Keith Emmer's Emails: Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Tue, 31, Mar 2009, Page 52
37
Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Mmutes, September 29 2008, Page 76
3B
Keith Emmerys Emails, To Tom & Lenell Chace from Keith Emmer October 8, 2008, Page 18
39
Keith Emmer's emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to some Greenbelt Property Owners. October 16, 2008
40
Review of past annual meeting minutes and correspondence by Arlene Johnson
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Z

Scott Royal, nonresident, was nominated for a Board position by the plaintiffs at the 2007
Annual meeting, 4 1

A2

He was not elected and did not attempt to run for the Board again.

Mike Huber, a nonresident, was also nominated at the 2007 annual meeting. ° He was not
elected.
3.

Tom and Lenell Chace were asked in advance of the 2009 Annual Meeting if they wanted to
put any names on the ballot so it could be mailed out before the annual meeting.44 Tom
Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee, wanted to know how many
board positions were open. AS Keith Emmer responded that the roads position and the water
position were open. He emphasized the time commitment of both positions.46 The Property
Rights/ Greenbelt Committee did not identify anyone to run for the Board in 200947 but they
did nominate Jeff Ohlson as a candidate for the ACC. ^

49

Jeff Ohlson is a resident and he

owns greenbelt property qualified under Bob Chew. ^ He was elected in June 2009 to
replace Annette Emmer, a resident
4.

Plaintiffs were asked by the Special Litigation Committee if they knew of any nonresident
who was told they could not run for the board. 5 1 They produced an email Keith Emmer sent
to Tom Chace on April 21, 2009 outlining the time commitment and the responsibilities of the
positions up for electron. This email does not mention residency. w The plaintiffs did not
produce any other communication or relevant information.

5.

The plaintiffs mentioned that there was a requirement that if a committee member misses
one emergency meeting they will be taken off the committee.53 No evidence of this alleged
requirement has been found. The Bylaws state that the Board can declare the office of a
Director to be vacant in the event such Director shall be absent from three consecutive
regular meetings of the Board.54

6.

At every annual meeting members are solicited to serve on the A C C , the Board, area
coordinators, treasurer and secretary. None of the three plaintiffs, Tom Chace. or Lenell
Chace have ever volunteered to run for office.

41

Special Litigation Committee Interviews, plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Brandon Frank Page 14 Line 643
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 7,2007, Page 69, Paragraph 4
43
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 7, 2007, Page 69, Paragraph 4
44
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom and Lenell Chace, Monday April 20, 2009. Page 65
43
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Tue, 21 Apr 2009, bottom of Page 68
46
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom and Lenell Chace, Tuesday April 21,2009, Page 68
47
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace, Tuesday, April 21, 2009."We have no names to add to the ballot.",
Page 69
48
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, plaintiffs, April 28,2010, Brandon Frank Page 14 Line 653
49
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Fri, 24 Apr 2009 stating "We would like to add Jeff
Ohlson's name as a candidate for the ACC, Page 74
50
Documentation for Architectural Control Committee, Letter dated January 7,2009 from the Greenbelt
Committee to the ACC. attachment includes everyone qualified by Bob Chew's horses from Greenbelt
51
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 14, Line 663
K
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, April 21, 2009, Page 68
5S
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,1010, Page 15, Line 694
54
Bylaws of HECU Article VII, Section 1 -d
42
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IV.

Roads
Claims: The Board has denied some members access to their property on safe or maintained roads.
The Board has failed to maintain roads in a safe and reasonable uniform manner and condition. The
Board is engaged in self dealing in that roads near Board members homes are maintained and
improved.
A.

HCEII was never a properly platted and recorded subdivision. The "roads" are defined as 50 foot
right-of-way easements for access to parcels of land in Hi Country Estates Phase IL55 These
right-of-ways are recorded as meets and bounds legal descriptions of centerlines with 25 feet on
each side. These "roads" were never designed for traffic flow, grade changes, fire truck access
or storm water runoff controls as normally required by a governing agency for residential access
roads. Salt Lake County has never approved the roads in HCEII as a group of residential roads.
Once Salt Lake County approves a building permit it has been assumed by HCEII that
improvements to the easement are adequate to treat it as a road and regular maintenance
begins.

B.

There are three types of roads in Hi Country Estates Phase II. Each is maintained in a different
manner.
1.

Properties owned by both residents and nonresidents located on the paved Rose Canyon
Road receive road maintenance from Salt Lake County. This is a public road with the right-of
-way dedicated to Salt Lake County. ** Salt Lake County uses property taxes paid by all
owners of taxable real estate in the unincorporated areas of Salt Lake County to pay to
maintain Rose Canyon Road. 15% or 69 out of 460.5 units front on Rose Canyon Road.
They do not need to access any HCEII private roads in order to travel in and out of HCEII or
to access their property. They pay the same assessments as the rest of HCEII.57

2.

Properties owned by both residents and nonresidents located on private roads receive
maintenance from HCEII. This is about 69% or 319.5 out of 460.5 unrts. All of the
defendants in the lawsuit (with the exception of Carol Dean who has since resigned and
moved out of state) are residents of HCEII and the roads fronting their properties were
maintained by HCEII before they were on the board. M The cost of maintenance of roads
maintained by HCEII is covered by assessments shared by all members of the homeowners
association. Tom and Lenell Chace's 40 acres front these roads. Brandon Prank has two
tots fronting these roads.

3.

Properties owned by only nonresidentsfrontrough gradedright-of-wayeasements that are
not regularly maintained by HCEII. They receive minimal maintenance, they do not lead to
any residences and there is minimal traffic. This includes about 16% or 72 out of 460.5

ss

Various Documents HCEII, Special Warranty Deed, Zion's First National Bank to James and Frieda Mascara,
March 20,1974, Page 122
56
Various Documents HCEII, Salt Lake County VS HCEII, December 20,1985, Page 129
57
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Richard and Dorothy Mittlestaedt, They live on Rose Canyon which is
maintained by Salt Lake County and expressed disagreement with using their assessments to pay for everyone
else's improvements. Page 42, line 1882
58
Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Defendant's Property
8
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units. All three plaintiffs own property on these easements that are not regularly maintained
by HCEII59. They travel on about 1 3/4 miles of HCEII maintained roads to get to the area
where maintenance ends. They must travel about 3 / miles of rough graded easements to
access, their Jots.
C. The HCEII Certificate of Incorporation states: T h e Association is also formed to promote the
health, safety and welfare of the residents within Hi Country Estates il
"60
S L C Observation #2: Past boards and the current board have treated annual road
maintenance, improvements and snow removal as health, safety and welfare responsibilities to
the residents within Hi Country Estates ll. Historically, maintenance does not begin on a road
until the County issues a building permit for a residence on that road.
1.

In the early to mid 1980s, Mascaro Trucking was hired to grade and remove snow from the
entrance of Hi- Country Estates II to existing residents; Lot 44 (Andreason) on Rose
Canyon Road 6 \ Lot 18 and 23 {Larry Fuller and Harvey Heed) on Mountain Top Road. 62
In 198463 and 1986 M the practice of grading and improving roads to existing homes and
homes under construction was articulated by the Board.

2.

The only road work done in "Area D" (Area D encompasses the roads from Rose Canyon
Road to the plaintiffs' properties) between the times when the right-of-way easements were
originally rough graded in the 1970s and when a pad (fire truck turnaround) was constructed
for Jerry Gilmore in the early 1990s was for access to construction of the upper water tank,
the upper well and related piping.65 ^

3.

Larry Fuller, President of HCEII in 1992, articulated to Salt Lake County that the Association
was committed to grade and improve Step Mountain Road between lot 100 and lot 106;
however, he also stated that the timing for totally completing the work was based on Mr.
Gilmore, the owner of lot 100, applying for a building permit 67

4.

Regular annual road maintenance in Area D from Rose Canyon Road to lot 92 began when
the Step Mountain LLC development was started in the 1995. M ^

5.

There are no residences on the segment of Step Mountain Road between lots 76 and 92.
After the water lines were installed in 1993, the segment of Step Mountain Road between
lots 76 and 100 was treated as a utility right-of-way rather than a road because Salt Lake

59

Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Plaintiffs Property
Certificate of Incorporation, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association; Third Article
61
Various Documents HCEII, Salt Lake County VS HCEII, Salt Lake County did not claim ownership to Rose Canyon
Road and start maintaining it until 1991, Page 130 section 4.
62
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 15, Line 668
E3
Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Members from Board, May 10,1984, Page 1
64
Various Documents HCEH, Fall 1986 Membership Status Letter, Capital Improvements and Maintenance, Page 4
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 19, Line 860
66
Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes, August 27,1991, Page 10
67
Various Documents HCEII, Letter: Larry Fuller to Salt Lake County RE Subdivision Application PL 92-1077, By Jerry
Gilmore, August 13,1009, Page 115
68
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 19, Line 843
59
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from Step Mountain LLC to the Members in Area D, Feb. 8,1996, Page 47
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County would not approve the steep grade for residential access. 7 0 Other parts of this rightof-way also lead through a drainage subject to storm water runoff. This is the location of the
plaintiffs' properties.7172
D. Certificate of Incorporation, Article II, Subsection 2 states" The homeowners Association is
obligated to provide maintenance and all services stated above only to the extent that such
maintenance and services can be provided with the proceeds of such annual payments0 About
$60,000 per year is spent to maintain 10.5 miles of roads. Residents complain about the
condition of the gravel roads.
1.

A visual inspection shows that the roads receive minimal maintenance in order to stay
within this budget.73 In the SLC interview, Robert Messmer complained about Shaggy
Mountain Road where he lives 74

2.

Keith Emmer stated that road maintenance projects and needs are identified by the Board
on an annual basis. They drive the HOA area and identify deteriorated areas on roads that
lead to residences. They also respond to complaints regarding the condition of roads75

E.

Step Mountain Road leading to the plaintiffs' properties was drivable in 1993. Walt Hoffman
owned lot 99 between 1993 and 2006. Mr. Hoffman stated that \n 1992 when he purchased his
tot he could drive a two wheel drive vehicle up the steep section of Step Mountain Road
(between lots 76 and 100)76 Jerry Gilrnore stated that he could drive a sedan to his lot 100 in
1992 when he purchased it.77
SLC Observation #3: Upper Step Mountain Road was made passable in the early 1990s
primarily for construction equipment to deliver supplies for the well and water tank and to install
water lines.
1.

On August 27,1991 the Board authorized grading Arnold Hollow Road and Step Mountain
Road in order to get pipe delivered for water transport from the well and so that a generator
could be set up at the well house. The Board consisting of Larry Fuller, Ed Huish and
Sydney Morganson voted on making a passable road. n

In summer of 1992 the upper well

and associated water lines were under construction. These lines were installed in Step
Mountain Road.79 Rough grading was necessary to complete the installation of water lines.
2.

In 1993 Larry Fuller stated that Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning would not accept the
use of Step Mountain Road and Arnold Hollow Roads as the primary access to the lots or

70}

\Various documents HCEII, Directors Proposition 1992-D, Page 28

71

Map, Status of HCEII Roads, Plaintiffs' Property
Section XII of this document, Photograph #1
73
Section XII of this document, Photographs 1-13
74
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Robert Messmer, resident, Page 50, Line 2266
75
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Kefth Emmer, Page 11, Line 499
76
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Walt Hoffman, Page 34, Line 1513
77
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 6, Line 255
7
* Various Documents, Monthly Meeting Minutes, August 27,1991, Page 10
79
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, 1992, Page 13
72
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homes on the southeast side of the HCEH. Step Mountain is too steep and Arnold Hollow
Road is too long for public safety vehicle (police and fire) response. 8 0
F.

Past practices show that capital improvement projects are needed to bring some "roads" up to a
standard that they can effectively be maintained by the Association and they meet Salt Lake
County standards for access in order to issue a residential building permit.81 These projects
have been funded with past assessments, lot foreclosures, developers and special
assessments. The segment of Step Mountain Road between Lot 92 and 76 as well as other
unmaintained easements in the development, are not included in this list because there has
never been a capital improvement project to bring these roads to Salt Lake County standards.
In December of 2008 Keith Emmer suggested to Tom Chace, representing the Greenbelt/
Property Rights Committee, to determine from the County what the roads require to meet
standards.B2 There was no response to that request. 8 3
1.

At the time building permits were granted, there were roads within HCE II that met Salt Lake
County standards for granting a building permit without substantial improvements after the
original road was cut in 1974.

2.

a.

Shaggy Mountain Road Lot 18 to 7

b.

Country View Lane

c.

Rose Creek Lane, lower section

d.

Mountain Top Road

e.

Sharose Road

f.

Lower Step Mountain Road

Capita! Improvement projects were completed by developers on roads that needed to be
improved to meet Salt Lake County standards for a building permiL These roads have been
maintained by HCEII from the time they were completed. They include the following:
a.

Step Mountain LLC -

b.

Wapti Heights-West part of Area D

c.

East part of Area D

M

K

Mascaro Estates - All Roads that feed into 14900 South and 14900 South to Rose
Canyon Road * 6

3.

In 1993 a special assessment was approved for some roads. **
a.

Step Side Road (Salt Lake County never granted approval)

b.

Shaggy Mountain Road Lots 1 to 7

c.

Shaggy Mountain Road Lots 1 to 162

d.

Rose Creek Lane, Upper Y* mile

e.

Arnold Hollow Road Lot 77 to 170

80

Various documents HCEII, Directors Proposition 1992-D, Page 28
Various Documents HCEII, LetterfromStep Mountain LLC to Area D Lot Owners, Feb 8,1996, Page 47
82
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, Monday, December 15,2008 paragraph 6, Page 40
85
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Keith Emmer, Page 3, Line 117
84
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Keith Emmer, Page 12, line 533
85
Various Documents HCEH, Letter from Step Mountain LLC to Area D members summarizing the project. Feb. 8,
1996. Page 47
Special litigation Committee interviews, Rex Facer, Page 20, Line 920
87
Various Documents HCEII, Director's Proposition 1992-D, Page 28
81
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G. Jerry Gllmore stated that the owners of lots along upper Step Mountain Road (from Lot 92 to lot
100) should not have to pay a special assessment for capital improvements per Certificate of
Incorporation because HCEll had made a commitment to complete the capital improvements
that would upgrade Step Mountain Road leading to his lot 100. 8B
SLC Observation #4: Because Mr. Gilmore closed on the property he purchased from HCEll
before his subdivision was recorded, he purchased Lot 100 as is and the Association had no
contractual obligation to Mr. Gilmore. Even though he knew he could not get a building permit
because Salt Lake County Health Department would not approve a septic tank. Mr. Gilmore
continued to reguest that the Association grade his road with the justification that he needed it
graded to get a building permit.
1. Jerry Gilmore purchased his lot 100 from HCEll. He signed an earnest money agreement in
April 1992 and closed on property in October 1992. He agreed that the buyer will obtain
subdivision approval from Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning. If the county will not
qualify property for building this earnest money agreement is cancelled.89
2.

Before Mr. Gilmore closed on his lot, Larry Fuller, (President of the Association) sent a letter
to Salt Lake County stating that the Homeowners Association would upgrade Step
Mountain Road by recrowning it, placing culverts at appropriate grade points, from Lot 100
and to Lot 106 to allow surface water to run from the east side of the natural drainage to
the west. The timing for totally completing the work was based on Mr. Gilmore applying for a
building permit Mr. Fuller asked that the County approve the Gilmore subdivision with the
stipulation that a building permit not be granted without the roadway upgrading by the
association and approved by the County *° The S LC was not able to find any such written
stipulation by Salt Lake County. There is also no documentation addressing Salt Lake
County's position on the condition of the segment of road from lot 106 to Arnold Hollow
Road.

3.

The Gilmores closed on their lot in October 1992. In the June 1993 Annual Meeting a
proposition was presented by Larry Fuller requesting approval for a special assessment for
various roads in the association and an extension of Step Side Lane, (The extension of Step
Side Road was never approved by the County but use of Arnold Hollow Road for
ingress/egress was eventually approved.) Improvements to the section of Step Mountain
Road that fronts the plaintiffs' properties and improvements to roads between Arnold Hollow
Road and lot 106 were not included in this proposition.91

4.

In the Special Litigation Committee Interview Mr. Gllmore stated: "The subdivision was
recorded, everything was approved with exception of the roads and Salt Lake County was
waiting for High Country Estates to fulfill their commitments to make the roads and that
was the only thing that was holding them back."91 He also stated "The subdivision was
never completed because High Country Estates didn't complete their agreement."** Salt

88

Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11. Line 484
Various Documents HCEll, Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated April 14,1992, Considerations and
Contingencies. Page 12
90
Various Documents HCEll, Letter: Larry Fuller to Salt Lake County RE Subdivision Application PL 92-1077, By Jerry
Gilmore, August 13,1009, Page 115
91
Various Documents HCEll, Proposition 1992-0, Page 28
92
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11, Line 512
93
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11, Line 518
89

12

HCE00106
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Lake County Development Services has no record of stipulations for approval or that Mr.
Giimore recorded his subdivision thus he could not have applied for a building permit94
5.
6.

Mr. Atwood also stated that a subdivision was recorded for his lot 98.

x

Step Mountain Road from Step View Drive to Step Side Road was funded between 1995
and 1996 by Step Mountain LLC and other members whose property fronted on this road.
Improvements installed by Step Mountain LLC and other association members were
originally planned to extend along High Step Lane to Jerry Gilmore's lot 10096. These
planned Improvements would also have extended to Lindsay Atwood's lot 98.

7.

February 4,1995, 2.5 years after closing on his lot, Mr. Giimore wrote a letter to the Board
of Directors stating that then Association president, Larry Fuller, made a verbal agreement
that if (Giimore) purchased this property, HEClI would provide Salt Lake County Planning
and Zoning approved Ingress and Egress.

97

This was also discussed in the 2009 Annual

Meeting and there were conflicting memories of previous commitments.98 In the meeting
with the Special Litigation Committee Mr. Giimore stated: "Actually whenever I bought my
property the Homeowners Association agreed to bring all roads to my property up to county
code so that I can get a building permit for that/1"
8.

The February 4,1995 letter from Mr. Giimore also requested that the fire truck turn-around
be builL The Board seemed to think it had been completed- 10°

101

In the interview with the

Special litigation Committee Mr. Giimore stated "... / agreed to afire truck turnaround on
my property and the association actually came in there and they put road base down for
the turn and they started going back up that road and then It came to a stop. The Board
put a stop to it. So It was, the Homeowners Association actually paid for the road base that
was on the turnaround on my property."
9.

102

Fifteen years ago, the Board determined that the Association had no obligation to Mr.
Giimore for building a road based on a July 20,1995 opinion by Daniel Gibbons," the
association's legal counsel, regarding Gilmore's Ernest Money Agreement It was stated
that the language in the Earnest Money Agreement was unenforceable after closing since
the only result of nonperformance is cancellation of the Earnest Money Agreement The
performance must occur, if at all, while the Earnest Money Agreement is still pending.103

Salt Lake County Development Services, File on Jerry Gilmore's subdivision PL-92-1077, renumbered as 5853
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 11. Line 493
Various Documents HCE1I, Letter to Board of Directors from Area D property owners. June 23,1995,
Map, Page 41
97
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from Jerry and Catherine Giimore to HCEH. February 4,1995, Page 32
9B
Recording of 2010 Annual Meeting
99
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, plaintiffs April 28, 2010, Page 11, Line 484
100
Various Documents HCEiJ, Letter from Jerry Giimore to HCEH, February 4,1995. "Lack of progress on the fire
truck turnaround" Handwritten note on Mr. Gilmore's letter stating that this was complete. Page 31
101
Special Litigation. Committee Interviews, Rex Facer Page 19, Line 860 and 874
102
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 10, Ljne 435
103
Various Documents HCEII, Opinion on Giimore Earnest Money Agreement, Daniel Bay Gibbons, July 20,1995.
Page 33
95
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10. Salt Lake County's adoption of the Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone (FCOZ) in 1998
created development limitations and increased the costs of development in HCEII.1(* The
Property Rights Committee considers this "the cruelest form of imminent domain". 105106
Even if they have a recorded subdivision, before obtaining a building permit each of the
plaintiffs will need to comply with F C O Z . 1 0 7 Because the slope of their lots exceeds 30%
and parts of the plaintiffs' lots are on the ridgefine, Chapter 19.72.030 Section B, 3 & 4 o f
F C O Z may cause the plaintiffs' lots to be undevelopable.

t08109

(This determination can

only be made by the Sail Lake County Development Services Division)
11. In 2001 a drinking water source protection plan for Herriman City's spring along Arnold
Hollow Road was completed and filed with the State. This led to a septic tank moratorium for
the parts of Area D that drain into this spring. Because there is no sewer and septic
systems are the only source of waste water treatment in that area, development was
effectively halted in most of Area D as a direct consequence of Herriman's water source
protection plan and the Salt Lake County Health Department's unwillingness to consider
alternative septic (i.e. closed) systems. The plaintiffs' properties are not in this moratorium in
that they drain along Step Mountain Road to the north.
12. Mr. Gilmore stated at the January 31,2006 monthly meeting that the road and subdivision
had been approved but he has not been through FCOZ. He said that he could not get a
building permit until the road is improved. Mr. Gilmore was advised to work with the Board
and go through the County to make sure he could build on his lot

11

°

11

\ Jerry Gilmore

appeared at several other meetings of the Board requesting that his road be graded.112113114
The section of Step Mountain Road fronting Jerry Gllmore's property also serves the other
plaintiffs' properties and the HCEII well house. It runs along a gully through deep clay and
becomes rutted when it is wet and driven on. 115 The "road" has never been engineered and

104
C-2 Chapter 19.72 FOOTHILLS AND CANYONS OVERLAY ZONE (FCOZ) Salt Lake County Government Web Site
http://WWW.co.slc.ut.us/)
105
Keith Emmerys Emails, Hr Country Property Owners, Lindsay Atwood, Dave Moore and Tom Cbace, August 18,
2008, Page 9, #2, last sentence
106
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from the Property Rights Committee to HCEII members, May 6, 2010, Page
139.
107
Various Documents HCEII, Cal Schneller, Salt Lake County Planning Director 1996-2002, Page 114
108
Various Documents HCEII, Unbuildable Area>30%, Page 136
109
Map, HCEII Non-Buildable Land Area, Hansen Allen & Luce Engineers
uc
Various Documents HCEII, HCEII, Agenda for January 31, 2006 monthly meeting with handwritten note by
Ariene Johnson, Page 60
111
Various Documents HCEII, Cal Schneller, Salt Lake County Foothill Overlay Zone, The FCOZ zone came into effect
in December 1997. tf the subdivision had been recorded before that date it would have been a legal
nonconforming lot and exempt from the FCOZ provisions but obtaining a building permit from a structure would
require compliance with FCOZ. Page 114, Item 6
112
Various Documents HCEII, Minutes from the July 5, 2006 Directors' meeting, Mr. Gilmore stated that his road
had been neglected for thirteen years. He has decided not to build on his property and Is trying to sell it. Page 65
113
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 9, 2007, Jerry Gilmore stated that he had his land
since 1992 and his road had never been graded. He cannot get to his property and cannot build because the
County says he needs a better road. The Board of Directors stated that the Board provided the most money where
the most people live. Page 68
114
1X5

2009 Annual Meeting, Recording
Section XII this report. Photograph #7
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lacks culvert pipes and road base installed to divert storm water. Upper Step Mountain
Road was graded and Tony Mascaro filled in a washed out area along the water line in the
fall of 2006116 117( it was graded to the well house the spring of 2008.118 119 and in
November 2009 it was graded for access to the well house.120
13. Mr. Giimore stated that he met with Salt Lake County Health Department Director about four
years ago (2006) and he was told that they would not approve a septic tank on his
property.121 If he could not get a septic tank approved, he could not get a building permit.
14. At various annual meetings, some form of a proposition to create a special assessment for
improvements to roads has been presented by the Board. Every proposal has been voted
down since 1993. The recent vote in 2009 showed that all of the plaintiffs voted against
paying additional funds in addition to annual assessments for roads. 122
H. The June 12, 2009 Demand letter from Wade Budge, Plaintiffs' Attorney, states that the Board
has failed to act in accordance with its fiduciary duties in that the Board does not maintain the
roads within the Association in an equal or nondiscriminatory manner. AH members of HCE II
pay the same assessments and they receive a different level of road maintenance.
SLC Observation #5: Some property owners do not have maintained roads that front their
property. However this is not due to neglect offiduciaryduties of the Board in that the governing
documents were complied with, and were consistent with past practices. The Board's method of
prioritizing road maintenance and improvement is consistent with state and local government
practice. Furthermore, the Board must operate within the funds actually available.
SLC Observation #6: The Board's legal counsel's opinion differs from Wade Budge's opinion.
Where an issue results in a conflicting interpretation of the law between Attorneys, the Board's
most responsible option is to act according to the opinion of their legal counsel.
1. The Certificate of Incorporation, Addendum Part II allows the Homeowners Association the
power and purpose to Install utility improvements within an area designated by the
association. Utilities have been interpreted lo include water and road improvements.123
2. The Special Litigation Committee compared traffic patterns with money spent on road
maintenance. Recordsfromthe past fifteen years show that segments of roads with the
highest traffic volume receive the greatest level of maintenance and efforts have been made

116

Various Documents HCEII, Board Meeting Minutes, July 5, 2006, Tfte Board decided to get a cost estimate. Page
65. The road was graded and a washed Dur area filled in fall of 2006. Tony Mascaro was paid for this work.
117
Section Xff of this document, Photograph #4
118
Annual Meeting Recording, June 2008, a statement was made by the Board that the road to the upper well had
been graded.
119
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 17 Line 773
120
Section XII this report, Photograph #8
m
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,2010, Page 17, Line 788 & 802
122
Various Documents HCEII, 2009 Proposition Voting Results, Page 83
123
Various Documents HCE II, Opinion on June 23,1995 Proposal from Area "D" Owners, Dan Gibbons, July 10,
1995, Roads ware treated as utilities per Certificate of Incorporation, Page 42
15

HCE00109
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to construct them to the most durable standard.124 The Board spends funds to remedy the
wear and tear on the roads created by traffic volume. This is consistent with practices of the
State of Utah and local governments. If equal money were spent on all roads, the collectors
most used would fall into disrepair while the roads seldom used would remain in the best
condition.
3.

In the November 24, 2008 annual meeting Jerry Gilmore suggested that the "roads should
all be equal and that nicer roads should be allowed to degrade if needed so that the other
roads reach better condition *1*5

4.

In an email to Tom Chace dated December 15, 2008, Keith Emmer stated "l/Ve maintain
roads that receive the most vehicle traffic because vehicle traffic causes a high amount of
wear, wash boarding, uneven compaction and redistribution of road base. In that the
Association funds are not adequate to even repair this ongoing damage, we cannot be
expected to repair low traffic areas that have not been engineered to prevent water runoff
damage."1Z6

5.

In a letter, dated February 27, 2009, from Mike and Laurel Bruun, nonresident members,
they quoted Greg Schmidt, attorney and nonresident member, "...HCEIL Has violated its
obligations in how they have used the assessments they have collected historically, if they
did not have enough money to maintain ail of the roads to a high standard, then they should
have maintained all of the roads to a lesser standard, not some of the roads to a high
standard with some of the roads receiving no maintenance. ...the Board of Directors of a
HO A owes a fiduciary obligation to ail members of the association not to provide services in
a discriminatory fashion....

6.

"127

In a discussion of the Addendum to the Certificate of Incorporation, Daniel Gibbons,
previous legal counsel to the Board, pointed out that the association "shall have the right* to
install utilities or roads. Nowhere is the Association bound by a 50% vote to install roads, the
directors are limited in debt and bound to stay within a budget.128

7.

This question of not giving all roads in HCEII an equal level of maintenance was addressed
with Howard Lundgren, the association's attorney, after receipt of the June 12,2009
Demand letter. Howard Lundgren's verbal advice to the Board was that the Board was
within itsrightsto manage the load maintenance projects according to a consistent business
plan. 129

124

Various Documents HCEII, Hi Country Estates H Road Maintenance Patterns 1994 to 2009, December 2009,

Page 99
125
Various Documents, HCEH, Monthly Meeting Minutes November 24,2008, Page 117
126
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom and Lenell Chace, December 15, 2008, Page 39
127
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from Mike and Laurel Bruun to HCEIJ, February 27, 2009, Page 80
128
Various Documents HCEII, Opinion on June 23,1995 Proposal from Area "D" owners. Daniel Gibbons, Page 42
129
Arlene Johnson's and Tony Sarra's recollection of the discussion with Howard Lundgren.
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I.

When Mr. Atwood and Mr. Frank purchased their lots they were aware of the road conditions.
They have not changed since that time.
1.

Mr. Atwood commented that he had to walk Vz mile to get to his property when he first
looked at it before purchasing it.

130

In the Special Litigation Committee Interviews Mr.

Atwood stated: "... in my first HOA meeting that i went to I explained that the roads were a
disaster,, that we're paying associations dues, I was told by the Board the intent of the
Board was they would work on the roads the following year. That was four years ago they
were going to start working on the roads/'

m

The Board stated at the 2005 Annual

meeting that they would grade Step Mountain Road.132 It was graded form lot 106 to lot 100
in the fall of 2006.133
2.

In the September 2006 monthly meeting Mr. Atwood wanted to know when the road up to
his area was going to be repaired because he was having difficulty getting to the property
he recently purchased. Keith Emmer told him that High Step Lane was in fairly good shape
and the steep section of Step Mountain Road could not be repaired.134

3.

Brandon Frank purchased his lot in January 2006. He stated that he had a difficult time
accessing it when he purchased it 1 3 5

4.

Sometime between 6/08 and 6/09 Mr. Atwood purchased another lot, 64A, with slope and
access limitations.136

5.

All three Plaintiffs' properties are located within an area termed "Area D*. They must travel
on HCEII maintained roads (Arnold Hollow Road, the S Curve and Step Mountain Road) a
distance of approximately 1.75 mile to get to the unmaintained segment of Step Mountain
road that starts at lot 92. At that point they must travel approximately .75 miles on the
unmaintained segment of Step Mountain Road to the frontage of their properties. The
plaintiffs' lots are located on the 1.25 mile long segment of Step Mountain Road between
Lot 76 and Lot 92 where there are no residences. This segment of Step Mountain Road
has never been engineered and constructed to a standard where a building permit can be
granted and annual maintenance can occur.137 Part of that segment has been ruled by
Salt Lake County to be too steep for safe access.138 The fact that this segment of "road" is
unmaintained has been interpreted as unfair by the plaintiffs as well as by Walt Hoffman, a
previous owner of Mr. Atwood's Lot 99. 139

230

Various Documents HCEII, Keith Emmer's Recollections, Page 119
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010,, Page 7, Line 314
132
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 11, 2005, Page 57
l a s5 .
Various Documents HCEII, Board Meeting Minutes, July 5,2006, The Board dedded to get a cost estimate. Page
65. The road was graded and a washed our area filled in fall of 2006. Tony Mascaro was paid for this work.
134
Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes, September 27,2006, Page 66
155
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 7, Line 297
136
Map, HCEII Non Buiidable Land Area
137
Map, Status of HCEII Roads
138
Various documents HCEII, Directors Proposition 1992-D, Page 28
139
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Walt Hoffman, Page 36, Line 1610
131
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J.

The plaintiffs have claimed that the HCEII Directors are self dealing in that their property fronts
on roads that have received more maintenance than the Plaintiffs' roads. 14°
S L C Observation #7: All of the HCEII Directors live on roads shared by other members and
maintenance began on their roads when building permits were issued. Their frontage does not
differ from other frontage of other members on the roads that are maintained by HCEII. There is
no evidence of self dealing and denying access to property by the Board
1.

Rex Facer has maintained the roads periodically since the early 1980s. (The years he did
not maintain the roads they were maintained by other contractors including Apache Sky,
VanGo, Boyd Hansen and TNT General Contractors) Mr. Facer stated in his interview that
he has never been asked by a board member to do special work on their road at the cost of
141

2.

the association.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs included a photograph of Shaggy Mountain Road past
Arlene Johnson's property as proof of self dealing. The lots 7,10 and 5 that Arlene
Johnson owns front on a relative flat grade and the area receives minimal traffic and does
not develop washboard.142 That area does not receive annual grading. 143 No road
maintenance or snow removal was done on this part of Shaggy Mountain road until the
Johnson's received a building permit in summer of 1986.

3.

Mountain Top Road was paved in 2006. This project was initiated by Rick Andrus, Board
President. Mr. Andrus lived on Rose Canyon Road. Arlene Johnson presented the project
at the 2005 annual meeting. U4 The project was justified in that Mountain Top Road was
becoming costly to maintain and the patchwork that was previously done was not working.
145

Mountain Top Road receives a level of traffic second to Arnold Hollow Road and the

area from which it collects traffic has received the second highest level of funding in the last
fifteen years.146 In the complaint, the plaintiffs showed photographs of Mountain Top Road
as their evidence that Tony Sarra, Board Member, was self dealing. They also showed his
paved driveway which he paid for himself. Tony Sarra as well as many other residents
uses Mountain Top Road for daily ingress/ egress. 147
4.

Keith Emmer and Tom Williams front on 14900 South and use it for ingress/ egress. This is
the collector road for Mascaro Estates and often develops washboard due to the amount of
traffic it receives.148 Tony Mascaro voluntarily grades it as a favor to family members who
use that road.149 Maintenance began on 14900 South before Tom Williams and Keith
Emmer were on the board.

5.

Carol Dean's property is in the general location of Brandon Frank's lots 112 and 122C,

15

Her lot receives the same level of maintenance as all of the residential lots in Area D. 151

140

Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 14, Line 630
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Rex Facer, Page 16, Line 699
142
Section XII this Report, Photograph #11
143
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Rex Facer, Page 20, line 894
144
Various Documents HCEII, Annual meeting June 11,2005, Page 56
145
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 16, Line 743
146
Various Documents HCEII, Hi Country Estates II Road Maintenance Patterns 1994 to 2009, Page 104
141

147

Section XII of this report, Photograph #13
Section XII of this Report, Photograph #12
149
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer. Page 20 Line 906
150
Map, Status of HCEII Roads

148
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V.

Snow Removal
Claim: The Board has given winter access rights to some lot owners (pn'ncipalty residents as
opposed to nonresidents who are members) The association wastes and spends limited resources
on winter snow removal for some roads but not all roads in the Association thus preventing some
Association members from accessing their prosperities in the winter while others enjoy year round
access
A.

There are three types of snow removal service in HCEII.
S L C Observation #8: Snow is removed from roads that allow access to residents/
homeowners. This is not due to neglect to fiduciary duties of the Board in that the Board has
followed governing documents, are consistent with past practices and the Board has to operate
within the funds actually available.
1.

15% of HCEII assessed units are properties owned by both residents and nonresidents
located on Rose Canyon Road. They receive snow removal service from Salt Lake County.
They do not need to access any HCEII owned roads for ingress/egress.

2.

69% of HCEII assessed units are properties owned by both residents and nonresidents
located on roads maintained by HCEIi receive snow removal from HCEII. All of the
defendants in the lawsuit (with the exception of Carol Dean who has since resigned from
the Board and moved out of state) are residents of HCEII and live on roads maintained by
HCEII. The cost of snow removal from roads maintained by HCEII is covered by
assessments shared by all members of the homeowners association.

3.

16% of the HCEII assessed units are properties owned by only nonresidents that are
located on rough graded "roads" not regularly maintained by HCEII. These "roads" do not
receive any snow removal because they do not lead to any residences. All three plaintiffs
own property where there are no residents thus snow is not removed from their frontage.
They travel on about 1 3/4 miles of HCEII maintained roads to get to the area where
maintenance ends.

B.

Justification for not removing snow on certain roads.
S L C Observation #9: Legal Counsel has advised the Board that they are in theirrightto
remove snow only on roads that lead to residents in the same way they regularly maintain
roads that lead to residents. While the plaintiffs' attorney may argue otherwise, the Board has
chosen to follow the legal advice of the Attorney that the Board hired to advise them
1.

In attempting to build a case to create a special snow removal assessment for only
residents, Tom Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Group stated that land
owners do not go to their roads in the winter * / have not talked to anyone who has un-built
property that goes to their land in the winter. All they do is drive the road as they have no
driveway or access off the road that is kept open in the winter. Many of the landowners

151

Section XII of this report, Photograph #10
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don't even live in Salt Lake."152 In another email attempting to justify reducing
assessments paid by nonresidents for snow removal Tom Chace made the statement "The
point is that most of this land (owned by nonresidents) has no driveway access and unless
you go up each time it snows and clear a path, access through heavy snow would be very
difficult I don't understand how they use their land?"*15*
2. The Board considers snow removal for residents a safety responsibility in the same way
they consider road maintenance a safety responsibility as spelled out in the Certificate of
Incorporation. "The Association is also formed to promote the health, safety and welfare of
the residents within Hi Country Estates II
"154 There are no residents on Step Mountain
Road between Lots 92 and 76
• 3. As in road maintenance, snow removal for existing residences has been done since the
early 1980s/55 Tl
This has been a cost consideration and it is consistent with practices of
local government.
The Protective Covenants infer that even though nonresident members do not receive snow
removal, they are still obligated to pay their share of the cost. "Each grantee and lot owner for
himself, his heirs, executors and assigns, covenants and agrees to pay annually his pro rata
share of the costs to maintain roads, streets, and common areas
" *56 It is the opinion of
157
Legal Counsel for HCEll that road maintenance includes snow removal.
Tom Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Group, disputed snow removal as a
safety issue." Using the safety issue is also debatable. This is a broad term and could also be
applied to road conditions other than snow. There are places in the United States where the
roads are not plowed. They drive them all winter and pack them out...."158
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* " Keith Emmer's Email. Email Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 28,2009, Page 79
^ Keith Emmer's emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, May 3,2009, Page 95
1SA
Certificate of Incorporation, Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association; Third Article
** Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Rex Facer, Page 15, Line 668
1S6
Protective Covenants for Hi Country Estates Phase II, Article II, Section 2
m
Keith Emmer's Emails, Letter from Howard Lundgren to Keith Emmer dated May 6, 2009, Page 104
*** Keith Emmer's Email. Email from Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, Monday May 4, 2009, Page 97
20
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VI.

Architectural Control Committee
Claim: The Architectural Control Committee (ACC) has prepared a policy even though the governing
documents do not allow the ACC to enact or create any such policy.

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 1(a) of the Bylaws, The Board of Directors shall have the power
to (a) adopt and publish rules and regulations governing the use of roads, streets, common
areas, properties and facilities owned or under the control of the Association"159 In November
2004 K was recommended by legal counsel that a policy and procedure manual was needed for
the purpose of consistency and clarification.
1.

The need for a policies and procedures manual was presented to the membership by Tony
Sarra and Shane Capaldl in the June 11,2005 annual meeting. 1B0 In the July 6, 2006
director's meeting Dave Winters, an association member as well as the Zoning Enforcer for
Herriman City, stated that the ACC will write a policies and procedures (manual) in order to
be consistent.

2.

The assessment of fines for Protective Covenant violations was suggested by Dave Winters
in the August 9, 2006 meeting.162 Legal counsel advised Keith Emmerthat even though the
documents do not give a specific amount of fines, it can be done in a book of policies and
procedures.163 On July 28,2008 the ACC sent out a letter to all of the membership letting
them know that they were in the process of compiling a policies and procedures manual.164

3.

As of May 2010, no fines have been assessed on the plaintiffs or any Association members
for animal related issues. No fines have been collected from anyone in the Association.165

The June 12,2009 Demand letter states that the A C C "policy attempts to restnct certain property
owners ability to maintain their properties in greenbeit status and to burden historic grazing
operations with new standards and requirements".
SLC Observation # 10: The plaintiffs are not impacted by the ACC's policy in that they have not
submitted any applications to the ACC nor have any activities on their properties been
questioned, noted, cited or denied by the A C C .
1.

Historically, open, summer grazing of cattle qualified members for greenbeit Individuals, not
the Board, were responsible for greenbeit qualification.156 The Board was brought into
discussions regarding greenbeit when the cattle became a nuisance to members by grazing

159

Bylaws of Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association Phase II, INC
Various Documents HCEH, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 11, 2005, Architectural Control Committee Report,
Shane Capaldi and Legal Report, Tony Sarra, Page 56
161
Documentation of the Architectural Control Committee, HCEII Board meeting July 5, 2006, Page 7
1E2
Documentation for the Architectural Control Committee, HCEII Board meeting, August 9,2006, Page 8
163
Documentation for the ACC, email Annette Emmer to Terri Williams dated Saturday July 26, 2008, Page 9
1M
Documentation for the Architectural Control Committee, Letter to HCEII Members, July 28, 2008, Page 12
165
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams Page 27, Line 1198
166
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes 1992, Page 13
160
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on irrigated lawns.1s7

168169

Open, summer, cattle grazing came to an end on June 10,

2008 when members who were on greenbelt were informed by the Salt Lake County
Assessor that their property could no longer be qualified by Lon Burrow's open cattle
grazing.170 171 At the June 14, 2008 Annua! HCEH Meeting, Tom Chace suggested that lot
owners coordinate to fence in combined parcels and obtain animals to qualify for greenbelt
Walt Hoffman moved to form a committee to address greenbelt issues.172 In July of 2008,
Bob Chew brought his horses to HCEH to qualify some properties for greenbelt and there
was positive interaction with the A C C . 1 7 3 Mr. Chew's intent was to keep the horses in HCEH
year round, not just for the summer. In October 2008, Terri Williams verbally reminded Tom
Chace that Bob Chew's horses need to have shelters.174

175

Other members, including

residents, have received similar reminders.176177 178
2.

Year round horse grazing in fenced areas has not historically been used for greenbelt
qualification on an association^wide scale until the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee
introduced Bob Chew and his horses to some properties in H C E H Not all members who
have horses can qualify for greenbelt because their lots are less than five acres in size.
Some people qualify for greenbelt with horses other than Bob Chew's horses. Some people
qualify for greenbelt by other means such as cattle, burros or honeybees.

3.

The Plaintiffs are currently receiving a greenbelt property tax break and they are on the list
of properties submitted to Salt Lake County to be qualified for greenbelt by Bob Chew.179180
Tom Chace has horses on his property for only the summer and the property is fenced, His
fence was approved by the ACC. 1 8 1 None of the three plaintiffs have horses or any indication
of grazing operations on their properties. Their lots are not fenced and there are no shelters,
horse corrals or feeding areas. None of the plaintiffs have submitted applications or requests
to the ACC. Discussions involving A C C control of grazing operations do not appear relevant
to their situation.

1E7

Various Documents HCEH, letter to Board of Directors from Tom Chace, lenell Chace, Nancy McGahey and Dan
McGraw Dated June 18, 2001, Page 50
168
Various Documents HCEH, Letter to David Yocom, Salt lake County Attorney from concerned residents of the
Rose Canyon Area, June 26, 2001, Page 52
1619
Various Documents HCE II, The Salt lake Tribune, Council Delays Cattle Decision in Hopes Residents Will Settle

Tiff, August 2, 2001, Page 54
170
Keith Emmerys Emails, Keith Emmer to Board, Dec. 17,2007, Page 1
171
Various Documents HCEH, letter from Susan Yoshinaga to HCEH, June 10, 2008, Page 73
172
Various Documents HCEH, Annual Meeting Minutes, June 14, 2008, Page 74
173
Documentation for the AC C, email from Terri Williams to the Board, Tuesday, July 29, 2008, Page 13
174
Keith Emrner's Emails, Terri Williams to Keith Emmer, Wednesday October8,2008, Page 18
175
Protective Covenants, Article I, Section 11,
176
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams, Page 30, Line 1373 and 1383
177
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Robert Messrner, He has horses, is not on Greenbelt and received a
letter regarding shelter, Page 51, Line 2335
178
Documentation for ACC, Letters sent to people who have horses without shelter, Jan. 25, 2009, Page 3
179

Salt Lake County Assessor's online records
Documentation for ACC, letterfromthe Greenbelt Committee to the ACC, January 7, 2009, Page 34
181
Documentation for the ACC, Fencing Application- Tom and Lenell Chace, Page 17
180
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4. T o m Chace let Keith Emmer know that there may not be horses on all of the property that
Bob Chew js qualifying. H e also wanted the Board to sign a contract with Bob Chew but
Keith declined the offer.182
c

Mr. Budge stated to the SLC: 'Historically they (the ACC) completely, totally changed all the
rules. The other thing that needs to be voted into the analysis, Mr. Wilson, is you cannot try to
control uses on that, within that subdivision or within the project in a way that doesn't comply
with historic norm for regulating those and that's based out of Utah law."1*3 Mr. Budge feels
that since the County does not require horse shelters the H O A cannot require them. 184
SLC Observation #11: This claim involves a difference tn legal opinions between Howard
Lundgren and Wade Budge. The Board has followed the advice of Howard Lundqren because
he is their legal counsel.
1

Salt Lake County increased land development restrictions when F C O Z was adopted in
1997. t a 5 A comparison of the zone FA2.5 18S (Lots 99,100 and 102 are in this zone),
F C O Z and the H C E II Protective Covenants will show that the HCEH Protective Covenants
are more restrictive because they require setbacks and a minimum floor area for a dwelling.

2

T h e F R 5 zone, where Mr. Atwoocfs lot 98 resides, lists horses as a conditional use subject
to F C O Z review and approval. 187188 If horse grazing is considered "historic norm" then
"historic norm* was not a consideration in the zoning of Mr. Atwood's Jot 98 by Salt Lake

County.
3

The Special Litigation Committee asked the plaintiffs where the documents state that a
Policies and Procedure manual would be forbidden. Wade Budge responded: "It's the other
way, it's not what's forbidden it's what's allowed. In other the words the CC&Rs sets the
baseline on what the board may do by way of regulations. They don't open the gate and
allows us continually expansive readings and the reasons is, is because when you are
someone who is starting a subdivision and there's a lot of case law in this, you set the
standard or the baseline for everyone's expectations based on the initial governing
documents and you cannot then encroach upon those property rights that are maintained by
everyone else by changing your interpretation and expanding your requirements. The
reason being that any time you grant someone the right to regulate your property that grant
is limited to the terms in that specific grant cause it's important that when there is any sort of
question that the rights of the property owners be maintained; an example would be there's
a lot of litigation in Florida about this issue and in Flon'da there are situations whereas
property values would increase, see new owners would come in and try and get new
interpretations of the long standing CC&R's and they would do so cause maybe they were
going to remodel their homes in a way that was inconsistent with the way it had been done
historically and so the courts have come down and said they're not going to allow you to do
something that would constitute substantial change in the way it had been done previously.

W2

Keith Emmer's emails, Keith Emmer to Bob Dean, September 26, 2008, Page 15
Litigation Committee interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,2010 Page 19, Line 874
184
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010 Page 19, Line 882
IBS
Various Documents HCEII, Cal Schneller, March 23, 2010, Page 112
186
Chapter 19.54 FA:2.5, FA-5, FA-10 AND FA-20 FOOTHILL AGRICULTURE ZONES (From Salt Lake County
Government Web Site http://WWW.co.slc.ut.us/}
183

n i

C-1 Chapter 19.12 FR-0.5, FR-1, FR-2.5, FR-5 f FR-10, FR-20, FR-50 A N D FR-100 F O R E S T R Y AND
R E C R E A T I O N Z O N E S (From Salt Lake County Government W e b Site http:/A/WvW.co.slc.ut.us/)
188
C-2 Chapter 19.72 FOOTHILLS AND CANYONS OVERLAY ZONE (FCOZ) {From Salt Lake County Government Web
Site http://WWW.co.sfc.ut.us/)
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The examples would be they were mobile homes and now they are all mansions on a golf
course. They can't now change that particular subdivision in a way that is more restrictive
than it was when it was created." m
The June 12, 2009 demand letter questions the authority of the Policies and Procedures Manual
and states that it is inconsistent with governing documents.
1. As set forth in A of this section, the Bylaws of the organization specifically allow the adoption
of rules and regulations to govern the use of properties under the control of the association.
The ACC justified the level of detail based on the Protective Covenants: "Any animals to be
kept outside shall be housed and managed, based upon a plan for such housing and
management, which shall have had prior Architectural Control Committee Approval"190
2.

No standards for housing and management were included in the Protective Covenants.
"Housing* is interpreted as shelter. "Management" Is interpreted as providing food and water
for grazing animals. The ACC determined that the standards used by the Humane Society
would provide the detail needed to be consistent These standards are referenced in the
Policy and Procedures Manual as worded in C~1 above. 1&1 192

3.

The June 12, 2009 Demand letter cites, Page 9, section 5. Livestock, of the Policies and
Procedures Manual an example and makes the statement "... The Policy attempts to
specify the type and quantity of hay and the type of shelters that must be maintained for
people to enjoy agricultural uses
Unfortunately the Board has sanctioned an effort to
change the nature and general plan of the Association from one where agriculture uses are
allowed and fostered to one where they are discouraged in favor of residential uses. "
SLC Recommendation #3: On Page 11, Clarification of Protective Covenants and Bylaws.
Section 7-f. the documents states "Structure must have County Conditional use approval/
This is covered on Page 8. Section 1 - e. "Compliance with state and county regulation rests
with the owner". Property owners are required to get the proper permits from Salt Lake
County by County ordinance. The ACC should not be accountable for an owner's obtaining
County approval. It is recommended that the Board amend the document so that Page 11.
Chapter 5. Section f. is removed.

Page 9, Section 5. Livestock!183
d.

Animals must be housed and managed
j.
Adequate food end water
1.
Adequate water is defined as access to drinking water at alt times (per Humane
Society
recommendations)
Z
For alt grazing animals where pasture is depleted, adequate food is defined as a minimum of
1.5 pounds of dean hay per 100 lbs per animal daily (per Humane society
recommendations
/L
Adequate
shelter
1.
Z

189

Permanent
Temporary

Shelter
Shelter

Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28,2010 Page 20 Line 915

130

Protective Covenants, Article I, Section 11

191

HCEI1 Architectural ControlCommittee, Policies and Procedures Manual, Page 9

191

Special litigation Committee interviews, Terri Williams, Page 23, Line 1022

193

ACC Policies and Procedures Manual, Page 9
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See clarifications section for additional information
Clarification of Protective Covenants and Bylaws .
(Chapter 5) Clarification of Temporary Shelter for Livestock
a.
Structure must be removable within 48 hours
b. Structure cannot have a permanent foundation
c. A CC will inspect property within seven (7) days after installation of removal of temporary structure to
insure ail stipulations are met
o*. Materials must be durable enough for the length of use and the intended purpose.
e.
Owner and/ or lessee is responsible for maintenance of shelter and must insufc that the structure does
not become a nuisance and or visually offensive
f.

Structure must have County Conditional use approval and this document must be presented for approval
of the shelter to the ACC.

During the winter of 2009 there were a series of complaints from members to the ACC about the
treatment of horses owned by Bob Chew. These complaints included improper housing, neglect,
lack of food, loose horses and a dead horse 195196 Keith Emmer contacted Tom Chace about
these complaints.197
1. Tom Chace, representing the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee,tookresponsibility to
manage lots where Bob Chew's horses grazed. In one case Mr. Chace requested ail
communication to be sent to the Group Greenbelt Committee due to the legal action against
the HCEII HOA and the ACC. 1 9 8 1 " 20° According to Terri Williams, Mr. Miyagi (other than
Tom Chace) was the only member of Group Greenbelt that sent fence plans to the ACC for
approval. 201 It is not clear why Tom Chace, as the committee leader, submitted the fencing
plans for his own property to the ACC but the rest on the Greenbelt Group did not submjt
plans as individuals. The ACC felt that the Property Rights/ Greenbelt Committee wanted
special treatment from the ACC and the County. 2D2
2. Tom Chace stated" The main reason properties are in greenbelt is because the property
cannot be developed. These property owners are far more concerned about buiiding on their
land than maintaining greenbelt.* 2°3

194

ACC Policies and Procedures Manual, Page 11

135

Documentation for the Architectural Control Committee, Feb 2, 2009, note to ACC from Terri Williams, Page 39

196

Special Litigation Committee interviews, Terri Williams, Voice mail left by Animal Control Officer on Terri

Williams phone stating that a horse had to be put down. Page 29, Line 1330
"^Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, March 4, 2009, page 49 & 50
198

Special Litigation Committee interviews, Terri Williams,

199

Documentation for the ACC, Letter to Ms Taylor from the AAC dated November 23,2009, Page AS

200

Documentation for the ACC, Letter from Group Greenbelt Committee to HCEII, December 16, 2009, Page 49

203
202

Page 22, Line 998

Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams, Page 25, Line 1123.
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Terri Williams, Mr. Ely complained that he had to follow FCOZ but Tom

Chace did not, Page 23, line 1009
203

Keith Emmer's emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, January 8,2009, Page 44
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VIL

Greenbelt
Claim: The Board has allowed the creation of policies to deny individuals the benefit of a preferred
property tax benefit known as "greenbelt0 status. A Board member has contacted Salt Lake County
to determine what can be done to disqualify land within the Association from being treated as
greenbelt
SLC Observation #12: No evidence was produced by the plaintiffs that the ACC recommendations
have denied the plaintiffs of qreenbett status or that a Board member has attempted to disqualify
land within the Association of greenbelt. None of the plaintiffs have lost greenbelt status.
A. The majority of the land area in HCEII is on greenbelt204 53% of the voting units and 66% of the
land area are in Greenbelt205 Bob Chew (he is the owner of the horses and he is coordinated by
the Greenbelt Committee) qualifies 30% of the HCEII voting units and 37% of the land for
greenbelt with his horses. 2°e. The remaining 23% of voting units and 29% of the land are
qualified for greenbelt by other means.207
B. "Susan Yoshinaga, Greenbelt Manager for Salt Lake County Assessor's Office, stated that no
one has involuntarily lost greenbelt status in the last two years. 20B Bob Chew qualifies most of
the people in HCEII and none of the people he qualifies are at risk of losing that status. The
HCEII Board has nothing to do with that status. 209
C. In the SLC interview, the plaintiffs were asked what actions were taken by the Board to interfere
with Greenbelt status. They responded that it was the entire Board because they approved the
ACC recommendations. 21°. Tom Chace expressed his frustration with the ACC's involvement
with the fencing that was needed for livestock that qualified members for greenbelt in an email
dated December 9,2008211 Tom Chace stated that Susan Yoshinaga told him that she received
complaints that the land is not suitable for greenbelt and should not have that status. 212The
plaintiffs' Attorney could not identify a Board member that he assumed had contacted Salt Lake
County to disqualify land within the Association from being treated as greenbelt 213

D. In an email dated April 6, 2009f Torn Chace stated "777© greenbelt Property Owners can't
understand why the Board and ACC seem determined to interfere with their greenbelt issues.
They perceive that the goal is to make the HCII parameters of compliance more and more
impossible so that the requirement cannot be met They cannot understand the reasoning
behind the time consuming effort to monitor the horses to "make sure they are in compliance
*" Map, Land Qualified for Greenbelt.
Salt Lake County Assessor's Records (From Salt Lake County Government Web Site
http://WWW.co.slc.ut.us/)
206
Documentation for ACC, Email from Greenbelt Committee to ACC, January 7, 2009, Attachment, Page 35
207
Salt Lake County Assessor's Records(From Salt Lake County Government Web Site
http://WWW.co.slc.utus/)
208
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Wade Budge agreed, Page 21, Line 968
209
Various Documents HCEII, Communication between Susan Yoshinaga and Arlene Johnson, Page 109
210
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, Page 20, Line 951
111
Documentation for ACQ Tom Chace to the ACC, December 9, 2008, Page 27
212
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 6,2009, Page 55
213
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, Page 21, Line 956
205
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and report back to the Assessor" from a governing body that is supposed to be on our side and
didn%t have time to help with keeping us in greenbeft. Susan (Yoshinaga) has told me that the
calls she has received complain that land is not suitable for greenbelt and should not have that

E.

Susan Yoshinaga stated that no Board member has tried to get anyone off greenbelt. For years,
residents in Rose Canyon have complained about roaming livestock from people on greenbelt
This dates back to Tony Mascara 215 216 Susan Yoshinaga \s not aware of any HCEII policies
that were, designed to deny individuals of greenbelt status. 217

F.

The HCEII Board has historically taken a hands-off approach to greenbelt They are not
responsible for greenbelt status impact resulting from decisions made by the State of Utah, Salt
Lake County or the Association Member. 218 219 m **1 m

214

Keith Emmerys Emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 6, 2009, Page 55
Various Documents HCEII, Communication between Susan Yoshinaga and Arlene Johnson, Page 110
216
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Wade Budge could not remember which
Board member had contacted the Assessor about disqualifying greenbelt land, Page 21 Line 956
217
Various Documents HCEII, Communication between Susan Yoshinaga and Arlene Johnson, Page 109
Special Litigation Committee interviews, Keith Emmer, Page 1, Line 42
219
Various Documents HCEII, Annual Meeting Minutes 1992, Bill 45, The Utah Farmland Assessment Act, Page 15
220
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from "The Cow Committee" to the Board of Directors, June 18, 2001. Page 50
Various Documents HCEII, Letter from individuals opposed to open grazing as a way for members to qualify for
greenbelt to Dave Yocorn, SLCo Attorney, June 26, 2001, The person who grazes the cattle (Lon Burrows) has an
agreement with individuals, not HCEII, Page 52
222
Various Documents HCEII, Annual meeting Minutes, June 14,2008, last paragraph, Keith Emmer stated that the
Board never coordinated Greenbelt status. Page 75
225
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VIII. Gate Keys
Claim: The Board has allowed the installation of gates and not provided keys to members within the
Association including the Plaintiffs.
S L C Observation # 13: This should have not been included in the claim in that the plaintiffs and
their attorney knew five months before the claim was filed that the gate had been unlocked.
A.

Two gates were installed on Step Mountain Road. 223 Keys were issued by Tom Williams. Mr.
Atwood was provided keys to both the upper and the lower Step Mountain Gates. Mr. Gilmore
was provided keys to both gates on two occasions. Mr. Frank never requested a key from Tom
Williams. 224 Keith Emmer stated that Brandon Frank came to his house and Mr. Emmer gave
Mr. Frank a key.22S During the time the gates were locked, Mr. Frank was behind on his
assessments and should not have been given a key.226 2 2 7 When he paid his back assessments
of $1,372 on December 2, 2009 for lot 102, the upper gate had been unlocked for five months.228
When the complaint was filed on November 25, 2009, the upper gate had been unlocked for five
months and the plaintiffs' attorney, Wade Budge, had been informed of this by Howard Lundgren
three months before the lawsuit was filed.229

B.

The upper gate is located south of the plaintiffs' property. In the June 2009 Annual Meeting, Scott
Royal, a property owner above the gate, requested that the upper gate be unlocked. It was
unlocked after the 2009 annual meeting and is currently unlocked.

C.

The lower gate is located to the northwest of the plaintiffs' property. It was left locked in order to
discourage ORVs from driving up the steep gully leading to Step Mountain (Step Mountain Road)
No requests from the plaintiffs to unlock this gate are known.

223
22

Map, Status of HCEII Roads
" Various Documents HCEII, Written statement from Tom Williams regarding Step Mountain Gates, March 6,

2010, Page 108
225

Various Documents HCEII, Recollections of statements, Keith Emmer, Page 119
Certificate of Incorporation, Addendum Section IV,
227
Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes, November 24, 2008r Page 118
226

228

HCEII Financial Records
Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Wade Budge from Howard Lundgren, September 1, 2009, Mr. Budge,
Plaintiffs' Attorney, was told the gates were unlocked. Page 92

229
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IX.

2009-10 Budget.
Claim: The Association is operating without a budget

S L C Observation #14: Legal Counsel has advised the Board that they do not need a membership
vote to establish a budget Where an issue results in a conflicting interpretation of the law between
attorneys, the Board's most responsible option is to listen to the opinion of the Attorney they have
hired to represent them.

A.

The plaintiffs questioned the line [tern for legal fees in the 2009-2010 budget presented in the
2009 annual meeting. 230 The plaintiffs attempted to block the budget by proposing a hand vote
at the meeting. 2 3 t They claim that their hand vote represented the majority of the voting units
present at the meeting thus they had the power to approve or deny the passing of the budget

B.

A review of the governing documents has found nothing that states a membership vote is
necessary to pass or adopt a budget. Past annual meetings do not consistently reflect attending
membership votes regarding the budget

C.

Plaintiffs were asked by the Special Litigation Committee to point out in the governing
documents where it states that the association is obligated to get member approval for the
budget Their Attorney, Wade Budge, stated that would be addressed as legal issue; they have
no comment at this time,232.

230
231

Various Documents HCEH, Proposed 2009 -2010 Budget, Page 81
Recording of the 2009 Annual Meeting
Special litigation Committee interviews. Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 2, Line 65
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Resolution
Claim: The Plaintiffs have tried to resolve issues with the HCEH Board.
A.

In the November 2008 monthly meeting there were discussions about the condition of roads
fronting the plaintiffs' properties, the philosophies behind prioritizing road maintenance, County
zoning, sewer, water rights and annexation . 2 3 3 Mr. Atwood threatened to bury the association in
legal fees. 234 Tom Williams stated that after the November 24, 2008 meeting Mr. Atwood stopped
him in the parking lot and marie a statement that "you have not seen anything yet**

B.

The Greenbelt Committee expanded its scope to the Property Rights Committee.235
237 23a 239

Chace also represented the Greenbelt Committee as "Group Greenbelt".

23e

Tom

Tom Chace

provided almost all of the email communication between the Board and the Property Rights
Committee.240 2 4 1 2 4 2 243 He refused to meet with the Special Litigation Committee and it is
unclear what communication he has had with the three plaintiffs.244
C.

In December 2008 Keith Emmer responded to accusations from Tom Chace regarding the Board
being resentful to greenbelt, having no respect for those who cannot build, and generally not
supporting development.

245

Tom and Lenell Chace stated that the Property Rights Committee'

has one simple goal - to do anything we can to make it possible for un-built property to be
developed: ZA*
D. At the March 28, 2009 monthly meeting, the Board presentedinformation regarding development
issues. 247 Tom Chace was complimentary of the effort with the exception that greenbelt issues
were not presented. 248 249
E

The demand letter was written on June 12, 2009.25D Howard Lundgren, the defendants' attorney,
and Wade Budge, the plaintiffs' attorney, exchanged telephone conversations and emails after
the demand letter was received. Howard Lundgren recapped the conversations " As I told you in

233

Various Documents HCEII, Monthly Meeting Minutes, November 24, 2008, Page 118
Various Documents HCEII, Keith Emmerys Recollections, Page 119
235
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, December 7, 2008, email signed "Tom and Lenell Chace The
Property Rights Committee and The Greenbelt Committee" Page 35
236
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, March 31, 2009, Page 52
237
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, April 6, 2009, Page 55
238
Documentation for the ACC, Tom and Lenell Chace to Terri Williams and Rob Dean, December 15, 2008, Page 30
239
Documentation for the ACC, Group Greenbelt Committee to HCEII ACC, December 16,2009, Page 49
240
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, April 27, 2009, Page 77
241
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, April 28, 2009, Page 79
242
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, May 3, 2009, Page 83
243
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, May 4, 2009, Page 96-97
244
Various Documents HCEII, Conversation between Arlene Johnson and Tom Chace, Feb. 10,2010, Page 106
245
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, December 15,2008, Page 39
246
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, January 8,2009, Page 44
147
Electronic Copy of the Power Point presentation is availablefromTony Sarra
24S
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, March 31,2009, Page 53
2<l9
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom & Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, April 6, 2009, Page 55
250
Various Documents HCEH, Claim and Written Demand, June 12, 2009, Page 86
234
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our initial conversation, my letter of July 1,2009, our second conversation in fate July 2009 and
my email of August 6, 2009 the Board of Directors of Hi Country Estates Homeowners
Association Phase I! is ready, willing and able to begin a dialogue with group greenbelt, the
Property Rights Committee and your individual clients regarding the issues raised in your June
12, 2009 fetter and the draft complaint which you provided with your August 19, 2009 letter"2S1
In a letter from Wade Budge to Howard Lundgren dated August 19, 2009, Mr. Budge stated that
his clients wanted concessions to the items brought out in the June 12, 2009 Demand letter. Mr.
Budge stated that his clients were especially interested in roads, greenbelt and bars to
nonresident involvement on Boards252 He attached a copy of a draft complaint * Hi-Country
Property Rights Group, Lindsay Atwood, Tom Chase, Lenell Chace, Jerry Gilmore and Brandon
Frank vs. Hi-Country Estates Homeowner's Association Phase II"253
G. On September 1, 2009 Howard Lundgren responded to Wade Budge and suggested using a
mediator before litigation is filed.

2BA

No meeting with the Attorneys or a mediator was set up.

Instead Tony Sarra met with Tom Chace on September 8, 2009 to discuss the various issues,
H.

In the September 8, 2009 meeting. Tom Chace stated to Tony Sarra that greenbelt was the least
of the Property Rights Committee's concerns. Their interest is in developing their properties.
The priority was to get out from under F C O Z restrictions, getting sewer installed and deal with
roads and water. Further, they want all issues resolved together and are unwilling, to quote,
"salami" these into separate initiatives. At this meeting it became clear for the first time that
greenbelt was not their main concern. Tony told Tom Chace that he did not think the wording of
the June 12, 2009 demand letter was clear and a meeting to clarify thai would be helpful. 25S 25B

I.

On September 10,2009 Howard Lundgren sent Wade Budge a notice that the Board had elected
to form a Special Litigation Committee. He asked Mr. Budge to provide specific bases for
allegations and evidence that the Board has violated its fiduciary duty to the association in
regards to maintaining the roads. 257 That was never received.

J,

Keith Emmer told Tom Chace that the Board is willing to meet with the Property Rights
Committee but legal counsel had advised that Tony Sarra and Arlene Johnson not meet in any
negotiations because they were on the Special Litigation Committee and they must remain
independent from the negotiations. He suggested that if the June 12, 2009 demand letter were
rescinded then it would be possible for the full board to meet with them25a 23*260 Tom Chace sent

251

Various Documents HCEII, Howard Lundgren to Wade Budge, September 1, 2009. Page 92
Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Howard Lundgren from Wade Budge, August 19, 2009, Page 91
253
Keith Emmer's Emails, Draft Complaint, August, 2009, Page 117
254
Various Documents HCEII, Howard Lundgren Letter to Wade Budge, September 1,2009, Page 93, last paragraph
2S5
Keith Emmets emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, October 10,2009, Page 132
256
Recollection by Tony Sarra of a lunch meeting with Tom Chace on September 8,2009,
2S7
Various Documents HCEII, Letter to Wade Budge from Howard Lundgren, September 10, 2009. Page 95
258
Keith Emmerys emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, October 8,2009, Page 133
259
Keith Emmer's emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, October 12,2009, Page 132
Keith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Tom Chace, October 13,2009, Page 134
252
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email to Keith Emmer stating "If the entire Board is not wilting to meet

Then we will proceed

with filing a lawsuit against the HOA and members of the Board individually."251
K.

On October 14, 2009 Keith Emmer, Carole Dean, Kim Wilson, Lindsay Atwood, Tom Chace,
Lenell Chace, Jerry Gilmore and Brandon Frank met The content of the meeting did not relate to
the concerns set forth in the June 12, 2009 demand letter or the draft complaint or Wade Budge's
letter dated August 19, 2009. Lindsay Atwood stated that the threat of a lawsuit would go away if
the Board would support them in convincing the membership to annex to Herriman and bonding
for improvements.

2BZ 253 2 M 26S

In the interview with the Special Litigation Committee, Mr.

Atwood stated that Herriman City had not promised them anything.266 , 267 Tom Chace has
promoted getting out of unincorporated Salt Lake County in order to get out from under FCOZ. 2 6 8
269 270 j^Q p r0 p er ty Rjghts Committee said in a letter to the membership that Herriman would
remove the Salt Lake County Foothills and Canyons Overlay Zone (FCOZ).
L.

271

Tom Chace told Arlene Johnson that after the meeting on October 14, 2009 Tom and Lenell
Chace broke away from the group. Tom and Lenell Chace refused to meet with the Special
Litigation Committee.272

M. On October 23, 2009, one month before the complaint was filed, Lindsay Atwood sent an email to
Keith Emmer stating that he believed the Board had no interest \n settling the lawsuit in that they
had not responded to the requests he made at the October 14, 2009 meeting.273 Keith Emmer
informed Lindsay Atwood that the association's attorney has instructed the board that they must
remain neutral on annexation to Herriman. Keith offered to facilitate a meeting with the
membership where Lindsay's group could present their ideas on annexation

274

Mr. Atwood

forwarded Keith Emmerys offer to set up a meeting on annexation to Wade Budge, Tom Chace,
Brandon Frank and Jerry Gilmore but they did not respond to Keith Emmer's offer.275
N. A meeting was scheduled on November 11, 2009 in Howard Lundgren's office to attempt to
discuss issues. All of the Board was present but the Plaintiffs did not show up. The plaintiffs
Counsel left Mr. Lundgren a voicemail approximately 30 minutes before the scheduled meeting
time to advise that he and the plaintiffs would not be attending the meeting and apologized for his
clients4 "unprofessionalism".
O. The complaint was filed on November 25, 2009.
P.

The plaintiffs met with the Special Litigation Committee on April 28, 2010. Their responses
relative to the complaint are throughout this document.

261

Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, signed Property Rights Litigation Committee, October 12,
2009, Page 134
282
2B2
lKeith Emmer's Emails, Keith Emmer to Howard Lundgren, October 15,2009, Page 135
263.
Various Documents HCEII, email Kim Wilson to Howard Lundgren, Page 97
264
Various Documents HCEII, Keith Emmer's Recollections, Page 119
265
Various Documents HCEII, Letter Property Rights Committee to HCEI1 Property Owners, May 6, 2010, Page 137
266
Special litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 21 Une 974
267
Special Litigation Committee Interviews, Plaintiffs, April 28, 2010, Page 21 Line 974
268
Keith Emmer's emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, June 21, 2008, Page 3
269
Keith Emmer's emails, Tom and Lenell Chace to Keith Emmer, September 22, 2008, Page 13,14
270
Keith Emmer's Emails, Tom Chace to Keith Emmer, October 24, 2008, Page 30, last paragraph
271
Various Documents HCEII, Letter Property Rights Committee to HCEII Property Owners, May 6, 2010, Page 139
272
Various Documents HCEII, Notes from conversation between Tom Chace and Arlene Johnson, Feb. 10, 2010,
Page 106
273
Keith Emmer's Emails, Lindsay Atwood to Keith Emmer, October 23,2009, Page 136
274
Keith Emmer's Emails, Lindsay Atwood from Keith Emmer, October 23,2009, Page 136
275
Keith Emmer's Emails, Lindsay Atwood to Keith Emmer, October 24,2009, Page 137
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XL

1.

Photographs

Plaintiffs' Property from the West Steep section of Step Mountain Road where it bisects Lindsay
Atwood's Property. Photo by SLC

2>

Step Mountain, from the Southwest, Photo by SLC
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3,

Frontage of lot 100 on Step Mountain Road looking northwesterly toward the top of Step Mountain.
4/25/10, Photo by SLC

4.

Lot 99 looking Northwesterly before Road drops in elevation. A small part of road is visible on the left
Top of Step Mountain at the Center. 11/5/06. Photo by Arlene Johnson
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5.

Step Mountain Road 1992-1993. Road had been graded for delivery and installation of water pipe. Photo
by Plaintiffs included in complaint.

6.

Step Mountain Road from Lot 100 frontage looking south 4/25/10. Photo by SLC
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7.

8.

Step Mountain Road Fall 2009. Photo by Plaintiffs included in complaint.

Step Mountain Road at well house. 11/28/09 Photo by Keith Emmer.
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9.

Brandon Frank's frontage, Lots 112 and 122C on Step Mountain Road, 4/25/10 Photo by SLC

10. Carol Dean's Frontage on Step Mountain Road. 4/25/10 Photo by SLC

I L Artene Johnson's frontage on Shaggy Mountain Road, 4/15/10 Photo by SLC
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12. Keith Ernmer's and Tom William's frontage, 14900 S looking west. 4/24/10 Photo by SLC

13.

Tony Sarra's house upper left. Paved portion of Mountain Top Road extends from the square to a point
beyond therightedge of the photograph. 4/24/10 Photo by SLC (Closer views of the asphalt are
contained in the claim)
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